Niall Livingstone

A Commentary on Isocrates' *Busiris*

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A COMMENTARY ON ISOCRATES' *BUSIRIS*

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NIALL LIVINGSTONE

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BY

NIALL LIVINGSTONE

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ABBREVIATIONS AND CONVENTIONS

Works of Isocrates

Aegin. = Aegineticus (XIX)
Antid. = Antidosis (XV)
Archid. = Archidamus (VI)
Areop. = Areopagiticus (VII)
Bus. = Busiris (XI)
Callim. = Against Callimachus (XVIII)
ad Dem. = To Demonicus (I) (ph. not the work of Isocrates)
Euth. = Against Euthynous (XXI)
Evag. = Evagoras (IX)
Helen = Encomium of Helen (X)
Loch. = Against Lochites (XX)
Nic. = Nicocles (III)
ad Nic. = To Nicocles (II)
de Pace = On the Peace (VIII)
Panath. = Panathenaicus (XII)
Paneg. = Panegyricus (IV)
Phil. = Philip (V)
Plat. = Plataicus (XIV)
Soph. = Against the Sophists (XIII)
Trap. = Trapeziticus (XVII)
Zeug. = On the Yoke (XVI)

Isocrates' letters are cited as *Ep. I*, *Ep. II* etc. When titles of speeches are not abbreviated they are cited in English: hence *ad Nic.* but *To Nicocles*, *Zeug.* but *On the Yoke.*

General

AS, *Artium Scriptores* = L. Radermacher (ed.), *Artium scriptores (Reste der voraristotelischen Rhetorik)* (Vienna 1951)
Baiter/Sauppe = *Oratores Attici, recensuerunt adnotaverunt scholia fragmenta indicem nominum addiderunt* Io. Georgius Baiterus *et* Hermannus Sauppius (Zürich 1839–1850)

Benseler/Blass = *Isocratis Orationes, recognovit, praefatus est, indicem nominum addidit* G.E. Benseler. *Editio altera stereotypa curante* F. Blass (Leipzig: Vol. I, 1878; Vol. II, 1879)

Blass = F. Blass, *Die Attische Beredsamkeit* (Leipzig, 2nd ed.: I, 1887; II, 1892; III[1], 1893; III[2], 1898)

D-K = H. Diels, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, revised by W. Kranz (Berlin 1934–1937)

Drerup = *Isocratis Opera Omnia, recensuit, scholiis testimoniis apparatu critico instruxit* E. Drerup (Vol. I only, Leipzig 1906)

FGrH = F. Jacoby (ed.), *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker* (Berlin 1923–1930 and Leiden 1940–1958)

Guthrie = W.K.C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy* (Cambridge 1962–1981)

K-A = R. Kassel and C. Austin (eds.), *Poetae Comici Graeci* (Berlin and New York): Vols. II (Agathenor-Aristonymus), 1991; III.2 (Aristophanes), 1984; IV (Aristophon-Crobylus), 1983; V (Damoxenus-Magnes), 1986; VII (Menecrates-Xenophon), 1989; VIII (Adespota), 1995

Kaibel = G. Kaibel (ed.), *Comicorum Graecorum Fragmenta* I.1 (Berlin 1899)

Kock = T. Kock (ed.), *Comicorum Atticorum Fragmenta* (Leipzig: Vol. I, 1880; Vol. II, 1884)

LIMC = *Lexicon Iconographicum Mythologiae Classicae* (Zurich and Munich 1981–1999)

LSJ = Liddell/Scott/Jones, *Greek Lexicon*

Mathieu/Brémond = G. Mathieu and E. Brémond (eds.), *Isocrate, Discours. Texte établi et traduit*... (Paris: Vol. I, 1929; Vol. II, 1938, Vol. III, 1942; Vol. IV, 1962)

Nauck = A. Nauck (ed.), *Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta* (2nd ed., Leipzig 1889)

PMG = *Poetae Melici Graeci.* In the case of Alcman, Stesichorus and Ibycus, reference is to *Poetarum Melicorum Graecorum Fragmenta. Volumen I...post* D.L. Page *edidit* M. Davies (Oxford 1991); otherwise to D.L. Page (ed.) *Poetae Melici Graeci* (Oxford 1962)

Radt = *Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta* Vol. III (Aeschylus), ed. S. Radt (Göttingen 1984); Vol. IV (Sophocles), ed. S. Radt (Göttingen 1977)

RE = *Paulys Real-Encyclopädie der Altertumswissenschaft*

RG = L. Spengel (ed.), *Rhetores Graeci*, III Vols., Leipzig 1853–1856: references are by volume number and page number (I.1 etc.) or by volume, page and line number (I.1.1 etc.)

Snell = B. Snell (ed.), *Supplementum, continens nova fragmenta Euripidea et adespota apud scriptores veteres reperta* (appended to reprint of Nauck, Hildesheim 1964)

Editions used

Unless otherwise stated, Isocrates' works are cited from Mathieu/Brémond. Works of Alcidamas, Antisthenes and Gorgias are cited from *Artium Scriptores*. When citing other classical authors, my policy has been to use the (most recent) Oxford Classical Text if there is one, otherwise the (most recent) Teubner edition. Apollodorus' *Library* is cited from Frazer's Loeb edition (Harvard 1921). In cases where systems of reference vary widely or are not firmly established, or where the text of the passage cited is problematic, the edition used is identified by the editor's name. Abbreviations for the names and works of classical authors generally follow LSJ.

Cross-references

Cross-references to notes in the Commentary take the form 'see note on [section number + lemma]', e.g. 'see note on § 1 τὴν μὲν ἐπιείκειαν'. In the commentary, when a section number is not given (e.g. 'see note on ἀποκρύψασθαι below'), the lemma referred to is from the same section of the speech as the lemma currently under discussion. Cross-references to parts of the Introduction are given using section numbers in bold type: e.g. 'see Introduction **IV.ii**', or 'see **IV.ii**'.

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INTRODUCTION

I. *What is* Busiris?

The text known as *Busiris* was part of an explosion of published writings on questions of education, persuasive discourse, politics and philosophy in the Greek world, Athens especially, in the first half of the 4th century B.C. Partly for good reasons, and partly by historical accident, this period is best known to modern readers as the age of Plato. Most of the numerous pamphlets, treatises and polemics written by Plato's intellectual competitors have perished, and are known to us only as titles or from scanty fragments. *Busiris* survived because of the renown of its author Isocrates. Isocrates' reputation, both in antiquity and in the modern world, has rested mainly on his great public discourses like the *Panegyricus* and *Panathenaicus*, in which the twin ideals of Greek cultural and political unity and fluid, elaborate Greek prose style find ample expression. In his lifetime, however, Isocrates was at least as much a teacher as a writer, and the surviving corpus of his work includes several compositions which pertain specifically to his educational work: *Busiris*; the *Encomium of Helen*, which is—among other things—an example-speech for learner rhetoricians; and the polemic *Against the Sophists*.

Busiris is a sophisticated advertisement for Isocrates' educational program. It satirises his rivals, and puts forward his own ideas, in a playful and unusual way. Isocrates writes to a rival educator, Polycrates—author of a notorious *Accusation of Socrates*, and used here to represent all that Isocrates opposes in contemporary sophistic teaching of rhetoric. Polycrates has 'praised' a legendary villain, the Egyptian king Busiris, not by denying his crimes (Busiris murdered his guests and—in Polycrates' version—went on to eat them), but by defending them as precedented and therefore acceptable behaviour. Isocrates affects not to realise that this outrageous paradox is a deliberate tour-de-force on Polycrates' part, and treats it instead as mere incompetence. So, after pointing out what Polycrates has got wrong (he has failed to understand that praising people means saying good things about them), he kindly offers to demonstrate how even a villain like Busiris can, in fact, be praised 'correctly'. In the

speech-within-the-speech which follows, he praises Busiris by diverting attention from the traditional story to the country of which Busiris is supposed to have been king: he makes Busiris founder of the Egyptian civilisation, which he depicts as a 'model constitution' in the manner of contemporary Greek political theory. Concluding the work, Isocrates once again addresses Polycrates directly, and takes a new, rather Platonic tack, warning him against poetic myths which blasphemously present the gods' own children (such as Busiris) as villains, and urging him to embrace the serious, morally beneficial rhetoric of which Isocrates himself is the master.

The present work is, to the best of the author's knowledge, the first scholarly commentary on *Busiris* in any language. The introduction deals with the structure, unity and generic properties of the work, and provides background information which will aid understanding: on the career of the addressee Polycrates; on the earlier literary and iconographic tradition for the myth of Busiris; on the Greek fascination with Egypt which underpins Isocrates' sketch of her civilisation; and on relationships between *Busiris* and the work of other contemporary educators such as Plato. In particular, it is argued (**IV.i**) that Isocrates' sketch of Egyptian society is a direct parody of the state constructed in Plato's *Republic*, and his criticism and 'betterment' of Polycrates' speech is shown to display close textual and conceptual parallels with Socrates' treatment of Lysias' speech in the *Phaedrus* (**IV.ii**): parallels which may point to a widespread technique in sophistic teaching. The commentary itself aims to elucidate the text at the levels of language, style, argument and rhetorical technique (the few significant textual variants are also discussed, but since the tradition is basically secure no new examination of manuscripts has been attempted). It seeks to show that the themes and arguments of the work cohere as a unified persuasive strategy, which presents Isocratean education as a practical and honourable option for the Athenian (and pan-Hellenic) elite, a middle way between the unworldly pursuit of abstract truth and amoral sophistic individualism.

The *Busiris* is a key text in defining Isocrates' public role as writer and educator; it is also of great interest for students of the context and reception of the work of Plato; of the sophistic milieu and of the wider intellectual culture of classical Athens; and of the history of literary criticism. At the same time, its modest length, its varied

subject-matter, and above all its variety of stylistic register (by turns polemical, sarcastic, humorous, discursive, and richly epideictic) make it an excellent introduction to Isocrates, as well as to the broadly 'Isocratean' style of much subsequent rhetorical prose. Isocrates remains under-represented in modern scholarship relative to his standing and influence in the ancient world, though interest is growing (see e.g. Ch. Eucken, *Isokrates* (Berlin/New York 1983); S. Usener, *Isokrates, Platon und ihr Publikum* (Tübingen 1994); Y.L. Too, *The Rhetoric of Identity in Isocrates* (Cambridge 1995); T. Poulakos, *Speaking for the Polis: Isocrates' Rhetorical Education* (South Carolina 1997)). This study is meant both for Isocratean specialists and for a wider community of scholars and students with interests in ancient Greek rhetoric, political theory and teaching practice; it also seeks to make *Busiris* accessible as a starting-place for newcomers to Isocrates' oeuvre.

I.i *Isocrates and* Busiris

Isocrates enjoyed a long life (436–338 B.C.), and was, it seems, already in his late forties when he embarked on the career which was to bring him fame and success. Around 390 B.C., he gave up writing speeches for the law-courts and devoted himself to 'philosophy' and 'education' (φιλοσοφία and παιδεία or παίδευσις), activities which for him were virtually synonymous and amounted to a single profession. The essence of this profession was to practise and teach the eloquent use of language for good ends, with a particular focus on πολιτικοὶ λόγοι, speeches (or discourse) addressing problems of government. From this time on Isocrates both taught pupils and produced elaborate written works of his own which illustrate his ideals in politics and in education.

The date of the composition of *Busiris* cannot be fixed (see **III.v** below), but it was probably among the earlier products of Isocrates' new career: possibly close in time to the *Panegyricus*, which established Isocrates' reputation as the supreme practitioner of epideictic oratory. It is a work which has received little attention from modern scholarship. One reason for this neglect is that scholars have found its very existence puzzling: it is felt not to be the sort of thing that Isocrates *ought* to have written. Although in outward form it is a letter to the rhetorician Polycrates, it is easy to think of it—especially because of its title—as being 'essentially' an encomium (i.e.

formal praise) of Busiris.[1] Busiris is a mythological villain. Isocrates elsewhere denies interest in mythological themes, and here characterises the theme as 'unserious'.[2] The *Busiris* itself argues that the exercise of praising those who do not really deserve praise is at best pointless, at worst dangerous. So what is to be made of a work which appears to reject its own theme and denounce itself as frivolous?[3]

There is a simple answer to this question, though it has not always been seen. *Busiris* contains an Encomium of Busiris, but it is not accurate to say that it *is* an Encomium of Busiris. As will be seen, the *Busiris* owes something to several different traditions of rhetorical creation. The encomium is one part of a complex whole; it must be interpreted in relation to the other parts, and with an awareness of the ironic, insinuating tone of the work as a whole. The 'practical criticism' which the work directs both at its own inset Encomium

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[1] Hence its position among the 'encomia' (with *Evagoras, Helen* and *Panathenaicus*) in the traditional ordering of Isocrates' works. Cf. *hypoth.* 44–46 (ὁ Ἰσοκράτης . . . ὑποτίθεται αὐτὸς πῶς ἔδει αὐτὸν γράψαι τὸ ἐγκώμιον. διὸ καὶ ὁ λόγος οὗτος τῶν τεσσάρων ἐγκωμίων ἐστιν): the hypothesis-writer is evidently aware of a need to explain in what sense *Busiris* is an encomium. On the status of the work as a letter, see **I.ii** below.

[2] Cf. *Panath.* 1 προῃρούμην γράφειν τῶν λόγων οὐ τοὺς μυθώδεις, *Bus.* 9 καίπερ οὐ σπουδαίαν οὖσαν. S. Usher (Usher 1973 p. 50, with n. 79) is not quite right in saying that in *Busiris* Isocrates 'denies that legendary material is worthy to be treated in a dignified style': what is denied is the potential for serious treatment of *this particular* legendary theme. See also Papillon 1996a, arguing that Isocrates makes a distinction between μῦθος, which can have practical usefulness (as in *Bus.*), and λόγος μυθώδης, which does not.

[3] Critics whose foregrounding of the Busiris-encomium has led to dismissive judgements of the work include Mathieu, Van Hook, Flacelière, Usher and Kennedy. Mathieu emphasises its triviality ('Isocrate ne s'est fait nulle illusion sur la puerilité de son sujet'), and seems to regard it as a piece written simply to put Polycrates in the shade, a πάρεργον soon forgotten by its author as he went on to higher things (Mathieu/Brémond I.183–4). Similarly Flacelière criticises the self-satisfied tone of the Prologue, which he sees as ill-justified by 'la valeur plutôt médiocre de cet ouvrage sur un sujet qu' Isocrate, tout le premier d' ailleurs, ne jugeait pas très sérieux' (Flacelière 1961 p. 54; cf. Van Hook 1945 p. 101). Usher describes *Busiris* as a rhetorical exercise which demonstrates the epideictic technique while simultaneously emphasising its lack of seriousness (Usher 1973 p. 50; cf. Usher 1994 p. 143); elsewhere he calls it a rhetorical exercise on the subject of ideal leadership (Usher 1990 p. 117), but he does not suggest why the praise of a notorious villain should be considered fit material for either type of demonstration. For Kennedy, *Busiris* is 'primarily an example of how to develop the topics of an encomium' (Kennedy 1963 p. 180): again it is left unclear what reason there might be for giving such a limited and offbeat example. Kennedy does, however, point a way forward by conceding that a 'serious idea' may underlie the work in spite of its bizarre subject (*ibid.* p. 181).

and at the antecedent works of Polycrates is among its most interesting features.

Thus the legendary king Busiris is only one thread in the work which bears his name. Others include the character and work of the rhetorician Polycrates, who is the recipient, or rather the butt, of this rhetorical 'gift'; the moral grounding of rhetoric and the question of rhetorical standards; Athenian imaginings of Egyptian civilisation, perceived as radically 'other', simultaneously contemptible and awe-inspiring; and the moral and political ideas of rhetoric's greatest critic, Plato. These threads, and the relationships between them, will be examined below.

I.ii *Writing to Polycrates*

The surviving Isocratean corpus consists of twenty-one 'discourses' (λόγοι) and nine letters (ἐπιστολαί). *Busiris* identifies itself as a written communication sent in private to Polycrates (cf. § 2 σοὶ μὲν ἐπιστεῖλαι, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἄλλους . . . ἀποκρύψασθαι). Why, then, is it conventionally included among the discourses, not among the letters?

There are several answers to this question. One is given by the ancient editor who wrote the introductory *hypothesis* (quoted in n. 1 above): because *Busiris* contained an encomium, it was classified among Isocrates' encomia. Another is that *Busiris* would be rather out of place in the collection of letters, all of which are addressed to foreign potentates (Dionysius of Syracuse, Philip of Macedon, the governing magistrates of Mytilene and others) and display Isocrates in his role as tutor to the great and chief advocate of a Panhellenic political ideal. A third is its length: in *Letter II* (*To Philip*), after what amounts to three-and-a-half pages of modern printed text (in the Budé edition), Isocrates observes that he has let himself be carried beyond the proportions of a letter and into the expansiveness of a λόγος, and duly draws to a close after another two-and-a-half pages; *Busiris* runs to more than twelve pages.[4] This may lead us to identify

[4] *Ep. II* 13 φοβοῦμαι τὴν ἀκαιρίαν· καὶ γὰρ νῦν κατὰ μικρὸν προϊὼν ἔλαθον ἐμαυτὸν οὐκ εἰς ἐπιστολῆς συμμετρίαν, ἀλλ' εἰς λόγου μῆκος ἐξοκείλας. Cf. Demetrius *On Style* 228 τὸ δὲ μέγεθος συνεστάλθω τῆς ἐπιστολῆς . . . αἱ δὲ ἄγαν μακραὶ . . . οὐ μὰ τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐπιστολαὶ γένοιντο ἄν, ἀλλὰ συγγράμματα τὸ χαίρειν ἔχοντα προσγεγραμμένον. *Ep. II* is indeed, jointly with *Ep. IX*, the longest of the nine letters in the Isocratean corpus, but the situation is complicated by the fact that several (including *Ep. IX*) are conspicuously incomplete, and would be significantly longer if they went on to

it more with the other longer discourses addressed to an individual (*To Nicocles, Evagoras, Philip*) than with the *Letters*.

The work does, however, have some clear epistolary features. In the opening sentences, Isocrates refers to what he is doing as ἐπιστέλλειν (§ 2 σοὶ μὲν ἐπιστεῖλαι), which elsewhere in his work generally refers to sending a letter.[5] This is presented as a second-best, interim substitute for a direct face-to-face encounter. Demetrius *On Style* credits a certain Artemon (perhaps the second-century B.C. grammarian of that name) with the observation that a letter is 'half of a conversation' (§ 223 εἶναι γὰρ τὴν ἐπιστολὴν οἷον το ἕτερον μέρος τοῦ διαλόγου: notice the use of the verb διαλέγεσθαι in the Isocratean passages cited below), and it becomes an epistolary commonplace that writing is a second-best alternative to oral communication: cf. 'Demetrius' τύποι ἐπιστολικοί p. 5 lines 9–11 Weichert ἐπεὶ μὴ παρὼν τετύχηκα παρακαλεῖν σε, δι' ἐπιστολῆς ἔκρινα τοῦτο ποιῆσαι.

The whole of the relevant passage of *Busiris* may be compared with the fuller treatment of the same topics in the opening of *Letter I* (*To Dionysius*):

> ἥδιστα μὲν ἄν σοι περὶ ὅλης ἐπαρρησιασάμην τῆς παιδεύσεως . . . ἐπειδὴ δ' οὔπω περιτετυχήκαμεν ἀλλήλοις, περὶ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων, ἥν ποτ' εἰς ταὐτὸν ἔλθωμεν, τόθ' ἡμὶν ἐξέσται διὰ πλειόνων ποιήσασθαι τὴν συνουσίαν, ἃ δ' ἐν τῷ παρόντι δυναίμην ἂν εὐεργετῆσαί σε, ταῦτα δ' ᾠήθην χρῆναι σοὶ μὲν ἐπιστεῖλαι, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἄλλους ὡς οἷόν τε μάλιστ' ἀποκρύψασθαι (*Bus.* 1–2).

> εἰ μὲν νεώτερος ἦν, οὐκ ἂν ἐπιστολὴν ἔπεμπον, ἀλλ' αὐτὸς ἄν σοι πλεύσας ἐνταῦθα διελέχθην· ἐπειδὴ δ' οὐ κατὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους ὅ τε τῆς ἡλικίας τῆς ἐμῆς καιρὸς καὶ τῶν σῶν πραγμάτων συμβέβηκεν . . . ὡς οἷόν τ' ἐστὶν ἐκ τῶν παρόντων, οὕτω σοι πειράσομαι δηλῶσαι περὶ αὐτῶν. (2) οἶδα μὲν οὖν ὅτι τοῖς συμβουλεύειν ἐπιχειροῦσιν πολὺ διαφέρει μὴ διὰ γραμμάτων ποιεῖσθαι τὴν συνουσίαν ἀλλ' αὐτοὺς πλησιάσαντας, οὐ μόνον ὅτι περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν πραγμάτων ῥᾷον ἄν τις παρὼν πρὸς παρόντα φράσειεν ἢ δι' ἐπιστολῆς δηλώσειεν, οὐδ' ὅτι πάντες τοῖς λεγομένοις μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς γεγραμμένοις πιστεύουσιν, καὶ τῶν μὲν ὡς εἰσηγημάτων, τῶν δ' ὡς ποιημάτων ποιοῦνται

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fulfil what the extant portions promise. There are, of course, examples of much longer letters from the classical period, most notably *Letter VII* in the Platonic corpus.

[5] Cf. Eucken 1983 p. 134 n. 47. Note, however, § 34 τὸν ἐμὸν λόγον (referring to Isoc.'s treatment of Busiris). At *Phil.* 81 the expression ἅπερ ἐπέστειλα <u>καὶ</u> πρὸς Διονύσιον τὴν τυραννίδα κτησάμενον perhaps suggests that no fundamental generic distinction is made between the long discourse *Philip* itself and the Letter to Dionysius, *Ep. I*, to which these words refer.

> τὴν ἀκρόασιν· (3) ἔτι δὲ πρὸς τούτοις ἐν μὲν ταῖς συνουσίαις, ἤν ἀγνοηθῇ τι τῶν λεγομένων ἢ μὴ πιστευθῇ, παρὼν ὁ τὸν λόγον διεξιὼν ἀμφοτέροις τούτοις ἐπήμυνεν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἐπιστελλομένοις καὶ γεγραμμένοις, ἤν τι συμβῇ τοιοῦτον, οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ διορθώσων· ἀπόντος γὰρ τοῦ γράψαντος ἔρημα τοῦ βοηθήσοντός ἐστιν (*Ep. I* 1–3).

Compare also *Ep. VII* 10, where, as in *Busiris*, further advice is promised at some unspecified time in the future (although the reason for putting it off is not the written medium itself, but the importance of speed): ἔτι δ' ἂν πλείω σοι περὶ τούτων διελέχθην . . . εἰ μὴ παντάπασιν ἔδει με διὰ ταχέων γράψαι σοι τὴν ἐπιστολήν. νῦν δὲ σοὶ μὲν αὖθις συμβουλεύσομεν . . . ἐν δὲ τῷ παρόντι περὶ τῶν ἰδίων δηλώσομεν. This idea is a variant on the τόπος in *captatio benevolentiae* where the speaker enumerates factors which may prevent her or him from doing justice to the theme in hand: cf. e.g. *ad Nic.* 7 (the shortfall between the work as conceived in the writer's imagination and the work as seen by the public), *Phil.* 24–8.

That the written word is a poor substitute for 'live' communication is the theme of the discourse *On the Sophists* by Isocrates' contemporary Alcidamas, whose advocacy of improvisation as opposed to written composition is developed by Plato in the *Phaedrus* into a more fundamental critique of writing (*Ep. I* 3 is probably influenced by *Phaedrus*: cf. esp. *Phaedrus* 275e (the written λόγος) τοῦ πατρὸς ἀεὶ δεῖται βοηθοῦ· αὐτὸς γὰρ οὔτ' ἀμύνασθαι οὔτε βοηθῆσαι δυνατὸς αὑτῷ). Isocrates' 'apologies' for communicating in writing, in *Busiris* and in the two Letters cited, attest to the influence of the attack on the written word; they also develop a distinctively Isocratean line of response. Alcidamas depicts writing as slow and laborious, and therefore stale: unable to respond smartly to changing circumstances (see e.g. *On the Sophists* 10 ὅταν γὰρ νουθετῆσαι δέῃ τοὺς ἁμαρτάνοντας . . . τηνικαῦθ' ἡ τοῦ λέγειν δύναμις τῇ χρείᾳ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐπικουρεῖν οἵα τ' ἐστίν· ἡ δὲ γραφὴ σχολῆς δεῖται . . .). But a letter sent to someone far away or outside one's circle provides quicker, more timely advice than would be possible if it were necessary to wait for a face-to-face encounter. The idea is developed further at *Philip* 25–9.[6] There, Isocrates acknowledges the advantages of being able to deliver what one has to say in person (not through the medium of writing), but

[6] *Phil.* 29, τὰς . . . δυσχερείας τὰς περὶ τοὺς σοφιστὰς καὶ τοὺς ἀναγιγνωσκομένους τῶν λόγων, may well be an echo of what has been transmitted as the title of Alcidamas' discourse, κατὰ τῶν τοὺς γραπτοὺς λόγους γραφόντων ἢ περὶ σοφιστῶν.

his inference from this is that written composition is harder than improvisation—not easier, as Alcidamas claims. Moreover, sophistications of oral delivery (like ornaments of style, of which Isocrates is no longer capable because of his age) tend to obscure what is really at issue (αὐτὰς τὰς πράξεις), whereas this written speech will present it ἁπλῶς. (For a full discussion of parallels between *Phil.* 25 ff. and Alcidamas' speech, see Wersdörfer 1940 pp. 72–5.) Similarly in *Busiris* 1–2 Isocrates indicates that writing has a value which its critics have not considered: far from inevitably being slow and artificial, it is often the most practical and efficient means of communication. Another advantage, though an ambivalent one,[7] is ironically hinted by ἀποκρύψασθαι in § 2 (see Commentary *ad loc.*): what one says to someone in writing can be made available for others to read and evaluate as well.

Thus the rhetoric of the opening of *Busiris* identifies it to some extent as a letter, and at the same time locates it in a debate on the uses of writing. On the other hand, *Busiris* is formally more ambitious than the letters, not least in virtue of its included λόγος about Busiris. In the next section, it will be shown how the work exploits other literary forms besides the epistolary.

I.iii Busiris *and the Emerging Genres of Rhetoric*

It is not clear when rhetoric was first systematised in the form of 'handbooks' such as the surviving fourth-century work known as the *Rhetoric to Alexander.* Early teaching may have been largely by example: a teacher might distribute finished speeches or pieces illustrating specific techniques (proems, arguments from probability, appeals to pity etc.); the pupil could imitate these or, in the latter case, simply re-use them with minor adaptations.[8] Only with the emergence of structured treatises, aiming to describe all the major public uses of eloquence, does a stable classification of types of speech become

[7] Cf. Plato *Phaedrus* 275de, where dissemination is treated as inevitable (and dangerous): ὅταν δὲ ἅπαξ γραφῇ, κυλινδεῖται μὲν πανταχοῦ πᾶς λόγος ὁμοίως παρὰ τοῖς ἐπαΐουσιν, ὡς δ' αὔτως παρ' οἷς οὐδὲν προσήκει, καὶ οὐκ ἐπίσταται λέγειν οἷς δεῖ γε καὶ μή.

[8] See Cole 1991, esp. chapters V–VII. Cole provides an interesting discussion of other forms which early τέχνη may have taken, but perhaps goes too far towards denying the existence of any sytematic theory. See Russell 1992; Fortenbaugh 1993 (esp. p. 387); Schenkeveld 1992 (pp. 390 f., on Cole's neglect of *Rhet. ad Alex.*); Kennedy 1994 pp. 30–35 (esp. p. 33 n. 5).

important. It is inevitable, then, that discussions of genre in early rhetoric take as their starting point the first surviving examples of such treatises—Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and the *Rhetoric to Alexander*—even though they represent a slightly later stage of development.

These works agree on the division of rhetoric into three categories, which remain standard thereafter: symbouleutic (deliberative), dicanic (forensic), and epideictic.[9] Each category is sub-divided: symbouleutic into protreptic and apotreptic, dicanic into prosecution and defence (plus 'inquiry', ἐξεταστικόν, in *Rhet. ad Alex.*), and epideictic into praise and blame or dispraise (ψόγος). The first two, the 'practical' genres of symbouleutic and dicanic, are easy to recognise, founded as they are on the everyday business of assembly and law-court. Epideictic is more complicated; here the analysis into 'praise' and 'blame' is perhaps as much as anything a product of the urge for theoretical tidiness, since the potential range of 'non-practical', display oratory is in fact much wider.[10] In practice the term is often used to describe any rhetorical work whose aim is to demonstrate the author's skill rather than to influence an immediate decision, even if it does not fit into the categories of praise and blame.[11] Clear examples of epideictic praise are the speeches delivered at great civic or pan-Hellenic occasions—funeral orations and festival speeches; it also includes sophistic παίγνια such as Gorgias' *Helen* and the light-hearted encomia attributed to Polycrates. Examples of epideictic 'blame' are harder to find, unless one turns to imaginary sophistic 'prosecutions':[12] but, as will be seen, Isocrates insists on the difference between 'defence' and 'praise' (*Helen* 14), and we might expect a corresponding distinction between 'prosecution' and 'blame'.

This whole classification is not on first impression particularly helpful when dealing with the work of Isocrates.[13] Of his major pedagogical

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[9] *Rhet.* 1358a36–b20, *Rhet. ad Alex.* 1421b7–20.

[10] For accounts of epideictic see Buchheit 1960, Kennedy 1963 pp. 152–173, Russell and Wilson 1981 pp. xi–xxxiv (esp. xiii–xv and xviii–xxii).

[11] One example is the type of speech exemplified by Gorgias' *Palamedes*, Alcidamas' *Odysseus*, and the *Odysseus* and *Ajax* of Antisthenes, where a dispute in the legendary world of the heroes is imagined as a formal exchange of speeches before court or assembly. Such speeches are outwardly dicanic or symbouleutic in form, but their purpose allies them more with epideictic. For a discussion of the world of myth as a setting for generalised illustration of technique, see Innes 1991 pp. 228–230.

[12] Such as Alcidamas' *Odysseus* (or *Against Palamedes*) and Polycrates' Κατηγορία Σωκράτους: see last note, and **II** below for discussion of Polycrates' speech.

[13] On the challenge to generic description posed by Isocrates' oeuvre, see also Usener 1994 pp. 20–46 and Too 1995 pp. 10–35.

works,[14] some can be fitted—with varying degrees of simplification or distortion—into the handbook categories: *Archidamus, Plataicus, On the Peace* as symbouleutic; *Antidosis* as dicanic; *Nicocles, Panegyricus, Panathenaicus* as epideictic praise. Others, including *Busiris*, resist such classification. There are also grounds on which one might assign *all* these works to the epideictic category: they are composed for written dissemination, not for live delivery at a unique moment of decision;[15] any court or assembly situations they envisage are fictitious; and they sometimes seem designed to advertise Isocrates' educational programme, or his moral and political stance, rather than to sway the audience's mind on a particular issue.[16] Isocrates himself does not make many pronouncements about categories of rhetorical production; his interest is mainly in asserting the difference between his own work and everyone else's, and he tends to appeal to criteria of style, subject-matter and moral purpose rather than of form or occasion.[17]

Thus genre in general, and the traditional rhetorical genres as defined by Aristotle in particular, are awkward tools for interpreting the writings of Isocrates. But there are two respects in which the standard generic scheme is an important background for the *Busiris*. Firstly, this work, while it does not fit into any one category, contains elements of several: praise (the Encomium of Busiris), defence (refutation of charges against Busiris), apotreptic (urging Polycrates to abandon his present course) and protreptic (urging him to adopt a new one).[18] It will also be suggested that the work as a whole can

[14] This formulation is intended to signal that certain works of Isocrates have been set on one side: both his 'logographic' output—i.e. *Euth., Callim., Loch., Zeug., Trap., Aegin.* (speeches apparently written for a client to use in court), all of which probably date from before he embarked in earnest on his pedagogical career—and the nine *Letters*. It is not implied that these works are unimportant or unconnected with the rest of the oeuvre; they form distinct groups and pose different problems.

[15] Of course it is highly uncertain how the written versions of dicanic and symbouleutic speeches, such as those of Lysias or Demosthenes, relate to what really took place in court or assembly, and in some cases there may be no direct relationship at all: but it remains true that such speeches presuppose a unique real occasion of delivery, whereas even when Isocrates' speeches sketch a 'real-life' setting for themselves, the fictionality of the setting is made very clear.

[16] The speeches themselves, however, tend to insist on their practical purpose, and express hostility to the idea of ἐπίδειξις: see note on § 44 οὐ γὰρ ἐπίδειξιν . . .

[17] For collective characterisation of Isocrates' own λόγοι, see *Antid.* 45–50, *Panath.* 272, *Paneg.* 4. See also Livingstone 1998 pp. 269–72.

[18] A protreptic aim is implicit in all serious encomium, insofar as it commends an example for others to follow. This is made explicit in *Evagoras* (§ 74–81): note especially § 77 τοὺς μὲν γὰρ ἄλλους προτρέπομεν ἐπὶ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ἑτέρους ἐπαινοῦντες,

be seen in terms of the stereotypical four-part structure of a dicanic speech: there is a Proem and an Epilogue; the Encomium of Busiris represents the Narrative, and the Defence of Busiris functions as Proof. Secondly, *Busiris* reflects, and perhaps has a role in establishing, one generic distinction which Isocrates does regard as important.

This is the distinction, mentioned above, between praise and defence. At *Helen* 14–15, Isocrates commends Gorgias' *Helen* for its choice of subject, but criticises one 'small inadvertence': the author, Isocrates objects, claims to have written an encomium, when in fact he has presented a defence.[19] It is easy to see what is meant by this criticism. Gorgias' *Helen* describes itself as an ἔπαινος (§ 1) and as an ἐγκώμιον (§ 21), and the treatment of Helen begins with what is to become standard encomiastic material (genealogy, and the individual's

ἵνα ζηλοῦντες τοὺς εὐλογουμένους τῶν αὐτῶν ἐκείνοις ἐπιθυμῶσιν, ἐγὼ δὲ σὲ καὶ τοὺς σοὺς οὐκ ἀλλοτρίοις παραδείγμασι χρώμενος ἀλλ' οἰκείοις παρακαλῶ, καὶ συμβουλεύω προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν, ὅπως καὶ λέγειν καὶ πράττειν μηδενὸς ἧττον δυνήσει τῶν Ἑλλήνων (see also Sykutris 1927 pp. 35 f.). *Busiris* is, of course, a special case, because it is the method, not the subject, of the encomium that is exemplary.

[19] διὸ καὶ τὸν γράψαντα περὶ τῆς Ἑλένης ἐπαινῶ μάλιστα τῶν εὖ λέγειν τι βουληθέντων, ὅτι περὶ τοιαύτης ἐμνήσθη γυναικός . . . οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτον μικρόν τι παρέλαθεν· φησὶ μὲν γὰρ ἐγκώμιον γεγραφέναι περὶ αὐτῆς, τυγχάνει δ' ἀπολογίαν εἰρηκὼς ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐκείνῃ πεπραγμένων. (15) ἔστιν δ' οὐκ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν ἰδεῶν οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν †ἔργων ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ πᾶν τοὐναντίον· ἀπολογεῖσθαι μὲν γὰρ προσήκει περὶ τῶν ἀδικεῖν αἰτίαν ἐχόντων, ἐπαινεῖν δὲ τοὺς ἐπ' ἀγαθῷ τινι διαφέροντας (ἔργων del. Blass). The identification of τὸν γράψαντα here as Gorgias is rejected by Brémond (Mathieu/Brémond I.158–9). He argues that when Gorgias has been criticised by name for his περὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος (Isoc. *Helen* 3), it is unnatural that he should then be allusively commended for his *Helen* (Isoc. *Helen* 14) without any acknowledgement of this contrast; and that the phrase τὸν γράψαντα περὶ τῆς Ἑλένης, which directly follows a discussion of contemporary writers, must refer to a work of recent publication. But there is a definite break between the general argument against paradoxical subjects in § 8–13 and the focus on this particular speech (note διὸ καὶ τὸν γράψαντα), where none of the words used implies that a recent work is in question. Perhaps Gorgias' name is omitted here expressly to avoid an irrelevant and distracting 'cross-reference': Isocrates does not wish to associate the *Helen* with the περὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος (which he links, not with rhetorical παίγνια, but with Zeno and Melissus, as an example of paradoxical Eleatic philosophy). Moreover the perfect infinitive in φησὶ μὲν γὰρ ἐγκώμιον γεγραφέναι (§ 14: 'he says that he *has* written an encomium . . .') looks like a verbal reminiscence of the fact that it is indeed at the end of his work that Gorgias gives it this name, in his famous closing words ἐβουλήθην γράψαι τὸν λόγον Ἑλένης μὲν ἐγκώμιον, ἐμὸν δὲ παίγνιον. (Contrast the aorist at *Bus.* 5 ἀπολογήσασθαι φάσκων). Gorgias' *Helen* was probably well known, and it seems unlikely that another writer on the same theme would have followed him not only in presenting a defence as an encomium, but also in waiting to the end of the work to identify it as an encomium. For a defence of the coherence of Isocrates' treatment of Gorgias here, see Papillon 1996b p. 384, and for a detailed reading of Isocrates' *Helen* in relation to Gorgias', Papillon 1997.

most outstanding positive attribute—in this case, beauty);[20] but in § 4–5 there is a swift transtion to what is identified as the beginning of the speech proper (ἀρχὴ τοῦ μέλλοντος λόγου), namely the demonstration that Helen's flight to Troy was εἰκός. This achieves the object set out in the proem of refuting those who blame her for it (ἐλέγξαι τοὺς μεμφομένους Ἑλένην). The proof uses a type of argument obviously appropriate for—and widely used in—legal defence: a formal (and professedly exhaustive) 'division' of the possible explanations of what happened, followed by systematic demonstration that, on each hypothesis in turn, the accused is innocent.

Isocrates' treatment of Polycrates' *Busiris* indicates that it, too, alternated or wavered between praise and defence, and that Polycrates failed to distinguish the two procedures. Isocrates does not make this an explicit ground of criticism: to do so would be to obscure the main charge, that Polycrates never satisfied the requirements of *either* form. He 'corrects' the error by supplying both praise and defence in his own exemplary treatment of the Busiris theme, but keeping the two separate and using a distinct style and method in each. He underlines the double nature of the demonstration (§ 9 and § 44 καὶ τὸν ἔπαινον καὶ τὴν ἀπολογίαν); it is perhaps surprising that the transition from one to the other (§ 29 to § 30) is not explicitly announced, but it is marked unmistakeably by the change of tone and by the reappearance of Polycrates as direct addressee. Where Gorgias was commended for his choice of theme but criticised on formal grounds, Polycrates is shown to have failed in both respects.[21]

In both *Helen* and *Busiris* Isocrates insists on a 'pure' genre of Encomium: a rhetorical form in which good qualities and acts are attributed to the subject, where these good attributes are amplified, and where nothing bad has any place at all—not even to be denied or refuted. This pure Encomium is exemplified in *Helen*, in *Busiris* 10–29, and in *Evagoras*. Encomium assumes a consensus of admiration for its subjects, and seeks to increase that admiration. Defence,

[20] On the order of topics in encomia, see note on § 10–29; on genealogy as the first topic, see note on § 10 εὐγενείας. Beauty is the first heading in Agathon's Encomium of Love in the *Symposium* (195a–196b).

[21] That *Busiris* embodies a critique on grounds of form as well as theme is well argued by Buchheit, who stresses the importance of *Helen* and *Busiris* in articulating Encomium as a distinct genre and thereby preparing the ground for *Evagoras* (Buchheit 1960, esp. pp. 45–53).

by contrast, inevitably concedes the existence of negative opinions, however unjustified, about the person or thing defended.[22]

Isocrates' criticism of Gorgias and Polycrates for confusing praise with defence may seem like pedantry—pointing out an obvious but unimportant imprecision in the way their works were described. In fact, it is characteristic of Isocrates to present his own judgements about rhetoric as almost too obvious to be worth stating, matters of common knowledge or common sense:[23] this is a variant on the artful speaker's perennial claim to lack art and so, by implication, guile. In *Busiris*, the terms ἔπαινος/ἐγκώμιον and ἀπολογία are not discussed or defined, and at *Helen* 15 the distinction between ἐγκώμιον and ἀπολογία is treated as self-evident. But more is at stake than is at first apparent. The mixing of praise and defence criticised by Isocrates is not a product of mere accident or inadvertence: it is a natural, if not inevitable, consequence of the choice of a paradoxical theme.[24] A speech which sets out to praise παρὰ δόξαν is under strong pressure to engage with the prevailing δόξα: to refute the existing negative opinions about its subject. Paradox seems, as Isocrates complains at *Helen* 8–13, to have dominated the field of sophistic display-encomium (as opposed to 'real' civic encomia such as funeral speeches)—whether because of its possibilities for entertaining virtuosity, or because it was a way to avoid direct comparison with poetry, long the vehicle of true encomium.[25] *Helen* and *Busiris* illustrate how a resolute adherence to pure encomium, as opposed to defence, will tend to nullify any paradoxical quality a subject may have. They point the way for rhetoricians to display and exercise their skill in genuine encomia, resembling the earlier sophistic encomia in being composed for written circulation and in focusing on a single individual, yet sharing the seriousness and dignity of the great civic encomia. They thus prepare the way for the *Evagoras*, which claims to break new ground as a prose encomium of a contemporary figure.[26]

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[22] Cf. *Helen* 15 ἀπολογεῖσθαι μὲν γὰρ προσήκει περὶ τῶν ἀδικεῖν αἰτίαν ἐχόντων, ἐπαινεῖν δὲ τοὺς ἐπ' ἀγαθῷ τινι διαφέροντας.

[23] Cf. *Bus.* 4 ἁπάντων γὰρ εἰδότων . . ., and note *ad loc.*

[24] On the genre of rhetoric embracing paradoxical and insignificant themes (παράδοξα and ἄδοξα), see Pease 1926. The theme of Gorgias' *Helen* is one which can easily be either paradoxical or non-paradoxical, because of the sharply divergent images of its heroine in literary tradition; Polycrates' *Busiris* is a more extreme example.

[25] I am grateful to Professor D.A. Russell for this point.

[26] See *Evag.* 5–11; on the significance of the *Evagoras*, Momigliano 1971 pp. 49 ff.

I.iv *Structure and Argument*

Busiris has four main parts, which I will refer to as the Prologue (§ 1–9: the offer of help to Polycrates and critique of his work), Encomium (§ 10–29: Isocrates' demonstration of how one might praise Busiris), Defence (§ 30–43: Isocrates shows how one might defend Busiris, and contrasts his own account with Polycrates') and Epilogue (§ 44–50: summary of the faults and dangers of Polycrates' *Busiris*, and final words of advice).

As has been suggested (p. 4), the traditional title *Busiris* is potentially misleading: the work is not primarily about Busiris, just as it is not primarily an encomium, or indeed an example of mythological epideictic. Even so, one way in which its form must be understood is against the background of a tradition of mythological epideictic.

Prologue and Epilogue are closely connected. They form a frame around the treatment of Busiris; more precisely, they define the argument into which the treatment of Busiris is inset, and to which it is largely subordinated.

This frame of theoretical argument surrounding a treatment of a mythological theme can be seen as a radical extension of the remarks which a sophist might make at the beginning of an ἐπίδειξις (the προλαλιά of later declamation)[27] and perhaps at the end, telling the audience (or readers) what to expect and guiding their response. Examples can be found in the surviving written pieces. Thus in Gorgias' *Helen* the mythological encomium has surrounding sections which do not address the theme itself, but explain how and why the work has been written. Gorgias' speech has a symmetrical structure in which this 'outer frame' occupies the first and last sections; the second and penultimate sections form an 'inner frame' of proem and conclusion to the Helen-theme itself.[28]

This procedure of introducing and concluding a speech with theoretical observations is parodied in the Encomium of Love spoken by Agathon in Plato's *Symposium*, where it appears as a mark of the

[27] See Russell 1983 pp. 77–79.

[28] Thus § 1 χρὴ τὸ μὲν ἄξιον ἐπαίνου ἐπαίνῳ τιμᾶν is recalled by § 21 ἀφεῖλον τῷ λόγῳ δύσκλειαν γυναικός, ἐνέμεινα τῷ νόμῳ ὃν ἐθέμην ἐν ἀρχῇ τοῦ λόγου, while § 2 τὴν μὲν . . . παῦσαι τῆς αἰτίας, τοὺς δὲ μεμφομένους ψευδομένους ἐπιδεῖξαι is picked up by § 20 πῶς οὖν χρὴ δίκαιον ἡγήσασθαι τὸν τῆς Ἑλένης μῶμον; . . . πάντως διαφεύγει τὴν αἰτίαν.

exaggerated self-consciousness of the rhetorician: ἐγὼ δὲ δὴ βούλομαι πρῶτον μὲν εἰπεῖν ὡς χρή με εἰπεῖν, ἔπειτα εἰπεῖν (194e), and ὁ παρ' ἐμοῦ λόγος . . . τῷ θεῷ ἀνακείσθω, τὰ μὲν παιδιᾶς, τὰ δὲ σπουδῆς μετρίας . . . μετέχων (197e). The latter passage, which concludes Agathon's speech, echoes Gorgias' final words 'Ελένης μὲν ἐγκώμιον, ἐμὸν δὲ παίγνιον (Gorgias *Helen* 21).

In Isocrates' *Helen*, 'theory' is confined to a prologue, but this theoretical preamble is more extensive (roughly one fifth of the whole).[29] *Helen*, like *Busiris*, has a polemical purpose; it is necessary to identify targets and indicate how Isocrates' work should be contrasted with theirs. Once it has begun, however, the Encomium of Helen acquires a degree of independence from the polemic, and there is no epilogue to reassert its status as a theoretical model. In *Busiris*, the mythological theme is much more explicitly subordinated to the polemic. The technique of *Busiris*, where an inset encomium interacts with and contributes to a surrounding discussion, has parallels with Plato's *Symposium* and *Phaedrus*, though it is obviously on a much smaller scale.[30]

The polemical frame, combined with the division of the treatment of Busiris into Encomium and Defence, results in a four-part structure reminiscent of the traditional organisation of forensic speeches: Proem, Narrative, Proof, Conclusion.[31] As has already been suggested, this pre-existing structural model exerts some influence on the way the parts of *Busiris* interrelate. Thus the Defence is not a self-contained, systematic refutation of the charges against Busiris (as, for instace, the charge against Helen is systematically refuted by Gorgias); instead it sets out to show that the account of Busiris' career already developed in the Encomium is convincing (§ 32) and probable (§ 35), and to refute Polycrates' defamatory version. In

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[29] The prologue of the *Helen* is cited by Aristotle to illustrate how epideictic speeches can have an extended proem which is not necessarily connected with the main theme, but is made to lead in to it: ἐν τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικοῖς λόγοις δεῖ οὕτως γράφειν, ὅ τι ἂν βούληται εὐθὺ εἰπόντα ἐνδοῦναι καὶ συνάψαι, ὅπερ πάντες ποιοῦσιν. παράδειγμα τὸ τῆς Ἰσοκράτους Ἑλένης προοίμιον· οὐθὲν γὰρ κοινὸν ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἐριστικοῖς καὶ Ἑλένῃ (*Rhet.* 1414b24–28).

[30] Similarities and links between *Busiris* and *Phaedrus* are explored further in **IV.ii** below.

[31] For the 'parts of the speech' in early theory see especially Plato *Phaedrus* 266d ff.; also Arist. *Rhet.* 1354b16 ff., 1414a29 ff. For an example of the four-part structure in Isocrates' own forensic work, cf. *Against Callimachus*: Proem, § 1–3; Narrative, § 4–12; Proof, § 13–57; Conclusion, § 58–68.

other words, it functions—in part—as Proof of the Encomium's Narrative, and the work as a whole takes on the character of a forensic defence speech. This device makes it appropriate for the Defence not to restrict itself to defending Busiris directly, but also to contrast the two λόγοι that have been composed about him—just as a forensic Proof would support the speaker's own Narrative and undermine his opponent's. Here, this allows for an interweaving of fictive demonstration with substantive theory, which bridges the gap between the Busiris-sections and the polemical frame. The speech as defence of Busiris, seen in the light of this structural pattern, merges with the speech as counterblast to Polycrates, or, to put it another way, as defence of rhetoric against Polycrates' misuse.

The Prologue may be seen as a Proem introducing Polycrates' travesty of rhetoric; the Encomium, presenting 'correct' rhetoric in the form of an example, is the Narrative; the Defence demonstrates the contrast between the two kinds of rhetorical procedure, and the Epilogue, as conclusion, recapitulates the 'guilt' of Polycratean compositions, which discredit rhetoric, and goes on to canvas the support of Polycrates himself—and by implication of the wider audience—for the 'true' rhetoric on which Isocrates himself is the authority.

Isocrates takes full advantage of the fact that his Defence of Busiris is a reply to a previous speech, just as a real forensic defence speech would be: he can thus put Polycrates, the *soi-disant* defender of Busiris, in the role of prosecutor. Attention is focused on the opposing accounts—the traditional myth adopted and embroidered by Polycrates, and Isocrates' edifying 'revised' version—more than on the figure of Busiris himself. Hence the Defence section, having Isocrates' Encomium and Polycrates' speech as its objects of reference, is drawn towards the theoretical plane; the real issue—the superiority of Isocratean rhetoric—starts to break through the ostensible issue of Busiris' reputation. This emerging undercurrent is brought to the reader's attention by the purely theoretical line of argument at § 33 (τῆς ἰδέας ὅλης . . . φαίνει διημαρτηκώς), which would have no place in a real defence of Busiris.

This relationship between the sections of the speech creates a hierarchy of levels. The Encomium adheres strictly to its mythological theme: it makes no reference to other parts of the work, Polycrates is not mentioned, and the author's own presence is effaced. This section displays the highest epideictic style and maintains the greatest fictional distance. The Defence remains overtly centred on the

Busiris theme. Here there is constant reference to the Encomium and to Polycrates' speech; the figures of Polycrates and Isocrates both have a high profile; but all is conditioned by the imagined forensic confrontation—Polycrates' *Busiris* appears as the prosecution-speech to be refuted, Isocrates' Encomium as the defence narrative to be confirmed, and the two men are cast as rival litigants. Yet treatment of Busiris is now mediated by reference to the two opposing λόγοι, which brings the underlying rhetorical agenda closer to the surface. Prologue and Epilogue are both at a 'higher' level: they define the purpose of the central sections and of the whole work. They stand outside the fiction of concern with Busiris; they create, and simultaneously undermine, the fiction of altruistic benevolence towards Polycrates.[32]

The parts of the work, operating as they do on different levels, are unified by the articulation of the polemic against Polycrates. In the Prologue he is cast as an untutored novice in the art of rhetorical education; his faults are seen as absurd blunders, marks of sheer ignorance and incompetence. Isocrates' role as benefactor is from the start undercut by irony,[33] and as the account progresses there is a growing suggestion of moral as well as technical censure: still, however, the overt assumption is that Polycrates simply does not know how to write an encomium or a defence, so the expert must show him the way. Isocrates avoids for the moment any acknowledgement that, by standards other than his own, to praise someone whom one admits to be a cannibal tyrant might be a *tour de force* or a sophisticated joke.[34] He takes the opportunity to ridicule his adversary, and to stage a preliminary attack on his Busiris-speech, while leaving until later the serious question of what Polycrates may really have wished to achieve.

In the Encomium, as in the *Helen*, Isocrates adheres strictly to praise and does not mention the ill that has been spoken of the

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[32] See esp. note on § 1–9 and on § 2 ἀποκρύψασθαι.

[33] This irony is particularly apparent from the condescending tone of the opening sentences and from the nuances surrounding Isocrates' offer of help: see note on § 1–9.

[34] Isocrates does not find fault in any way with the theme Polycrates has chosen until the transitional paragraph § 9, where he observes that it is οὐ σπουδαία (see note *ad loc.*). His determinedly serious treatment of a work meant to be outrageous contributes greatly to the ironic humour of the Prologue.

character he is praising.[35] Since there is very little that is creditable in the traditions about Busiris, the traditions must be abandoned. Isocrates therefore creates a new story: he makes Busiris the founder of the kingdom and civilisation of Egypt. Egypt thus becomes a 'monument of his excellence' (μνημεῖον ἀρετῆς, § 10), with the result that an encomium of Egypt can serve as an encomium of Busiris. Each feature of the country is counted to Busiris' credit: he chose the country for its amenities, established its institutions and so on (Busiris remains the grammatical subject, though not always the logical subject, through most of the section § 11–27).[36] The tendentiousness that results from this device is not acknowledged here: it is left to be dealt with in the Defence.

The Encomium begins, again as in *Helen*, with the standard topics of genealogy and birth, and goes on to the establishment of Busiris' kingdom. After that, though a chronological ordering is sometimes suggested (e.g. § 15 ἤρξατο μὲν οὖν ἐντεῦθεν . . . μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα . . .), it is much less prominent than in *Helen*. The Encomium is organised instead by different categories of good quality: physical amenities and cultivation (§ 12–14), political institutions (§ 15–20), science and philosophy (§ 21–23), and religious institutions (§ 24–27). These are 'virtues' proper to a country or a city rather than an individual—we are left to infer that Busiris, being responsible for them, must have possessed corresponding personal virtues.[37]

The structure is less reminiscent of Isocrates' praise of Helen, which concentrates on beauty as her outstanding attribute, than of Agathon's speech in the *Symposium*, where Eros is praised for κάλλος, divided under the headings of νεότης, ἁπαλότης and ὑγρότης, and for ἀρετή, divided into δικαιοσύνη, σωφροσύνη, ἀνδρεία and σοφία. Agathon's speech, however, ascribes these qualities directly to

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[35] On the structure of the Encomium and its relationship to Isocrates' other Encomia, see also note on § 10–29.

[36] Note, however, that only once in the Encomium is Busiris actually named: see note on § 10 Βουσίριδος. In the Encomium in the *Helen*, Helen's name appears more often, but only once in the nominative case (§ 61); she is the grammatical subject only in the section dealing with her apotheosis and divine powers (§ 61–65) and in one other passage (§ 40 οὕτω πρόδηλος ἦν ἅπασιν ἐσομένη περιμάχητος). Part of the reason for this is, of course, that Isocrates is avoiding mention of Helen's most celebrated or notorious 'action', her elopement with Paris.

[37] In the 'physical amenities' section, where there is no obvious corresponding human virtue, it is explicitly observed that Busiris' priorities in choosing the country demonstrate his good sense (ἤρξατο . . . ὅθεν περ χρὴ τοὺς εὖ φρονοῦντας, § 15).

the god, while devoting little attention to the inference (197c1–3) that he is the cause of similar qualities in others; Isocrates, on the other hand, describes the good qualities of Egypt and asserts that Busiris was responsible for them, but leaves his personal qualities to be inferred.

The treatment of εὐσέβεια, which forms the climax of the Encomium, is reinforced by the testimony of Pythagoras, who learned his piety from the Egyptians: this may be compared with the sections in the *Helen* where Theseus, the suitors, and Paris each testify by their actions to Helen's beauty.[38] In the treatment of Pythagoras, as in the immediately preceding account of animal-worship as a salutary institution, the Encomium acquires an unmistakeable tone of irony (see note on § 28–29): a reminder that the subject is not one that admits of σεμνοὶ λόγοι.[39]

The Defence sets out at once to counter Polycrates' anticipated objection that Isocrates cannot prove that Busiris was responsible for the virtues of Egypt. This makes clear its dual purpose: it is both a demonstration of rhetorical defence and a defence of the preceding demonstration of rhetorical praise. The arguments form a progression. First, a theoretical consideration: Isocrates' claims are at least possible and appropriate for an encomium (§ 30–33); then an argument from probability: Busiris is the individual most likely to be responsible (§ 34–35); thirdly an appeal to 'factual' evidence: the version of the story used by Polycrates is inconsistent with established chronology. This attack on Polycrates' uncritical acceptance of his sources leads into the last and most important argument: the traditional story is blasphemous, like all poetic myths which ascribe wickedness to the gods or their offspring. Polycrates, who repeated and embroidered this blasphemy, shares the poets' ἀσέβεια (§ 40). By

[38] *Helen* 18–38 (Theseus), 39–41 (suitors), 41–48 (Paris); for this mode of praise, cf. Arist. *Rhet.* 1363a17–19. See also note on § 10–29.

[39] It will be argued that the Encomium of Egypt, with its increasingly clear ironic undertones, has an effect which goes beyond the polemic against Polycrates, namely to satirise an 'ideal state' of the kind envisaged in Plato's *Republic*: see **IV.i** below. *Busiris* may be seen in the light of Gorgias' dictum about the use of humour and seriousness in practical ἀγῶνες (Arist. *Rhet.* 1419b4–5): δεῖν . . . τὴν μὲν σπουδὴν διαφθείρειν τῶν ἐναντίων γέλωτι τὸν δὲ γέλωτα σπουδῇ. Isocrates' Prologue demolishes the humour of Polycrates' *Busiris* by treating it seriously (though perhaps it is more accurate to say that his tongue-in-cheek simulation of seriousness outdoes Polycrates by creating a more sophisticated joke); his Encomium seeks to demolish the seriousness of *Republic* by treating it humorously.

emphasising his respect for the gods and making a virtue of rejecting traditional myth, Isocrates gives new force to the argument, which seemed weak before, that Busiris as son of Poseidon and grandson of Zeus was 'the most likely' author of the great institutions of Egypt. At the same time he develops, especially in § 41–43, a direct moral contrast between himself and Polycrates.[40]

The Encomium ended with the evidence of Busiris' εὐσέβεια; at the end of the Defence, Isocrates contrasts his own piety with Polycrates' ἀσέβεια. The structural link highlights the contrast between Isocrates' morally edifying encomium and Polycrates' blasphemous encomium, and connects rhetorical competence with moral uprightness; this sets the tone for the Epilogue, with its serious moral censure of Polycrates' work.

The Epilogue returns to the themes of the Prologue, summarising Polycrates' errors once again and announcing the fulfilment of Isocrates' promise to provide guidance. It also introduces new elements into the critique. In § 45 comes the first mention of a way in which Polycrates did in fact attempt to defend Busiris—the argument from precedent, pointing to others who had behaved as he did. The series of arguments in § 45–47 attempts to bring home to Polycrates the disgrace of using such a defence, on grounds both of practical uselessness and of the potential moral harm to anyone foolish enough to put faith in it.

In § 48 it is acknowledged for the first time that the paradoxical quality of Polycrates' *Busiris*, which admitted Busiris' crimes while ostensibly defending him, may reflect a deliberate choice on the part of its author. Isocrates' response to this possibility (§ 48–49) follows on from his arguments in § 45–47: since for practical purposes Polycrates' method of defence is worse than useless, his work has no merit even as an attempt to make the best of an impossible case; moreover, compositions of this kind inevitably add to public distrust of rhetorical education.[41]

The concluding advice in § 49 brings these arguments together and emphasises the freshly-exposed moral aspects of Polycrates' error.

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[40] On the background to Isocrates' attack on poetic blasphemy, see note on § 38 ταῖς τῶν ποιητῶν βλασφημίαις.

[41] In the Prologue, Polycrates' speeches were treated as isolated absurdities, flying in the face of 'what everyone knows'; now that the absurdity and immorality of his *Busiris* has been exposed in detail, it is safe to admit that there may be others like it, even a genre to which it belongs: τοὺς τοιούτους τῶν λόγων (§ 49).

The paradoxical theme is condemned in the phrase πονηρὰς ὑποθέσεις. He is urged not to write on such themes; but if he must, he should do so in a way that will not be disgraceful or pernicious.

These alternatives draw attention to the achievement of Isocrates' own Encomium, which praised Busiris in a way that was both rhetorically skilful and morally admirable, and prompts the reader to think again about what it is that makes such themes 'wicked'. Isocrates' treatment has in fact deprived the theme of its paradoxical—and mischievous—character, by adapting the material in accordance with proper rhetorical principles.

Hence the alternatives offered in § 49 turn out not to be alternatives at all: to avoid disgrace and harmfulness, Polycrates will have to follow Isocrates' example and observe correct rhetorical procedure; but if he does so, then he will be constrained to treat his themes, as Isocrates has done with Busiris, in such a way that they cease to be πονηραί. This 'lack of alternative' encapsulates the major doctrinal point which underlies the structure of the *Busiris*: on the one hand, a wicked or unworthy theme cannot (without transformation) serve to display real rhetorical skill;[42] on the other, adherence to correct rhetorical procedure is itself enough to ensure a morally acceptable treatment of any theme. The rhetorical technique, which necessarily incorporates certain moral commitments (such as concern for the truth and dedication to the goal of ὠφέλεια), will itself guarantee the moral value of the finished work.

I.v *Style*

Isocrates' style had a profound influence on later Greek rhetorical prose. It is characterised by long elaborately-constructed periods and by a great concern for the smooth flow of words. Harsh juxtapositions are avoided, and hiatus in particular; figures of sound and rhythm are used in such a way as not to be obtrusive.[43] This style,

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[42] Thus clever paradoxical speeches and *jeux d'esprit* conceal incompetence and ignorance of rhetorical principles. Similarly at *Helen* 9–13 paradoxical and absurd themes are characterised as the refuge of those incapable of treating worthwhile subjects: δῆλον ὅτι δι' ἀσθένειαν ἐνταῦθα καταφεύγουσιν (§ 10).

[43] For a full discussion of Isocrates' style and its variations from work to work, see Usher 1973 (on *Busiris*, p. 50; statistics pp. 46–47); for a shorter account, Usher 1990 pp. 10–12. Passages in Isocrates' works which comment on style are collected and discussed by Wersdörfer (Wersdörfer 1940 pp. 117–127); the style of *Busiris* is discussed briefly in Wirth 1910, pp. 10–12.

once perfected, was used with great consistency throughout his career; *Busiris* is thus remarkable in showing striking variations of style within a very short compass.

Neglect of this internal variation has led to an inadequate account of *Busiris* in Stephen Usher's authoritative work on Isocrates' style. Usher's verdict is that *Busiris* exemplifies Isocrates' 'mature epideictic style' as found in *Panegyricus*, except that the average period length is much less; he relates the use of less complex periods to Isocrates' promise of brevity and his statement that the theme does not admit σεμνοὶ λόγοι (*Bus.* 9). He suggests further that, if period length is the major stylistic difference between *Busiris* and *Panegyricus*, we may infer that complex periodicity is for Isocrates the supreme distinguishing mark of serious oratory.

Usher in fact overstates the average 'shortness' of periods in *Busiris*.[44] The figure he gives for his index of period length would ally *Busiris* more with the forensic speeches than with any other epideictic work; the corrected figure, while confirming that periods in *Busiris* are significantly shorter on average than in, say, the *Panegyricus*, restores it to its place among the epideictic works, with longer periods than *To Nicocles* and *Nicocles*.

These averages are of limited value, however, in view of the variation within the work. Periods in the Epilogue are extremely short; those in the Prologue and Encomium are much longer; the Defence falls somewhere in between.[45] In general, the Encomium has the

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[44] The overstatement arises from numerical errors. Usher's method is to list the number of occurrences of each stylistic feature in which he is interested, the number of Teubner pages of text, and, as an index of comparison, the equivalent number of occurrences in 25 Teubner pages (i.e. no. of occurrences ÷ no. of pages × 25). Thus in the case of periods a higher index means more, and hence shorter, periods. For *Busiris*, Usher gives the number of periods as 70, the number of pages as 10.5, and the comparative index as 189. This last figure must be an error of calculation, because 70 ÷ 10.5 × 25 = 167. This is still not the correct figure, though, because the number of pages in *Busiris* is in fact not 10.5, but a little more than 11.5: so the correct index is 70 ÷ 11.5 × 25 = 152. Compare this with Usher's figures for some other works: *Euth.* 205, *Helen* 136, *Paneg.* 114, *ad Nic.* 182, *Nic.* 180, *Archid.* 145, *Antid.* 127. Usher's error as to the number of pages in *Busiris* obviously affects his indices for all stylistic features; his conclusion that it represents the 'mature epideictic style' still holds, but most be modified to take account of variation within the work.

[45] Indices using Usher's method (bearing in mind that these are very short samples of text): Prologue 109, Encomium 135, Defence 158, Epilogue 234. (Prologue: 10 periods in 2.3 pages, 10 ÷ 2.3 × 25 = 109; Encomium: 26 periods in 4.8 pages,

richest style, with the highest frequency of *homoeoteleuton, parison* and other 'Gorgianic' figures.[46] The Prologue and Defence are rather less ornate. The dignified, authoritative and mock-benevolent tone of the Prologue is marked by long periods; in the Defence, the dense argument of § 30–37 produces short periods, but elaborate long periods return in the excursus on poetic blasphemy (§ 38–43). The Epilogue, where the tone of the argumentation is sharpest and closest to forensic oratory, is plainer in style.

The stylistic features of each section can best be shown by a brief discussion of sample passages.

Prologue: § 4–5

ἁπάντων γὰρ εἰδότων ὅτι δεῖ
τοὺς μὲν εὐλογεῖν τινὰς βουλομένους
πλείω τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἀγαθῶν αὐτοῖς προσόντ' ἀποφαίνειν,
τοὺς δὲ κατηγοροῦντας
τἀναντία τούτων ποιεῖν,

τοσούτου δεῖς οὕτω κεχρῆσθαι τοῖς λόγοις
ὥσθ'
ὑπὲρ μὲν Βουσίριδος ἀπολογήσασθαι φάσκων
οὐχ ὅπως τῆς ὑπαρχούσης αὐτὸν διαβολῆς ἀπήλλαξας,
ἀλλὰ καὶ
τηλικαύτην αὐτῷ τὸ μέγεθος παρανομίαν προσῆψας,
ἧς οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅπως ἄν τις δεινοτέραν ἐξευρεῖν δυνηθείη·

τῶν γὰρ ἄλλων τῶν ἐπιχειρησάντων ἐκεῖνον λοιδορεῖν
τοσοῦτον μόνον περὶ αὐτοῦ βλασφημούντων
ὡς ἔθυε τῶν ξένων τοὺς ἀφικνουμένους,
σὺ καὶ κατεσθίειν αὐτὸν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ᾐτιάσω·[47]

Σωκράτους δὲ κατηγορεῖν ἐπιχειρήσας,
ὥσπερ ἐγκωμιάσαι βουλόμενος
Ἀλκιβιάδην ἔδωκας αὐτῷ μαθητήν,

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26 ÷ 4.8 × 25 = 135; Defence: 19 periods in 3 pages, 19 ÷ 3 × 25 = 158; Epilogue: 15 periods in 1.6 pages, 15 ÷ 1.6 × 25 = 234.) The counting of periods is of course somewhat subjective. In the Teubner text of *Busiris*, the total number of units ending in full stop or question mark is in fact 73: Usher presumably reached his figure of 70 by regarding § 7–8 πότερα . . . ἀπώλλυεν as a single period, and the same treatment of that passage has been adopted for the calculations above. If it is treated as four separate periods, the index for the Prologue becomes 13 ÷ 2.3 × 25 = 141.

[46] For definitions of these figures and of other stylistic features discussed here, see Usher 1973 pp. 44 f. (with note 65).

[47] Following the Teubner (Benseler/Blass) punctuation: Mathieu/Brémond break this into two periods with a full stop after ᾐτιάσω.

ὃν ὑπ' ἐκείνου μὲν οὐδεὶς ᾔσθετο παιδευόμενον,
ὅτι δὲ πολὺ διήνεγκε τῶν Ἑλλήνων,
ἅπαντες ἂν ὁμολογήσειαν.

This passage is a good example of Isocrates' technique in constructing periods (cf. Usher 1973 pp. 42 f.). Suspense is maintained by the constant use of anticipatory constructions. The opening absolute construction, with its dependent μέν/δέ antithesis, leads up to the first finite verb (line 6), which begins a correlative construction (τοσούτου . . . ὥσθ') leading into the principle antithesis ὑπὲρ μὲν Βουσίριδος . . ./ Σωκράτους δὲ . . . Within each part of this antithesis the thought is carried along by forward-pointing constructions. In the first, we find οὐχ ὅπως . . . ἀλλὰ καί, τηλικαύτην . . . ἧς, and τῶν γὰρ ἄλλων, which, reinforced by μόνον, points forward to σὺ καί. In the second, the participles in lines 17 and 18 require the finite verb in line 19 for the completion of their sense, and this clause in turn requires the explanation provided by the μέν/δέ antithesis in lines 20–21. Figures of sound are not especially prominent. In ἀποφαίνειν . . . ποιεῖν there is an instance of *homoeoteleuton*; the clauses in lines 9 and 11 balance each other in quantity, and attention is drawn to this by the correspondence in sound and sense between διαβολῆς ἀπήλλαξας and παρανομίαν προσῆψας. Variety as well as order is cultivated in the patterning of the sentence; in several places an exact balance between contrasting expressions could easily have been achieved, but is avoided (e.g. lines 2 and 4, lines 20 and 21).

Encomium: § 12–13

ἑώρα γὰρ
τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους τόπους
οὐκ εὐκαίρως
οὐδ' εὐαρμόστως πρὸς τὴν τοῦ σύμπαντος φύσιν ἔχοντας,
ἀλλὰ
τοὺς μὲν ὑπ' ὄμβρων κατακλυζομένους,
τοὺς δ' ὑπὸ καυμάτων διαφθειρομένους,
ταύτην δὲ τὴν χώραν
ἐν καλλίστῳ μὲν τοῦ κόσμου κειμένην,
πλεῖστα δὲ καὶ παντοδαπώτατα φέρειν δυναμένην,[48]
ἀθανάτῳ δὲ τείχει τῷ Νείλῳ τετειχισμένην,
ὅς οὐ μόνον φυλακὴν

[48] Following Benseler/Blass in accepting παντοδαπώτατα (Γ), rather than παντοδαπὰ τἀγαθὰ (Λ) which is adopted by Mathieu/Brémond. See note *ad loc.*

ἀλλὰ καὶ τροφὴν ἱκανὴν
  αὐτῇ παρέχειν πέφυκεν,
  ἀνάλωτος μὲν ὢν καὶ δύσμαχος
    τοῖς ἐπιβουλεύουσιν,
  εὐαγωγὸς δὲ καὶ πρὸς πολλὰ χρήσιμος
    τοῖς ἐντὸς αὐτοῦ κατοικοῦσιν.

This again is a good example of the architecture of an elaborate period. The overall structure is very simple—the main verb ἑώρα comes at the beginning, and directly introduces the main antithesis τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους τόπους/ταύτην δὲ τὴν χώραν—so there are no complexities of thought to distract from the development of the main theme, the outstanding geographical qualities of Egypt.[49] The first part consists of an οὐκ/ἀλλά antithesis which leads into a μέν/δέ antithesis: the doubling by means of μέν/δέ in lines 6–7 matches the doubling οὐκ εὐκαίρως οὐδ' εὐαρμόστως in lines 3–4. In the second part, the μέν/δέ . . . δέ contrast in lines 9–11 brings the period to a possible conclusion, but it is continued by means of a relative clause; this relative clause takes the form of an οὐκ/ἀλλά antithesis, and is amplified by the further antithesis ἀνάλωτος μὲν . . . εὐαγωγὸς δὲ . . . The high style of this passage of *auxesis* is marked by the conspicuous presence of 'Gorgianic' figures of sound. There is *parechesis* in εὐκαίρως . . . εὐαρμόστως, *parison* with *homoeoteleuton* in lines 6–7, triple *homoeoteleuton* in lines 9–11; the concluding antithesis in lines 15–18 again shows *homoeoteleuton* (ἐπιβουλεύουσιν . . . κατοικοῦσιν), here accompanied by other correspondences of sound and rhythm (ἀνάλωτος/εὐαγωγὸς, δύσμαχος/χρήσιμος). In line 11 there is an example of *figura etymologica* (τείχει . . . τετειχισμένην). There is much alliteration (esp. κ and χ in lines 8–9, π and φ in line 10, τ and θ in line 11), and assonance in lines 12–13 (φυλακὴν . . . τροφὴν ἱκανὴν). The amplification is also marked by the use of near synonyms and of words which add relatively little to the sense (εὐκαίρως . . . εὐαρμόστως, πλεῖστα . . . καὶ παντοδαπώτατα, τείχει . . . τετειχισμένην, πρὸς πολλὰ χρήσιμος).

Defence: § 34–35

εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλος τις ἦν φανερὸς ὁ ταῦτα πράξας,
  ἀγώ φημι γεγενῆσθαι δι' ἐκεῖνον,
ὁμολογῶ λίαν εἶναι τολμηρὸς
  εἰ,

[49] On the patterning of ideas in this passage, see note on § 12–14.

περὶ ὧν ἅπαντες ἐπίστανται,
περὶ τούτων μεταπείθειν ἐπιχειρῶ.
νῦν δ'
ἐν κοινῷ τῶν πραγμάτων ὄντων
καὶ δοξάσαι δέον περὶ αὐτῶν,
τίν' ἄν τις τῶν ἐκεῖ καθεστώτων
ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων σκοπούμενος
αἰτιώτερον εἶναι νομίσειεν ἢ
τὸν
ἐκ Ποσειδῶνος μὲν γεγονότα,
πρὸς δὲ μητρὸς ἀπὸ Διὸς ὄντα,
μεγίστην δὲ δύναμιν τῶν καθ' αὑτὸν κτησάμενον
καὶ παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὀνομαστότατον γεγενημένον;
οὐ γὰρ δή που
τοὺς ἁπάντων τούτων ἀπολελειμμένους
προσήκει
μᾶλλον ἢ 'κεῖνον
τηλικούτων ἀγαθῶν εὑρετὰς γενέσθαι.

These three sentences put the case ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων for Isocrates' presentation of Busiris as the founder of Egypt. The first (lines 1–6) is simple in structure, but still carefully balanced: the main clause (line 3) is framed by two conditional clauses (the first modifying the main verb, the second dependent on it as part of the indirect statement introduced by ὁμολογῶ); each conditional clause contains a relative clause correlated with a demonstrative pronoun (ταῦτα . . . ἀγώ, περὶ ὧν . . . περὶ τούτων), and the ordering is chiastic: in the first case the demonstrative precedes the relative, in the second it follows it. The second sentence (lines 7–17) is more elaborate. The interrogative τίν' which identifies it as a rhetorical question only appears after the balanced participle phrases (with *homoeoteleuton*) in lines 8–9; suspense is then maintained by delaying αἰτιώτερον . . . ἢ, which leads to the statement of Busiris' claims in lines 14–17: two antitheses (one joined by μέν/δέ, the other just by καί), both with *homoeoteleuton* and a close metrical equivalence between the parts. The third sentence (lines 18–22), answering the rhetorical question, is scarcely an independent period. There is a metrical balance between τοὺς ἁπάντων τούτων ἀπολελειμμένους (19) and τηλικούτων ἀγαθῶν εὑρετὰς γενέσθαι (22); the infinitive γενέσθαι is kept to the end to achieve a satisfactory closure by completing the sense. In this passage, as in the Defence in general, there is a greater interdependence between periods than is typically the case in the Prologue and Encomium; the argument runs on from one sentence to the next.

Epilogue: § 46

μάλιστα δ' ἂν κατίδοις τὴν εὐήθειαν τῶν εἰρημένων
ἐπὶ σαυτοῦ θεωρήσας.
ἐνθυμήθητι γάρ·
εἰ
  μεγάλων καὶ δεινῶν αἰτιῶν περὶ σὲ γεγονυιῶν
  τοῦτόν τις τὸν τρόπον σοι συνείποι,
πῶς ἂν διατεθείης;

ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ οἶδ'
ὅτι μᾶλλον ἂν αὐτὸν μισήσειας ἢ τοὺς κατηγοροῦντας.

καίτοι πῶς οὐκ αἰσχρὸν
  τοιαύτας ὑπὲρ τῶν ἄλλων ποιεῖσθαι τὰς ἀπολογίας,
  ἐφ' αἷς ὑπὲρ σαυτοῦ λεγομέναις μάλιστ' ἂν ὀργισθείης;

This passage illustrates the polemical style of the Epilogue at its most 'choppy', with many short, pointed expressions (such as those in lines 2, 3, 7, 8 and 10 here), and an alternation between questions and assertions. There are few of the balancing constructions associated with complex periods (only the contrast μᾶλλον . . . ἢ in line 9, and the correlative τοιαύτας . . . ἐφ' αἷς in lines 11–12), and there is little in the way of amplification (μεγάλων καὶ δεινῶν in line 5 is one example). Figures of sound are represented only by the assonant genitive endings in line 5, and some alliteration (σ and τ in line 6; possibly π in lines 10–11?).

I.vi *The Text*

This commentary is based on the text in the Budé edition of Isocrates (Mathieu/Brémond I.188–200). In the few places where an alternative reading seems preferable, this is indicated in the notes. The text of *Busiris* presents few significant problems: discussion of textual issues in this commentary has been kept to a minimum, and confined to those passages where variant readings would have a substantial impact on interpretation. Besides Mathieu/Brémond, reference is regularly made to the Teubner text (Benseler/Blass) and to Drerup's edition of 1906, which has the fullest *apparatus criticus*.[50] Manuscripts have not been examined: the authority of Drerup's *apparatus* has been accepted. Manuscripts referred to in the commentary are listed below.

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[50] On the manuscript sources, see Drerup pp. IV–CXIV and Seck 1965 pp. 1–107.

Γ = Urbinas 111, IXth–Xth century (five correctors, designated $Γ_1$, $Γ_2$ etc.)
Θ = Laurentianus LXXXVII 14, XIIIth century
Λ = Vaticanus 65, dated 1063
E = Ambrosianus O 144, early XVth century

II. *Polycrates*

The name of Polycrates was to remain notorious among later Greek rhetoricians, but about the man himself and his works we know relatively little. Unlike most 'sophists', he was an Athenian by birth.[51] From *Busiris* we learn that he was older than Isocrates (hence born before 436),[52] but turned to the profession of rhetoric relatively late in life, allegedly because of financial hardship.[53] Isocrates has not met him, and does not anticipate an imminent opportunity to do so:[54] perhaps Polycrates' career took him away from Athens for significant periods of time. The writer of the hypothesis to *Busiris* asserts that Polycrates was working in Cyprus at the time of the *Busiris*: this is plausible enough, but may just be a guess based on Isocrates' own connections with Cyprus. Polycrates taught Zoilus of Amphipolis (notorious as the 'Homeromastix'),[55] and his services are said to have been turned down in favour of Gorgias' by Jason, the ruler of Pherae in Thessaly.[56]

Polycrates was famous in antiquity for his speeches on paradoxical and absurd themes.[57] These included speeches in praise of notorious figures in mythology, such as his *Busiris* and an *Encomium of Clytemnestra* (in which she was contrasted favourably with Penelope).[58]

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[51] Dionysius of Halicarnassus *Isaeus* 20, Suda s.v. Πολυκράτης (1977 Adler).

[52] *Bus.* 50 νεώτερος ὢν. The crucial words are omitted by one manuscript (Γ), and their authenticity has been disputed: see note *ad loc.*

[53] *Bus.* 1. The idea of the late start and the change of fortune may of course be a fiction, a mock-charitable—but actually insulting—explanation for the fact that a working rhetorical teacher of mature years knows (in Isocrates' view) so little about his subject. Sophists were in the business to make money, a fact naturally stressed by their detractors: see e.g. Plato *Apology* 19e–20b, *Rep.* 337d; Isoc. *Soph.* 3–5; Dover 1968 pp. 157 f.

[54] *Bus.* 2.

[55] Aelian *Var. hist.* XI.10.

[56] Pausanias VI.17.9.

[57] For the history of this genre see Pease 1926.

[58] Quintilian II.17.4, Philodemus II p. 216 f. Sudhaus: both sources also mention Polycrates' *Busiris*.

Polycrates may have been the author of an *Encomium of Paris* in which Paris was contrasted favourably with Hector.[59] He also composed encomia of insignificant things, including an *Encomium of Mice*,[60] an *Encomium of Pebbles*,[61] and probably an *Encomium of a Pot*.[62] It is plausible that he was the author of some of the other trivial or paradoxical encomia which are mentioned by ancient sources without ascription: encomia of bumble-bees and salt, and an encomium of the life of beggars and exiles.[63] He also wrote an encomium in which some unworthy figure, perhaps Thersites, received lavish heroic treatment.[64] According to Josephus, Polycrates inveighed against the Spartan constitution, but this is no reason to suppose that he wrote an independent work on the subject.[65] He is also mentioned by Quintilian among the authors of rhetorical handbooks.[66]

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[59] This work—sometimes known simply as the 'Αλέξανδρος—is mentioned without an author's name by Philodemus (*loc. cit.*: n. 8 above). The hypothesis to Isocrates' *Helen* says that Polycrates attacked Isocrates ὡς κακῶς γράψαντος τὸν λόγον τοῦτον (sc. the *Helen*), just as Isocrates attacked Polycrates in *Busiris*: if true, this could point to a Polycratean Encomium of Paris which in one way or another 'bettered' Isocrates' defence of Paris at *Helen* 41–48. Blass argues (II.371) that the arguments from the *Paris/Alexandros* quoted by Aristotle do not seem Polycratean (*Rhet.* 1397b21, 1398a22: but cf. 1401a20, 1401b34). See further discussion below.

[60] Arist. *Rhet.* 1401b15, cf. 1401a13.

[61] Alexander περὶ ῥητορικῶν ἀφορμῶν (*RG* III.3).

[62] *Ibid.*

[63] Bumble-bees: *Helen* 12; salt: *Helen* 12 and Plato *Symposium* 177b; beggars and exiles: *Helen* 8 and Arist. *Rhet.* 1401b24 ff.

[64] Πολυκράτει . . . ἐγκωμιάζοντι ⟨. . .⟩ ὡς 'Αγαμέμνονα, ἐν ἀντιθέτοις καὶ μεταφοραῖς καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἐγκωμιαστικοῖς τρόποις (Demetrius *On Style* 120). Cf. Maass 1887 p. 576 n. 2: 'ergaenze "Thersiten" oder einen entsprechenden Namen'. This conjecture fits Demetrius' citation of the work as an instance of τὰ μικρὰ μεγάλως λέγειν, and gives specific point to his reference to Agamemnon: we might then guess that Polycrates made a topsy-turvy comparison between Thersites and Agamemnon, like the comparison with Penelope in the *Encomium of Clytemnestra*. Alternatively the missing name could be 'Busiris' (as suggested by Innes 1995 p. 423 note d): in this case, Agamemnon might simply be mentioned as an example of a genuinely 'laudable' hero, or Demetrius might be recalling an actual comparison made in Polycrates' speech (Agamemnon sacrificed Iphigenia and presided over the sacrifice of Polyxena: see note on § 45 ὡς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τινὲς). But Demetrius' point about incongruity between subject and style perhaps points to a lowly figure, like Thersites, rather than a villainous one. For Thersites and Agamemnon as opposites, cf. D.S. XVI.87.1–2: Demades rebukes Philip for disgracing the fortune of an Agamemnon with the conduct of a Thersites. Thersites was popular in the later tradition of παράδοξα/ἄδοξα: see Pease 1926 p. 37 n. 2.

[65] Josephus *Contra Apionem* I.220 f. Conceivably abuse of Sparta found a place, one way or another, in Polycrates' *Busiris*, in which case Isocrates' treatment of the topic in § 17–20 might be a (more balanced) response.

[66] III.1.11.

Busiris does not add very much to our knowledge of Polycrates' interests. He is given the stereotypical characteristics of a sophist: mercenary motives, arrogant boastfulness, the claim to make people 'better'.[67] At *Busiris* 8 he is said to have taken an interest in genealogies (περὶ τὰς γενεαλογίας ἐσπουδακώς). Genealogy is a prime topic of encomium (see note on § 10 εὐγενείας), and Isocrates may just mean that he developed it with more than average enthusiasm; or he may have made use of arguments from heroic chronology, as Isocrates himself does in *Busiris* 8. Alternatively he may have had an independent interest in the genealogy of the heroes, as did Hippias of Elis.[68]

Dionysius of Halicarnassus classes Polycrates, along with Antiphon, Thrasymachus, Critias and Zoilus, among the teachers of practical rhetoric.[69] He criticises Polycrates' style severely, in terms which imply overblown verbosity and a tasteless use of too many extravagant figures and poeticisms.[70] Dionysius mentions 'real' (ἀληθινοί) speeches: it is not clear exactly what this means, but the word suggests works written for actual use in court or assembly.[71] No other source mentions any such works. For ancient writers on rhetoric, he was clearly the writer of παίγνια *par excellence*.[72] His predilections seem to have been inherited by his pupil Zoilus, who, besides his famous works *Against Homer's Poetry* and *Against Plato*, is said to have written an

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[67] Cf. *Bus.* 1 χρηματίζεσθαι, 4 μεγαλαυχούμενον, 42 καὶ σὺ μὲν οἴει . . ., with note *ad loc.* in each case.

[68] Cf. Plato *Hippias maior* 285d.

[69] τῶν . . . τοὺς ἀκριβεῖς προαιρουμένων λόγους καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐναγώνιον ἀσκούντων ῥητορικήν (*Isaeus* 20).

[70] Πολυκράτης δὲ κενὸς μὲν ἐν τοῖς ἀληθινοῖς, ψυχρὸς δὲ καὶ φορτικὸς ἐν τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικοῖς, ἄχαρις δὲ ἐν τοῖς χαριεντισμοῦ δεομένοις ἐστί (*Isaeus* 20): on Dionysius' critical terms, see Geigenmüller 1908 pp. 110 f., 114. We may recall the encomium described by Demetrius, with its 'antitheses, metaphors, and every epideictic figure'.

[71] The adjective ἀληθινός, occurring most often in the phrase ἀληθινοὶ ἀγῶνες, normally implies a real forensic or political situation (Geigenmüller 1908 p. 60). In *Isaeus* 20 Polycrates comes between Antiphon and Thrasymachus in the discussion; Dionysius states explicitly that Antiphon did not engage in dicanic or symbouleutic contests, and that Thrasymachus left no lawcourt speeches. Hence the absence of any such statement about Polycrates, together with the reference to ἀληθινοὶ (λόγοι), strongly suggests that Dionysius did know of some practical speeches ascribed to him—unless it is simply that he did not recognise, or chose to ignore, the fictional character of the *Accusation of Socrates*: compare his criticism of the speech in Plato's *Menexenus* as though it were a real ἐπιτάφιος (*Demosthenes* 23–30).

[72] Demetrius understands his purpose and excuses his bombastic style: ἔπαιζεν γάρ, οὐκ ἐσπούδασε, καὶ αὐτὸς τῆς γραφῆς ὁ ὄγκος παίγνιόν ἐστι (*On Style* 120). Cf. Alexander περὶ ῥητορικῶν ἀφορμῶν *RG* III.3, Quintilian II.17.4.

Encomium of Polyphemus and an *Encomium of the People of Tenedos*, the island presumably being chosen for its small size and insignificance.[73]

Another glimpse of Polycrates' reputation comes from an epigram by the poet Aeschrion, quoted and explained by Athenaeus (335bc). The hetaera Philaenis was notorious as the author of a sex manual.[74] Aeschrion makes her defend herself in an imaginary epitaph by saying that she did not write (or even read) the book: the real author was Polycrates, whom she calls 'some subtle word-mincer, a slanderous tongue':[75]

ἐγὼ Φιλαινίς, ἡ 'πίβωτος ἀνθρώποις,
ἐνταῦθα γήρᾳ τῷ μακρῷ κεκοίμημαι.
μή μ', ὦ μάταιε ναῦτα, τὴν ἄκραν κάμπτων
χλεύην τε ποιεῦ καὶ γέλωτα καὶ λάσθην,
οὐ γάρ, μὰ τὸν Ζῆν', οὐ μὰ τοὺς κάτω κούρους,
οὐκ ἦν ἐς ἄνδρας μάχλος οὐδὲ δημώδης.
Πολυκράτης δὲ τὴν γονὴν Ἀθηναῖος,
λόγων τι παιπάλημα καὶ κακὴ γλῶσσα,
ἔγραψεν οἷ' ἔγραψεν· ἐγὼ γὰρ οὐκ οἶδα.

Dioscorides imitates this epigram (Dioscorides XXVI in Gow and Page 1965), but does not name the alleged pseudepigraphist, perhaps because Polycrates' name was no longer widely enough known.[76] As Gow and Page remark, it would be interesting to know how Polycrates entered the story in the first place. The sophist Alcidamas wrote an encomium of the hetaera Naïs, so the idea of Polycrates writing a work on the arts of love under Philaenis' name is not entirely incredible, but Aeschrion's epigram clearly has more point if the ascription is a joke.

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[73] ἐγκώμιον εἰς Πολύφημον: Σ *in Plat. Hipparch.* 229d, cf. Philodemus II pp. 216 f. Sudhaus. Τενεδίων ἐγκώμιον: Strabo 271 (and see Blass II.374); possibly the object of an ironic glance in Vergil *Aeneid* II.21 f. 'Tenedos, notissima fama/insula', cf. Seneca *Troades* 224.

[74] Fragments of Philaenis περὶ ἀφροδισίων (including the opening words τάδε συνέγραψε Φιλαινὶς . . .): P. Oxy. 2891. Ancient authors' references to it are listed in Gow and Page 1965 p. 4.

[75] The identification with our Polycrates seems virtually certain, though Gow and Page accept it with caution; it was clearly made by Athenaeus, who refers to Πολυκράτης ὁ σοφιστής. The dates of both hetaera and poet are unknown, but Gow and Page incline towards placing Philaenis in the early fourth century B.C. (which would give point to the allegation or joke that Polycrates wrote her book) and Aeschrio in the late fourth to early third century (Gow and Page 1965 pp. 3–4).

[76] Lines 5–6 εἰ δέ τις ἡμέας/αἰσχύνων λαμυρὴν ἔπλασεν ἱστορίην . . . Cf. Gow and Page 1965, prefatory note to Aeschrion I *ad fin.*

Polycrates' best known work by far, both among ancient authors and in modern scholarship, is his *Accusation of Socrates*.[77] It owes its notoriety to its unusual, and sensational, theme, but more particularly to the fact that as early as the third century B.C. it was wrongly believed to be the actual prosecution speech used at Socrates' trial.[78] This idea was refuted on internal evidence by Favorinus, but remained current,[79] and has encouraged modern scholars to form a conception of the *Accusation of Socrates* which would place it on quite a different level from the rest of Polycrates' work.[80] Scholars accept that Polycrates' speech was not the real accusation, but often assume that it was nonetheless a serious piece of propaganda: a work which gave authentic expression to the views of Socrates' accusers, and provoked the dead philosopher's friends and associates to respond by writing in his defence.[81]

Central to this assessment of the *Accusation of Socrates* is the conviction that correspondences between Xenophon's Socratic writings and the *Apologia Socratis* of Libanius point to Polycrates as their common source, and that from these correspondences we can recon-

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[77] *Bus.* 4–6, Aelian *Var. hist.* XI.10, D.L. II.38–39, Quint. II.17.4 and III.1.11, Themistius XXIII 296bc, *Epist. Socr.* XIV.3, Σ *in Ael. Arist.* III p. 480 Dindorf (cf. p. 319), Suda s.v. Πολυκράτης 1977 Adler. Modern literature includes Cobet 1858 pp. 662–682; Breitenbach 1869; Hirzel 1887; Blass II.368–70; Förster 1909 pp. 1–4; Markowski 1910; Mesk 1910; Wilamowitz 1919 II.95–105; Humbert 1930; Treves 1952; Chroust 1955 and 1957; Kerferd 1959; Grayeff 1959; Gebhardt 1957; Kühn 1960; Dodds 1959 pp. 28 f., 270–72, 371; Erbse 1961; Brickhouse and Smith 1989 pp. 71–87.

[78] Hermippus F 32 Wehrli (in D.L. II.38). On Hermippus' reliability as a source, see Wehrli's note *ad loc.*: 'gehört ihm nicht mehr als die spielerische Kombination der verschiedenen Namen von Klägern, welche überliefert waren.'

[79] Favorinus ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν Ἀπομνημονευμάτων, quoted in D.L. II.39. Favorinus observes that Polycrates' speech mentioned the rebuilding of the Long Walls by Conon, six years after Socrates' death: this gives 394 as a *terminus post quem* for the *Accusation of Socrates.* The importance of Favorinus' testimony was brought to the attention of modern scholarship by Richard Bentley (Bentley 1697). (The fact that the speech was a fictional accusation, written after Socrates' death, is also sufficiently proven by *Bus.* 6 τοῖς τετελευτηκόσιν (referring to Socrates and Busiris)—it is clearly implied that the living Socrates did not have the opportunity to evaluate Polycrates' speech.) For the persistence of the error in antiquity, see e.g. Themistius XXIII 296bc, Σ *in Ael. Arist.* III p. 480 Dindorf, Suda s.v. Πολυκράτης 1977. The Suda's statement that Polycrates wrote *two* speeches 'for Anytus and Meletus' may be based on the principle that two prosecutors would need two speeches, or may reflect two sources both imagining Polycrates to have written the real speech, but each giving a different prosecutor's name.

[80] See especially Humbert 1930, Treves 1952, and Chroust 1955 and 1957.

[81] For an example of the continuing prevalence of this view see Brickhouse and Smith 1989 pp. 71–87.

struct the content of Polycrates' speech. More specifically, it is claimed that because the anonymous 'accuser' (κατήγορος) countered by Xenophon in *Memorabilia* I.ii is made to voice charges which were not used in the actual trial, this accuser must be identified, not with one of the original prosecutors, but with Polycrates.[82] There is no good reason to accept these assumptions.[83] Coincidences between Xenophon and Libanius are far more likely to reflect Libanius' use of Xenophon than a common use of Polycrates.[84] We cannot hope to reconstruct in detail, or with any certainty, what took place at the trial in 399. It is clear, however, that Xenophon's professed interest in *Memorabilia* I is in the arguments used at the trial—the arguments that actually led to Socrates' condemnation—rather than in any subsequent propaganda.[85] In the light of this it makes more sense

[82] This theory was first advanced by Cobet (Cobet 1858 pp. 662–682) and has since been the orthodoxy (see e.g. Guthrie III pp. 331 n. 1, 346, 382 f.; Brickhouse and Smith pp. 71 ff.). It was questioned early on by Breitenbach, who countered Cobet's arguments and put forward his own view that the κατήγορος may perfectly well be identified with the prosecutor Meletus (Breitenbach 1869). In spite of the endorsement of Blass (II.368), Breitenbach's response to Cobet has been neglected. There is no obvious basis for Chroust's assertion that 'the opinion advanced by Breitenbach can no longer be maintained (Chroust 1955 p. 4 n. 9), since to identify Xenophon's κατήγορος with Meletus is clearly not to imply that *Memorabilia* contains accurate reportage of what Meletus said at the trial.

[83] The same negative assessment of the influence of Polycrates' *Accusation* and the feasibility of reconstructing it has been argued for independently, on grounds which overlap, but do not entirely coincide, with my own, by Prof. Mogens Herman Hansen (Hansen 1980). I am very grateful to Prof. Robert Parker for letting me see an English version of the article in question. Prof. Hansen's work on this subject is to be published in English in a forthcoming volume entitled *Athenian Democracy and Culture*, edited by M. Sakellariou.

[84] It is very doubtful that Libanius would have had access to the text of Polycrates' *Accusation*. Libanius worked mostly with a restricted canon of texts, and he makes little use of the early orators other than Demosthenes, Isocrates and Lysias; he does, on the other hand, show a very thorough knowledge of both Plato and Xenophon (see Festugière 1959 p. 216). A.F. Norman argues that Libanius' library was essentially confined to the major classics and a range of scholarly works of reference; in the light of his wider conclusions, he is wrong to accept, on the authority of Förster and Markowski, that Libanius 'can utilize Polycrates' oration for his *Apologia Socratis*' (Norman 1964; quotation, p. 170).

[85] πόλλακις ἐθαύμασα τίσι ποτὲ λόγοις Ἀθηναίους ἔπεισαν οἱ γραψάμενοι Σωκράτην ... (*Mem.* I.i.1). Cobet takes these words, and the rhetorical question which follows (I.i.2 ... ποίῳ ποτ' ἐχρήσαντο τεκμηρίῳ;), to imply that Xenophon has no idea what went on at the trial ('plane nescire'), and must therefore resort to arguing against Polycrates. If Xenophon were so ill-informed, he would surely not admit it. But clearly Xenophon is expressing mystification, not about what the charges actually were, but as to how the accusers were able to *persuade* the Athenians when those charges were—as he will show—entirely unfounded.

that he should ascribe to the original prosecutor charges which he believes were implicit at the time of the trial, even if they were not openly used,[86] than than that he should respond in detail to a new case against Socrates put forward in a pamphlet after the event.

Another attempt to prove Libanius' use of Polycrates' *Accusation* rests on a link between Libanius *Apologia Socratis* 87 and Plato *Gorgias* 484b.[87] The argument turns on citation in both places of the Pindar fragment F 169a Maehler (lines 1–4):

> νόμος ὁ πάντων βασιλεὺς
> θνατῶν τε καὶ ἀθανάτων
> ἄγει δικαιῶν τὸ βιαιότατον
> ὑπερτάτᾳ χειρί . . .

At *Gorgias* 484b, Callicles is made to cite this fragment is support of his theory of 'natural justice'. At *Apologia Socratis* 87, it is said to have been cited by Socrates' accusers, in the context of their complaint that Socrates attacked the great poets. Libanius upholds Socrates' criticism of Pindar:

> οὕτω καὶ περὶ Πινδάρου διαλέγεται [sc. Σωκράτης] δεδοικὼς αὐτοῦ τὴν διδαχὴν καὶ φοβούμενος μή τις τῶν νέων ἀκούσας ὡς ὑπερτάτῃ χειρὶ βιάζεται τὸ δίκαιον ἀμελήσας τῶν νόμων ἀσκῇ τὼ χεῖρε. καὶ τοῦτο οὕτως εἰκότως ὑφορᾶται Σωκράτης, ὡς ὁ σοφώτατος Ἄνυτος ἐτόλμησε μεταγράψαι τὸ τοῦ ποιητοῦ καθάπερ ἐν Σκύθαις διαλεγομένου [sc. Σωκράτους (Förster)] καὶ οὐκ εἰσομένοις ἀνθρώποις, τί μὲν Ἀνύτου, τί δὲ Πινδάρου. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν καλῶς ἐποίησε κακουργῶν. ἐν γὰρ τῷ μεταθεῖναι τὸ τοῦ ποιητοῦ κατηγόρηκε τοῦ Πινδάρου καὶ τὸν Σωκράτην ἐπῄνεσεν.

Clearly Libanius relies on a corrupt version of the Pindar fragment, which instead of ἄγει δικαιῶν τὸ βιαιότατον reads ἄγει βιαιῶν τὸ δικαιότατον (paraphrased here as βιάζεται τὸ δίκαιον). This corrupt text appears also in our manuscripts of the *Gorgias*. Libanius believes, or makes his defender of Socrates believe, that what is in fact the correct text (ἄγει δικαιῶν τὸ βιαιότατον) is a cunning 'improvement' of Pindar's text on the part of Anytus.

Wilamowitz argues that Plato himself misquoted the Pindar fragment, and that Polycrates jumped at the opportunity to attack him—or 'Socrates'—for the misquotation. A variation on this view is put

[86] Such as, perhaps, the charge that Alcibiades was a product of Socrates' evil influence (*Mem.* I.ii.12): see below.

[87] See especially Wilamowitz 1919 II.95–105 and Chroust 1957 pp. 89 f. with n. 507 (giving further references).

forward by Humbert: he suggests that it was Polycrates who first misquoted the fragment, and that Plato then put the misquotation in the mouth of Callicles because Callicles is a Polycrates-figure, an accuser of Socrates (Humbert 1930). Both theories are conclusively dismissed by Dodds, who shows that Plato must have quoted the Pindar fragment accurately: the manuscript reading is the product of (very early) textual corruption (Dodds 1959 pp. 270–72). Dodds does, however, accept the view that Libanius owes his knowledge of an alternative reading, the 'accusers' reading', to Polycrates' *Accusation* (p. 272).

Three facts are reasonably secure:

(i) Libanius read in his text of Plato at *Gorgias* 484b the corrupt text of the fragment, ἄγει βιαιῶν τὸ δικαιότατον/ὑπερτάτᾳ χειρί.
(ii) He believed this text—which he paraphrases ὑπερτάτῃ χειρὶ βιάζεται τὸ δίκαιον—to be what Pindar actually wrote. He took it to mean that in some sense or another violence prevails over justice; Socrates was thus right to criticise it.
(iii) Libanius knew some source in which a different version, presumably the correct text ἄγει δικαιῶν τὸ βιαιότατον ὑπερτάτᾳ χειρί, appeared as an example of a poetic text criticised by Socrates and/or used against him by his accusers.

Libanius presumably concluded that this other version, which he perhaps interpreted as meaning or being intended to mean something like δικάζεται τὸ βίαιον, had been invented by the accuser as a kind of 'cover-up' for the poet—and that it thus vindicated Socrates in his original criticism. We have no evidence, however, as to the source from which Libanius obtained this version, and no particular reason to identify it as Polycrates' *Accusation.* It could, for instance, have been a scholarly work or compendium which noted that Socrates was attacked for his use of the poets, and gave examples, taken from Plato, of passages discussed by Socrates, including the correct text of Pindar F 169a.[88] *Apologia Socratis* 87 certainly does not give us reason to believe that Libanius had the text of Polycrates' *Accusation* in front of him, much less that his work is a point-by-point refutation of Polycrates'.

[88] The correct text would presumably have continued to appear in some texts of Plato, and the error would in any case have been corrected by any reader who knew this famous passage.

On balance it seems altogether improbable, given Polycrates' other interests and his reputation as a paradoxographer, that the *Accusation of Socrates* was a serious political or philosophical document. Isocrates is not disingenuous in presenting it as a παίγνιον, and placing it on a par with the *Defence of Busiris*: Polycrates attacked Socrates, not because he was in sympathy with the accusers or jury of 399, but because he took it for granted that Socrates was a hero of his own profession (whatever Socrates himself—or Plato—might have thought of such an identification), and thus someone supremely difficult for a practitioner of παιδεία to attack.

If we cannot reconstruct the *Accusation* from Xenophon or from Libanius, we are left with only sparse information as to its contents. It made Alcibiades Socrates' 'pupil', and mentioned Conon's rebuilding of the Long Walls.[89] Aristotle tells us that Polycrates praised Thrasybulus by presenting the overthrow of the Thirty Tyrants as if it were equivalent to destroying thirty individual tyrants; this device may well have appeared in the *Accusation*.[90] Extravagant abuse of Socrates may have been set in relief by equally extravagant praise of Conon and Thrasybulus.

It is often argued that Polycrates was the first to use Alcibiades as a weapon against Socrates.[91] This view is based on three main considerations: (i) Plato's *Apology* and Xenophon's *Apology* make no mention of Alcibiades (or of Critias); (ii) *Memorabilia* deals with Alcibiades (and Critias) at some length (I.ii.12–46);[92] (iii) Isocrates' words at *Busiris* 5 suggest that the charge relating to Alcibiades was a novel one ('Ἀλκιβιάδην ἔδωκας αὐτῷ μαθητήν, ὃν ὑπ' ἐκείνου μὲν οὐδεὶς ᾔσθετο

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[89] Alcibiades: *Bus.* 5; Long Walls: Favorinus quoted in D.L. II.39. The Σ *in Ael. Arist.* ascribes to Polycrates the charge that Socrates gave an anti-democratic interpretation of *Iliad* II.188 ff. (cf. *Mem.* I.ii.58, Libanius *Apol. Socr.* 92–96); but this is less likely to be based on first-hand knowledge of the *Accusation* than on the belief that it was the real prosecution speech, and therefore contained all the charges to which Socrates' defenders reply.

[90] Arist. *Rhet.* 1401a33 f. (an example of 'apparent enthymeme'); cf. Quint. III.6.26, VII.4.44. The anonymous commentator (*in Rhet., loc. cit.*) speaks of an ἔπαινος εἰς Θρασύβουλον: that need not imply a separate speech, and is in any case probably just an inference from the text. Such a 'serious' theme would be uncharacteristic (cf. Blass II.369 n. 4); also Isocrates claims originality for *Evagoras* as the first prose ἔπαινος of a contemporary figure (though Aristotle reserves for a certain Hippolochus the honour of being the recipient of 'the first encomium': *Rhet.* 1368a17); cf. Momigliano 1971 pp. 49 ff.

[91] See e.g. Brickhouse and Smith 1989 pp. 84 f.

[92] Cf. Aeschines I *Against Timarchus* 173 Σωκράτην μὲν τὸν σοφιστὴν ἀπεκτείνατε, ὅτι Κριτίαν ἐφάνη πεπαιδευκώς . . ., and Libanius *Apol. Socr.* 136–149.

παιδευόμενον . . .). It is inferred that Alcibiades and Critias were not mentioned at the trial,[93] and that Polycrates' *Accusation* had a key role as the turning-point between an early body of Socratic literature (closely connected with the actual trial) which does not discuss these figures, and a later body which does.[94]

This inference is not justified. Reference in the fourth century to Socrates' association with Alcibiades is by no means restricted to *Memorabilia*: their relationship is dramatically presented in Plato's *Symposium*, and mentioned in *Gorgias*; Alcibiades is among those present in the *Protagoras*; and the two men were portrayed in conversation, not only in the two pseudo-Platonic *Alcibiades* dialogues, but also in dialogues by Antisthenes and Aeschines of Sphettos.[95] The most probable explanation for this literature is that it has some basis in a real relationship between Socrates and Alcibiades, the nature of which we cannot hope to reconstruct. Even if, however, the relationship is a fourth-century invention, it seems far more likely that it originated among the Socratics—who made such varied use of it—and was borrowed from them by Polycrates, than that Socrates' pupils and admirers all took their cue from Polycrates' *Accusation*.[96]

If the association between Socrates and Alcibiades was not invented by Polycrates, a different reading of *Busiris* 5 is required. Such an

[93] There is no definite evidence for this. The two *Apology* speeches are complex in their aims and technique: it is dangerous to draw a positive conclusion from their silence. It is possible that reference to Alcibiades and Critias would have been unlawful under the amnesty of 403; this raises the much-debated question of a possible political dimension to the trial of Socrates. (For the terms and application of the amnesty, see references in Brickhouse and Smith 1989 p. 32 n. 113; on the wider question, *ibid.* pp. 73 ff.; Brickhouse and Smith conclude that political charges such as those relating to Alcibiades and Critias could in fact have been used in 399—but were not.) The evidence does not seem conclusive, but, since a full discussion cannot be attempted here, it is accepted for the sake of argument that Socrates' association with Alcibiades was not mentioned at the trial.

[94] The date of *Memorabilia* is uncertain; this argument would give it a *terminus post quem* by placing it after Polycrates' *Accusation*.

[95] On Alcibiades' and Critias' appearances in Plato, see Brickhouse and Smith 1989 p. 72; on the *Alcibiades* dialogues of Antisthenes and Aeschines, Kahn 1994.

[96] This point is forcefully made by Kahn 1994 pp. 105 f. Brickhouse and Smith seem at one point to entertain the extreme view that the whole thing was pure invention on the part of Polycrates (Brickhouse and Smith 1989 p. 81 n. 58: 'we think that it is entirely possible that Polycrates alone invented this charge, perhaps out of whole cloth'), but elsewhere they clearly accept the relationship between Socrates and Alcibiades as historical (e.g. p. 72 n. 36: Alcibiades' praise of Socrates in *Symposium* 214e–222b 'can safely be considered to refer to features of the actual relationship between the two').

alternative reading is readily available. The emphasis in the relevant passage (Ἀλκιβιάδην ἔδωκας αὐτῷ μαθητήν, ὃν ὑπ' ἐκείνου μὲν οὐδεὶς ᾔσθετο παιδευόμενον . . .) is on the words μαθητήν and παιδευόμενον:[97] what Isocrates considers novel in Polycrates' accusation is that he has not merely said that Alcibiades 'associated with' Socrates, or even that Socrates 'corrupted' Alcibiades, but that Alcibiades was Socrates' *pupil*—contrary to the tradition that Socrates disclaimed being a teacher or having any pupils.[98] From Isocrates' standpoint, of course, to make Socrates a practitioner of παιδεία, and the educator of a pre-eminent public figure like Alcibiades, can only be praise. Polycrates' use of it as a charge against Socrates is symptomatic of his dangerous lack of respect for his own profession (cf. *Busiris* 49). It also gives Isocrates the opportunity to 'correct' the idea that Socrates' role as an educator was something to be denied; in this respect *Busiris* 5 anticipates *Antidosis*, where Isocrates puts himself in a quasi-Socratic role to defend his own παιδεία.[99]

Busiris 5 strongly suggests that Polycrates used the noun μαθητής, and perhaps also the verb παιδεύειν, to describe Alcibiades' relationship to Socrates. If so, it is interesting to observe that neither word is used by Xenophon or Libanius in reporting what 'the accuser' said on this subject.[100]

Thus we have no reason to believe that Polycrates was the first to use Alcibiades as an example of Socrates' 'corruption of the young', and it is very unlikely that other writers who present or discuss the relationship between the two men are primarily responding to Polycrates. The literary and philosophical interest of the pairing is so obvious that its popularity needs no explanation.

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[97] As was pointed out by Blass (II.248 n. 8).

[98] Cf. Plato *Apology* 33ab: ἐγὼ δὲ διδάσκαλος μὲν οὐδενὸς πώποτ' ἐγενόμην . . . (33b) καὶ τούτων ἐγὼ εἴτε τις χρηστὸς γίγνεται εἴτε μή, οὐκ ἂν δικαίως τὴν αἰτίαν ὑπέχοιμι, ὧν μήτε ὑπεσχόμην μηδενὶ μηδὲν πώποτε μάθημα μήτε ἐδίδαξα· εἰ δέ τίς φησι παρ' ἐμοῦ πώποτέ τι μαθεῖν ἢ ἀκοῦσαι ἰδίᾳ ὅτι μὴ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες, εὖ ἴστε ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγει.

[99] Cf. especially *Antid.* 28–32, and see Mathieu/Brémond III.89. Note the comparison and contrast between Isocrates and Socrates implicit in § 30, where Isocrates gives details of the accuser's charge that he corrupts the young: οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἰδιώτας φησί μου γεγενῆσθαι μαθητάς, ἀλλὰ καὶ ῥήτορας καὶ στρατηγοὺς καὶ βασιλέας καὶ τυράννους . . .

[100] Xenophon *Mem.* I.ii.12 ἀλλ' ἔφη μὲν ὁ κατήγορος, Σωκράτει ὁμιλητὰ γενομένω Κριτίας τε καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδης πλεῖστα κακὰ τὴν πόλιν ἐποιησάτην. Libanius *Apol. Socr.* 136 πονηρῶν δέ, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἔργων διδάσκαλον αὐτὸν Ἄνυτος καλῶν καὶ φάσκων ὑμῖν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ διεφθάρθαι τοὺς νέους οὐκ ἔσχε πλὴν Ἀλκιβιάδου καὶ Κριτίου μνησθῆναι.

Thus we know very little of the detail of Polycrates' *Accusation*; there remains the question what kind of work it can have been, if I am right in arguing that it did not present a serious case. As Professor D.A. Russell has pointed out to me, paradoxical accusations are less easy to imagine that paradoxical encomia. One possibility is that it was essentially a paradoxical ψόγος proceeding in the same way as a paradoxical encomium, but recast in the form of a prosecution: in other words, that it took obviously good qualities of Socrates (say, his personal bravery or his advocacy of σωφροσύνη) and turned them, one way or another, into grounds for condemnation (e.g. by arguing that bravery is an affront to the less brave, or that temperance is unnatural in the young, or whatever). A second possibility, perhaps easier to square with references to Alcibiades and to Conon and Thrasybulus, is that its humour consisted not so much in paradox as in the use of exaggerated or preposterous arguments (placing it more on a par with encomia of ἄδοξα such as the *Praise of Mice*); Socrates could, for instance, have been cast as personally responsible for every delinquency of every individual with whom he was associated, and thus for all the city's problems (e.g. it is possible to imagine a line of argument 'and thus the Walls were destroyed—so, thanks to Socrates, even now the city would be defenceless—if it were not for Conon', etc.). Of course this is simply guesswork. It might be easier to put flesh on the *Accusation* if we could ascribe to Polycrates some particular philosophical or political agenda; scholars who believe in the seriousness of the *Accusation* (most notably Chroust 1957) construct such an agenda for him, but in doing so they go well beyond the evidence.

For the content of Polycrates' *Busiris*, our evidence comes from Isocrates' *Busiris* alone, and thus consists mainly of features picked out by Isocrates for special ridicule.[101] These accord well with the

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101 Polycrates' speech will be referred to simply as *Busiris*, rather than *Encomium of Busiris* or *Defence of Busiris*, because it is uncertain what title, if any, Polycrates gave it. Isocrates initially identifies it as *Defence of Busiris* (*Bus.* 4), but regards it as containing attempts at both praise and defence (§ 9). Philodemus' and Quintilian's references to the work suggest *Encomium* (Philodemus II p. 216 Sudhaus Βουσείριδας … ἐγκωμιάζοντες, Quintilian II.17.4 'cum Busirim laudaret'), but they may well know of it only from Isocrates. In Isocrates' allusions to it, the idea of defence predominates over that of praise (defence: § 4 τῇ Βουσίριδος ἀπολογίᾳ, 5 ἀπολογήσασθαι φάσκων, 37 ἀπολύσασθαι … διαβολὴν, 44 οὐκ ἀπολογίαν … ἀλλ' ὁμολογίαν, 48 τὰς ἀπολογίας: praise, e.g. 31 βουληθεὶς … Βούσιριν εὐλογεὶν, 47 ἃ σὺ τυγχάνεις εὐλογῶν). But Isocrates' introduction of the speech as *Defence of Busiris* may well be

impression of Polycrates' technique we obtain from other sources. He made of Busiris an inhuman figure who sacrificed and devoured his guests, and who was personally responsible for splitting the Nile in its course to create the Delta (§ 5, 31). Polycrates' Busiris sought to rival the reputation of Aeolus and of Orpheus: it is not clear what the point of comparison was (see note on § 7 ζηλῶσαι δόξαν), but these blameless figures may have had the same function in the praise of Busiris as Penelope in Polycrates' *Encomium of Clytemnestra*, Hector in the unascribed *Encomium of Paris*, and possibly Agamemnon in a Polycratean *Encomium of Thersites*.

Busiris was defended on the grounds 'that certain others had also done the same things' (*Bus.* 45). The weakness of this argument need not have been so obvious as Isocrates makes it appear. We can perhaps find a clue as to what the strategy might have been in a line of argument from the *Encomium of Paris*, summarised by Aristotle: ὅτι, εἰ μηδὲ Θησεὺς ἠδίκησεν, οὐδ' Ἀλέξανδρος, καὶ εἰ μηδ' οἱ Τυνδαρίδαι, οὐδ' Ἀλέξανδρος, καὶ εἰ Πάτροκλον Ἕκτωρ, καὶ Ἀχιλλέα Ἀλέξανδρος (1397b23–25). The fact that Polycrates' *Busiris* relied on the same sort of specious argument is a small point in favour of regarding the *Encomium of Paris* too as the work of Polycrates.

III. *The date of the* Busiris

We do not know for certain when *Busiris* was written, and most of the arguments involved in its dating are to some extent subjective or impressionistic.

There are two main views. One places *Busiris* among the first pieces Isocrates wrote after opening his school, probably in the period 388–384, and certainly before *Panegyricus*. The other associates the date of *Busiris* with the (equally uncertain) date of Plato's *Republic*, and suggests a date in the 370s.[102] In this section the evidence on both sides will be examined, and it will be argued tentatively that the later dating is more likely to be correct. This conclusion is based

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influenced by the neat antithesis this provides with the *Accusation of Socrates*, while the predominance of defence-words may reflect the fact that direct references to Polycrates' work occur in Isocrates' own Defence section, not in his Encomium.

[102] 388–384: see e.g. Mathieu/Brémond I.184 f.; 370s: see Eucken 1983 pp. 173 ff.

primarily on the belief that there is a link between the Αἰγυπτίων πολιτεία in the *Busiris* and the account of an ideal state in Plato's *Republic*: the evidence for such a link will be discussed in detail in **IV.i** below.

Any attempt to determine the date of the *Busiris* presupposes, perhaps naïvely, that Isocrates' existing works were composed, and disseminated, in a definite chronological order which we could in principle reconstruct. The assumption may be naïve because we know almost nothing about the early history of this corpus of texts. Y.L. Too has argued that Isocrates' works construct for themselves a 'narrative order' which has a unifying function, and which must be distinguished from the historical order of composition.[103] As Too points out, recognition of this distinction does not in itself invalidate traditional chronological inquiry; but it does make the task of 'dating' considerably more complex. It also points to a deeper problem. If the corpus we have is itself a construct, how can we tell how any of its parts relate to whatever Isocrates may have written and disseminated separately, before the corpus was assembled? Isocrates was certainly a perfectionist, and it is possible that his revision and restructuring of his life's work was, in some cases, so substantial as to efface their real historical ordering altogether—though we have no evidence that such is the case. These questions are important, and hard to answer; but since, as will be seen, the conclusions that can be drawn on factual grounds about the relative chronology of *Busiris* are almost entirely negative, there is little point in debating whether it is a 'real' or a 'dramatic' date that is at issue.

Before discussing *Busiris* itself, it will be useful briefly to survey the evidence concerning other 'landmarks' in Isocrates' early career, which are invoked as reference-points in the controversy.

III.i *The opening of Isocrates' school*

It is unclear how formal Isocrates' teaching arrangements were, and the number of students at any one time was probably quite small, so it may be misleading to speak of the opening of a school. The start of Isocrates' pedagogical career (though this too is a questionable concept) is regularly dated shortly before 390 B.C.[104] None of

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103 Too 1995 pp. 41–48.
104 E.g. Mathieu/Brémond I.139.

the extant forensic speeches is later than 390; one of them, the *Trapeziticus* (which can be dated to the range 394–390), was written for a young Bosporan nobleman who is said to have been a μαθητής of Isocrates.[105] It is inferred that the *Trapeziticus* comes from a small period of overlap between Isocrates' forensic and pedagogical activity. This argument has the weakness that Dionysius' description of the speaker of *Trapeziticus* as a μαθητής may be an inference rather than an independent piece of information. Still it seems plausible that the end (so far as our evidence goes) of Isocrates' forensic work coincides more-or-less with the beginning of his full commitment to παιδεία.[106]

III.ii Against the Sophists

In *Antidosis* Isocrates, introducing a passage from *Against the Sophists*, refers to it as a speech produced 'when I was starting to follow this profession' (§ 193: ὅτ' ἠρχόμην περὶ ταύτην εἶναι τὴν πραγματείαν). This places *Against the Sophists* near the beginning of Isocrates' teaching career (though it does not in itself justify the common conclusion that it is the earliest of the pedagogical speeches). It is usually dated c. 390, soon after the received date for the opening of the school,[107] but from the perspective of *Antidosis* (354/3) the 'beginning' of Isocrates career could probably extend further than that. We can perhaps not go much further than to say that *Against the Sophists* is likely to be earlier than *Panegyricus*. There is reason to believe that the speech is earlier than Alcidamas' *On the Sophists*, but this does not help much towards establishing an absolute date.[108]

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[105] D.H. *Isocrates* 18. On the date of *Trapeziticus*, see Mathieu/Brémond I.68.

[106] Blass tries to date the opening of the school using the list of Isocrates' early pupils at *Antidosis* 93, together with our other evidence for their biographies (particularly important is Lysias XIX *On the Property of Aristophanes* 15 (c. 387 B.C.), where Philomelus—one of the second group of pupils—figures as the speaker's brother-in-law). He concludes that the date cannot be much later than 393. The problem with Blass' method is that it is hard to know exactly what kind of association is meant by the expression used at *Antid.* 93 (ἤρξαντο . . . μοι . . . πλησιάζειν), or, more generally, by the word μαθητής—especially when the 'pupils' in question were themselves normally resident in Athens, and when we are discussing the beginnings of Isocrates' teaching career. Did they necessarily take a one-off, full-time course of study with Isocrates before entering public life? If it is possible that they assimilated Isocrates' teaching at the same time as beginning, or continuing, their adult careers, then Blass' dating argument dissolves.

[107] E.g. Mathieu/Brémond I.139, Eucken 1983 p. 5.

[108] See Livingstone (forthcoming).

III.iii Helen

Helen is conventionally dated between 390 and 380: after the received date for the opening of the school, before *Panegyricus*. Again there is no concrete evidence. Subjectively it seems likely that the sharp, lively, targeted ironies of the *Helen*'s prologue are a follow-up to the broader attack on sophistic teachers in *Against the Sophists*, but since the exact nature and function of *Against the Sophists* is far from clear this must remain a guess. The argument that *Helen* must be earlier than *Panegyricus* because § 67–68 'anticipate' the panhellenism of *Panegyricus* is a *petitio principi*.[109]

III.iv Panegyricus

In form *Panegyricus* is an Olympic oration, but like all Isocrates' pedagogical works it was composed, not to be performed orally by its author, but for some form of written dissemination. Dating here depends on two apparently contradictory allusions to contemporary events: one passage would associate it with the Olympic festival of 384, another with that of 380.[110] Various attempts have been made to resolve this difficulty,[111] but they do not take account of the fact that *Panegyricus* is a *fictional* Olympic oration. It could have been disseminated before an Olympiad, to feed people's anticipation, or after one, to outshine whatever oratory had in fact been on offer; and since it would reach its audience, not at the festival itself, nor indeed

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[109] See e.g. Eucken 1983 p. 44.

[110] § 141, which speaks of Evagoras' war against the Persians in Cyprus as continuing and unresolved, suggests 384: two passages of Diodorus conflict as to when this war ended, but at all events it seems to have been over before 380 (D.S. XIV.98 suggests 381, XV.9.2 suggests 385). § 126, which speaks of the Spartans as currently besieging Olynthus and Phlius, suggests 380: these sieges lasted from 382 to 379 and from 381 to 379 respectively.

[111] Engel 1861 suggests that *Panegyricus* went through two 'editions', the first published in 384, the second—our surviving text—in 380. For the second edition, Isocrates added what is now § 125–132 (or possibly § 122–132: cf. Blass II.252 n. 2), but he omitted to correct the now-anachronistic § 141. Mathieu argues for 380 as the date of publication: he assumes that war in Cyprus ended in 381, and that § 141 is either a passage which was written earlier and remained uncorrected, or an indication that even in 380 Isocrates considered Evagoras a 'dangerous adversary' for the Great King (Mathieu/Bremond II.5). Eucken puts forward another argument in favour of 380: in his view, Isocrates' reference in § 141 to six years of war (ἤδη . . . ἓξ ἔτη διατέτριφεν) must have as its starting point the 'Peace of Antalcidas' of 387/6. He concludes that Diodorus' testimony is to be rejected: the war in Cyprus was still being fought in 380.

at any one precise moment, but in various times and places, it would not need to recreate the circumstances of the festival with any exactitude—the 'dramatic date' need not be clearly, or even consistently, defined. Hence the 'contemporary' references really provide us only with a *terminus post quem*, namely 381 (the start of the siege of Phlius). It seems reasonable to suppose that the *Panegyricus* was completed and began to circulate quite soon after this, while the events mentioned in it were still at least fresh memories, but it is impossible to say exactly how soon.

III.v Busiris

The most widely held view places *Busiris* in the early-to-mid 380's.[112] In outline, the arguments on which this view rests are as follows. (i) Polycrates' *Accusation of Socrates* appeared (so it is assumed) soon after 393; *Busiris*, which presents Polycrates as a relative novice, should not come too long after the *Accusation*. (ii) In 390, the Egyptians, with Athenian support, repelled a Persian invasion: this would be a good historical background for the praise of Egypt in *Busiris*. (iii) At *Busiris* 50 Isocrates draws attention to his own relative youth: this favours an earlier date. (iv) As a playful speech, a παίγνιον, *Busiris* belongs with *Helen* in the early years of Isocrates' teaching career: written earlier at any rate than the appearance of *Panegyricus*, and probably before Isocrates began the long work of composing the masterpiece.[113] So, on this view, *Busiris* must lie between 390 and 380, and is probably closer to 390.

Each of these arguments has its weaknesses. (i) We have no *terminus ante quem* for Polycrates' *Accusation*.[114] The view that it appeared

[112] See e.g. Mathieu/Brémond I.184–85; Münscher 1916; Münscher 1927 pp. 1099–1101; Pohlenz 1913 pp. 164 and 218 ff.; Ries 1959 p. 51.

[113] The time devoted to the writing of *Panegyricus* is mentioned, but not quantified, by Isocrates himself (*Paneg.* 10): it becomes a τόπος for later authors. Timaeus makes it a foil to the greatness of Alexander: it took Alexander less time to conquer Asia than it took Isocrates to advocate doing so (*FGrH* 566 F 139 = [Longinus] *On the Sublime* 4.2). The author of *On the Sublime*, in his comment on Timaeus' comparison, sets the time taken at ten years. Cf. D.H. *De Compositione Verborum* 25, Quint. X.4.4 (both giving ten years as a minimum), Plut. *The Glory of Athens* 350de (nearly three Olympiads), [Plut.] *Vit. X Or.* 837f (some say ten, some say fifteen years).

[114] Bluck 1961 places Polycrates' *Accusation* c. 386, between Plato's *Gorgias* and *Meno*; but in my view his arguments, like so much scholarly discussion of the chronology of this period, are based on an overestimate both of the seriousness of the *Accusation* and of our knowledge of its contents.

soon after 393 rests largely on the assumption that other Socratic literature such as *Memorabilia* responds to it: as has been shown, this view is without foundation (see **II** above). Also *Busiris* need not follow closely on the appearance of the *Accusation*: in view of the ironic tone of the Prologue, it is hard to know how seriously to take its implication that Polycrates has only recently embarked on a rhetorical career. (ii) The Encomium of Egypt need not be associated with any climate of pro-Egyptian sentiment: as will be argued, it is not wholly serious, and it includes features such as the 'superstition' of animal worship which Athenians tended not to admire (see **V.i** below). In any case, interest in things Egyptian among classical Athenians seems to have been continuous, not sporadic. (iii) When Isocrates describes himself as 'younger' at *Busiris* 50, the word must be strictly comparative in sense: in 393 he was already over forty.[115] (iv) The mythological theme of *Busiris* certainly gives it an affinity with the *Helen*, and its polemical content associates it with both *Helen* and *Against the Sophists*, but the links do not entitle us to infer closeness in time. There is σπουδή as well as παιδιά in both *Helen* and *Busiris*; in any case, there is no reason to assume that Isocrates' works 'progressed' from playfulness to seriousness.[116]

The argument for a later dating, probably in the 370s, is put forward most fully as well as most recently by Eucken (Eucken 1983 pp. 180–83). He argues that Isocrates' reference to 'philosophers who choose (or 'choose to praise') the Egyptian constitution' indicates that he has some specific target in mind in his own sketch of the Egyptian state and its culture.[117] The target must be a contemporary philosopher (cf. present participles in *Bus.* 17) whose political theory has points of contact with Isocrates' picture of Egypt. This can only be Plato: no other known figure fits the description.

Eucken believes that *Busiris* was written at a time when the *Republic* had not yet appeared, but when the ideas that it would contain were already widely discussed and the dialogue itself eagerly anticipated. This accounts for the fact that *Busiris* echoes themes and arguments of the *Republic*, but has few close verbal reminiscences; it also gives

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[115] Cf. Eucken 1983 p. 175.

[116] Some other attempts to establish *termini* are discussed, and shown to be unsuccessful, at Eucken 1983 p. 175 n. 22.

[117] *Bus.* 17 . . . ὥστε καὶ τῶν φιλοσόφων τοὺς ὑπὲρ τῶν τοιούτων λέγειν ἐπιχειροῦντας καὶ μάλιστ' εὐδοκιμοῦντας τὴν ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ προαιρεῖσθαι πολιτείαν (ἐπαινεῖν Γ) . . .

a literal and precise sense to the present participle ἐπιχειροῦντας in § 17. In his view, we can find Isocrates' notice of the actual appearance of the *Republic* (whatever that may mean in practice) in *To Nicocles* 7, where he speaks of literary works which arouse great expectations but fail to satisfy them: a display of *Schadenfreude* at the mixed public reception of Plato's dialogue.[118] When he goes on to say that his present work fills a gap by 'giving laws to monarchies', he is letting his audience understand that *To Nicocles* will succeed where *Republic* tried and failed.[119]

This latter part of Eucken's account is little more than guesswork. We have no evidence concerning either public anticipation of the *Republic* or public reaction to it when it first appeared. (It is a further question whether we should imagine the publication of a literary work at this period—other than one performed on an important public occasion—as an 'event' in the sense which Eucken's argument seems to require.) What Isocrates says at *To Nicocles* 7–8 makes perfect sense within the development of the speech itself; the passage does not need, and is not obviously enhanced by, a cryptic allusion to Plato.[120] Its wording in fact seems to suit a general reference better than a dig at an individual.[121] Returning to *Busiris*, the pre-

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[118] *Ad Nic.* 7 πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ τῶν μετὰ μέτρου ποιημάτων καὶ τῶν καταλογάδην συγγραμμάτων ἔτι μὲν ἐν ταῖς διανοίαις ὄντα τῶν συντιθέντων μεγάλας τὰς προσδοκίας παρέσχεν, ἐπιτελεσθέντα δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐπιδειχθέντα πολὺ καταδεεστέραν τὴν δόξαν τῆς ἐλπίδος ἔλαβεν.

[119] *Ad Nic.* 8 οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τό γ' ἐπιχείρημα καλῶς ἔχει, τὸ ζητεῖν τὰ παραλελειμμένα καὶ νομοθετεῖν ταῖς μοναρχίαις. In the *Republic* monarchy (βασιλεία, e.g. 445d) is identified as one form of the ideal constitution, and νομοθετεὶν is frequently used, as here, in a figurative sense (e.g. 398b, 425 *passim*).

[120] Determination to continue in spite of difficulties is a proem τόπος: cf. *Bus.* 3 ὅμως δ' οὐκ ὀνκητέον . . ., and see note *ad loc.* The reflection on literary failures is to be seen in the light of Isocrates' determination to write 'as no one else can' (see e.g. *Paneg.* 10); the difficulty of writing well is a favourite theme for him (see Usher 1990 on *ad Nic.* 7, comparing *Soph.* 14–17 and *Antid.* 187–191), and diffidence as to whether the speech will be 'a worthy gift' is perhaps particularly appropriate when the recipient is a king. The connection of ideas here—Isocrates recognises the difficulties of his task, and claims he is doing for the first time something which should have been done before, but has not been—has a close parallel in *Evagoras* 5–11.

[121] On Eucken's reading, the antithesis καὶ τῶν μετὰ μέτρου ποιημάτων καὶ τῶν καταλογάδην συγγραμμάτων would have to suggest something like 'not just poems, but prose works too', which seems forced; it looks more like a general reference to all works of literature, expressing Isocrates' sense that he is in competition with poets as well as prose-writers (cf. e.g. *ad Nic.* 42 ff., *Evag.* 8 ff.). The expression ζητεῖν τὰ παραλελειμμένα καὶ νομοθετεῖν ταῖς μοναρχίαις implies that 'making laws for monarchies' is something which past writers have omitted to do, not something

sent participle ἐπιχειροῦντας need not imply that whoever Isocrates has in mind is making the attempt in question now, even as Isocrates writes: the present tense is more naturally understood as timeless, 'those who try (at any time)'.

There is no need, then, to follow Eucken in finding an overt reference to Plato at *Busiris* 17. For his larger thesis—that the sketch of the Egyptian constitution in *Busiris* parodies a philosophical 'ideal state' similar to that in Plato's *Republic*, and that the target is likely to be the *Republic* itself—there is a stronger case. The arguments will be examined in the next section.

In conclusion, the technical evidence we have does not enable us to fix the date of *Busiris*, and does not justify the orthodoxy that it is among Isocrates' first pedagogical works. Where we place the work in relation to Isocrates' career will depend on interpretation. Several characteristics of the work may be taken to suggest, subjectively, a relatively early date: Isocrates is concerned to articulate differences between his own productions and the 'sophistic' rhetoric represented by Polycrates, which later in his career we might expect to be taken for granted; and his careful self-presentation as an established expert and defender of the honour of his profession perhaps suggests that he was not, in reality, all that well-known as yet. On the other hand, connections between *Busiris* and the *Republic* may indicate that it was not written as early as has been generally supposed. We may guess at the early 370s as the most likely period for the composition and dissemination of *Busiris*; but in our present state of knowledge, plausibility is the most that can be claimed.

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they have attempted without success (for παραλελειμμένα cf. *Helen* 67, *Panath.* 208). It is true that the figurative use here of the verb νομοθετεῖν has no exact parallel in Isocrates (the closest is *Nic.* 7 = *Antid.* 255), but nor is it quite the same as the use of the word in *Republic* (here it refers to the setting down of moral precepts which are *like* laws, in *Republic* to the making of laws for an *imaginary* state), and it is any case quite straightforward and comprehensible. (Usher, the most recent commentator on *To Nicocles*, seems to adopt Cobet's conjecture νουθετεῖν τὰς μοναρχίας (it does not appear in his text or apparatus, but cf. 'to offer advice to kings' in his translation, Usher 1990 p. 123), which derives some support from the appearance of accusative τὰς μοναρχίας on papyrus; if this emendation is correct, the point based on νομοθετεῖν obviously dissolves.)

IV. Busiris *and Plato*

It has long since been observed that there are points of connection between *Busiris* and several Platonic dialogues, the *Republic* in particular.[122] In this section, these connections (and possible connections) are reviewed, and some interpretations are proposed. I argue for relationships of influence, not just of similarity; but it should at once be stressed that because of our limited knowledge of what was being written and said in the early fourth century, as well as deep uncertainty about the relative chronology of writings which have survived, all conclusions must be very provisional. For purposes of this discussion I follow a broad but not universal consensus in assuming that *Republic, Phaedrus, Timaeus* and *Critias* were composed in that order, with a substantial gap between *Republic* and *Timaeus*; I place *Busiris* between *Republic* and *Phaedrus*. Should this order be changed, the relationships of influence would need to be reassessed,[123] but it is my hope and belief that the lines of interpretation offered here—suggesting for instance how *Busiris* might function as a reading of *Republic*, and how *Phaedrus* might function as a reading of *Busiris*—would not thereby lose all their value.

IV.i Republic

The 'Egyptian constitution' sketched in *Busiris* 15–27 is in several respects reminiscent of the constitutional programme put forward in Plato's *Republic*, and there are reasons to think that it mimics the *Republic* itself. The resemblances and links which form the basis of this view are as follows:

> (i) § 15 . . . dividing them all into groups, he [Busiris] appointed some to priesthoods, set others to work at crafts, and compelled others to train themselves for war, in the belief that necessaries and surplus must be furnished by the land and by crafts, and that the surest way to preserve them (φυλακή) is preparation for war and piety towards the gods.

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[122] See the discussion in Eucken 1983 pp. 172–212, with references to earlier scholarship; also Morgan 1998 p. 110.

[123] For example, a revival of the view that *Timaeus* and *Critias* belong closely in date with the *Republic* (Owen 1953; *contra*, Cherniss 1957) would allow a simpler, if less interesting, explanation of similarities between *Busiris* on the one hand and *Republic, Timaeus* and *Critias* on the other, in terms of a one-way relationship of influence of Plato upon Isocrates.

Herodotus' account of the Egyptian class system lists seven categories.[124] Isocrates' threefold division could be derived from it by quite a natural process of simplification, taking the two best-known and most important classes—the μάχιμοι and the ἱερεῖς—and grouping all the rest together as 'workers'. On the other hand, it also matches the three classes which emerge in the *Republic*: the philosopher-guardians (φύλακες, ἄρχοντες or φιλόσοφοι), the soldiers (ἐπίκουροι or στρατιῶται), and the workers (δημιουργοί).[125] In *Busiris* the ἱερεῖς take the place of Plato's φύλακες (see § 22, discussed below), and εὐσέβεια correspondingly takes the place of δικαιοσύνη.[126] The noun φυλακή here, and the verb διαφυλάττουσιν in § 17, may perhaps echo Plato's term φύλαξ, though neither word is striking enough in its context to make this more than a slight possibility.

> (ii) § 16 He included all the numbers[127] out of which a community might best be organised, and it was always the same people he instructed to take in hand the same activities, because he knew that those who change from job to job do not attain precision in so much as one of their tasks, whereas those who remain constantly in the same activity accomplish every task to a pre-eminent standard.

A similar principle of specialisation is central to the *Republic*: cf. 433a ὅτι ἕνα ἕκαστον ἓν δέοι ἐπιτηδεύειν, expressed in a more abstract form as 'doing what is one's own', τὸ τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν (433b etc.). In *Republic* it is justified mainly on the grounds that different people are naturally suited to different occupations, but also, as here in *Busiris*, by reference to the greater expertise and concentration attained by constant adherence to one occupation.[128] The fact that in *Republic* τὸ

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[124] For further discussion see note on § 15 διελόμενος . . . ἠνάγκασεν.

[125] In the *Republic*, this division into three classes first becomes explicit in the Myth of the Metals (414d–415c). Up to this point, there has been no clear distinction between the ἐπίκουροι and the true φύλακες. At 414b it is suggested that the ἐπίκουροι are simply younger than the φύλακες, but this is contradicted by the Myth in which the former have silver natures and the latter gold, and from then on two distinct groups seem to be envisaged. The first actual list of the three γένη appears in the discussion of the virtues of the state: e.g. 434c (χρηματιστικόν, ἐπικουρικόν, φυλακικόν) and 441a, where the three classes (χρηματιστικόν, ἐπικουρητικόν, βουλευτικόν) are found to correspond to the three parts of the soul (ἐπιθυμητικόν, θυμοειδές, λογιστικόν).

[126] See note on § 24–27.

[127] The interpretation of this statement is difficult: see note on § 16 ἅπαντας δὲ τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς περιλαβών.

[128] Argument from natural ability: e.g. 370ab, 433a. Arguments from experience and concentration: e.g. ἑνὶ ἑκάστῳ . . . ἓν ἀπεδίδομεν, πρὸς ὃ ἐπεφύκει ἕκαστος καὶ

τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν is found to be the essence of δικαιοσύνη would illuminate the prominence given to 'specialisation' in *Busiris*, and in particular the fact that it is said to be responsible not only for the technical superiority of the Egyptians but also for their enviable political system (σύνταξις).[129]

> (iii) § 17 we will find . . . that in respect of their constitutional structure (σύνταξις), by means of which they protect their kingship and the other aspects of their state (τὴν ἄλλην πολιτείαν), they show such excellence, that philosophers who set out to treat these subjects choose to praise the Egyptian constitution (πολιτεία), and that the Spartans, by imitating in part the arrangements there, achieve the best organisation of their own city. For the policy that none of the fighting-men may leave the country without the approval of the authorities, the practice of communal meals, the physical discipline, the guarantee that none need neglect his public duties through lack of the necessities of life, and that none [of the military class] spends time on other trades, but that all devote their attention to their arms and their campaigning—all these features they have borrowed from Egypt.

If the expression 'choose to praise the Egyptian constitution' (τὴν ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ προαιρεῖσθαι πολιτείαν ἐπαινεῖν)[130] is taken exactly at face value (and *de dicto*), then the reference is obscure to us: we do not know of a philosopher who praised Egypt as having the best constitution.[131] It seems likely, though, that a broader (*de re*) interpretation is appropriate—the philosopher in question chose to praise the constitution which (according to Isocrates) as a matter of fact exists in Egypt, but did not necessarily refer to Egypt itself. In this case the field opens to include, potentially, any philosopher who admired a Spartan-style constitution—Xenophon perhaps; but the antithesis καὶ τῶν φιλοσόφων . . . καὶ τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους is most effective if the instance of the 'Egyptian constitution' praised by the philosophers is not in fact the Spartan one—the *Republic* fits the bill admirably.

ἐφ' ᾧ ἔμελλε τῶν ἄλλων σχολὴν ἄγων διὰ βίου αὐτὸ ἐργαζόμενος οὐ παριεὶς τοὺς καιροὺς καλῶς ἀπεργάσεσθαι, and 374de. The whole discussion in 374 echoes familiar terms used in defining the requirements of rhetoric: the trio φύσις/τέχνη/μελετή, and the need to respond to καιροί (cf. e.g. Isoc. *Soph.* 16–17). Once the principle of τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν is applied to the soul, considerations of experience and concentration give way entirely to the argument from natural ability.

[129] See § 17 τοιγαροῦν . . .

[130] On the text here, see note *ad loc.*

[131] Except, perhaps, Plato in the *Timaeus*: see **IV.iii** below.

The features Sparta is alleged to have borrowed from Egypt all have parallels in the *Republic*:[132]

(a) τὸ μηδένα . . . ἀποδημεῖν: 420a οὐδ' ἂν ἀποδημῆσαι βούλωνται ἰδίᾳ, ἔξεσται αὐτοῖς (a consequence of the fact that the φύλακες are unpaid, and part of the objection 'they will not be happy' anticipated by Socrates).
(b) τὰ συσσίτια: 416e φοιτῶντας δὲ εἰς συσσίτια ὥσπερ ἐστρατοπεδευμένους κοινῇ ζῆν, 458c οἰκίας τε καὶ συσσίτια κοινὰ ἔχοντες.
(c) τὴν τῶν σωμάτων ἄσκησιν: 403c δεῖ μὲν δὴ καὶ ταύτῃ [sc. τῇ γυμναστικῇ] ἀκριβῶς τρέφεσθαι ἐκ παίδων διὰ βίου, and ff. (cf. 404a κομψοτέρας δή τινος . . . ἀσκήσεως δεῖ τοῖς πολεμικοῖς ἀθληταῖς).
(d) τὸ μηδενὸς τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀποροῦντας . . . ἀμελεῖν: 416de τὰ δ' ἐπιτήδεια . . . ταξαμένους παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν δέχεσθαι μισθὸν τῆς φυλακῆς.
(e) μηδ' ἐπὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις διατρίβειν: implied by the doctrine of τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν, and frequently stated, e.g. 374de.

> (iv) § 22–23 and for souls they [sc. οἱ ἱερεῖς] discovered the exercise of philosophy, which has the power both to make laws (νομοθετῆσαι) and to inquire into the nature of what exists (τὴν φύσιν τῶν ὄντων ζητῆσαι). And he set the older ones in charge of the most important affairs . . .

This description of philosophy matches its role in the *Republic*: philosophical study confers on the mature guardians a knowledge of Reality which makes them uniquely fitted to govern the city (see e.g. 540ab). It bears little relation, on the other hand, either to Isocrates' own conception of φιλοσοφία (broadly equivalent to λόγων παιδεία, instilling sound judgement and the ability to give good advice on political questions: see e.g. *Paneg.* 47 f.) or to earlier Greek accounts of the Egyptian priests, whose wisdom as presented by Herodotus is primarily historical and theological.

> (v) § 23 . . . but persuaded the young to set pleasures aside and spend their time on astronomy and calculations (λογισμοί) and geometry . . .

This matches the educational program of *Republic*: see e.g. 536d τὰ μὲν τοίνυν λογισμῶν καὶ γεωμετριῶν καὶ πάσης τῆς προπαιδείας, ἣν τῆς διαλεκτικῆς δεῖ προπαιδευθῆναι, παισὶν οὖσι χρὴ προβάλλειν (cf. also

[132] Cf. Eucken 1983 p. 178 with n. 34.

530b προβλήμασιν ἄρα . . . χρώμενοι ὥσπερ γεωμετρίαν οὕτω καὶ ἀστρονομίαν μέτιμεν).

> (vi) § 24 but those who have taken charge of religion in such a way as to make both the gods' attention and their retribution seem to be more exact than they really are—such people are the greatest benefactors of human existence.

This could be said to be a feature, not so much of the regime described in the *Republic*, but of the *Republic* itself, in the 'Myth of Er' (*Republic* 614b ff.: e.g. 616a τὰς μὲν δὴ δίκας τε καὶ τιμωρίας τοιαύτας τινὰς εἶναι, καὶ αὖ τὰς εὐεργεσίας ταύταις ἀντιστρόφους).

A case which might be advanced as a caution against asserting any connection between *Busiris* and the *Republic* is that of Aristophanes' *Ecclesiazusae*. Praxagora's communist policy (*Ecclesiazusae* 583–709) has points of contact with the system envisaged at *Republic* 457c ff.[133] It would be easy to assume, on the basis of these correspondences, that the comedy parodies the *Republic*: but considerations of chronology make this hypothesis difficult at the very least.[134] I believe, however, that the case of *Ecclesiazusae* is only superficially comparable with the case of *Busiris*.[135] *Ecclesiazusae* parallels a single strand of *Republic*, the communal lifestyle of the guardians. While there are intriguing sim-

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[133] See Adam 1902 I.345–355 (list of textual parallels, 350 f.), Ussher 1973 pp. xv–xx, Eucken 1983 pp. 180 f., Halliwell 1993 pp. 224 f. The principal common features are: (i) community in sex and reproduction (*Eccl.* 614 f., *Rep.* 457cd); (ii) state control of sex and reproduction (*Eccl.* 615–629, *Rep.* 458de, 459d–461c); (iii) familial relations universal within the state (*Eccl.* 635–643, *Rep.* 461de, 463c); (iv) community of possessions (*Eccl.* 590–594, *Rep.* 416de, 464bc) leading to freedom from disputes (*Eccl.* 657–671, *Rep.* 464de); (v) common quarters and συσσίτια (*Eccl.* 673–676, 715 f., *Rep.* 416de).

[134] *Ecclesiazusae* cannot be dated exactly, but it must belong in the close vicinity of 393/2 (cf. Ussher 1973 pp. xx–xxv). Few Plato scholars would wish to place the *Republic* so early in its author's career, though it has been suggested that the ideas in question might have appeared in an early version (for the hypothesis of an 'early *Republic*', see Thesleff 1982 pp. 101–10). Conversely it has also been argued that *Republic* itself 'replies' to *Ecclesiazusae* (the play having parodied Plato's known, but unpublished, views): see Boeckh 1811 p. 26, and cf. Adam 1902 I.354, Eucken 1983 p. 181 n. 45; *contra*, Wilamowitz 1919 II.199 f., Ussher 1973 p. xvii with n. 4; other refs., Ussher 1973 p. xvii n. 5. This latter view, however, rests primarily on Socrates' remarks about those who may mock the provisions for female guardians (collected by Adam, I.349), and these are concentrated precisely in that part of the discussion of women which does not in fact contain striking parallels with *Ecclesiazusae* (namely *Rep.* 450a–457b, dealing with the need for women guardians to participate in training and particularly in athletics: see Halliwell 1993 p. 225 § (E)).

[135] So also Eucken 1983 pp. 180 f.

ilarities in the way this idea is developed in the two texts, in each case the development is determined by a clear, and quite independent, guiding logic. Thus in *Ecclesiazusae* communism is a vehicle for a number of stock comic themes: γυναικοκρατία; the predicament of those whose sexual appetite exceeds their sexual attractiveness; father-beaters; debt-evasion; συκοφάνται and litigiousness, etc.; its orientation is 'populist and hedonistic'.[136] In *Republic*, on the other hand, the communal life of the guardians is motivated by the need to ensure the 'oneness' of the city, which would be challenged by any impulse to competition, and by the very existence of distinct families; state control of reproduction provides an apparatus for implementing the programme of eugenics already adumbrated in the Myth of the Metals; and so on. 'Communism' of the kind that is in question here was not an entirely new idea for the Athenians:[137] there is no need to assume either a cross-reference between *Ecclesiazusae* and *Republic* or one particular common source for the two works.[138]

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[136] Halliwell 1993 p. 224 § (B).

[137] Cf. the egalitarian political theory of Phaleas of Chalcedon (Arist. *Pol.* 1266a, 1274b). Sexual communism was described by Herodotus both among the Scythian Agathyrsoi and among the Libyan Makhlyes and Auseeis. The motive he ascribes to the former is reminiscent of *Republic*: ἐπίκοινον δὲ τῶν γυναικῶν τὴν μεῖξιν ποιεῦνται, ἵνα κασίγνητοί τε ἀλλήλων ἔωσι καὶ οἰκήιοι ἐόντες πάντες μήτε φθόνῳ μήτ' ἔχθεϊ χρέωνται ἐς ἀλλήλους (IV.104). Among the latter he makes the practice sound less dignified (IV.180.5 μεῖξιν δὲ ἐπίκοινον τῶν γυναικῶν ποιέονται, οὔτε συνοικέοντες κτηνηδόν τε μισγόμενοι), but he does tell us their answer to the problem of child-father recognition: each infant is assigned to the man it most resembles (IV.180.6). A character in Euripides' *Protesilaus* was also made to recommend this policy (F 653 κοινὸν γὰρ εἶναι χρῆν γυναικεῖον λέχος); cf. also the slightly different recommendation in F 402 νόμοι γυναικῶν οὐ καλῶς κεῖνται πέρι·/χρῆν γὰρ τὸν εὐτυχοῦνθ' ὅτι πλείστας ἔχειν . . . Even so it is perhaps overstating the case to say that 'communism was at this time much in the air' (Ussher 1973 p. xvi). Halliwell 1993 pp. 10–12 provides a survey (with bibliography) of evidence for heterodox views at Athens on the proper role of women, and of sources that may have influenced such views.

[138] Cf. Halliwell 1993 p. 224 § (D): 'it is easier and preferable to believe that Ar[istophanes] gleaned and amalgamated ideas from a variety of sources'. Ussher does endorse the notion of a common source ('that both rely on an earlier philosopher is not only likely, but attractive', Ussher 1973 p. xx), but his own arguments in pp. xix–xx seem to point to the opposite conclusion. The source imagined would have to be a work which was familiar to both Aristophanes and Plato, and yet was missed or ignored by Aristotle, who states that 'no-one else' among political theorists had made such an innovation as community of women and children (*Pol.* 1266a34 ff.). (We do not know what led Aristoxenus to claim that 'virtually all' of the *Republic* had appeared before in Protagoras' *Antilogika* (D.L. III.37, cf. III.57), but if Protagoras' work had indeed foreshadowed any substantial elements of the *Republic*, it is hard to believe that it would have been left to Aristoxenus alone to say so.)

In the case of *Busiris*, the considerations which seem to favour a positive link of some kind with the *Republic* are (a) the prominence and importance accorded by Isocrates to the principle of specialisation; (b) the claim that 'philosophers' choose the Egyptian constitution; and (c) the association of the priestly class with a regulated educational curriculum, with law-giving, and with abstract philosophical enquiry.

Busiris' state is not to be directly identified with the state in the *Republic*; it has structural features reminiscent of Plato's work, but it is also specifically Egyptian, or rather conformant with Greek perceptions of Egypt. This is obvious from the treatment of geographical features (§ 12–14), but also from some elements of the constitution: thus medicine, which is all but excluded from the state of the *Republic*, is given prominence because of its traditional association with Egypt.[139] There is also a kind of translation of aspects of Plato's state into appropriately Egyptian terms: most strikingly, εὐσέβεια replaces δικαιοσύνη, and priests take on the function of φύλακες; Busiris' use of superstition to control his subjects is akin to the program of censorship and religious indoctrination in *Republic*, but the particular form of superstition, animal worship, is specifically Egyptian—a practice which encapsulates the strangeness of Egypt for classical Athenians.

The imitation, or parody, of a philosophical ideal state is only one aspect of *Busiris*, and must be seen in the context of the whole. It is misleading to characterise the work as 'attacking' the *Republic* or 'replying' to it. Apart from anything else, its primary agenda—the attack on a conception of rhetoric divorced from morality—is one in which Isocrates is closer to aligning himself with Plato than to opposing him. This allusive, ironic play with the Platonic ideal state is a bonus for those readers who happen to be familiar with Plato's ideas and thus able to appreciate Isocrates' references to them. How many readers would fall in this group we cannot say: the official addressee, Polycrates, is clearly not envisaged as being among them.

That *Busiris* is a composition which permits, or even requires, reading at more than one level has been made apparent at the start by the fiction that it is a private letter which will be kept secret.[140] In the Αἰγυπτίων πολιτεία the available levels of response multiply: it

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[139] *Rep.* 405a ff.; *Bus.* 22.

[140] See note on § 2 ἀποκρύψασθαι.

might be read, for instance, (i) as a genuine sketch of Egyptian society, sharing Herodotus' admiration for that country; (ii) as presenting an ideal state in the Laconising tradition, a relative of Xenophon's *Constitution of Sparta*; (iii) as presenting a Platonic ideal state; (iv) as an *ironic* representation of a Laconising constitution, devaluing such systems as 'un-Greek' through the association with superstitious, servile, barbarous Egypt; (v) as an *ironic* representation similarly devaluing, and poking fun at, a Platonic ideal state as constructed in the *Republic*.

What lends force to ironic readings is the incongruity between praise of any kind and the monstrous figure of the 'traditional' Busiris, ever-present in the background. The question of how far it is the material of genuine praise that is being deployed is resolutely left open. (It must remain at least *possible* to read the praise as genuine, in order that Isocrates may appear to have set Polycrates the promised good example and thus to have defended φιλοσοφία.) Irony seems most remote in the treatment of Busiris' genealogy and of the physical advantages of Egypt (§ 10–14); it comes closest to the surface in the commendation of animal worship (§ 26–27) and the treatment of Pythagorean wisdom (§ 28–29). Between these, both in position and in tone, lies the Πολιτεία.

Eucken contrasts the Platonic πολιτεία of *Busiris* with the Athenian constitution as portrayed in the *Panegyricus*, and argues that the two together articulate something akin to Karl Popper's antithesis between the Open and the Closed Society.[141] The contrast may be seen in miniature in two verbally similar passages defining the kind of 'philosophy' which is the distinctive invention of each society.[142] In the Platonic/Egyptian society, the objects of philosophy are fixed laws and timeless essences; in Athens, philosophy teaches people to interact with each other and to respond with word and action to changing circumstances. Athens is the inventive, adaptable society, reliant on λόγοι; Egypt is the static, authoritarian society, which has no use for λόγοι, but instead educates the young in the mathematical sciences, that is, in facts and rules.

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141 Eucken 1983 pp. 191–195, 207; Popper 1952.

142 *Bus.* 22 φιλοσοφίας ἄσκησιν κατέδειξαν, ἣ καὶ νομοθετῆσαι καὶ τὴν φύσιν τῶν ὄντων ζητῆσαι δύναται: *Paneg.* 47 φιλοσοφίαν τοίνυν, ἣ . . . πρός τε τὰς ἄλλας πράξεις ἡμᾶς ἐπαίδευσε καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐπράϋνε, καὶ τῶν συμφορῶν τάς τε δι' ἀμαθίαν καὶ τὰς ἐξ ἀνάγκης γιγνομένας διεῖλε, καὶ τὰς μὲν φυλάξασθαι, τὰς δὲ καλῶς ἐνεγκεῖν ἐδίδαξεν, ἡ πόλις ἡμῶν κατέδειξεν, καὶ λόγους ἐτίμησεν . . .

While the polarity is not absolute (the institution of fixed laws, for instance, is numbered among Athens' benefactions to Greece (*Paneg.* 39–40), and the Egyptian priests are given leisure for intellectual invention (*Bus.* 21–22)), it remains striking. But if the πολιτεία in *Busiris* is an anti-Athens, it does not follow that it is an anti-ideal. Isocrates' political φιλοσοφία is highly flexible; it permits him to celebrate democracy, but also to commend monarchy in the Cyprian Orations, and Spartan oligarchy (through *personae*) in *Archidamus* and parts of *Panathenaicus*, as well as courting Philip of Macedon as a potential leader of Greece. Isocrates is not, like Popper, the committed champion of the Open Society, and *Busiris* is not a tract.

In my view Isocrates' use of Platonic ideas in the Αἰγυπτίων Πολιτεία is best read as essentially light-hearted: he does not pass judgement on Plato's imaginary constitution, but plays with it—though in doing so he insinuates that it is something exotic, improbable, *not* to be taken seriously. Some weight must be given, though, to the effect of the section on Egyptian εὐσέβεια. We expect it to be the climax of the Encomium, and it is presented as such (§ 24): but it focuses on animal worship, the bizarre, un-Greek feature of Egypt *par excellence*, and its scornful tone inevitably colours the reader's response to what has gone before.[143] This tilts the imitation towards hostility as well as playfulness.

IV.ii Phaedrus

Many allusions to Isocrates, of varying plausibility, have been found in the *Phaedrus*: the only work of Plato which mentions him by name.[144] I suggest, however, that there is a more fundamental connection between *Phaedrus* and *Busiris* which has been overlooked. This is a connection not primarily in the form of surface allusion or polemic, but at a deeper, structural level, and it is a connection

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[143] Cf. esp. § 26, where animal-worship is interpreted as serving 'to habituate the masses to obey every command of their rulers', i.e. as inculcating the servility that conventionally characterises Eastern barbarians (see note on § 25–27). On Greek perceptions of animal worship, see Smelik and Hemelrijk 1984.

[144] *Phaedrus* 278e–279b. There is an extensive literature on the tone and function of this reference (and on the wider question of relations between Isocrates and Plato): in the present account I refer only to work which has a direct bearing on *Busiris*. For a balanced discussion of the *Phaedrus* passage, with references to some earlier treatments, see Rutherford 1995 pp. 250 f.

which suggests that Isocrates' work served Plato in part as a model as well as a target.

The structural parallelism is, in outline, quite simple. Both works take as their starting-point a written speech by a self-styled rhetorical expert, who is not present to receive or answer criticisms; in both cases, the speech in question is a paradoxical ἐπίδειξις. The speech is criticised on its own terms—for failing to make its paradoxical case effectively—and a better example is offered: a speech which makes the same paradoxical theme more respectable by treating it in a more orderly fashion, and by giving it an apparent moral and rational basis. From this point *Phaedrus* goes its own way: the 'corrective' speech itself is seen to be at fault, and is retracted in a 'palinode', deserting the original paradoxical thesis in favour of the opposing true thesis. After this palinode in the *Phaedrus*, and after the initial corrective speech in *Busiris*, comes a discussion of the speeches' relative merits. Thus:

Busiris	*Phaedrus*
Paradoxical speech (described) § 4–5	Paradoxical speech (recited) 230e–234c
Discussion § 6–8	Discussion 234d–235d
Corrective speech § 10–29	Corrective speech 237b–241d
	'Palinode' 243e–257b
Discussion and comparison § 30–50	Discussion and comparison 262c–266a

This comparison is schematic, and glosses over some details: for instance, Isocrates in *Busiris* begins by discussing two speeches before focusing on one; there is no sharp dividing line between description and discussion of Polycrates' speech; and I have ignored the general discussion of rhetoric which intervenes in the *Phaedrus* between the palinode and the examination of Lysias' and Socrates' speeches.[145]

[145] I refer to the first speech in the *Phaedrus* as Lysias' speech because it functions within the dialogue *as if* it were a speech by Lysias, whether or not this is really the case. I assume that it is in fact a Platonic pastiche, though the arguments are not conclusive (see de Vries 1969 pp. 11–14; Dover 1968 pp. 69–70, 194; Rowe 1986 p. 142 f. (inclining to the opposite view); Rutherford 1995 p. 252 n. 23). If

There remains, though, a broad similarity of conception between the *Busiris* and the first part of the *Phaedrus*. The following discussion aims to give substance to this outline resemblance.

Lysias' 'non-lover's' speech is placed within a category of paradoxical speeches—the genre in which Polycrates, as we have seen, was a master—when Socrates at 227c imagines extensions of the theme: if only Lysias would argue also that favours should be given to the poor and not the rich, and to the old and not the young. Lysias, like Polycrates, is absent when his speech is criticised, and attention is drawn to this when Socrates discovers that Phaedrus has the written text in his possession and jokingly refers to it as making Lysias 'present'.[146]

In the discussion which follows the speech, Socrates criticises it on grounds of εὕρεσις (234e ff.): he had been unaware that it was attempting to 'say the necessary things' as well as to achieve a fine style.[147] This matches Isocrates' criticism of Polycrates, who chose bad material (§ 5 etc.) and failed to identify good material (§ 37). This focus on εὕρεσις serves the same purpose in both works: it gives leverage to the idea that, to speak well, one must not merely speak with skill, but must also say *the right things* about a given theme—hence there may be a *right way* to approach a subject, and other ways may be wrong. In *Busiris*, this *aperçu* makes the difference between Isocratean and sophistic rhetoric; for Socrates in *Phaedrus*, it implies that one is attending not to τὸ ῥητορικόν (235a), but to higher (i.e. philosophical) considerations.

Isocrates introduces his 'corrective' Encomium with the observation that the theme is not σπουδαία and does not permit of σεμνοὶ λόγοι. The relation between σπουδή and παιδιά—an established topic, at least since Gorgias' *Helen*, of sophistic παίγνια—is a constant theme

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that is correct, then it is primarily the fictional character Socrates who is reproducing Isocrates' procedure; if, on the other hand, the speech is a real work of Lysias, then Plato himself is in a sense closer to Isocrates in taking issue with a contemporary rhetorician. Apart from this, the question does not affect my argument.

[146] παρόντος δὲ καὶ Λυσίου, 228de (cf. also 263e, where Socrates makes Phaedrus read the opening of the speech yet again ἵνα ἀκούσω αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου). This joke of course acquires more significance later on in the light of the discussion of the ways in which a written work does *not* make its author 'present' (275de, 277e–278b). The expression also acts as a signpost that 'Lysias' is being given a fair hearing (fairer than Polycrates receives), to the extent that his speech is quoted in full and verbatim.

[147] 234e καὶ ταύτῃ δεῖ . . . τὸν λόγον ἐπαινεθῆναι, ὡς τὰ δέοντα εἰρηκότος τοῦ ποιητοῦ . . .; Cf. *Bus.* 4 πολὺ τοῦ δέοντος . . . διήμαρτες and note *ad loc.*

of the *Phaedrus*.[148] Socrates' seriousness becomes an issue before he speaks his 'corrective' speech,[149] but, significantly, it is his second speech—the palinode—which is subsequently identified as παιδιά: a name which his first speech is perhaps now seen not to deserve. This first speech he delivers ἐγκαλυψάμενος: the immediate reason is to prevent himself from being overcome by embarrassment or self-consciousness (αἰσχύνη) at his own lack of expertise (236d), but when it later becomes clear that the speech itself was good cause for shame (again αἰσχύνη), the veiling takes on a new significance: Socrates sets out to distance himself from what he said and to deny responsibility for it.[150] The motif of pretended concealment to avoid embarrassment or shame is another link with *Busiris*: when Isocrates claims to be addressing Polycrates in private, the ostensible aim is to save Polycrates the embarrassment of having his professional shortcomings exposed, but in practice it is an obvious pretence which constructs an ironic distance between the work and its author.[151]

Socrates' speech breaks off rather suddenly. When Phaedrus protests that he was expecting the negative treatment of the lover to be followed by a positive commendation of the non-lover, Socrates responds by asserting that there is no need to go on at length, since what has been said will serve for both: καὶ τί δεῖ μακροῦ λόγου; περὶ γὰρ ἀμφοῖν ἱκανῶς εἴρηται (241e). In similar terms Isocrates interrupts his discussion of Busiris, saying that his aim has simply been to indicate how both praise and defence should be composed (§ 44 οὐχ ἡγοῦμαι δεῖν μακρολογεῖν· οὐ γὰρ ἐπίδειξιν τοῖς ἄλλοις ποιούμενος, ἀλλ' ὑποδεῖξαί σοι βουλόμενος ὡς χρὴ τούτων ἑκάτερον ποιεῖν, διείλεγμαι περὶ αὐτῶν).

At 242b ff., Socrates reveals that he has received a warning from his δαιμόνιον: the speech he has just delivered is impious, and must be recanted. His explanation of its impiety coincides very closely with Isocrates' clinching argument against the myths which slander

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[148] See e.g. de Vries 1969 pp. 18–22, Rowe 1986 pp. 7–11.

[149] 234d (the seriousness or otherwise of Socrates' claim that he has become 'inspired' under the influence of Phaedrus' enthusiasm); 236b (Socrates tries to avoid being made to speak by suggesting that he was 'only teasing' in his attack on Lysias' work).

[150] Cf. 243b: Socrates delivers his palinode γυμνῇ τῇ κεφαλῇ καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ τότε ὑπ' αἰσχύνης ἐγκεκαλυμμένος. Socrates' denial of responsibility for his first speech: cf. 238d σὺ αἴτιος, 242de τοῦ σοῦ λόγου, ὃς διὰ τοῦ ἐμοῦ στόματος καταφαρμακευθέντος ὑπὸ σοῦ ἐλέχθη, 243e–244a ὁ μὲν πρότερος ἦν λόγος Φαίδρου τοῦ Πυθοκλέους . . .

[151] See note on § 2 ἀποκρύψασθαι, and further discussion below.

Busiris: whatever is divine is necessarily good.[152] This realisation leads him to condemn the silliness of both the speeches for the non-lover: they 'put on airs' despite the fact that there is no truth in them; the embarrassment (αἰσχύνη) which caused him to cover his face while speaking is now re-identified as shame. Similarly, Isocrates accuses Polycrates of putting on airs over speeches which he ought to be ashamed of.[153] The speeches for the non-lover would be exposed if the figure they decry, namely a true lover, were there to hear them: so too Polycrates' speeches would be exposed to ridicule if their targets, Socrates and Busiris, were able to discuss them.[154]

The realisation that Eros is divine, and therefore good, points to the need for recantation, and introduces the story of Stesichorus (243ab). The connection between this passage and Isocrates' use of the palinode story in *Helen* has been much discussed.[155] What has not been generally observed, however, is that Isocrates refers to the story in *Busiris* as well, and in a context which presents a closer parallel with *Phaedrus*.[156] The accounts of Helen and the poets presented in *Phaedrus* and in *Helen* differ in one important respect: their treatment of Homer. For Isocrates, Homer is Helen's special favourite, and owes to her influence the charm and success of his poetry (§ 65). In

[152] To be precise, *Busiris* puts the more unusual case that the offspring of the gods must be as perfect as their parents (a view which has revolutionary implications for traditional myth): see § 41 ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν οὐχ ὅπως τοὺς θεούς, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τοὺς ἐξ ἐκείνων γεγονότας οὐδεμιᾶς ἡγοῦμαι κακίας μετασχεῖν. (This argument has a parallel, if not a model, in *Republic* Books II–III: see note on § 38 ταῖς τῶν ποιητῶν βλασφημίαις.) In *Phaedrus*, where Eros is the theme, all that is needed is the relatively commonplace argument that gods themselves cannot be 'bad' (242e εἰ δ' ἔστιν, ὥσπερ οὖν ἔστι, θεὸς ἤ τι θεῖον ὁ Ἔρως, οὐδὲν ἂν κακὸν εἴη). Note, however, that Socrates gives Eros Aphrodite as his mother (not the most standard genealogy: see Rowe 1986 *ad loc.*), and does so, apparently, to 'prove' his divine credentials: 242d τὸν Ἔρωτα οὐκ Ἀφροδίτης καὶ θεόν τινα ἡγεῖ; Both works use effectively the same strategy to 'earth' the paradoxical theme to a moral base.

[153] *Phaedrus* 242e–243a ἡ εὐήθεια αὐτοῖν πάνυ ἀστεία, τὸ μηδὲν ὑγιὲς λέγοντε μηδὲ ἀληθὲς σεμνύνεσθαι ὡς τὶ ὄντε, and 243b οὐχ ὥσπερ τότε ὑπ' αἰσχύνης ἐγκεκαλυμμένος (cf. 237a, with Rowe 1986 *ad loc.*). *Busiris* 6 πῶς οὐκ αἰσχύνεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ σεμνύνεσθαι προσήκει . . .

[154] *Phaedrus* 243c εἰ γὰρ ἀκούων τις τύχοι ἡμῶν γεννάδας καὶ πρᾷος τὸ ἦθος, ἑτέρου δὲ τοιούτου ἐρῶν ἢ καὶ πρότερόν ποτε ἐρασθείς . . ., cf. *Busiris* 6 εἰ γένοιτ' ἐξουσία τοῖς τετελευτηκόσι βουλεύσασθαι περὶ τῶν εἰρημένων . . .

[155] *Phaedrus* 243a, *Helen* 64. For detailed discussion, with references to some of the earlier literature, see Eucken 1983 pp. 115–120.

[156] § 39 οἱ δ' ἐτυφλώθησαν: Stesichorus, though not mentioned by name, is the obvious object of reference (see note *ad loc.*). The examples of blaspheming poets and their punishments lead directly to the general argument concerning the perfection of the gods, discussed above.

Socrates' account, on the other hand, Homer's blindness is attributed to the same cause as that of Stesichorus: he too blasphemed against Helen, but, unlike Stesichorus, he failed to recognise his offence and recant. This has been interpreted as a covert attack by Plato on Isocrates: the *Helen* praises its heroine while reproducing the traditional story of her going to Troy; Isocrates has thus failed, like Homer, to learn Stesichorus' lesson.[157] But in *Busiris*, on the most likely interpretation, Isocrates himself juxtaposes Homer and Stesichorus as exemplars of the punishment of poetic blasphemy.[158] *Phaedrus* merely takes the further step of identifying Homer's blindness as part of his punishment.[159] Socrates acts as Isocrates advises to avoid the blasphemer's fate,[160] and he passes this advice on to Lysias just as Isocrates passes it on to Polycrates.[161]

Socrates' Palinode marks the end of direct structural parallelism between *Busiris* and *Phaedrus*. Naturally many passages in the remainder of the dialogue, and in the discussion of 'contemporary' rhetoric in particular, reward comparison with passages in the work of Isocrates, but as a rule they form part of wider controversies.[162] There are, however, a few further passages where comparison with *Busiris* seems particularly apt.

At 260b, Socrates, examining the proposition that knowledge is

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[157] Eucken 1983 pp. 116 f. I see two main objections to this reading. First, it seems heavier than such a light-hearted, ironic passage will bear. Second, how seriously can we take the implication of 243a that Stesichorus was μουσικός, but Homer was *not* (cf. de Vries 1969 *ad loc.*)? In any case, comparison with Homer seems a doubtful means of attack, even with a readership aware of Plato's objections to poetry.

[158] § 39 οἱ μὲν αὐτῶν ἀλῆται καὶ τῶν καθ' ἡμέραν ἐνδεεῖς κατέστησαν, οἱ δ' ἐτυφλώθησαν ... For Homer and Stesichorus as the primary objects of reference here, see commentary *ad loc.*

[159] It is unclear whether this link is Plato's invention, or older: see Rowe 1986 on 243a, inclining to the former view. It may, of course, have figured in Stesichorus' poem. The story entered the biographical tradition: see *Vita Homeri VI* 51–57 Allen, where elements of both Plato's and Isocrates' versions appear. Helen's ψυχή appears to Homer by night (cf. *Helen* 65); she advises him to burn his poems, promising (presumably: there is a lacuna) to restore his sight, of which in her anger she has deprived him; but Homer refuses to comply.

[160] 243b ἐγὼ οὖν σοφώτερος ἐκείνων γενήσομαι κατ' αὐτό γε τοῦτο· πρὶν γάρ τι παθεῖν διὰ τὴν τοῦ Ἔρωτος κακηγορίαν πειράσομαι αὐτῷ ἀποδοῦναι τὴν παλινῳδίαν: cf. *Bus.* 40 ὥστ' ἢν σωφρονῶμεν, οὐ μιμησόμεθα τοὺς λόγους τοὺς ἐκείνων, οὐδὲ περὶ μὲν τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους κακηγορίας νομοθετήσομεν, τῆς δ' εἰς τοὺς θεοὺς παρρησίας ὀλιγωρήσομεν, ἀλλὰ φυλαξόμεθα ...

[161] 243d συμβουλεύω δὲ καὶ Λυσίᾳ ὅτι τάχιστα γράψαι. ...

[162] A notable instance is *Phaedrus* 269d: *Soph.* 17–18.

not required in order to speak well, imagines a scenario in which neither he nor Phaedrus knows what a horse is, but he knows that Phaedrus believes it is the domesticated beast with the largest ears. He could then praise an ass as if it were a horse, commending its usefulness in peace and war, and Phaedrus might be persuaded. This recalls Isocrates' suggestion that it does not really matter if neither he nor Polycrates knows the truth about Busiris: Isocrates' speech remains superior, because it contains the proper material of praise.[163]

When Phaedrus responds with bemusement to the story of Theuth and Thamous ('Socrates, you can easily make up stories from Egypt or wherever you want,' 275b), Socrates chides him. The first mantic utterance is said to have come from an oak tree at Dodona: what matters, surely, is not the provenance of a story, but its truth? There is probably no contempt in the tone of Phaedrus' Αἰγυπτίους: he is commenting simply on Socrates' versatility.[164] Socrates, however, misunderstands him, or affects to do so, and takes him to be expressing distrust of the story on grounds of its origin: the analogy with the oak of Dodona implies that it is the respectability of the source itself that is at issue.[165] Two points thus emerge from the exchange: it does not matter *whether* the story comes from Egypt (or whether Socrates made it up); and it does not matter if *Egypt* (a peculiar, non-Greek country) is where it comes from. All that matters is whether it expresses something true. This provides an interesting counterpoint to *Busiris*, where a constitutional system resembling that of the *Republic* was teasingly relocated in Egypt. The Theuth-story clearly bears no direct relation to the imaginary Egypt of *Busiris*, but it is worth noting that the list of Theuth's discoveries includes the three elements which make up Busiris' programme of 'propaideutics', which in turn is close to that adopted in the *Republic*.[166]

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[163] *Bus.* 33 εἰ καὶ τυγχάνομεν ἀμφότεροι ψευδῆ λέγοντες, ἀλλ' οὖν ἐγὼ μὲν κέχρημαι τούτοις τοῖς λόγοις οἷσπερ χρὴ τοὺς ἐπαινοῦντας . . . Socrates' restriction σπουδῇ (260b ἀλλ' ὅτε δὴ σπουδῇ σε πείθοιμι . . .) is interesting, since Isocrates in *Busiris* is expressly not speaking seriously.

[164] So de Vries 1969 (on 275b3–4, following Thompson, against Ast). On this view, Phaedrus' subsequent response ὀρθῶς ἐπέπληξας is scarcely true, or at least is meeker than it need be; but this is not a problem. He acknowledges that he was wrong to say something which was a distraction from the central quest for truth.

[165] Cf. 275b τοῖς μὲν οὖν τότε . . . ἀπέχρη δρυὸς καὶ πέτρας ἀκούειν ὑπ' εὐηθείας, εἰ μόνον ἀληθῆ λέγοιεν: the point is not that they were ready to believe *that* the words came from an oak tree, but that they were prepared to *listen to* an oak tree which was speaking the truth.

[166] 274cd τοῦτον δὴ πρῶτον ἀριθμόν τε καὶ λογισμὸν εὑρεῖν καὶ γεωμετρίαν καὶ

A final point: *Busiris* closes with Isocrates explaining how it is that he sees fit to admonish Polycrates, even though he himself is the younger man (§ 50 νεώτερος ὤν). This is an observation calculated to catch the reader's attention, coming as it does from an author who must be at least in his late forties and more probably around sixty. In the light of this, it is intriguing, at least, that Socrates' first remark about Isocrates at *Phaedrus* 278e is νέος ἔτι. Isocrates would, of course, have been young by any standards at the dramatic date of the dialogue.[167] But if the passage contains also some genuine παραίνεσις for the present, at the time of writing,[168] it may be relevant that in *Busiris* Isocrates cast himself as a *comparatively* young man: someone who might be expected to receive, rather than to give, advice.

I suggest that *Busiris* served as a structural and conceptual model, doubtless one among many, for the composition of *Phaedrus*. This involves the supposition that *Phaedrus* was composed after *Busiris*; this can only be a supposition, since neither work offers objective dating criteria, but it is not a problematic one, and the comparisons drawn

ἀστρονομίαν, ἔτι δὲ πεττείας τε καὶ κυβείας, καὶ δὴ καὶ γράμματα. *Bus.* 23 ἐπ' ἀστρολογίᾳ καὶ λογισμοῖς καὶ γεωμετρίᾳ διατρίβειν ἔπεισεν . . . The 'list of inventions' is almost a mini-genre in itself. Geometry, astronomy and λογισμός are the only inventions of Theuth which do not appear also in the list Alcidamas' Odysseus gives of the alleged inventions of his enemy Palamedes (*Odysseus* 22: military τάξεις, the alphabet, numbers, measures and weights, πεττοί, dice, music, coins, signal-fires). Compare the list which Gorgias puts in the mouth of Palamedes himself (*Palamedes* 30: military τάξεις, written laws, alphabet, measures and weights, numbers, signal-fires, πεσσοί), and see also Kleingünther 1933. Gorgias' Palamedes describes letters as 'an instrument of memory' (μνήμης ὄργανον): a likely model for Plato's phrase μνήμης φάρμακον. The word φάρμακον suggests the magical quality of the invention, and perhaps points to the capacity of writing, like rhetoric, to charm and beguile its recipients into a false sense of knowledge. It also has the ambivalent quality, as 'cure' or 'poison' (cf. *Odyssey* IV.230), celebrated by Jacques Derrida in his reading of the dialogue (Derrida 1972 pp. 74–197), though this ambiguity is not exploited in Thamous' judgement of its βλαβή or ὠφελία: he simply finds it to be ὑπομνήσεως φάρμακον rather than μνήμης φάρμακον. Note that *Busiris* contains a development of the merits of Egyptian φάρμακα: they are emphatically beneficial, *not* harmful.

[167] The dramatic date is undefined, perhaps historically impossible, perhaps indeed deliberately so, but probably to be imagined as earlier than the year 415, when Phaedrus was caught up in the affair of the mutilation of the Herms and exiled (see Rutherford 1995 pp. 248–50); Isocrates, then, would be in his teens or just into his twenties.

[168] Cf. Hackforth 1952 p. 168: 'Isocrates in 370 B.C. was, though elderly, not necessarily impervious to argument.'

above do seem to me to support it. If *Phaedrus* responds to some of the strategies and themes of *Busiris*, we can see how it re-evaluates and develops them in line with Plato's commitment to a reality beyond appearances. If, on the other hand, *Busiris* draws on *Phaedrus*, it is very hard to see the point of the borrowing: it ignores most of what Plato's dialogue has identified as most important, and the treatment of Busiris invites identification with a speech which has been found to be superficial and amoral. And it is not implausible that Plato should take notice of, and respond to, the project of *Busiris*. Both *Gorgias* and *Phaedrus* demonstrate their author's interest in the question whether rhetoric can in any way be 'salvaged' or 'converted' for moral ends. It is to be expected, therefore, that he would examine any attempt by Isocrates to articulate a difference between his own work and that of Polycrates and his kind—especially when that difference is expressed, as it is in *Busiris*, as one of moral commitment. In *Phaedrus*, Plato explores both the potential and the limitations of Isocrates' way of responding to sophistic rhetoric.

Some relatively minor features of *Busiris* reappear as significant themes in the *Phaedrus*. Isocrates' pretence of concealment is ostensibly meant to save Polycrates the embarrassment of being seen to receive such advice, but also serves to distance the author from the work (§ 2 ἀποκρύψασθαι: see note *ad loc.*). It receives no particular emphasis, though a claim of secrecy in a work clearly meant for publication is itself calculated to command attention. Socrates' theatrical self-veiling (237a) is a much more elaborate device. It is at first motivated by fear of embarrassment;[169] later, it is seen to have been appropriate for more profound reasons, and it aids Socrates' denial of responsibility for the speech after it becomes clear that moral, more than intellectual, shame attended his performance. Again, Isocrates' abjuration of μακρολογία, on the grounds that his purpose is practical, not 'epideictic', is in itself quite conventional (§ 44: see commentary *ad loc.*). It does, however, serve to underline the fact that he has not chosen to provide two formal demonstrations, a Βουσίριδος ἀπολογία as well as an ἐγκώμιον, but has demonstrated the one and indicated the materials for the other. In *Phaedrus*, Socrates' refusal to continue his first speech has greater dramatic and theo-

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169 Where Isocrates casts himself as the expert counselling the novice, Socrates is a layperson attempting to correct the expert: cf. 236d γελοῖος ἔσομαι παρ' ἀγαθὸν ποιητὴν ἰδιώτης αὐτοσχεδιάζων περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν.

retical significance: it marks Socrates' sense that he is being unhealthily 'carried away' by this kind of rhetoric, and suggests the pointlessness of presenting the same material twice merely in deference to conventional forms.

Most important is the adaptation of the design of the *Busiris*. The aim of Isocrates' speech (see **I.iv** above) is to demonstrate that a properly 'rhetorical' treatment of any theme at all will not be disgraceful or corrupting: it is only bad rhetoricians—rhetoricians lacking *rhetorical* skill—who set a bad example. This would imply that rhetoric is an art which 'knows what it's doing' at the moral level: in other words, something which might qualify as a Platonic τέχνη. The moral basis of Isocrates' rhetoric is not explicitly stated or described, but allowed to emerge gradually; its key, however, is the 'common-sense principle' (§ 4) governing the correct material for praise and blame. In the case of Busiris this principle works perfectly: it is easy for Isocrates to create a new myth of a praiseworthy Busiris; but what if he had chosen instead to illustrate the 'Accusation of Socrates'? The 'theological' argument which appears to give the Encomium an objective grounding, and which serves to boost the high moral tone of the Epilogue, is in fact a windfall: not all paradoxical themes could be so easily or so neatly deprived of their paradoxical quality. This crowning argument actually exposes the weakness of Isocrates' procedure: it turns out *in the end* that Busiris is 'really' praiseworthy, as a god's child; but no effort was made to prove this point *before* embarking on his praise.

It is this weak link between purely rhetorical respectability and genuine moral rectitude that is broken and exposed in the *Phaedrus*. Socrates' first speech is rhetorically unexceptionable: it is appropriate to its theme, clear, well-organised, and even pays lip-service to φιλοσοφία. But none of this saves it from being corrupt and sacrilegious.[170] The reason is that it failed to examine the *merit* of its theme, whether Eros really is a suitable object for blame or for praise. The transition to the Palinode brings out the real force of the religious argument casually introduced in the *Busiris*: the argument which made Isocrates' paradoxical theme melt into respectability here demands the recantation of the paradoxical attack on Love. One can only speak well if one knows, by reference to a higher criterion,

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[170] Cf. 242d ὑπό τι ἀσεβῆ, 242e μηδὲν ὑγιὲς λέγοντε.

what kind of treatment is appropriate to the theme in hand: and this makes rhetoric dependent on philosophy as Plato understands it, on the science of good.

IV.iii Timaeus *and* Critias

The fictional Encomium in the *Busiris* presents a model constitution resembling that of Plato's *Republic* and identifies it as the original constitution of Egypt. In the opening exchange of Plato's *Timaeus*, Critias is made to identify Socrates' imagined city of *Republic* with the primal constitution of Egypt, which his story also reveals to be the antediluvian constitution of Athens.[171] The parallelism between the two texts, observed by Pohlenz, was first treated in detail by Eucken, who regards this section of *Timaeus* as Plato's direct response to the attack on the *Republic* implicit in *Busiris*.[172]

The parallel consists above all in the outline of the idea: that the state imagined in the *Republic* was realised in practice long ago, in Egypt, by a mythological lawgiver, and that it persists there in its essentials to the present. Eucken also draws attention to a number of correspondences of detail between *Timaeus* and *Busiris*:

(i)	*Timaeus* 24b τὸ δ' αὖ περὶ τῆς φρονήσεως, ὁρᾷς που τὸν νόμον τῇδε ὅσην ἐπιμέλειαν ἐποιήσατο . . .	*Busiris* 21 καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ τῆς περὶ τὴν φρόνησιν ἐπιμελείας εἰκότως ἄν τις ἐκεῖνον αἴτιον νομίσειεν.

In Eucken's view these words, which in each text serve as a heading for a section on Egyptian intellectual training, give the reader of *Timaeus* 'a definite reference' to the *Busiris*.[173] That may be an

[171] That the constitution of Egypt and (above all) that of Ur-Athens is *the same* as that described in *Republic* is at first merely implied by the fact that Critias' story is meant to answer Socrates' wish to see his city 'in action'. The identification is explicitly proposed by Critias at 26d: τοὺς δὲ πολίτας καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἣν χθὲς ἡμῖν διῄεισθα σύ, νῦν μετενεγκόντες ἐπὶ τἀληθὲς δεῦρο θήσομεν ὡς ἐκείνην τήνδε οὖσαν, καὶ τοὺς πολίτας οὓς διενοοῦ φήσομεν ἐκείνους τοὺς ἀληθινοὺς εἶναι προγόνους ἡμῶν, οὓς ἔλεγεν ὁ ἱερεύς.

[172] Pohlenz 1913 pp. 221 f.; Eucken 1983 pp. 208–210. Note also the story in the ancient scholarly tradition that Plato in *Timaeus* responded to critics who had accused him of 'plagiarising' from the Egyptian constitution in the *Republic* (Crantor *apud* Proclus, *in Tim.* 2.76).

[173] 'Daß das ägyptische Erziehungswesen mit denselben Worten wie im Busiris als "Sorge um die Vernunft" charaktisiert wird, gibt dem Leser den bestimmten Hinweis auf diese Schrift' (Eucken 1983 pp. 208–9).

exaggeration, but there is certainly a noteworthy equivalence of vocabulary and context. The accounts of Egyptian philosophy which follow are quite different in emphasis (in *Timaeus*, pride of place is given to 'cosmology', linking Critias' story with the speech of Timaeus which forms the bulk of the dialogue); one point of contact is that both commend Egyptian ἰατρική, by contrast with the low status of medicine in the *Republic*.[174]

(ii) *Timaeus* 24b τὸ μάχιμον γένος	*Busiris* 18 τῶν μαχίμων

The adjective μάχιμος, which had been used by Herodotus for the Egyptian warrior-class (II.164), is found in both *Busiris* and *Timaeus*.[175] The account of Egyptian class divisions is essentially the same in *Timaeus* as in *Busiris*: see note on § 15 διελόμενος.

(iii) *Timaeus* 24c ἐκλεξαμένη τὸν τόπον ἐν ᾧ γεγένησθε, τὴν εὐκρασίαν τῶν ὡρῶν ἐν αὐτῷ κατιδοῦσα, ὅτι φρονιμωτάτους ἄνδρας οἴσοι . . .	*Busiris* 11–12 ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ κατεστήσατο τὴν βασιλείαν . . . ἑώρα γὰρ τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους τόπους οὐκ εὐκαίρως οὐδ' εὐαρμόστως πρὸς τὴν τοῦ σύμπαντος φύσιν ἔχοντας . . . ταύτην δὲ τὴν χώραν ἐν καλλίστῳ μὲν τοῦ κόσμου κειμένην, πλεῖστα δὲ καὶ παντοδαπώτατα φέρειν δυναμένην . . .

Athena chooses Athens, as Busiris chooses Egypt, with a view to the balance of its climate and the crops it can produce, though in the case of Athens the 'crop' is one of intelligent men. Reference to climate and crops are, of course, to be expected in the praise of a country (see note on § 10–29), and it becomes a commonplace in the praise of Athens that her distinctive product is not things, but men.[176]

To these might be added:

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[174] *Tim.* 24c, *Bus.* 22; contrast *Rep.* 405a–410a.

[175] Other instances are *Tim.* 25d, *Crit.* 110c, 112b; cf. also *Laws* 830c. The adjective occurs only once in *Republic* (386c), with the general meaning 'war-like', 'soldierly' (cf. *Menex.* 240a).

[176] This τόπος is to be linked both with the idea that Greece, as the centre of the world, has the most temperate climate (cf. Hdt. III.106.1), and with the theme of Athenian autochthony. Cf. Plato *Menexenus* 237c ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ χρόνῳ, ἐν ᾧ ἡ πᾶσα γῆ ἀνεδίδου καὶ ἔφυε ζῷα παντοδαπά, θηρία τε καὶ βοτά, ἐν τούτῳ ἡ ἡμετέρα θηρίων μὲν ἀγρίων ἄγονος καὶ καθαρὰ ἐφάνη, ἐξελέξατο δὲ τῶν ζῴων καὶ ἐγέννησεν ἄνθρωπον, ὃ συνέσει τε ὑπερέχει τῶν ἄλλων καὶ δίκην καὶ θεοὺς μόνον νομίζει, and Isocrates *Areopagiticus* 74. See also note on § 12 πλεῖστα δὲ καὶ παντοδαπώτατα.

(iv) *Timaeus* 22de ὥς ποτε Φαέθων . . . τά τ' ἐπὶ γῆς συνέκαυσεν καὶ αὐτὸς κεραυνωθεὶς διεφθάρη, τοῦτο μύθου μὲν σχῆμα ἔχον λέγεται, τὸ δὲ ἀληθές ἐστι τῶν περὶ γῆν κατ' οὐρανὸν ἰόντων παράλλαξις καὶ διὰ μακρῶν χρόνων γιγνομένη τῶν ἐπὶ γῆς πυρὶ πολλῷ φθορά. τότε οὖν ὅσοι κατ' ὄρη καὶ ἐν ὑψηλοῖς τόποις καὶ ἐν ξηροῖς οἰκοῦσιν μᾶλλον διόλλυνται τῶν ποταμοῖς καὶ θαλάττῃ προσοικούντων· ἡμῖν δὲ ὁ Νεῖλος εἴς τε τἆλλα σωτὴρ καὶ τότε ἐκ ταύτης τῆς ἀπορίας σῴζει λυόμενος. ὅταν δ' αὖ θεοὶ τὴν γῆν ὕδασιν καθαίροντες κατακλύζωσιν, οἱ μὲν ἐν τοῖς ὄρεσιν διασῴζονται, βουκόλοι νομῆς τε, οἱ δ' ἐν ταῖς παρ' ὑμῖν πόλεσιν εἰς τὴν θάλατταν ὑπὸ τῶν ποταμῶν φέρονται· κατὰ δὲ τήνδε χώραν οὔτε τότε οὔτε ἄλλοτε ἄνωθεν ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρούρας ὕδωρ ἐπιρρεῖ, τὸ δ' ἐνάντιον κάτωθεν πᾶν ἐπανιέναι πέφυκεν.

Busiris 12–13 ἑώρα γὰρ τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους τόπους οὐκ εὐκαίρως οὐδ' εὐαρμόστως πρὸς τὴν τοῦ σύμπαντος φύσιν ἔχοντας, ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὲν ὑπ' ὄμβρων κατακλυζομένους, τοὺς δ' ὑπὸ καυμάτων διαφθειρομένους, ταύτην δὲ τὴν χώραν ἐν καλλίστῳ μὲν τοῦ κόσμου κειμένην, πλεῖστα δὲ καὶ παντοδαπώτατα φέρειν δυναμένην, ἀθανάτῳ δὲ τείχει τῷ Νείλῳ τετειχισμένην, ὃς οὐ μόνον φυλακὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ τροφὴν ἱκανὴν αὐτῇ παρέχειν πέφυκεν . . .

Both passages refer to Egypt's unique exemption from destruction by either fire or flood, though in *Busiris* the reference is simply to seasonal extremes, not to the cyclical catastrophes of *Timaeus*; and in both texts this is closely linked with the idea of the Nile as saviour/defender of Egypt.

(v) *Timaeus* 24a πολλὰ γὰρ παραδείγματα τῶν τότε παρ' ὑμῖν ὄντων ἐνθάδε νῦν ἀνευρήσεις . . .

Busiris 17 . . . Λακεδαιμονίους μέρος τι τῶν ἐκεῖθεν μιμουμένους ἄριστα διοικεῖν τὴν αὐτῶν πόλιν.

In each case, Egypt stands as an 'exemplar' of a Greek city: in *Busiris*, of Sparta, which copied it; in *Timaeus*, of Ur-Athens, of which Egypt itself is a copy.

(vi) *Timaeus* 24d πάσῃ τε παρὰ πάντας ἀνθρώπους ὑπερβεβληκότες ἀρετῇ, καθάπερ εἰκὸς γεννήματα καὶ παιδεύματα θεῶν ὄντας.

Busiris 17 ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν οὐχ ὅπως τοὺς θεούς, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τοὺς ἐξ ἐκείνων γεγονότας οὐδεμιᾶς ἡγοῦμαι κακίας μετασχεῖν, ἀλλ' αὐτούς τε πάσας ἔχοντας τὰς ἀρετὰς φῦναι . . .

The gods' offspring must have the greatest innate virtues and the best upbringing. Cf. also the *ad hominem* argument in *Bus.* 42–43: how can Polycrates claim for himself the ability to 'improve' complete strangers, and at the same time imagine that the gods do not ensure the excellence of their own children?

At the opening of the account of Atlantis in the *Critias* there are again some small features in common with *Busiris.*

(a) *Critias* 113c Ποσειδῶν . . . ἐκγόνους αὑτοῦ κατῴκισεν ἐκ θνητῆς γυναικὸς γεννήσας . . .	*Busiris* 10 πατρὸς μὲν ἦν Ποσειδῶνος, μητρὸς δὲ Λιβύης τῆς Ἐπάφου τοῦ Διὸς . . .

The people of Atlantis are, like Isocrates' Busiris, offspring of Poseidon and a human mother. The Atlantis story does, however, have sufficient internal motivation for the choice of Poseidon as divine ancestor.

(b) *Critias* 113de Ποσειδῶν . . . τὸν γήλοφον, ἐν ᾧ κατῴκιστο, ποιῶν εὐερκῆ περιρρήγνυσιν κύκλῳ, θαλάττης γῆς τε ἐναλλὰξ ἐλάττους μείζους τε περὶ ἀλλήλους ποιῶν τροχούς, δύο μὲν γῆς, θαλάττης δὲ τρεῖς οἷον τορνεύων ἐκ μέσης τῆς νήσου, πάντῃ ἴσον ἀφεστῶτας, ὥστε ἄβατον ἀνθρώποις εἶναι· πλοῖα γὰρ καὶ τὸ πλεῖν οὔπω τότε ἦν.	*Busiris* 12–13 ἀθανάτῳ δὲ τείχει τῷ Νείλῳ τετειχισμένην, ὃς οὐ μόνον φυλακὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ τροφὴν ἱκάνην αὐτῇ παρέχειν πέφυκεν, ἀνάλωτος μὲν ὢν καὶ δύσμαχος τοῖς ἐπιβουλεύουσιν, εὐαγωγὸς δὲ καὶ πρὸς πολλὰ χρήσιμος τοῖς ἐντὸς αὐτοῦ κατοικοῦσιν. *Busiris* 31 προείλου λέγειν ὡς τόν τε Νεῖλον περὶ τὴν χώραν περιέρρηξεν . . .

Poseidon surrounds the hill of the royal city with circles of land and water which make it inaccessible to humans (ἄβατον ἀνθρώποις): this is reminiscent of Isocrates' memorable image of the Nile as a wall of water defending Egypt. Isocrates reports that in Polycrates' version, Busiris himself split the course of the Nile (περιέρρηξεν), just as Poseidon cuts the defences of Atlantis in *Critias* (περιρρήγνυσιν). Neither Plato nor Isocrates uses the verb περιρρηγνύναι anywhere else. Isocrates is probably reproducing Polycrates' own choice of word, but the ultimate source is likely to be a recollection of Herodotus II.16.2 τοῦ Δέλτα δὲ τούτου κατὰ τὸ ὀξὺ περιρρήγνυται ὁ Νεῖλος.

(c) *Critias* 113e ὕδατα μὲν διττὰ ὑπὸ γῆς ἄνω πηγαῖα κομίσας . . . τροφὴν δὲ παντοίαν καὶ ἱκανὴν ἐκ τῆς γῆς ἀναδιδούς.	*Busiris* 12–13 πλεῖστα δὲ καὶ παντοδαπώτατα φέρειν δυναμένην, ἀθανάτῳ δὲ τείχει τῷ Νείλῳ τετειχισμένην, ὃς οὐ μόνον φυλακὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ τροφὴν ἱκανὴν αὐτῇ παρέχειν πέφυκεν . . .

For Atlantis, as for Egypt, a divine water-source ensures adequate nourishment (τροφὴ ἱκανή). Note also παντοίαν/παντοδαπώτατα.

(d) *Critias* 114a τήν . . . μητρῴαν οἴκησιν *Busiris* 11 τὴν . . . μητρῴαν ἀρχὴν

This is the only instance in Plato's works (and indeed in Isocrates') of the adjective μητρῷος.

We thus have a series of small parallelisms and similarities between *Timaeus* and *Critias* on the one hand, and *Busiris* on the other (the first, (i) above, is the most substantial). Each individually could be put down to coincidence, and there is room for doubt as to whether the sum amounts to anything more. In my view, however, these verbal and conceptual reminiscences combine with the links between *Busiris* and *Republic*, and with the broad similarity already sketched between Isocrates' Αἰγυπτίων πολιτεία and the story given to Critias in *Timaeus*, to make a strong case for the supposition that a reading of *Busiris* lies behind *Timaeus* and *Critias*.

Eucken proposes that Critias' speech in the *Timaeus* and its unfinished sequel in the *Critias* are a response to the combined message of Isocrates' *Busiris* and *Panegyricus*. In *Busiris*, Isocrates depreciates a Platonic constitution by relocating it in a barbarian country in the distant past, and by making it the work of Busiris, traditionally a sinister tyrant. The picture he gives of this constitution—static, regimented, founded on superstition and not distinguished by military achievement—is in sharp contrast with authentic Isocratean praise of a state, as represented by *Panegyricus*: Athens is creative, versatile, dependent on the individual ἀρετή of her citizens, and her history is a catalogue of military successes benefitting the rest of Greece. The overall effect, then, would be to imply that the Platonic constitution, whatever theoretical arguments may be advanced in its favour, is not a fit model for a Greek city. On Eucken's view, Critias' story counters this implication by adopting the link with Egypt, only to 'reveal' that the Platonic constitution as seen in Egypt is itself a copy of an Athenian original. The antediluvian state of Ur-Athens thus appears simultaneously as the 'real' realisation of the Platonic state and as the 'real' Athens;[177] its achievement in defeating Atlantis

[177] Cf. *Tim.* 26d τοὺς ἀληθινοὺς . . . προγόνους ἡμῶν, and the notion in *Critias* that

parallels, and outdoes, the historical city's role in the Persian Wars—as celebrated, for example, in *Panegyricus*.[178] Plato's constitution, so far from being un-Greek or in conflict with ideals of freedom and valour, is associated with a glorious Athenian liberation struggle greater even than that credited to the democracy.

Eucken thus sees the whole story of Ur-Athens and Atlantis as emerging out of this controversy or rivalry with Isocrates, asserting the supremacy of the constitution in the *Republic* over any idealised picture of the historical Athenian state.[179] But we do not know what directions the *Critias* might have taken if it were complete, and polemic against Isocrates does not seem a very adequate motivation even for what we have of the Atlantis-story. It is possible to accept that *Busiris* did have an influence without adopting Eucken's radical conclusion.

I am inclined to see in *Timaeus* and *Critias* a response to Isocrates of a more light-hearted nature, humorously acknowledging his parody of the Platonic state, but tending rather to marginalise it by drawing attention to its lack of substance than to elevate it to the status of an opposing theory.[180] The story of Ur-Athens and Atlantis

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contemporary Attica is a 'remnant' of the country as it was: 110e λείψανον, 111b λέλειπται δή . . . πρὸς τὰ τότε τὰ νῦν οἷον νοσήσαντος σώματος ὀστᾶ.

[178] Comparison with rhetorical treatments of Athens' achievement against Persia, if not specifically with *Panegyricus*, is clearly invited by the language of the *Timaeus*. Cf. e.g. 25bc πάντων γὰρ προστᾶσα εὐψυχίᾳ καὶ τέχναις ὅσαι κατὰ πόλεμον, τὰ μὲν τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἡγουμένη, τὰ δ' αὐτὴ μονωθεῖσα ἐξ ἀνάγκης τῶν ἄλλων ἀποστάντων, ἐπὶ τοὺς ἐσχάτους ἀφικομένη κινδύνους, κρατήσασα μὲν τῶν ἐπιόντων τρόπαιον ἔστησεν, τοὺς δὲ μήπω δεδουλωμένους διεκώλυσεν δουλωθῆναι, τοὺς δ' ἄλλους, ὅσοι κατοικοῦμεν ἐντὸς ὅρων Ἡρακλείων, ἀφθόνως ἅπαντας ἠλευθέρωσεν. The whole of this passage clearly imitates, or parodies, the epideictic manner. Eucken aptly compares *Paneg.* 93 ff.: ἔρημοι συμμάχων γεγενημένοι . . . (95) . . . αὐτοὶ μὲν ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐλευθερίας πολεμεῖν παρεσκευάζοντο, τοῖς δ' ἄλλοις τὴν δουλείαν αἱρουμένοις συγγνώμην εἶχον. ἡγοῦντο γὰρ . . . ταῖς . . . προεστάναι τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἀξιούσαις οὐχ οἷον τ' εἶναι διαφεύγειν τοὺς κινδύνους, ἀλλ ὥσπερ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τοῖς καλοῖς κἀγαθοῖς αἱρετώτερόν ἐστιν καλῶς ἀποθανεῖν ἢ ζῆν αἰσχρῶς, οὕτω καὶ τῶν πόλεων ταῖς ὑπερεχούσαις λυσιτελεῖν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων ἀφανισθῆναι μᾶλλον ἢ δούλαις ὀφθῆναι γενομέναις.

[179] Cf. p. 210: 'Da der platonische Mythos offenkundig die Funktion hat, die Politeia-kritik des Isokrates abzuwehren und sein Athenbild zu verdunkeln, so liegt der Schluß nahe, daß er zu diesem Zweck erfunden wurde. Das gilt zunächst für die Sage von Urathen, aber auch die mit ihr verbundene, rätselfhaft wirkende Sage von Atlantis, für die Platon der einzige Zeuge ist, scheint aus dem Wettstreit mit Isokrates entstanden zu sein.'

[180] For a persuasive reading of *Timaeus* and *Critias* as reflecting on contemporary political ideology, and Isocrates' articulations of that ideology in particular, see Morgan 1998.

is pure invention,[181] a fact which is underlined, rather than obscured, by Critias' insistence that it is true and based on a secure tradition, and by Socrates' enthusiastic response to this 'fact'.[182] As a direct, serious response to *Busiris* it would thus be rather weak: capping Isocrates' lie, as it were, with a bigger one, inventing a new story arbitrarily in pursuit of a competition at a purely rhetorical level. In my view it is the momentary suggestion of such a competition which is the essential point of the allusions to *Busiris*. It indicates that, while there may be some entertainment value in discussing (or inventing) sources, models, historical antecedents and other contingent details of a political theory (or any other theory), these details have no bearing on the theory's validity, and that to focus on them is to miss the point.[183]

On this reading of Critias' speech in *Timaeus* and of the *Critias* itself, the imitations of encomium and ethnography form a surface level which is essentially playful and decorative. It is not vital to the effectiveness of the dialogues that the echoes of Isocrates be recognised. If they are, however, they add to the amusement value, while making a serious point, underlining the unimportance to the philosopher of his inventions in a field where invention has free play. The vehement assertions of truth invite the reader to think about what

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[181] I set aside the various theories which postulate a factual basis for the Atlantis-story as being without substance. For a brief (sceptical) discussion, see Gill 1980 viii–xii (with bibliography: xxv–xxvii).

[182] Cf. *Tim.* 20d λόγου μάλα μὲν ἀτόπου, παντάπασί γε μὴν ἀληθοῦς, *Crit.* 110d τὸ περὶ τῆς χώρας ἡμῶν πιθανὸν καὶ ἀληθὲς ἐλέγετο, *Tim.* 26e τό τε μὴ πλασθέντα μῦθον ἀλλ' ἀληθινὸν λόγον εἶναι πάμμεγά που. In *Timaeus*, Critias insists on the reliability of his own recollection: 21c σφόδρα γὰρ οὖν μέμνημαι, 26bc ἐγὼ γὰρ ἃ μὲν χθὲς ἤκουσα, οὐκ ἂν οἶδ' εἰ δυναίμην ἅπαντα ἐν μνήμῃ πάλιν λαβεῖν· ταῦτα δὲ ἃ πάμπολυν χρόνον διακήκοα, παντάπασι θαυμάσαιμ' ἂν εἴ τί με αὐτῶν διαπέφευγεν. ἦν μὲν οὖν μετὰ πολλῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ παιδιᾶς τότε ἀκουόμενα, καὶ τοῦ πρεσβύτου προθύμως με διδάσκοντος, ἅτ' ἐμοῦ πολλάκις ἐπανερωτῶντος, ὥστε οἷον ἐγκαύματα ἀνεκπλύτου γραφῆς ἔμμονά μοι γέγονεν . . . (at *Crit.* 108d he is less confident). Note also the description of the precise and unimaginably ancient records of the Egyptian priests (23e–24a): as Taylor notes (on 24a1), it is implied that there is not merely a tradition of records, but actual writings which date back to the period described, i.e. which are eight or nine thousand years old. In 26bc (cited above) the acknowledgement of παιδιά does something to undercut the claims to truth, while the writing simile perhaps points to an irony: Critias remembers his grandfather's tale from long ago better than the reasoned, dialectical account of the ideal constitution, which he heard only yesterday. (Cf. 17b, where Timaeus acknowledges, on behalf of the others, the gaps in their recollection of Socrates' account.)

[183] Cf. the exchange about the source of Socrates' myth at *Phaedrus* 275bc, discussed in **IV.ii** above.

is 'really' true, to distinguish between contingent and essential (or transcendent) truth.[184]

V. *Unpraised Busiris*

The Athenian practice of using representations of non-Greeks to construct and reinforce their representation of themselves is a familiar phenomenon, particularly in the wake of Edith Hall's *Inventing the Barbarian* (Oxford 1989). The Busiris story, and Polycrates' and Isocrates' manipulation of it, needs to be seen against this background. Before charting the development of this particular story and its meanings before and after Isocrates, I begin with a very brief survey of Greek viewing and reading of Egypt from Homer to the fourth century.

V.i *The Mirror of Egypt*

If the dynamic of Greek viewing of non-Greeks is essentially one of self-definition by antithesis, the case of Egypt is more than usually ambivalent. The impulse to contrast is accompanied by an impulse to appropriate, and Greek viewers seem perhaps more conscious of 'seeing themselves' in Egypt than in other barbarian mirrors. The antiquity, great monuments, and conspicuous literate culture of Egypt exercised an obvious fascination, and it is not surprising that for several Greek writers of the classical period Egypt was a particularly compelling 'Other'.[185]

In Homeric epic, Egypt is a byword for unimaginable wealth and power,[186] and a semi-fabulous territory which mediates between the familiar world of Greece and the fantastic lands of Odysseus' wanderings. The Egyptians themselves are imagined as generous, wise, and civilised, indeed hyper-civilised, in the observance of (Greek)

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[184] For this reading, cf. e.g. Dodds' interpretation of the truth-claim in the judgement myth of the *Gorgias* (Dodds 1959, note on *Gorgias* 523a2).

[185] See Froidefond 1971, and the forthcoming study by Phiroze Vasunia (*The Gift of the Nile*, University of California Press); also Smelik and Hemelrijk 1984, and Hall 1989, index *s.vv.* 'Egypt', 'Egyptians'. On the separate and controversial question of the extent of the Greeks' actual cultural debt to Egypt, see Bernal 1987 and 1991, Lefkowitz and Rogers 1996.

[186] *Od.* IV.127 ≈ *Il.* IX.382.

conventions regarding guests and suppliants.[187] Yet there is still a sense that Egypt, like fairyland, is perilous as well as magical, dangerous to enter and difficult to leave.[188]

Among surviving tragedies, Aeschylus' *Suppliants* is the one where the contrast between Greeks and Egyptians has greatest prominence. Here the presentation of the Danaids as 'Egyptianised' Greeks does not bridge the gap between the two cultures, but accentuates it. The women are instantly identified by the Argive king as foreigners, un-Greek in dress, speech and appearance (234 f., 279–289). If they, who are striving to claim Greek identity, present such a barbarian aspect, this is an index of the much greater foreignness of their cousins, the sons of Aegyptus. The impression is confirmed when the Herald arrives: he effectively declares himself at once as an Egyptian, and his confrontations with the king powerfully invoke the standard Greek-barbarian polarities.[189] Hall sees in Danaus 'a personification of Egyptian cunning', and points to an Aeschylean fragment which seems to have become semi-proverbial, 'Egyptians are clever, you know, at weaving schemes'.[190] In Sophocles' *Oedipus at Colonus*, Egypt figures as a place of inverted norms, when Oedipus likens his sons' unnatural behaviour to the customs of Egypt where men stay in and weave while women go out to work.[191] A fascinating interpretation of fragments of the same playwright's *Inachus* suggests that the guise in which Zeus seduces Io in this play provides 'an aitiology for Egyptian appearance and character': he has a dark complexion, is skilled with potions (φάρμακα), and uses deceit.[192]

The only surviving play which is actually set in Egypt, Euripides' *Helen*, has several interesting points of contact with *Busiris*. Egyptian piety and purity is foregrounded (in the figure of Theonoe), as is

[187] Generous: *Od.* IV.125–35, XIV.286; wise: *Od.* IV.220 and 231 f.; treatment of *xenoi/hiketai*: esp. XIV.278 ff.

[188] In Odysseus' Egyptian stories (XIV.199–359, XVII.419–44) the Egyptians are blameless, but all the same the Odysseus-character leaves Egypt in effective slavery. Note also Menelaus' seeming over-reaction to the news that he must return to Egypt and offer sacrifice: IV.481 αὐτὰρ ἐμοί γε κατεκλάσθη φίλον ἦτορ.

[189] Herald's self-identification: cf. 874 Αἰγυπτίαν γὰρ βᾶριν οὐχ ὑπερθόρῃ. Polarity between Greek and barbarian: e.g. 914, 922 f., 946 f., 952 f.

[190] Hall 1989 p. 123; Aeschylus F 373 Radt δεινοὶ πλέκειν τοι μηχανὰς Αἰγύπτιοι.

[191] *Oedipus at Colonus* 337–341, probably drawing on Herodotus, II.35.2 and II.35.4; see Hall 1989 p. 134.

[192] West 1984. See also Carden 1974 p. 70, Seaford 1980, Hall 1989 p. 140, and Lloyd-Jones 1996 pp. 113–6.

their reverence for the dead (in the protective power of Proteus' tomb), but these are set against a practice of killing strangers reminiscent of, and probably modelled on, the Busiris story.[193] In keeping with its general lightness of tone, the *Helen* tends to play down the horrific potential of this policy of guest-murder: we hear of no case in which it has been carried out, the Greek Teucer is able to come and go unnoticed, and Theoclymenus' door-keeper, though bad-tempered, is personally well-disposed to Greeks (εὔνους γάρ εἰμ' Ἕλλησιν, 481). Theoclymenus, an impulsive young tyrant like Thoas in *Iphigenia among the Taurians*, has only a touch of Busiris about him.[194] It is interesting, though, that the description in the messenger-speech of Menelaus' massacre of the Egyptian crew is strongly reminiscent of the popular scene in vase-painting where Heracles scatters the puny Egyptian attendants of Busiris.[195] In its collocation of the ideal, the sinister and the ridiculous, the *Helen* is the text which most closely prefigures Isocrates' treatment of the Busiris myth.

In Aristophanic comedy, Egyptians, like other non-Greeks, furnish their stock of jokes, which draw on features familiar from Herodotus and other sources.[196] It is in fourth-century 'Middle Comedy', however, that Egypt and its customs come into their own as a comic *topos*. Here the focus is on animal-worship, 'the most significant barbarian topic for Middle Comedy by far'.[197] The contrast between the Egyptian instinct to worship animals and the Greek instinct to eat them provides a perfect vehicle for mockery of barbarians as servile and credulous and celebration, by contrast, of Athenian practicality and common-sense.

Herodotus' description of Egypt in Book II of his *History* is too

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[193] Here limited to Greeks (155 κτείνει γὰρ Ἕλλην' ὅντιν' ἂν λάβῃ ξένον, 439 f.) and thus rationalised: the practice is grounded in Theoclymenus' fear that someone may rescue Helen (cf. 156 f., 1172–6).

[194] Cf. Kannicht 1969 I.51 f., Hall 1989 p. 113.

[195] Froidefond 1971 p. 213. See *Helen* 1526–1618, esp. 1604–10 (note 1609 ἐκκολυμβᾶν), and **V.vi** below on Busiris in vase-paintings.

[196] On non-Greeks in comedy see Long 1986. Egyptian jokes in Old Comedy: circumcision (and perhaps animal-worship), *Birds* 504–7 (see Dunbar 1995 *ad loc.*); menial labour building amazing monuments, *Birds* 1130–5, *Frogs* 1406; use of enemas, *Thesmophoriazusae* 857, *Peace* 1252 f., *Danaides* F 276 K–A; strange words/names: F 267 K–A. Note also the verb αἰγυπτιάζειν, 'behave dishonestly', used by Cratinus (F 406 K–A) and, punningly, by Aristophanes at *Thesm.* 922.

[197] Long 1986 p. 140. See esp. Timocles *Egyptians* F 1 K–A, Antiphanes *Lycon* F 145 K–A, Anaxandrides *Cities* F 40 K–A. For further discussion of Egyptian animal-worship in fourth-century comedy, see Smelik and Hemelrijk 1984 pp. 1881–3.

familiar to need detailed treatment here; particular points of contact or indebtedness are noted in the commentary. It is worth mentioning, however, some themes prominent in his account which form an important backdrop to Polycrates' and Isocrates' play with the Busiris story. First, already encountered in *Oedipus at Colonus* and in comedy, is the notion of Egypt as a place of inverted norms (Egyptian habits and customs are 'mostly the opposite of those of other people'), a law unto itself (the Egyptians 'avoid following Greek customs, and, in sum, the customs of all other peoples').[198] Second is Herodotus' insistence on the Egyptians' extreme pre-occupation with piety and religious purity: they are the most god-fearing people on earth.[199] Finally—and obviously relevant to Isocrates' construction of Busiris as 'inventor' of Egyptian civilisation and his tracing of Greek πολιτεῖαι to an Egyptian model—Herodotus is quick to identify the Egyptians as the originators of familiar techniques, beliefs, and practices, and to infer that other nations have learned these things from them.[200]

To conclude: in the fourth century there existed a complex of ways of seeing Egypt, separate in origin but capable of being intertwined. It could be a land of wealth and marvels, of wisdom and religious piety; a *monde renversé* where no familiar norms apply; a place of danger, home to cruel tyrants and evil tricksters; or a nation of ant-like, comically superstitious menial workers. What Polycrates and Isocrates did was to take one detail of this picture, the story of Busiris (in origin, as will be seen, not so much a story about Egypt as a waystation on the journeys of Heracles), and reinterpret it in the light of the whole.

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[198] II.35.2 (supporting instances, II.35.2–36.4) and II.91.1.

[199] Claims to this effect frame Herodotus' account of Egyptian religion: II.37.1 θεοσεβέες δὲ περισσῶς ἐόντες μάλιστα πάντων ἀνθρώπων, II.65.1 Αἰγύπτιοι δὲ θρησκεύουσι περισσῶς τά τε ἄλλα περὶ τὰ ἱρὰ καὶ δὴ καὶ τάδε. Cf. also II.37.3 (the Egyptian priests) ἄλλας τε θρησκείας ἐπιτελέουσι μυρίας ὡς εἰπεῖν λόγῳ.

[200] Thus the Egyptians are said to have been the first to use the calendar (II.4.1); to give names to the Twelve Gods, dedicate altars, statues and temples, and make sculptures in relief (II.4.2); to hold religious festivals and processions (II.58); to forbid sexual pollution of sacred places (II.64.1); to associate months and days with particular gods (II.82.1); to circumcise themselves (II.36.3: but cf. II.104.2–4); and to speak of the immortality and migration of the soul (II.123.2). Egypt is also the source of Greek pig-sacrifice and of phallic celebration in honour of Dionysus (II.48.1–50.1), of the oracle of Zeus at Dodona and the oracle of Ammon in Libya (II.54–57), of the 'Orphic' wool-taboo (II.81), of Greek geometry (II.109.3), and of the Thesmophoria festival (II.171).

V.ii *Busiris, King of Egypt: Introductory*

Busiris, King of Egypt, was in the habit of offering his guests as human sacrifice. Like many unlucky evildoers, he tried to do to Heracles what he had done to others. The Greek hero waited until the last moment, then, at the very altar, he broke free and killed the tyrant.

This is the prevailing story, and in this form it was popular at Athens from the early fifth century B.C., when it was the subject of numerous Attic vase-paintings.[201] The earliest known literary versions are those of the historian Pherecydes of Athens and of the epic poet Panyassis of Halicarnassus (both active in the first half of the fifth century).[202] The story was attacked by Herodotus as being 'silly' in the light of known Egyptian religious practice (II.45): he must have been aware of literary versions (Panyassis is said to have been his uncle), but there is no reason to believe that his criticism is aimed at a particular written source, rather than a popular tradition.[203] The popularity of the legend is confirmed by its repeated use in comedy: five comedies with the title *Busiris* are attested, as well as a satyr-play by Euripides.

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[201] See *LIMC* III.i 147 ff. (*s.v.* Bousiris), and further discussion in **V.vi** below.

[202] The reference in 'Hesiod F 378' (= Theon *Progymnasmata*, *RG* II.93 lines 19–22) clearly does not go back to a Hesiodic poem: cf. Merkelbach and West *ad loc.* It is probably not necessary, however, to emend κατὰ γὰρ Ἡσίοδον in the text of Theon to κατὰ γὰρ Ἰσοκράτην (Kontos, followed by Merkelbach and West). In this passage, Theon presents the argument used by Isocrates at *Bus.* 36–7 as an example of argument from chronological inconsistency. The argument involves an appeal to a known authority for the chronological facts. It seems unlikely that Theon, reproducing Isocrates' argument, would appeal within it to Isocrates as the confirming authority; more probably, κατὰ γὰρ Ἡσίοδον is Theon's misrecollection (or paraphrase, inaccurate but sufficient *exempli gratia*) of Isocrates' general appeal to πάντες οἱ λογοποιοί.

[203] Matthews suggests that Herodotus owes to Panyassis the detail that Heracles at first seemed to acquiesce (II.45.1 τὸν δὲ τέως μὲν ἡσυχίην ἔχειν . . .), since this is not mentioned in Pherecydes F 17 (on which see below) or in Apollodorus' account at II.116–7 (Matthews 1974 p. 127). But this may perfectly well have been a traditional part of the story; some measure of acquiescence is perhaps necessary if the 'unconquerable' Heracles is to be bound and led to the altar (as he is in Apollodorus), and while F 17 does not show that it featured in Pherecydes' account, it equally does not prove that it did *not*. Herodotus might well highlight this element to bring out the absurdity: why should Heracles let himself be brought to the altar at all? The link with Panyassis is no more than a guess.

V.iii *Literary sources for the Busiris story*

In Pherecydes' history, the story appears in what is to remain its standard outline. Heracles is on his way to find the apples of the Hesperides. He goes through Libya, where he kills the ὑβριστής Antaeus, and then

> ἀφικνεῖται ἐπὶ τὸν Νεῖλον εἰς Μέμφιν παρὰ Βούσιριν τὸν Ποσειδῶνος, ὃν κτείνει καὶ τὸν παῖδα αὐτοῦ Ἰφιδάμαντα καὶ τὸν κήρυκα Χάλβην καὶ τοὺς ὀπάονας πρὸς τῷ βωμῷ τοῦ Διός, ἔνθα ἐξενοκτόνει.[204]

The source does not reveal whether Pherecydes presented any explanation of Busiris' practice of ξενοκτονία, but the tyrant dies, by heroic justice, at his own altar. It is a reasonable guess, on the evidence of the vase-paintings (see **V.vi** below) and of later accounts, as well as from the location of the killing and the presence of herald and entourage, that preparations for the human sacrifice were in hand and that Heracles himself was the intended victim. Allusion to the king's retinue, here including the son and the herald both identified by name, is a recurring feature: Busiris is not in himself a worthy adversary for Heracles, so the latter's heroism consists in prevailing as one man against many. Note also that the killing of Busiris is a πάρεργον for the hero, an incidental adventure embroidering the account of his journey to a more important goal.

In the same period, the episode figured too in the epic *Heracleia* of Panyassis. This may safely be inferred from an allusion by the scholar Seleucus of Alexandria (first century A.D.) to Panyassis' 'account of the human sacrifice in Egypt'.[205] The reference is to an offering of cakes and fledgling birds (πολλὰ μὲν ἐπιθεῖναι λέγων πέμματα, πολλὰς δὲ νοσσάδας ὄρνις), presumably as part of the build-up to the (intended) sacrificial feast. Nothing more of Panyassis' treatment can be reconstructed. It is conceivable, in view of the wording of Seleucus' reference (παρ' Αἰγυπτίοις rather than, say, Βουσίριδος or παρὰ Βουσίριδι), that Panyassis presented the incident as an attack on Heracles by the Egyptians collectively, and did not focus on the particular figure of Busiris: if so, that would be a link with the form in which

[204] *FGrH* 3 F 17 = Σ *in A.R.*, on *Argonautica* IV.1396. *FGrH* prints ἐξενοκτόνουν, but Σ *in A.R.* (ed. Wendel, Berlin 1935) has ἐξενοκτόνει.

[205] ἐν οἷς περὶ τῆς παρ' Αἰγυπτίοις ἀνθρωποθυσίας διηγεῖται: Panyassis F 12 Bernabé (F 26 Kinkel) = Seleucus of Alexandria, *FGrH* 634 F 2 = Athenaeus 172d. Cf. Matthews 1974 pp. 126–28.

the story is reported by Herodotus (II.45.1 ὡς αὐτὸν στέψαντες οἱ Αἰγύπτιοι ὑπὸ πομπῆς ἐξῆγον ὡς θύσοντες τῷ Διί).

Herodotus' omission of reference to a particular king makes rejection of the story all the simpler, and enables him to present it, in line with his own interests, as an imaginary direct encounter between the Greek hero *par excellence* and the Egyptian people as a group: a confrontation which symbolises the very lack of friendly relations and cultural understanding that has allowed the story to take root in the popular imagination, through ignorance of the tight restrictions placed on blood-sacrifice by Egyptian nature and Egyptian law.[206] Again the altar is the focus of the story: led to it in a procession, Heracles only shows his strength at the moment of the καταρχαί. Again, too, his feat is represented by the number of his adversaries (cf. II.45.1 πάντας σφέας καταφονεῦσαι). Herodotus seems to treat the story as implying that Heracles killed the entire population of Egypt, and he turns this slaughter of countless thousands into another point against the verisimilitude of the story (II.45.2): ἔτι δὲ ἕνα ἐόντα τὸν Ἡρακλέα καὶ ἔτι ἄνθρωπον, ὡς δή φασι, κῶς φύσιν ἔχει πολλὰς μυριάδας φονεῦσαι;

None of the comic plays based on the story survives in more than a few lines, and it is impossible to tell on what sources they may have drawn, or how they may have varied in their treatment. The material there is, however, suggests that the dramatists brought in a new element to elaborate the plot and enhance its comic effect: the theme of πολυφαγία, gluttony. Epicharmus clearly exploited this theme, and the fragments suggest that Mnesimachus and Ephippus may have done so as well; the surviving scraps of Cratinus' and Antiphanes' *Busiris* plays also contain references to food and drink, but this may be a coincidence (or, in the case of the Antiphanes fragment, simply a reflection of the interests of the citing author, Athenaeus).[207] It seems that, in some versions at least, Busiris as well as Heracles was represented as a glutton or prodigious eater; perhaps the attempted sacrifice was preceded by a challenge to an eating-contest.[208]

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[206] II.45.2 ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν δοκέουσι ταῦτα λέγοντες τῆς Αἰγυπτίων φύσιος καὶ τῶν νόμων πάμπαν ἀπείρως ἔχειν οἱ Ἕλληνες· τοῖσι γὰρ οὐδὲ κτήνεα ὁσίη θύειν ἐστὶ χωρὶς ὀΐων καὶ ἐρσένων βοῶν καὶ μόσχων, ὅσοι ἂν καθαροὶ ἔωσι, καὶ χηνῶν, κῶς ἂν οὗτοι ἀνθρώπους θύοιεν;

[207] Epicharmus F 21–22 Kaibel; Mnesimachus F 2 K–A; Ephippus F 2 K–A; Cratinus F 23 K–A and Antiphanes F 66–68 K–A

[208] Busiris the glutton: cf. Dio Chrysostom VIII.32, discussed below. In Sositheus' *Daphnis* or *Lityerses*, Lityerses (another evil-doer slain by Heracles) is also a glutton:

In Epicharmus (F 21 Kaibel), a messenger brings Busiris a terrifying report of Heracles at his food:

πρᾶτον μὲν αἴκ ἔσθοντ' ἴδοις νιν, ἀποθάνοις·
βρέμει μὲν ὁ φάρυγξ ἔνδοθ', ἀραβεῖ δ' ἁ γνάθος,
ψοφεῖ δ' ὁ γομφίος, τέτριγε δ' ὁ κυνόδων,
σίζει δὲ ταῖς ῥίνεσσι, κινεῖ δ' οὔατα.

Presumably the monstrous barbarian king was 'out-monstered', in appearance, in appetite, and finally in physical violence, by the Greek hero. In Mnesimachus (F 2 K–A) Heracles introduces himself and his appetite to another speaker, possibly Busiris himself:

('Ηρ.) εἰμὶ γὰρ Βοιώτιος
ὀλίγα μὲν λαλῶν—(X) δίκαια ταῦτα—('Ηρ.) πολλὰ δ' ἐσθίων.

Similarly in Ephippus' play he announces that he always gets drunk before fighting (F 2 K–A):

('Ηρ.) οὐκ οἶσθά μ' ὄντα, πρὸς θεῶν, Τιρύνθιον
'Αργεῖον; οἳ μεθύοντες αἰεὶ τὰς μάχας
πάσας μάχονται. (X) τοιγαροῦν φεύγουσ' ἀεί.

Heracles is perhaps explaining to a sceptical servant a plan of accepting an offer of sustenance (maybe the eating-contest again, accompanied by a drinking-contest?) and then resorting to force when it becomes necessary.

From Antiphanes' play we have a list of fruit, presumably from an account of a feast, and an allusion to the sacrificial procession, while the Cratinus fragment is a single line referring, ironically perhaps, to the preparations for sacrifice.[209]

Of Euripides' satyr-play *Busiris* almost nothing has survived. Citations in other ancient writers give us only a bland two-line fragment of

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on this play and its generic affiliations see Xanthakis-Karamanos 1997, esp. 122–5 (where, however, it is assumed without good reason that Dio Chrysostom VIII.32 reports the plot of Euripides' *Busiris*). For the idea of an eating-contest, cf. the story of Lepreus (Athenaeus 412ab, Pausanias V.5.4): Lepreus challenges Heracles to various competitions, including an eating-contest, in which Lepreus loses (Athenaeus) or obtains a draw (Pausanias); in one version cited by Athenaeus there is also a drinking-contest. Finally Lepreus proposes single combat, in which he is killed.

[209] Antiphanes F 66 K–A βότρυς, ῥόας, φοίνικας, ἕτερα νώγαλα, F 67 K–A τὸ χερνιβεῖον πρῶτον· ἡ πομπὴ σαφής. Cratinus F 23 K–A ὁ βοῦς ἐκεῖνος χὴ μαγὶς καὶ τἄλφιτα, where the βοῦς in question may be Heracles himself: so Pieters, cited by K–A *ad loc.*

an oppressed slave's complaint, and two glosses.[210] There is a fragmentary hypothesis on papyrus (P.Oxy. 3651): the only significant readable group of letters is line 26]αμηλαδ[, presumably]α μῆλα δ[, which the editor takes as confirming that in Euripides, as in Pherecydes and Apollodorus, Heracles encountered Busiris while in quest of the golden apples.[211]

Another fragment which may possibly belong to Euripides' *Busiris*, and which, if the attribution could be proven, would be a fascinating addition to our knowledge of the play, is F 922 Nauck:

> τίς τοὐμὸν ὄνομα τοὐπονείδιστον βροτοῖς
> οὐκ οἶδε Λαμίας τῆς Λιβυστικῆς γένος;

The lines are quoted by Diodorus (XX.41.6), without attribution to a particular play. Wilamowitz argued that they come from *Busiris*.[212] His view gains some slight support from vase representations of Lamia in the company of satyrs and possibly of Heracles,[213] but remains only a conjecture. If, however, Euripides' play did connect Busiris with the vampire Lamia, this would not only be an intriguing plot-twist in itself but a particularly interesting antecedent for Polycrates' cannibal Busiris.

There is in any case a likely connection between Polycrates' Busiris and the Busiris of the comic eating-contests. Cannibalism, whether or not it actually figured in the comedies, would have been an easy extension of plots in which extravagant, grotesque eating culminated in, or accompanied, the attempt at human sacrifice.[214]

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[210] Eur. F 313 Nauck δούλῳ γὰρ οὐχ οἷόν τε τἀληθῆ λέγειν/εἰ δεσπόταισι μὴ πρέποντα τυγχάνοι. Glosses: F 314–5.

[211] The papyrus also gives, in line 24, part of the opening words of the play, probably to be reconstructed as ὦ δαῖμον ο . . .: see editor's note *ad loc.*

[212] See (e.g.) Wilamowitz 1931 p. 273 n. 2. It was once believed (and remains possible) that Euripides wrote a play entitled *Lamia* (see Nauck's entry for the title Λάμια). The authority for this is Σ *in Plat. Phaedr.* on 244b, which speaks of a Sibyl called Libyssa, ἧς μνήμην ἐποιήσατο ἐν τῷ τῆς Λαμίας προλόγῳ Εὐριπίδης: but this could mean 'the prologue spoken by Lamia' rather than 'the prologue of the *Lamia*'. Snell confidently attributes F 922 Nauck to *Busiris* (= F 312a Snell): this is because he believed that Wilamowitz' view had been confirmed by P.Oxy. 2455 fragment 19, which was thought to give the opening words of *Busiris* and to show a coincidence of letters with F 922. Unfortunately this is not correct. Haslam 1975 argues that P.Oxy. 2455 fragment 19 in fact gives the opening of *Phoenissae*, and demonstrates that there are in any case no grounds for connecting it with *Busiris*.

[213] See editor's note on P.Oxy. 3651 line 24.

[214] *Bus.* 5 presents the charge of cannibalism as Polycrates' invention, but I doubt whether this counts as strong evidence that it had not previously figured in comedy.

The most lasting contribution of Polycrates to the development of the myth is not in the field of paradox or exaggeration, but something which stems quite naturally from the endeavour of praising Busiris, namely, the abstraction of the figure of the Egyptian king from the specific incident of his encounter with Heracles. There is no indication that Busiris before this time had any mythical 'career' independent of this final episode.[215] Busiris the stranger-sacrificing tyrant, existing independently of the exploits of Heracles, is, so far as we know, Polycrates' own creation, just as Busiris the Egyptian king, existing independently of the human sacrifice story, is Isocrates'; both figures, known to posterity from Isocrates' *Busiris*, enjoy great popularity in later literature.[216]

In the second book of Callimachus' *Aetia*, the story of Busiris was paired with that of Phalaris, the tyrant of Acragas who roasted his victims inside a bronze bull; Heracles probably was not mentioned.[217] Callimachus is the first of the surviving sources to give a reason for Busiris' human sacrifices, the 'nine-year drought' mentioned in the one surviving fragment of his treatment of the story.[218] This detail is a link with Apollodorus' account, and Apollodorus is probably our best guide for the basic elements of the story as it appeared in the *Aetia*.

Apollodorus, like the earlier sources (but unlike Callimachus), presents the story within its context in the travels of Heracles, specifically on the quest for the golden apples.[219] After nine years of famine in

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Isocrates might well not take notice of a comic source, and to translate a wild comic invention into quasi-serious prose assertion would be originality enough. If, on the other hand, Polycrates was indeed the first to make Busiris a cannibal, it seems plausible that a comic poet treating the theme thereafter would take this idea on board.

[215] Except insofar as the final episode *presupposes* an earlier career of wrongdoing, since Busiris conforms to the type of the evil-doer who 'gets a taste of his own medicine' at the hands of a hero (cf. Antaeus, Procrustes, Sciron, Sinis etc.).

[216] I assume that Polycrates' *Busiris* did not remain in circulation, perhaps not even in existence, for very long. No quotations from it survive in later authors, and there is only one explicit reference (Quintilian II.17.4; cf. Philodemus II p. 216 f. Sudhaus). None of the later sources exploits, or even mentions, Polycrates' charge of cannibalism.

[217] Callimachus F 44–47: cf. esp. F 45 τὴν κείνου Φάλαρις πρῆξιν ἀπεπλάσατο. For the identification κείνου (probably) = Βουσίριδος, and the likely absence of reference to Heracles, see Pfeiffer's note on F 44.

[218] F 44 Αἴγυπτος προπάροιθεν ἐπ' ἐννέα κάρφετο ποίας: cf. Ovid *Ars Amatoria* I.647 ff. If this explanation appeared in a source known to Isocrates, there may be an allusion to it in § 12–13: see note on § 13 δύναμιν . . . ἰσόθεον.

[219] Apollodorus II.v.11.

Egypt, Phrasius, a visiting seer from Cyprus, told Busiris that the situation could be relieved if a foreigner was sacrificed to Zeus every year; Busiris began with Phrasius himself, and continued the practice until Heracles arrived and was seized for a victim. Heracles was brought to the altar, then broke free and killed 'Busiris and his son Amphidamas'. This fuller version of the story in its Heraclean context almost certainly goes back to a classical source (or sources) which also influenced Callimachus, perhaps Pherecydes or Euripides or both.[220]

Having discarded the traditional climactic scene at the altar, Callimachus seems to have found a new focus for the story in the fate of the seer Phrasius or Thrasius, who falls victim to his own art's discovery.[221] As in the *Hecale*, traditional myth is transformed by bringing a marginal figure to the centre. Phrasius/Thrasius is paired with Perillus, the designer and first victim of Phalaris' bronze bull.[222]

Treatments of the Busiris story after Callimachus may be roughly divided into two groups. On one side are rationalisations in historical and geographical writers, which take the early accounts (Pherecydes and Herodotus) as their starting-point and set out to confirm, refute or explain the story of human sacrifice.[223] On the other are the authors who, following in Callimachus' train, deploy the figure of Busiris (often coupled with another mythological tyrant or villain) as a rhetorical *exemplum* in poetic or epideictic argument.[224]

The poems of Ovid illustrate the range of uses to which the story can be put. In his imitation of Callimachus' treatment at *Ars Amatoria* I. 647 ff., Busiris and Phalaris are presented paradoxically as models

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220 Pherecydes: cf. Jacoby's note on *FGrH* 3 F 17: 'auf Ph. geht, seit Heyne anerkannt, Bibl. II.113–121 zurück. einige einlagen (116 αἴτιον des Busirisopfers . . .) sondern sich leicht ab.' So also Matthews 1974 p. 126. The only contradiction, as such, between Apollodorus' and Pherecydes' accounts is in the naming of Busiris' son (Amphidamas vs. Iphidamas). Euripides: cf. e.g. *LIMC* III.i.147, Apollodorus' version 'considérée comme l'argument de la pièce d' Euripide'.

221 He is Φρασίος in Apollodorus II.v.11, Thrasius in Ovid *Ars Amatoria* I.649 (where Ovid seems to follow Callimachus closely). Both are significant names, Φρασίος appropriate to a seer, Θρασίος to an *artifex necis*: perhaps, then, Θρασίος is Callimachus' invention, or a 'minority tradition' which he adopts.

222 See Ovid *Ars Amatoria* I.653 f.

223 See **V.iv** below for discussion of some of these accounts.

224 Cf. Vergil *Georgics* III.3–4 'omnia iam vulgata: quis aut Eurysthea durum/aut inlaudati nescit Busiridos aras?' The story's appearance in the *Aetia* makes it common poetic material, available to be called on with just a passing reference. Vergil's epithet *inlaudatus* is a litotes, but also clearly makes play of the fact that Busiris was (inappropriately) *laudatus* by both Polycrates and Isocrates.

of justice;[225] in *ex Ponto*, the same pair represent tyrannical rule;[226] while in *Tristia* both they and the inventor Perillus serve as models of cruelty pure and simple.[227] In *Heroides* (IX.67 ff.), Ovid draws on the 'Heraclean' tradition rather than on Callimachus: Deianeira reproaches Heracles for the effeminate manners he has adopted in Lydia, which would make Diomedes, Busiris and Antaeus blush for their conqueror. Antaeus and Busiris are connected, sequentially as well as geographically, in both Pherecydes and Apollodorus, and are linked again by Plutarch in the *Life of Theseus* where their fates encapsulate the principle of heroic justice.[228]

The juxtaposition with the Thracian Diomedes appears again in the first *Tarsic Oration* of Dio Chrysostom, where Ovid's usage is nicely reversed. If Heracles, patron of Tarsus, were to visit the city at time of sacrifice and witness the degeneracy of its inhabitants (specifically their uncivilised habit of 'snorting', ῥέγκειν, against which Dio inveighs), he would surely go off in disgust to visit Busiris' or Diomedes' descendants instead.[229] Dio's other reference to Busiris is more unusual. In *Diogenes, or On Virtue* (VIII), the speaker Diogenes interprets Heracles' adventures allegorically, as a campaign against

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[225] See lines 655–6:

iustus uterque fuit, neque enim lex aequior ulla est
  quam necis artifices arte perire sua.

Cf. *Ibis* 395 ff., and Claudian *In Eutropium* I.159 ff. Emphasis on the justice of Thrasius' and Perillus' punishment may well be part of Ovid's debt to Callimachus. Its effect is to reproduce, in a dislocated form, the structure of the more traditional story, with Busiris playing the traditional role of Heracles.

[226] *Ex Ponto* III.6.39 ff.:

at tu, cum tali populus sub principe simus,
  adloquio profugi credis inesse metum?
forsitan haec domino Busiride iure timeres,
  aut solito clausos urere in aere viros.

[227] *Tristia* III.11.39 ff.:

saevior es tristi Busiride, saevior illo,
  qui falsum lento torruit igne bovem,
quique bovem Siculo fertur donasse tyranno . . .

[228] *Theseus* XI.1–3: ἔπραττε δὲ ταῦτα μιμούμενος τὸν Ἡρακλέα. καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνος οἷς ἐπεβουλεύετο τρόποις ἀμυνόμενος τοὺς προεπιχειροῦντας, ἔθυσε τὸν Βούσιριν καὶ κατεπάλαισε τὸν Ἀνταῖον καὶ τὸν Κύκνον κατεμονομάχησε καὶ τὸν Τέρμερον συρρήξας τὴν κεφαλὴν ἀπέκτεινεν . . . οὕτω δὴ καὶ Θησεὺς κολάζων τοὺς πονηροὺς ἐπεξῆλθεν, οἷς μὲν ἐβιάζοντο τοὺς ἄλλους ὑπ' ἐκείνου καταβιαζομένους, ἐν δὲ τοῖς τρόποις τῆς ἑαυτῶν ἀδικίας τὰ δίκαια πάσχοντας.

[229] Dio XXXIII 47 οὐκ ἂν εἰς Θρᾴκην ἀπελθεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ Λιβύην καὶ τοῖς Βουσίριδος ἢ τοῖς Διομήδους ἀπογόνοις θύουσι παρεῖναι;

decadent vices. Diomedes is luxurious, Geryones rich and boastful, the Amazon queen vain; Prometheus is a sophist whose 'liver'—that is, his pride—is by turns swollen and eaten away with the fluctuation of public esteem; and the golden apples are given to the wicked Eurystheus because gold is worthless to the good man. Busiris appears between Geryones and the Amazon:

> τὸν δὲ Βούσιριν εὑρὼν πάνυ ἐπιμελῶς ἀθλοῦντα καὶ δι' ὅλης ἡμέρας ἐσθίοντα καὶ φρονοῦντα μέγιστον ἐπὶ πάλῃ, διέρρηξεν ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν καταβαλὼν ὥσπερ τοὺς θυλάκους τοὺς σφόδρα γέμοντας (VIII.32).

This reappearance of Busiris the Glutton, obviously appropriate to Dio's theme, presumably reflects a comic source, and it seems quite likely that the conflation of Busiris with his neighbour Antaeus, which Dio has no obvious motive to invent, also belongs to one of the *Busiris* comedies.[230]

V.iv *Busiris and* Pr-Wsir: *etymologies and aetiologies*

The name 'Busiris' originally belongs, not to a person, but to a town in the Nile Delta (Egyptian *Pr-Wsir*, 'House of Osiris').[231] Some rationalising treatments of the Busiris story correctly guess that the mythological figure takes his name, and the seed of his creation, from this town. Eratosthenes wrote that all barbarians were hostile to foreigners, but that the myth of Busiris, which had given the Egyptians a bad name, was an invention of later time meant as an attack on the exceptional unfriendliness of the people of the town of Busiris, οὐ βασιλέως μὰ Δία οὐδὲ τυράννου γενομένου τινὸς Βουσίριδος.[232] One of Diodorus' allusions to the myth, where he may be using Hecataeus of Abdera, comes quite close to a correct etymology; the sacrifice story is traced back to a supposed ancient practice of sacrificing red-heads

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[230] References to Busiris not mentioned in the above discussion include the following: Arrian, *Anabasis* III.3.1 (coupled with Antaeus); Lucian, *True Story* II.23 (the leaders of the 'revolt of the wicked' in the underworld are Phalaris, Busiris, Diomedes, Sciron, Pityocamptes *et al.*) and *Bis Accusatus* 8 (Hermes assures Justice that the great villains of old, the Σκείρωνες καὶ Πιτυοκάμπται καὶ Βουσίριδες καὶ Φαλάριδες, are no more); Conon *FGrH* 26 F 1 = Διήγησις XXXII; Agathon of Samos *FGrH* 843 F 3; Plutarch *Fortune and Virtue in Alexander the Great* 342a ('Ανταίους . . . καὶ Βουσίριδας); Sextus Empiricus, *adv. math.* II.104 (Βούσιρις καὶ ῎Αμυκος καὶ 'Ανταῖος οἱ ξενοκτόνοι: see note on § 10 εὐγενείας).

[231] See Griffiths 1970 p. 369.

[232] Quoted by Strabo, XVII.i.19 (802); cf. D.S. I.67.10–11.

(hence generally non-Egyptians) at Osiris' tomb, and the name 'Busiris' is said to have belonged to the tomb itself, not to a person.[233] Diodorus tells the regular 'Heraclean' story at IV.27.2–3; elsewhere, Busiris appears as a real person, but without reference to his practice of ξενοκτονία or his death at the hands of Heracles. At I.17.3, Osiris makes him ἐπιμελητής of 'the region extending towards Phoenicia, and the maritime districts' (note that Antaeus too is among the ἐπιμεληταί); at I.45.4, there are two kings called Busiris, eight generations apart, and the later of the two is said to have founded Egyptian Thebes.

V.v *Genealogy*

'Who could have any difficulty in speaking of the noble birth of Busiris? Busiris, whose father was Poseidon, and whose mother was Libye, the daughter of Epaphus son of Zeus . . .' (*Bus.* 10). But this genealogy may in fact be Isocrates' own invention. Since Busiris is for the most part *inlaudatus*, there are very few references to his ancestry in other authors. In Pherecydes, he is son of Poseidon (*FGrH* 3 F 17), and this remains standard. Apollodorus, however, makes two references to characters named 'Busiris': at II.v.11, where Apollodorus gives his version of the traditional Busiris-story (discussed in **V.iii** above), Busiris is son of Poseidon and of Lysianassa, daughter of Epaphus; at II.i.5, Busiris is one of the sons of Aegyptus (his mother is not identified), betrothed to the Danaid Automate. Clearly this latter Busiris, for whom a different fate lies in store, is not to be identified with Heracles' adversary; it is perhaps not very remarkable to find a Busiris (alongside a Proteus, for instance) in a list of fifty names associated with Egypt. But Aegyptus is the son of Belus, and in Apollodorus Belus has exactly the genealogy assigned by Isocrates to Busiris: his father is Poseidon, and his mother is Libye daughter of Epaphus son of Zeus. If the name Busiris for a son of Aegyptus belongs to an early source, that may have been the origin

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233 D.S. I.88.5 οὐ τοῦ βασιλέως ὀνομαζομένου Βουσίριδος, ἀλλὰ τοῦ Ὀσίριδος τάφου ταύτην ἔχοντος τὴν προσηγορίαν κατὰ τὴν τῶν ἐγχωρίων διάλεκτον (cf. Hecataeus of Abdera *FGrH* 264 F 25). Compare the etymology given at D.S. I.85.5, where it is suggested that Osiris was buried at Busiris inside a wooden cow, hence βοῦς + Ὄσιρις → Βούσιρις. For the sacrifice of red-heads, cf. Manetho's account (without reference to the Busiris story) of Egyptian sacrifices of ἄνθρωποι Τυφώνειοι (*FGrH* 609 F 22, *apud* Plutarch *Isis and Osiris* 380d). See also Griffiths 1970 pp. 552 f.

of Isocrates' version, with Busiris, traditionally son of Poseidon, transposed into the place of Belus.[234] Equally there may have been a version in which Belus and Busiris were brothers (in which case it would not be surprising for one of the sons of Aegyptus to inherit his great-uncle's name).

V.vi *Busiris in Vase-Painting*

The story of Heracles and Busiris was a popular theme in vase-painting, but its popularity was chronologically and geographically concentrated, with the greatest concentration in Athens and in the early part of the fifth century B.C.[235] It seems also to have enjoyed a vogue in Italy, but not so far as we know on the Greek mainland outside Athens (no Corinthian vases featuring it have been found).[236] What is most remarkable is that Busiris is absent from surviving Hellenistic and Roman art: no representations later than the fourth century have been found.

The vase-paintings all belong within a narrow narrative range: Heracles being led to sacrifice, his escape, the killing of Busiris and rout of his entourage. There is no evidence of Busiris appearing in any other narrative context, or in the absence of Heracles. As in the literary sources, the altar is the focus: Heracles is led to it in procession, breaks free when he reaches it, and kills Busiris at or near it.[237]

Apart from the altar, what distinguishes this scene from other similar incidents is the characterisation of Busiris and his priests and servants. Busiris himself tends to be small and inconspicuous by

[234] It obviously suits Isocrates' purposes for Busiris, founder of Egypt, to be son of the 'eponymous' Libye.

[235] Vases depicting the story: see especially Brommer 1984 pp. 42–46; Laurens 1986; Snowden 1981; Volkommer 1988 pp. 22 f. (I refer to vases described in the *LIMC* articles using the name of the author followed by the number: 'Laurens 1', 'Snowden 11' etc.) Of twenty-eight vases depicting the story listed by Laurens, twenty are Attic; of these, four (Laurens 10–13) are dated to the sixth century, fourteen (Laurens 1, 15–27) to the first half of the fifth century, and one (Laurens 2) to the second half of the fourth century, the remaining one (Laurens 14) being of uncertain date.

[236] Italian vases: Laurens 9 (Caere, sixth century), 6–7 (Lucanian, c. 400), and 3–5 (Apulian, fourth century). Eleven of the Greek vases in Laurens come from Etruscan tombs, but no native Etruscan representations have been found.

[237] Procession: Laurens 1–5; Heracles breaks free: 6–7; Heracles kills Busiris: 8–28. The detail of Busiris' death at his own altar is particularly clear in Laurens 10, Laurens 20 (= Snowden 13), and, if the figure at the altar is indeed Busiris himself, Laurens 18 (= Snowden 14).

comparison with Heracles, the focus of the scene, though there is usually some attribute—robes, sceptre or throne—to mark the king out among his followers.[238] But he and his retinue together are, in almost all representations, contrasted with their conqueror by conspicuous marks of racial difference. Some vases show wild caricature of stereotypical black-African traits, tending at the most extreme towards a grotesque and dehumanising effect.[239] Specifically Egyptian traits, such as the garment known as the *kalasiris* and the shaven heads of the Egyptian priests, appear alongside more broadly 'African' physical characteristics. The physical and 'racial' characteristics of the population of Egypt, and indeed of Greece, in the classical period, and the way Greeks perceived racial difference, are questions surrounded by controversy and uncertainty;[240] it seems clear, though, that the painters of some of these vases set out to endow Busiris and his followers with the strongest possible marks of 'otherness', and to present the most striking contrast between them and the victorious Greek hero. This is surely not an accident, but a reflection of the subject-matter: human sacrifice, the ultimate in 'barbarism', in ἀνομία and ἀσέβεια, is put at a distance by being associated with characters who are most visibly non-Greek.[241]

Laurens draws a sharp contrast between the ignorant, malicious

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[238] See Laurens 1986 p. 151, Vollkommer 1988 p. 23. Where there is no such distinguishing attribute, it may be wrong to identify Heracles' victim as Busiris.

[239] See especially the vases discussed by Snowden (Snowden 11–18 = Laurens 9. 15. 20. 18, 26, 16, 2, 1 respectively), but also Laurens 5, 7, 11, 13. On the marks of racial difference, see Laurens 1986 p. 152: 'les peintres se complaisent à insister sur les traits raciaux des étrangers: chevelures crépues (9, 18, 25) ou crânes rasés (11–13, 16–17, 24); prognathisme (11, 13, 18); épaisseur des lèvres (7, 13, 18, 21, 23, 25); nez camus (1–2, 7, 12, 18, 21); circoncision (20); *kalasiris*, quelquefois nettement distinguée du chiton ionien (9, 15).'

[240] For such a controversy referring specifically to the Busiris-vases, see the article by Felletti Maj, discussing the paintings which appear in Laurens' article as numbers 16 and 27. He argues that the painters failed to make a distinction between Egyptian traits and those of the people of Ethiopia and Sudan, who according to him formed a substantial minority within the contemporary population of Egypt (Felletti Maj 1938 p. 216). Snowden disagrees, believing that behind the comic exaggeration lies the artists' knowledge of the mainstream Egyptian population, as reflected in Egyptian communities within the Greek cities themselves ('it is more likely . . . that artists in their selection of Negroid types were influenced by Egyptian and Greek reality', Snowden 1981 p. 419). Laurens, on the other hand, interprets these caricatures as the product of hostile ignorance, speaking of 'la curiosité ironique—éventuellement nuancée de racisme—devant l'étranger que l'on connaît mal (l'image confond et mêle les traits égyptiens et éthiopiens)' (Laurens 1986 p. 149).

[241] Cf. Hughes' interpretation of the killing of Busiris as 'a sort of human sacrifice

prejudice of the popularist iconographic tradition and the respect which educated Greeks felt for Egyptian intellectual culture ('la méditation de l'élite intellectuel de la Grèce qui s'incline devant la sagesse égyptienne, sa ancienneté, sa science, depuis Herodote jusqu'à Isocrate'). It is equally possible, though, to see the vase-paintings not as the opposite pole to Herodotus' rejection of the Busiris-story, but as its counterpart in popular visual culture: the artists too are dissatisfied with the notion of an Egyptian king performing human sacrifice, or being overthrown single-handedly by Heracles, and they respond to this unease by making Busiris the ruler of a puny, comic race, who possess Egyptian/African characteristics in an exaggerated form, but are above all remote, un-Greek and uncivilised.[242]

The scene always has a comic tone: there is a macabre gaiety in the ease of Heracles' victory and in the surprise and discomfiture of the sacrificial company.[243] Thus on a famous sixth-century Caeretan hydria Egyptian priests are tossed in all directions;[244] on Attic vases of the late sixth and early fifth centuries Heracles is shown brandishing an Egyptian as a club,[245] and on another Busiris appears in undignified flight.[246] In view of this comic quality, if is curious that our evidence for the scene in Attic vase-painting ends abruptly in the middle of the fifth century, just where the influence of the comic Busiris-plays might be expected to begin.[247] The later vases from Magna Graecia (Laurens 3–7) may be influenced by drama; the only evidence for such influence is a Lucanian crater dated c. 400 B.C.

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to end all human sacrifices, which symbolises the triumph of Hellenic culture and sacrificial custom over the barbarian' (Hughes 1991 p. 188).

[242] This is not to deny the presence in the paintings of some definitely Egyptian symbols, such as the kalasiris, already mentioned, and the *uraeus*-crown worn by Busiris in Laurens 9 and in the fragments 29–30. Laurens identifies 9 as reversing an authentic motif of Egyptian triumphal iconography: the pharaoh trampling underfoot his defeated enemies, and threatening them with a club. But the parody, if such it is, is a wild one.

[243] Cf. Laurens 1986 p. 151: 'une constante qui est le sens de l'humeur, voire de la parodie, tendance qui confère à cet épisode une verve teintée d'irrespect d'une tonalité très populaire.'

[244] Laurens 9 = Snowden 11; for a photograph, see e.g. Carpenter 1991 plate 207.

[245] Laurens 10, 12, and Laurens 20 = Snowden 13.

[246] Laurens 16 = Snowden 16; dated c. 485 B.C.

[247] None of the plays can be dated with any precision, but Cratinus' *Busiris* (if it is the work of the older Cratinus: see K–A on F 23) and Euripides' satyr-play must belong to the second half of the fifth century; the other Attic Busiris-plays are all of fourth century date. Epicharmus' *Busiris* was presumably composed sometime in the first half of the fifth century; supposing that it became known in Athens, it is a possible influence on some of the earlier vases.

(Laurens 6), on which the scene of Heracles breaking free and attacking Busiris is portrayed with a satyr at one side; but such a feature does not permit a positive conclusion.

V.vii *The place of Isocrates' speech in the Busiris tradition*

The rhetorical exchange between Polycrates and Isocrates certainly contributed to Busiris' prominence in later literature, and to making him both an object of speculation and an archetypal figure of poetic myth rather than just an obscure character in a dramatic, but unimportant, episode on one of Heracles' journeys. The two rhetoricians ensure the failure of Herodotus' attempt to scotch this 'anti-Egyptian' myth.[248] The story's popularity with the comic poets adds a new dimension to Isocrates' characterisation of it as 'not serious nor permitting solemn treatment',[249] especially if Polycrates' Busiris-speech drew on comic versions. In Isocrates' own treatment, the portrayal of Busiris as the founder of Egypt may develop, in a radically different register, something suggested by Polycrates, since Polycrates apparently made Busiris responsible for the making of the Nile Delta (*Bus.* 31): Isocrates' detailed account of Busiris' rational choice of the best possible kingdom (§ 11–14) may be a response to a fantastic account of its creation in Polycrates' speech. Isocrates' major influence on the myth's future development consists in establishing Busiris' status as a human king (cf. *Bus.* 32), severe perhaps, but dignified, as against the tendency of comedy and vase-painting to make him a monster or a mere object of ridicule.

Perhaps because of his denial of seriousness, Isocrates is never cited as an authority in ancient discussions of the myth, and in literature his innocent Busiris enjoys no more popularity than Polycrates' cannibal. On the other hand, his characterisation of Busiris as a lawgiver and a paragon of εὐσέβεια is very likely to have been an influence on the paradoxically just Busiris of Callimachus and Ovid. Isocrates helps to make Busiris a rhetorical *topos*, and thereby imparts to him one genuinely praiseworthy characteristic: that of being περιμάχητος.[250]

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[248] One of the instances of Herodotus' 'philobarbarism' attacked by Plutarch (*Malice of Herodotus* 857a).

[249] *Bus.* 9 οὐ σπουδαίαν οὖσαν οὐδὲ σεμνοὺς λόγους ἔχουσαν: see note *ad loc.*

[250] *Helen* 17, cf. Arist. *Rhet.* 1363a8.

COMMENTARY

§ 1–9 *Prologue*

Formally *Busiris* is a letter (see Introduction **I.ii**). Isocrates addresses, in writing, someone hitherto unknown to him (Polycrates), with whom he now wishes to communicate 'in private'; it is natural to begin by defining his intentions towards the addressee. Compare the opening of *To Demonicus*, where the author defines his relationship to the addressee (as a πατρικὸς φίλος), his benevolent intentions, and the status of the letter itself as a gift (*ad Dem.* 2).

The Prologue develops a strong contrast between writer and addressee. Isocrates does not introduce himself. He speaks from knowledge (οἶδα, αὐτὸς ἀνεγνωκώς); his authority is expressed in *ex cathedra* judgements (ἡγοῦμαι, ᾠήθην) and impersonal verbal constructions (§ 2 χρῆναι, § 3 οὐκ ὀκνητέον . . . ἀλλὰ πειρατέον, § 4 δεῖ, § 6 προσήκει). His understanding of παίδευσις is complete, precise, and based on his own experience. He distances himself from Polycrates by emphasising that he has never met him, and presents the latter as an obscure, potentially suspect figure. This impression is underlined by the opening acknowledgement that Isocrates has 'heard reports of' Polycrates' good character (ἐπιείκεια); this puts Polycrates' character in some sense on trial, and raises the question of morality in rhetoric which is central to the whole work.

Isocrates insists on his good will and desire to help (§ 2 εὐεργετῆσαι, § 4 εὐνοϊκῶς). It is a function of a proem to win the audience's good will (*Rhet. ad Alex.* 1436a33–b28, and e.g. Dem. XVIII *On the Crown* 1), and one way of doing so is to assert the speaker's good will towards *them*. Here, however, the τόπος is subverted by irony. This is already clear in § 1, where Isocrates refers pointedly to circumstances a true friend would gloss over (βίου μεταβολήν, χρηματίζεσθαι); but the gap between appearance and reality becomes explicit in § 2, where the promise of confidentiality is obviously (since the work has reached us) disingenuous. This pretence is a signal that there is more to the work than its surface, and that it may be read at different levels. It is a sample of theoretical debate, part of an 'esoteric' conversation among professional educators; at the same time, it addresses a wider

audience, defending and advertising (Isocratean) φιλοσοφία—it is an example of what Isocrates later describes as περὶ . . . φιλοσοφίας πεπαρρησιασμένα καὶ δεδηλωκότα τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῆς (*Antid.* 10).

The shortcomings of Polycrates' works are here presented as marks of ignorant incompetence, but there are hints of the moral critique that will become dominant in the Epilogue. First there is the issue of Polycrates' good character; then there is Isocrates' morally admirable professed aim (cf. εὐεργετῆσαι, ὠφελείας)—ironic in that the benefaction consists of stinging criticism which Polycrates himself is unlikely to perceive as beneficial, but congruent with Isocrates own view of the purpose of this speech, which is also the goal of all responsible rhetoric. Polycrates' (anticipated) failure to appreciate the value of Isocrates' help is linked with his own failure to cultivate what is beneficial (§ 47, 49) and his dangerous blindness to moral implications. Polycrates is repeatedly characterised as someone who has failed to notice or recognise what should have been obvious: § 3 μὴ . . . ἀποβλέπειν, § 4 ποιῆσαι καταφανές, § 46 μάλιστα δ' ἂν κατίδοις . . . ἐπὶ σαυτοῦ θεωρήσας, § 47 σκέψαι . . . καὶ δίελθε πρὸς αὐτόν, § 48 εἰ καὶ πρότερον ἠγνόεις, ἡγοῦμαί σοι νῦν γεγενῆσθαι φανερόν, § 49 καὶ τοῦτο δῆλον.

Isocrates presents teaching as a profession with its own moral standards. He has a professional duty to speak his mind (παρρησιάζεσθαι) about παίδευσις, to defend its reputation, and to assist the straying novice. Usener uses the image of the self-awareness of a guild of artisans, resulting in 'mutual quality control' ('ein "Zunftbewußtsein" . . . das auf eine Art gegenseitiger "Qualitätskontrolle" hinausläuft', Usener 1993 p. 260). But mutuality is not in question here: if we use the metaphor of a guild, Isocrates is Master of it, Polycrates at best a probationary member. The professional duties of the educator are invoked again in the Epilogue, where Polycrates is rebuked for bringing φιλοσοφία into disrepute when it is already precariously placed (§ 49). The *Busiris* itself performs the expert's duty, to defend—and, partly for that purpose, to define—true φιλοσοφία.

§ 1 τὴν μὲν ἐπιείκειαν . . .: this phrase, opening the period and marked off from the rest by the vocative ὦ Πολύκρατες, is emphatic: it establishes morality, good character, as a key theme of the work. *Busiris* begins and ends with what appear to be 'significant' concepts (cf. on § 50 συμβουλεύειν), though this is not a feature of Isocrates' other works. Similarly in some forensic speeches the opening words iden-

tify one of the speaker's central complaints: Dem. XXI *Against Meidias* 1 τὴν μὲν ἀσέλγειαν . . . καὶ τὴν ὕβριν, XLV *Against Stephanus I* 1 καταψευδομαρτυρηθείς, LIV *Against Conon* 1 ὑβρισθείς, and cf. also the apparently formulaic opening τὴν μὲν παρασκευὴν κτλ. (Andocides I *On the Mysteries* 1, Aeschines III *Against Ctesiphon* 1, cf. Lysias XIX *On the Property of Aristophanes* 2), parodied by Cratinus in Πυτίνη: F 197 K–A τὴν μὲν παρασκευὴν ἴσως γιγνώσκετε.

It is Polycrates' reputed ἐπιείκεια that (supposedly) commends him to Isocrates (cf. *Ep. IV* 1: Isoc. recommends his pupil Diodotus to Antipater διὰ τὴν εὔνοιαν τὴν εἰς ἡμᾶς καὶ διὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἐπιείκειαν). It is the only available evidence that he may be teachable, and thus worth advising (cf. on πλείω πεπραγματευμένους below). But the antithesis τὴν μὲν ἐπιείκειαν . . . τῶν δὲ λόγων τινὰς . . . indicates a tension between his (reported) good character and his (known) writings, preparing the reader for the moral critique of the latter which comes to the fore in the Epilogue.

τὴν τοῦ βίου μεταβολὴν: on Polycrates' career, see Introduction **II**. We have no other evidence about this 'change', but the hypothesis-writer is clearly correct in interpreting Isocrates' meaning with the words ἐλθόντα ἐπὶ τὸ σοφιστεύειν διὰ πενίαν. Elsewhere Isocrates uses the phrase μεταβολὴ τοῦ βίου to refer to disastrous reversals (*Zeug.* 48 εἴπερ χρὴ τούτους ἐλεεῖν τοὺς ἀδίκως μὲν κινδυνεύοντας . . . πλείστων δὲ χρημάτων ἀπεστερημένους καὶ μεγίστῃ μεταβολῇ τοῦ βίου κεχρημένους, *Aegin.* 22), and once, in the plural, of vicissitudes both good and bad (*ad Nic.* 39). Brémond aptly adduces the *To Nicocles* passage here. Nicocles is advised whom to regard as wise: not those who promise to teach happiness when they themselves are ἐν πολλαῖς ἀπορίαις, but those who are modest and capable and 'not thrown into confusion by life's vicissitudes' (μὴ διαταραττομένους ἐν ταῖς τοῦ βίου μεταβολαῖς). Insinuating that P. would fail such a test, Isoc. places him among the teachers ridiculed at *Against the Sophists* 7 f., who promise their pupils a success which they have not achieved themselves.

παρ' ἄλλων πυνθανόμενος: the present participle hints that Isocrates' inquiries continue; the assertion that he has had to make such inquiries is both a distancing device (Isoc. moves in different circles) and a veiled insult (P. is not a 'celebrity').

ὧν γέγραφας: the fact that these compositions are available *in writing* is important: it enables Isocrates to assess Polycrates' work without

having met him, and to use it as 'evidence'. Cf. § 44 συνέγραψας and § 47 γράφειν, and see Usener 1993 pp. 259 f.

ἐπαρρησιασάμην: παρρησιάζεσθαι is to say freely what is on one's mind, regardless of whether it may cause offence; when someone describes their own discourse as παρρησία it implies, naturally, that what is being said is the unpalatable truth. παρρησία is a prerequisite for honest and constructive criticism, νουθετεῖν (cf. *de Pace* 14, *ad Nic.* 3 and 28 with Usher *ad loc.*), and as such it plays an important part in Isocrates' self-characterisation as an advisor: e.g. *Phil.* 72 οἶμαι γὰρ σοί τε συμφέρειν ἀκοῦσαι . . . ἐμοί τε προσήκειν μετὰ παρρησίας, ὥσπερ εἴθισμαι, ποιεῖσθαι τοὺς λόγους. At *Ep. IV* 4–6 the value of such παρρησία is discussed: it is μέγιστον . . . σημεῖον τῆς εὐνοίας τῆς πρὸς τοὺς φίλους.

τῆς παιδεύσεως περὶ ἣν . . .: i.e. τῆς περὶ τοὺς λόγους παιδεύσεως, cf. e.g. § 49 and *Soph.* 10 τὴν παίδευσιν τὴν τῶν λόγων.

ἠνάγκασαι: Polycrates' credibility as a teacher is undermined by this reminder that he has been 'forced' into this line of work. Isoc. reverses the familiar proem topic (Antiphon III *Second Tetralogy* β.1, Lysias XIX *On the Property of Aristophanes* 1, Euripides *Hippolytus* 989–991, etc.) in which the speaker states that he has been 'forced' to speak in order to dispel any impression that he is a professional speaker or litigant. The phrase ἀναξίως μὲν δυστυχοῦσιν recalls forensic appeals for pity (such as *Zeug.* 48, cited on τὴν τοῦ βίου μεταβολὴν above), but sympathy is tempered by the bluntness of ἐκ δὲ φιλοσοφίας χρηματίζεσθαι ζητοῦσιν.

χρηματίζεσθαι: a sophist's fees are a sensitive subject, for several reasons. It seems arbitrary and demeaning to assign a price to τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς. A high price suggests greed, a low price fraud or inferior goods. Aristocratic Greeks tend to look down on paid work in general as servile, and for a teacher profit may be seen as displacing more admirable motives such as love of truth, love of virtue, and goodwill towards the pupil. Isocrates' polemics make vigorous use of such prejudices in discrediting rival teachers: see esp. *Soph.* 3 f. and *Helen* 4. Isoc. does, of course, make money himself, and defends himself on this count at *Antidosis* 154–66 (he has not made so very much; his pupils have been satisfied; his success has benefited the city), where he displays great finesse in defending himself as a sophist while distancing himself from other members of the class; it is with a

definite note of contempt—however hypocritical—that he refers to the activities of Gorgias and others as τὸν χρηματισμὸν τοῦτον (155).

For a full discussion of evidence for popular, and Socratic/Platonic, hostility to paid teaching, see Brink 1985.

τοὶς . . . ἅπαντας τοὺς . . .: the generalising plurals keep the relationship between Isocrates and Polycrates slightly impersonal.

πλείω πεπραγματευμένους καὶ μᾶλλον ἀπηκριβωμένους: technique and experience (τέχνη and ἐμπειρία) go hand in hand in the development of natural ability (φύσις): see *Soph.* 14–18, esp. 17 f. ἀκρίβεια is characteristic of an advanced level of understanding: e.g. *ad Nic.* 35 and *Antid.* 190, and see further Wersdörfer 1940 pp. 95 f. Isocrates' account of education (e.g. at *Antid.* 187–91) may be contrasted with the lecture on the nature of rhetoric delivered by Polus at Plato *Gorgias* 448c, where τέχνη itself is discovered by ἐμπειρία, trial and error. For Isocrates, ἐμπειρία is logically posterior to τέχνη, though it may in the end be more important (see *Antid.* 296). Insistence on the importance of practice is a characteristic of Isocrates' pronouncements about teaching: *Soph.* 10 (with 14 f.), *Helen* 5, *Antid.* 200, 296, *Panath.* 272.

ἅπαντας . . . προσήκειν ἐθελοντὰς τοῦτον εἰσφέρειν τὸν ἔρανον: it is a commonplace that those blessed with wisdom have a duty to share it: see e.g. Theognis 769 f. χρὴ Μουσῶν θεράποντα καὶ ἄγγελον, εἴ τι περισσὸν/εἰδείη, σοφίης μὴ φθονερὸν τελέθειν. Emphasising the duty is also, of course, a way of emphasising the wisdom.

ἐθελοντὰς . . . εἰσφέρειν: the noun ἐθελοντής is used only here by Isocrates, but is fairly common in the other orators, always used adverbially (as here) and often of 'volunteering' to make contributions, perform liturgies etc.: Lysias XXIX *Against Philocrates* 4, Isaeus V *On the Estate of Dicaeogenes* 38, Demosthenes XIX *On the False Embassy* 230, XXI *Against Meidias* 13, etc. Willingness is the proper attitude for those contributing to an ἔρανος: see Thucydides II.43.1 προϊέμενοι (quoted below) with Gomme 1945 *ad loc.*, and Theophrastus' *Characters*, where to avoid contributing to a friend's ἔρανος is a mark of ἀνελευθερία (XXII.9), and to contribute with a bad grace a mark of αὐθάδεια (XV.7). εἰσφέρειν is the regular term: see MacDowell 1990 p. 323.

ἔρανον: there are two other instances of the word ἔρανος in Isocrates. In both, the word is used metaphorically with reference to a situation

between two parties—people (*Helen* 20) or cities (*Plat.* 57)—where a past service done by one for the other is to be returned in kind. The usage here, however, is closer to contemporary literal senses of the term: either (i) an interest-free loan collected by someone's friends to help them in time of need (see MacDowell 1990 pp. 322–4, with a list of examples both literal and metaphorical), or (ii) a subscription paid by members of a society for some mutual benefit or insurance (see Jebb and Sandys 1909 p. 53, note on line 14). It also has affinities with the widespread metaphorical use where ἔρανος denotes the contribution made by individuals to the common good of society: e.g. Thucydides II. 43.1 (of the Athenian dead) κάλλιστον . . . ἔρανον αὐτῇ [sc. τῇ πόλει] προϊέμενοι, Aristophanes *Lysistrata* 651 τοὐράνου γάρ μοι μέτεστι· καὶ γὰρ ἄνδρας ἐσφέρω, Plato *Laws* 927c, Lycurgus *Against Leocrates* 143, and (a more elaborate development) Demosthenes XXI *Against Meidias* 101.

In these metaphorical uses, what is contributed is not literally paid back, but something is still given in return: eternal glory to the dead in Thucydides, the right to speak to the women in *Lysistrata*. In the present passage the metaphor is subtly chosen. Polycrates is in financial trouble, and so might well think of collecting an ἔρανος from his friends. Instead he is trying to make money from φιλοσοφία, so the experts in the field should make him an ἔρανος, not of money, but of advice: Isocrates steps forward as their spokesperson. Thus in setting himself up as a teacher Polycrates is taking on an obligation comparable to that of a financial ἔρανος: he is seeking membership of a community which has, and will assert, its own shared values. The idea of philosophical παραίνεσις/protreptic as a kind of ἔρανος appears also at [Dem.] LXI *Eroticus* 54. By contrast, the two paraenetic speeches in the Isocratean corpus both identify themselves as 'gifts': *ad Dem.* 2, *ad Nic.* 2.

§ **2 περιτετυχήκαμεν . . . εἰς ταὐτὸν ἔλθωμεν**: both expressions imply a chance meeting. Isocrates does not expect to encounter P., and, as ἤν ποτ' . . . τοθ' . . . hints, does not intend to make any effort to do so. Contrast *Ep. I* 1: age alone prevents Isocrates from sailing to Syracuse to converse with Dionysius face to face.

περὶ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων . . . ἃ δ' ἐν τῷ παρόντι . . .: see Introduction **I.ii**.

συνουσίαν: the word covers all kinds of association and converse between people: cf. Gorgias *Palamedes* 6, where communication through

an intermediary, face-to-face, and in writing are treated as varieties of συνουσία. The context here suggests the more specialised application of the word to the time a pupil spends with a teacher (LSJ s.v. 3: see e.g. *Antid.* 92, Plato *Politicus* 285c, *Theages* 125a, Xenophon *Memorabilia* I.ii.60; οἱ συνόντες = pupils: *Bus.* 47, *Soph.* 4, 9, *Helen* 5, 7, etc.). We are made aware that Isocrates is in effect offering to make Polycrates, the would-be teacher, his own pupil. Note Isocrates' contemptuous remarks on 'teachers who need teaching' at *Soph.* 13.

εὐεργετῆσαί σε: with some irony, Isocrates stresses the 'helpfulness' of his advice: cf. § 3 τὰς ὠφελείας. Of course advice is meant to be beneficial (see e.g. *Paneg.* 130, *Archid.* 5, *de Pace* 72), and superficially the aim of *Busiris* is to make Polycrates better at his job. But for Isocrates the essential value of φιλοσοφία is that it confers a more specific and superior benefit, namely a moral one (cf. *Soph.* 21, *ad Nic.* 12, *Antid.* 209–14): πρὸς ἐπιείκειαν εὐεργετῆσαι is Isocrates' realistically modest adaptation of the famous or notorious sophistic claim to impart ἀρετή. As the *Busiris* progressively exposes the fact that Polycrates' technical deficiencies are also moral faults, so it becomes clearer that deeper, moral ὠφέλεια is what Polycrates needs and what Isocrates is offering. On the 'paraenetic' aspect of the *Busiris*, see also Introduction **I.iii**.

ἐπιστεῖλαι: on *Busiris* as a letter, see Introduction **I.ii**.

ἀποκρύψασθαι: the context supplies two possible reasons for concealment. (i) To save Polycrates from public humiliation: critics who address their comments to the object of criticism alone are more deserving of gratitude than those who publish them to the world at large, *de Pace* 14. (ii) To keep private the professional instruction which Polycrates is receiving as an ἔρανος, but which would not normally be available for free.

The promise of privacy obviously draws our attention to the fact that Isocrates' communication to Polycrates has in fact not been kept private, since it is before us. The fulsomeness of ὡς οἷόν τε μάλιστα—'as secret as can possibly be'—perhaps points up this irony. Alternatively, there may be a suggestion (once again undercut by irony) that, while Isocrates will try to control the dissemination of what he has written, it may not be within his power to do so: compare Socrates' reflections on the promiscuity of the written word in Plato's *Phaedrus*, esp. 275de.

As readers we can have little doubt that these words are disingenuous—that the composition was always intended to reach a wider public. The pretence of secrecy has several effects. It indicates that Polycrates has reason to be embarrassed, indeed ashamed (cf. § 6 πῶς οὐκ αἰσχύνεσθαι . . . προσήκει, § 46 πῶς οὐκ αἰσχρόν), and also raises the question why the communication has not, in fact, been kept private—are the issues it raises too important to be kept secret? A kind of complicity is also established between author and reader, at the addressee's expense.

The playful use of the medium of writing involved in disseminating a composition which claims that it is not meant for public distribution may be loosely compared with Alcidamas' procedure in disseminating a written speech which calls itself an 'indictment of written speeches' (*On the Sophists* 1), and with Plato's in composing an elaborate and intellectually demanding written dialogue which arrives at the conclusion that no written work deserves to be taken very seriously (*Phaedrus* 277e). The fiction that *Busiris* was not meant for 'publication' perhaps weakens the bond of responsibility between author and work (this is in some sense not Isocrates' 'public' voice), and thus makes it easier for Isocrates to demonstrate how to praise Busiris, a theme (ὑπόθεσις) which is at best οὐ σπουδαία, at worst πονηρά (§ 9, 49). Responsibility for one's λόγος (and the disruption or denial of such responsibility) is an important theme of the *Phaedrus*: on this and other links between *Busiris* and *Phaedrus*, see Introduction **IV.ii**.

§ 3 γιγνώσκω μὲν οὖν . . . ὅμως δ' οὐκ ὀκνητέον: Polycrates' expected hostility to criticism is the principal difficulty which stands in Isocrates' way. We might expect a deprecating reference to the author's own capabilities, as at *ad Nic.* 7 f., *Archid.* 1–5, and *Phil.* 10–12. Here, however, Isocrates does not question his own abilities as a speaker, but Polycrates' abilities as a listener: he is willing and able to help, but Polycrates may be unwilling, or even constitutionally unable (cf. on ἔμφυτον below), to receive help. There is a close parallel in the prologue to *On the Peace*, where Isocrates criticises his (imaginary) audience, the Athenian δῆμος, for listening only to what they want to hear, not to honest advice; the transition from the prologue to the body of the speech (§ 14–15) particularly recalls the present passage. In *On the Peace*, as in *Busiris*, the inability of the (supposed) addressees to see what should be done, amounting to moral blindness or moral idiocy, is an important theme. The insistence that the

advice must be given whatever the likely reception (οὐκ ὀκνητέον, *de Pace* 15 οὐκ ἂν ἀποσταίην) emphasises its importance, and perhaps also reminds us of the fictional character of these compositions: even if the supposed addressees are unlikely to appreciate Isocrates' wisdom, the wider audience can still benefit.

ὅτι τοῖς πλείστοις τῶν νουθετουμένων . . .: 'putting sense into someone', νουθετεῖν, is elsewhere contrasted by Isocrates with denunciation (κατηγορεῖν) on the one hand, and with flattery (πρὸς ἡδονὴν καὶ χάριν λέγειν) on the other. For the distinction between criticism and denunciation, see *Paneg.* 130, *de Pace* 72, 80 f.: both may involve saying the same things, but denunciation is ἐπὶ βλάβῃ, criticism ἐπ' ὠφελείᾳ; or criticism differs from denunciation in that it attacks the faults, not the person. For criticism vs. flattery, see especially *ad Nic.* 42–9. There it is said that everyone knows the benefits of literature which gives advice, in poetry or prose, and commends people who give honest criticism (τοὺς νουθετοῦντας): but in spite of this people do not listen to them, but prefer to be encouraged in their wrongdoing. The point is reinforced by a contrast between didactic verse (Hesiod, Theognis etc.) on the one hand, and epic and tragic poetry on the other. The former is recognised as useful, but is unpopular, or at least unheeded; the latter are popular because they aim simply to please. (When, at *ad Nic.* 48 f., Isocrates 'admires' Homer and the tragedians for finding the best way to make their poetry κεχαρισμένον τοῖς πολλοῖς, this cannot, in context, be 'l'apologie d'Homère et des tragiques et la justification de leur emploi dans l'enseignement' (Mathieu/Brémond II.110 n. 2): the passage is a parallel, not a reply, to Plato's critique of poetry in *Republic* II and III (see also note on § 38 ταῖς τῶν ποιητῶν βλασφημίαις). Isocrates contrasts writing which is morally beneficial and writing which aims at popularity, and asserts that anyone who followed the example of Homer and the tragedians would refrain from giving advice, but aim to please the public instead: this could not be more opposed to Isocrates' own expressed policy, and makes it clear that ἄξιον θαυμάζειν is sarcastic.)

The set of ideas expressed here in *Busiris*—that the critic/educator must persist even in the face of ignorant hostility—continues to be important throughout Isocrates' career, contributing to his stance of disinterested benevolence and detachment. *Busiris* exemplifies what Isocrates advocates at the end of his career, at *Panath.* 271: it is διδασκαλικὸς καὶ τεχνικός and τῆς ἀληθείας στοχαζόμενος.

τοῖς πλείστοις suggests the first half of an antithesis: 'most people do not understand the value of criticism, but I know you do, because (e.g.) you are a teacher yourself...': as at *ad Nic.* 50 ταῦτα δὲ διῆλθον ἡγούμενος σὲ δεῖν, τὸν οὐχ ἕνα τῶν πολλῶν, ἀλλὰ πολλῶν βασιλεύοντα, μὴ τὴν αὐτὴν γνώμην ἔχειν τοῖς ἄλλοις. But Polycrates remains unredeemed: Isocrates has no faith that he is any different from 'the majority'.

ἔμφυτόν ἐστιν: 'it is in their very nature'. The rare adjective ἔμφυτος (only here in Isoc.) belongs mostly to epideictic style: Gorgias *Epitaphios* (*AS* 42 lines 17 f.) οὐκ ἄπειροι οὔτε ἐμφύτου Ἄρεως οὔτε νομίμων ἐρώτων, Lysias XXXIII *Olympicus* 7 διὰ τὴν ἔμφυτον ἀρετήν, [Dem.] LX *Epitaphios* 1 τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν πᾶσιν ἔμφυτον τοῦ ζῆν ὑπερεῖδον ἐπιθυμίαν, Plato *Phaedrus* 237d (Socrates' first speech), *Symposium* 191c (Aristophanes' speech). The only occurrences in surviving forensic oratory are Dem. XVIII *On the Crown* 203 ἀλλ' οὐκ ἦν ταῦθ', ὡς ἔοικε, τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις πάτρι' οὐδ' ἀνέκτ' οὐδ' ἔμφυτα (see Wankel 1976 *ad loc.*), Dinarchus I *Against Demosthenes* 108, III *Against Philocles* 18.

In all the passages cited except the one from *On the Crown*, the adjective qualifies an abstract noun. Isocrates' construction ἔμφυτόν ἐστι + infinitive is somewhat unusual: the closest parallels are Plato *Politicus* 269d αὐτῷ (sc. τῷ παντὶ) τὸ ἀνάπαλιν ἰέναι... ἔμφυτον γέγονεν, *Timaeus* 71a οὐκ ἔμφυτον αὐτῷ (sc. τῷ ἐπιθυμητικῷ) τὸ μέλειν τινῶν ἔσοιτο λόγων, and Euripides F 776.1 f. (= *Phaethon* 174 f.) δεινόν γε, τοῖς πλουτοῦσι τοῦτο δ' ἔμφυτον,/σκαιόισιν εἶναι... In *Busiris*, the elevated and unusual word perhaps imparts a 'gnomic' tone like that of the lines from *Phaethon*, underlining Isocrates' gloomy acknowledgement of the inevitability of human folly.

Isocrates' representation of his task in terms of overcoming something ἔμφυτον by changing δόξα recalls the favourite sophistic antithesis between νόμος and φύσις (see Heinimann 1945, esp. Chapter III). Compare *Phaedrus* 237d, where Socrates describes the struggle between ἐπιθυμία ἔμφυτος and ἐπίκτητος δόξα: the former's victory results in ὕβρις, the latter's in σωφροσύνη. Gorgias' antithesis in the *Epitaphios* fragment cited above between ἔμφυτος Ἄρης and νόμιμοι ἔρωτες (both topics of praise) implies that some qualities 'should' be innate, while others, like ἔρως, are better controlled by νόμος. Isocrates embarks here on the difficult task of overcoming a bad instinct by means of education.

τοσούτῳ χαλεπώτερον ... ὅσῳ περ ἂν αὐτῶν τις ἀκριβέστερον ἐξετάζῃ τὰς ἁμαρτίας: cf. *de Pace* 38, and passages cited on ἀπέχθειαν below.

Naturally the attitude described is the opposite of the 'correct' one, for which see *de Pace* 72 f.: (προσήκει) τοὺς ... νουθετοῦντας ἐπαινεῖν ... καὶ τούτων αὐτῶν μάλιστα τὸν ἐναργέστατα δυνάμενον δηλῶσαι τὰς πονηρίας τῶν πράξεων. For the use of ἐξετάζειν, cf. *Areop.* 63, ἵνα μηδεὶς οἴηταί με τὰ μὲν ἁμαρτήματα τοῦ δήμου λίαν ἀκριβῶς ἐξετάζειν ... There, too, the 'precise' account is necessary to the effectiveness of the advice: § 19 ἵνα ... ἀκριβῶς εἰδότες ποιῆσθε καὶ τὴν αἵρεσιν καὶ τὴν κρίσιν. The feminine noun ἁμαρτία occurs in Isoc. only here and at *ad Nic.* 3 (cf. Antiphon IV *Third Tetralogy* γ.4). Much more frequent are neuter pl. ἁμαρτήματα and the verb ἁμαρτάνειν, e.g. *Paneg.* 130, *de Pace* 14, 39, 62, 80, *Panath.* 271. On the usage of ἁμαρτία and its cognates in general, see Dover 1974 p. 146 and pp. 152 ff.; of this word-group in Aristotle, Halliwell observes that it 'covers virtually the whole gamut of moral failure and error, from voluntary wickedness at one extreme to innocent mistakes at the other' (Halliwell 1986 p. 221: see also n. 28). Thus the semantic range of the word ἁμαρτία makes it ideal for insinuation. Contrast the explicit language of § 49–50: μισήσουσιν, πονηρὰς ὑποθέσεις, χείρων εἶναι δόξεις, λυμανεῖ, διαβαλεῖς.

ὅμως δ' οὐκ ὀκνητέον ... ἀλλὰ πειρατέον: this verbal pattern is an Isocratean 'formula': other instances include *Evag.* 11 ὅμως δὲ ... οὐκ ὀκνητέον, ἀλλ' ἀποπειρατέον ..., *de Pace* 15 ὅμως δὲ ... οὐκ ἂν ἀποσταίην, 62 οὐκ ἀποκνητέον, 81 οὐ μὴν ἀποστήσομαι ... ἀλλὰ ..., and *Panath.* 96 ἐπειδή περ οὖν ἐπελήλυθέ μοι τὸ παρρησιάζεσθαι ... οὐ κατασιωπητέον ... ἀλλ' ἀποδεικτέον ... Cf. Xenophon *Agesilaus* i.1 οὐ ῥᾴδιον ἄξιον ἔπαινον γράψαι, ὅμως δ' ἐγχειρητέον. A similar progression from an account of the obstacles ahead to a statement of determination is found at *Archid.* 72 χαλεπὰ μέν ἐστιν ἃ μέλλω λέγειν, ὅμως δ' οὐκ ὀκνήσω παρρησιάσασθαι περὶ αὐτῶν, *Trap.* 2, *Antid.* 11, and Plato *Rep.* 374d οὐκ ἄρα φαῦλον πρᾶγμα ἡράμεθα· ὅμως δ' οὐκ ἀποδειλιατέον ... The τόπος is reversed at *ad Nic.* 49 (see note on ὅτι τοῖς πλείστοις τῶν νουθετουμένων ... above): those who aim only to please *must* shrink from telling unpleasant truths (τοῦ μὲν νουθετεῖν καὶ συμβουλεύειν ἀφεκτέον, τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα λεκτέον, οἷς ὁρῶσι τοὺς ὄχλους μάλιστα χαίροντας).

τὴν ἀπέχθειαν τοῖς εὐνοϊκῶς ... ἔχουσιν: odium is one of the hazards of giving advice: *de Pace* 14, 38, 80, Dem. V *On the Peace* 7, *Proem 44.* The suggestion that the addressee will not accept criticism is part of the criticism itself: conversely Xenophon praises Agesilaus for not

being prone to such resentment, τῶν παρρησιαζομένων οὐδένα ἤχθραινε (*Agesilaus* xi.5).

Removal of odium is a proem topic (e.g. Antiphon III *Second Tetralogy* δ.2, Lysias XX *For Polystratus* 1 ff., XVI *For Mantitheus* 2); it is a species of λῦσαι διαβολήν, which in turn comes under the wider heading of *captatio benevolentiae*, τὸ εὔνους τοὺς ἀκροατὰς ποιῆσαι, see *Rhet. ad Alex.* 1436a33–40, 1436b37–1438a2, Arist. *Rhet.* 1415a26–38. This makes it all the more striking when someone accepts odium as inevitable. The contrast between the critic's goodwill and the recipient's hostility is underlined here by the juxtaposition τὴν ἀπέχθειαν τοῖς εὐνοϊκῶς. On the importance for Isocrates of the concept of εὔνοια, see de Romilly 1958.

μεθιστάναι τὴν δόξαν: i.e. to change their attitude to criticism, so that they are no longer οὕτω πρὸς τοὺς συμβουλεύοντας διακείμενοι. That attitude is symptomatic of their moral blindness, so its alteration stands for their general enlightenment. This way of describing 'persuasion' stresses its involuntary component—it is, as it were, an operation to be performed on Polycrates—and hence the power of the persuasive λόγος which brings it about. See the famous treatment of the power of λόγος at Gorgias *Helen* 8–14 (e.g. § 13 τοὺς τῶν μετεωρολόγων λόγους, οἵτινες δόξαν ἀντὶ δόξης τὴν μὲν ἀφελόμενοι τὴν δ' ἐνεργασάμενοι τὰ ἄπιστα καὶ ἄδηλα φαίνεσθαι τοῖς τῆς δόξης ὄμμασιν ἐποίησαν), and Plato's parody of sophistic 'forcible persuasion' at *Republic* 345b, when Thrasymachus is frustrated by Socrates' failure to be convinced: πῶς, ἔφη, σὲ πείσω; εἰ γὰρ οἷς νυνδὴ ἔλεγον μὴ πέπεισαι, τί σοι ἔτι ποιήσω; ἢ εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν φέρων ἐνθῶ τὸν λόγον; Strong persuasion is particularly necessary in criticism, because the hearers are particularly resistent: *Paneg.* 129, *de Pace* 27, 62, and esp. *Antid.* 196 f., which clearly shares the underlying structure of the present passage: οὐκ ἀγνοῶ δ' ὅτι τοὺς δυσκόλως διακειμένους οὐδέν πω τῶν εἰρημένων ἱκανόν ἐστιν ἀπαλλάξαι τῆς διανοίας ταύτης, ἀλλὰ πολλῶν ἔτι δέονται λόγων καὶ παντοδαπῶν εἰ μέλλουσιν ἑτέραν μεταλήψεσθαι δόξαν ἀνθ' ἧς νῦν τυγχάνουσιν ἔχοντες. (197) δεῖ δὴ μηδ' ἡμᾶς προαπειπεῖν διδάσκοντας καὶ λέγοντας, ἐξ ὧν δυοῖν θάτερον, ἢ μεταστήσομεν τὰς γνώμας αὐτῶν ἢ τὰς βλασφημίας καὶ κατηγορίας, αἷς χρῶνται καθ' ἡμῶν, ἐξελέγξομεν ψευδεῖς οὔσας. At the end of *Panathenaicus* Isocrates decides *not* to 'change the mind' of his dissenting pupil: εἴων αὐτὸν οὕτως ἔχειν ὥσπερ αὐτὸς αὐτὸν διέθηκεν (§ 265).

§ **4 οὐχ ἥκιστά σε μεγαλαυχούμενον**: the verb μεγαλαυχεῖσθαι, its cognates μεγάλαυχος and μεγαλαυχία, and the verbs αὐχεῖν, ἐπαυχεῖν, and ἐξαυχεῖν do not occur elsewhere in Isocrates, nor in the other Attic orators. The only classical prose writer in whose work μεγαλαυχεῖσθαι and its cognates are relatively common is Plato (seven instances: e.g. *Hippias minor* 368b πάντων σοφώτατος εἶ ἀνθρώπων, ὡς ἐγώ ποτέ σου ἤκουον μεγαλαυχουμένου). Plato always uses the verb absolutely: the present passage seems to be the first example of the construction μεγαλαυχεῖσθαι ἐπί + dat., on the analogy of the very common μέγα φρονεῖν ἐπί (also αὐχεῖν ἐπί + dat. at *Batrachomyomachia* 57, ἐπαυχεῖν + dat. at *Birds* 629 and in tragedy). The basic sense of the verb is 'to boast' (as in the *Hippias* passage) or 'to make big claims' (Aesch. *Agam.* 1527–9 ἀνάξια δράσας/ἄξια πάσχων μηδὲν ἐν Ἅιδου/μεγαλαυχείτω: the active voice is exceptional, see Fraenkel 1950 *ad loc.*). It can mean neutrally 'to be proud' (Plato *Alcibiades I* 104c κατὰ πάντα δὲ ταῦτα σύ . . . μεγαλαυχούμενος κεκράτηκας τῶν ἐραστῶν—a victory of character, not words; cf. *Lysis* 206a), but mostly retains a pejorative suggestion of loud boasting—loud enough, in this instance, to have reached Isocrates' attention—and insinuates that the claims made are excessive and hybristic: cf. e.g. Plato *Republic* 395d, *Laws* 716a, and Pindar *Pythian VIII* 15 βία δὲ καὶ μεγάλαυχον ἔσφαλεν ἐν χρόνῳ. The verb μεγαλαυχεῖσθαι thus paints a more negative picture than the plainer μέγα φρονεῖν. Proneness to μεγαλαυχία is an unpleasant characteristic: demonstrating that Agesilaus possessed τὸ εὔχαρι, Xenophon points first to his lack of τὸ μεγάλαυχον (*Agesilaus* viii.1: the only instance of this word-group in Xenophon).

Here the grand word underlines Polycrates' exaggerated pretensions, while the litotes οὐχ ἥκιστα insinuates that he is habitually vainglorious (cf. § 6 σεμνύνεσθαι). The importance of distinguishing what is and is not a fit matter for pride is a common topic for Isocrates (*ad Nic.* 30, *Paneg.* 130), and inability to do so is often attributed to 'sophists' by hostile witnesses (e.g Isoc. *Helen* 1 εἰσί τινες οἳ μέγα φρονοῦσιν κτλ., Alcidamas *On the Sophists* 1 ἐπειδή τινες τῶν καλουμένων σοφιστῶν . . . σεμνύνονται καὶ μέγα φρονοῦσι).

τῇ Βουσίριδος ἀπολογίᾳ καὶ τῇ Σωκράτους κατηγορίᾳ: on our (limited) information concerning these speeches, see Introduction **II**.

πολὺ τοῦ δέοντος . . . διήμαρτες: the point is expanded by ὅτι δεῖ . . ., and resumed in § 9 (ἐξ ὧν ἔδει) and in § 33.

Isocrates uses the singular τὸ δέον 'the right thing' (a) as here, with a verb of hitting or missing (cf. *de Pace* 28), (b) in the phrase ἐν τῷ δέοντι = ἐν καιρῷ (cf. *Nic.* 19), and (c), most frequently, after a comparative (e.g. *Areop.* 7). In other contexts the plural τὰ δέοντα is found. A rather blurred distinction can be made between three uses: (i) of action, where τὰ δέοντα = ἃ δεῖ πράττειν, (ii) of deliberation/advice, where τὰ δέοντα = ἃ δεῖ πράττειν or τί δεῖ πράττειν, and (iii) of speaking/writing, where τὰ δέοντα = ἃ δεῖ λέγειν (cf. Plato *Phaedrus* 234e ὡς τὰ δέοντα εἰρηκότος τοῦ ποιητοῦ).

The idea of λέγειν τὸ δέον/τὰ δέοντα is prominent in the surviving work of Gorgias: cf. *Helen* 2 τοῦ δ' αὐτοῦ ἀνδρὸς λέξαι τε τὸ δέον ὀρθῶς καὶ ἐλέγξαι τοὺς μεμφομένους Ἑλένην, *Epitaphios* (*AS* 42) lines 3–4 εἰπεῖν δυναίμην ἃ βούλομαι, βουλοίμην δ' ἃ δεῖ and lines 8–9 τὸ δέον ἐν τῷ δέοντι καὶ λέγειν καὶ σιγᾶν καὶ ποιεῖν ⟨καὶ ἐᾶν⟩. In the *Helen* prologue λέξαι τὸ δέον ὀρθῶς is explained by the preceding rule χρὴ τὸ μὲν ἄξιον ἐπαίνου ἐπαίνῳ τιμᾶν, τῷ δ' ἀναξίῳ μῶμον ἐπιτιθέναι: similarly τοῦ δέοντος διήμαρτες is here amplified by the rule expressed in δεῖ . . . ποιεῖν.

The principle which Isocrates asserts here differs from that enunciated by Gorgias in the prologue to the *Helen*: Isocrates focuses, not on the choice of the theme itself, but on the simpler matter of choosing appropriate material. ('Theme' will rise to prominence in the Epilogue: see on § 49 πονηρὰς ὑποθέσεις.) This is the theoretical lesson of *Busiris*: even if the principle of choosing worthy themes (which requires some moral judgement) is neglected, adherence to as obvious a precept as the rule of *inventio* stated here is enough to avoid infamous results. Comparison with *Phaedrus* 234c is particularly interesting: Socrates criticises Lysias' speech for its εὕρεσις (using the term at 236a) and goes on to produce his own speech on the same theme, correcting this defect; he is then brought to the realisation that his speech is in complicity with Lysias' more fundamental error, the blasphemous choice of theme (in the terms of *Bus.* 49, a πονηρὰ ὑπόθεσις): his 'palinode' begins where the *Busiris* ends. But while the development of ideas in the two works is in this respect closely comparable, the terms in which it is articulated reflect the authors' different ideologies. Lysias and Polycrates are criticised for the same facet of their work, Lysias for the poverty of his εὕρεσις, Polycrates for the ineptitude of his; but for Isocrates this demonstrates Polycrates' ignorance of rhetoric, whereas Socrates, with irony, takes it as a sign

that Lysias expected to be judged solely in terms of τὸ ῥητορικόν. See further Introduction **IV.ii**.

ὅτι δεῖ τοὺς . . . εὐλογεῖν τινὰς βουλομένους: εὐλογία, ἔπαινος and ἐγκώμιον (and their cognates) are all used by Isocrates as terms for rhetorical praise. If distinctions could be found in their use, this might be interesting evidence of the development of systematic rhetorical theory, but the answer is broadly negative. To consider the verbs first: at *Evag.* 11 (ἀποπειρατέον τῶν λόγων ἐστὶν, εἰ καὶ τοῦτο δυνήσονται, τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας εὐλογεῖν μηδὲν χεῖρον τῶν ἐν ταῖς ᾠδαῖς καὶ τοῖς μέτροις ἐγκωμιαζόντων) the change εὐλογεῖν . . . ἐγκωμιαζόντων is simply *variatio* (not a formal prose/verse distinction), since εὐλογεῖν is used elsewhere of verse encomium (e.g. *Evag.* 6), and ἐγκωμιάζειν is frequently used of prose (e.g. *Bus.* 5). In fact Isocrates uses εὐλογεῖν and ἐγκωμιάζειν interchangeably; ἐπαινεῖν is a near-synonym, but has a rather wider application (including 'approve', 'commend' etc.). For interchangeable use, see *Evag.* 5, 6, 11, 77 (εὐλογεῖν); 8, 11, 65 (ἐγκωμιάζειν); *Phil.* 144 ff. (ἐπαινέσειεν . . . εὐλογήσειαν . . . 147 ἐγκωμιάζουσιν); *Panath.* 37 (ἐπαινεῖν), 38 (εὐλογεῖν), 39 (ἐγκωμιάζειν). As for the nouns, the one most commonly used by Isocrates is ἔπαινος (as at *Bus.* 9). At *Phil.* 134, there may be a distinction between εὐλογία and ἔπαινος as general vs. particular, but the other two instances of εὐλογία (*Areop.* 76, *Ep. IX* 2) do not really support this. ἐγκώμιον occurs only twice; at *Paneg.* 186 it is a synonym for ἔπαινος; at *Helen* 14 (φησὶ μὲν γὰρ ἐγκώμιον γεγραφέναι) it sounds more like a technical term, but here the word is 'quoted' from Gorgias *Helen* 21: see Introduction **I.iii** note 19.

βουλομένους: followed up by φάσκων . . . ἐπιχειρησάντων . . . ἐπιχειρήσας . . . and ὥσπερ . . . βουλόμενος: what Polycrates intends, and claims, to do is the opposite of what he in fact achieves. The antithesis between intention and ability to carry out one's intention was a favourite topic with Gorgias, e.g. *Epitaphios AS* 42 l. 3–4 εἰπεῖν δυναίμην ἃ βούλομαι, βουλοίμην δ' ἃ δεῖ, *Palamedes* 5, 21, 27. Gorgias' *Encomium of Helen* is framed by statements of intention (§ 2 βούλομαι, 21 ἐβουλήθην), a model on which Isocrates here elaborates. His Prologue describes Polycrates' failure to do what he intended; after the Encomium, the Defence section offers further proof of this failure (see § 31 βουληθεὶς, § 37 τὸν βουλόμενον). The Epilogue proposes, but then rejects, a possible redefinition of Polycrates' intention

(§ 48 ἴσως ἂν εἴποις ὡς . . . ἐβουλήθης), before closing the work with a reminder of Isocrates' own, contrasting, purpose—to be morally beneficial (see § 50 τῶν πλεῖστ' εἰδότων καὶ βουλομένων ὠφελεῖν)—hinting that he, for his part, has done what he set out to do. See Introduction **I.iv**, and notes on § 49 πονηρὰς ὑποθέσεις and § 50 ἡγοῦμαι γάρ.

πλείω τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἀγαθῶν αὐτοῖς προσόντ' ἀποφαίνειν . . .: cf. Arist. *Rhet.* 1358b18 f. (epideictic is concerned with present rather than past or future): κατὰ γὰρ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ἐπαινοῦσιν ἢ ψέγουσιν πάντες.

The way Isocrates states this 'universally known' principle of praise has a rhetorically significant ambiguity: (i) 'to make it seem that they have more good attributes than they do', or (ii) 'to show that they have more good attributes than have so far been recognised'. Interpretation (i) involves taking ἀποφαίνειν in the sense which it has in § 32, in § 38, and probably in § 7 ('to make out', 'allege'), and taking τὰ ὑπάρχοντα to mean 'what there (really) is' (cf. *Paneg.* 167 and ὑπεῖναι in *Paneg.* 82). Compare *Evag.* 48: in Evagoras' case exaggeration, i.e. saying μείζω τῶν ἐκείνῳ προσόντων, is inconceivable. See also Wersdörfer 1940 p. 36. On this reading, Isocrates' account of praise and blame in *Busiris* will be comparable with the descriptions of rhetorical procedure at Plato *Menexenus* 234c and *Symposium* 198de (cf. also *Rhet. ad Alex.* 1425b36 ff. μὴ προσόντων συνοικείωσις). Interpretation (ii) involves taking ἀποφαίνειν to mean 'demonstrate' (or 'make a case'), as at *Callim.* 20, 67, *Antid.* 58 etc. (this is its sense also at *Bus.* 23 and perhaps § 45, but in each case the veracity of the demonstration is in doubt). This reading is perhaps favoured by τῆς ὑπαρχούσης . . . διαβολῆς below, where what ὑπάρχει is the current story, not the 'truth'. For an example of new material for praise being 'found' without exactly being invented cf. *Helen* 38: Theseus invoked as 'witness and judge' περὶ τῶν Ἑλένῃ προσόντων ἀγαθῶν (cf. Arist. *Rhet.* 1363a17–19).

The boundary between (i) and (ii) is blurred by the Greek tendency to treat good qualities as 'existing' only once they are recognised (see Dover 1974 pp. 235 f.). The ambiguity allows Isocrates to endorse inventiveness (such as his own in the Encomium) without fully embracing the idea that it is the business of encomium to play fast and loose with the truth. The art of 'accentuating the positive' may be compared with the procedure of 'making small things big and big things small', associated above all with Gorgias (e.g. Plato *Phaedrus*

267a, with which cf. *Paneg.* 8), and linked with praise in particular by Cicero at *Brutus* 47 (Aristotle is cited as the authority: on the question of sources, see Douglas 1966 pp. xlvi–vii).

§ 5 οὕτω κεχρῆσθαι τοῖς λόγοις: cf. § 33 ἐγὼ μὲν κέχρημαι τούτοις τοῖς λόγοις, οἷσπερ χρὴ . . .

διαβολῆς ἀπηλλάξας: the use of the word διαβολή '(false) accusation' (which is naturally applied by defendants to the charges against them: *Trap.* 5, 6, 10, *Callim.* 63 etc.), as opposed to αἰτία 'charge' (as at § 48), adopts the perspective of Polycrates' speech, supposedly a defence speech. This is the first hint that Isocrates is taking over Polycrates' theme, and preparing to defend Busiris against his 'defender'. For removal of διαβολή as a rhetorical 'specialism', cf. Plato *Phaedrus* 267d: Thrasymachus διαβάλλειν τε καὶ ἀπολύσασθαι διαβολὴν ὁθενδὴ κράτιστος. The phrase διαβολῆς ἀπαλλάττειν/-εσθαι is used by Isoc. in forensic contexts: *Zeug.* 7 ὡς ἀπηλλαγμένος ἤδη τῆς διαβολῆς, *Trap.* 27, 48.

παρανομίαν: an appropriate word; Isoc. generally uses παρανομία and its cognates not of mere transgressions of law, but of behaviour which negates civilised order, often when laws are not properly in force—e.g. in time of war (*Paneg.* 147, *Plat.* 4, 22, *de Pace* 45) or civil conflict (παρανομία was the norm under the Thirty, *Loch.* 4). At *Helen* 29 the noun is used of the great villains of myth: Polycrates has placed Busiris in this category, composing an encomium of the kind condemned at *Panath.* 135 (τοῖς . . . ἐγκωμιάζουσιν ἢ τὰ φαυλότατα τῶν ὄντων ἢ τοὺς παρανομωτάτους τῶν γεγενημένων), the polar opposite of correct rhetoric as Isocrates conceives it.

προσῆψας: a striking usage, which highlights the perversity of what Polycrates chose to do. The verb προσάπτειν does not occur elsewhere in Isocrates; it is very rare in oratory (once in the Demosthenic corpus, [Dem.] LXI *Eroticus* 53), but frequent in Plato. In its literal sense it refers to 'fitting' clothing or ornament onto a person (Euripides *Bacchae* 857 ff. (κόσμον), *Ion* 26 f. (χλιδήν)), hence the very common metaphorical use of 'conferring' some benefit or harm on someone, or 'attaching' glory or disgrace to their name: e.g. *Iliad* XXIV.110 ἐγὼ τόδε κῦδος Ἀχιλλῆϊ προτιάπτω, Pindar *Nemean VIII* 36 f. (κλέος), Sophocles *Electra* 356 (τιμάς), Xenophon *Agesilaus* i.36 (τὸ ναυτικόν, sc. naval command), Plato *Republic* 420d (εὐδαιμονίαν), *Laws* 890c (πειθὼ . . . τοῖς λόγοις) etc. In Plato, the metaphorical sense also extends

to things 'attached' by means of words (cf. the Pindar passage above): *Laws* 822b τοῖς δρομεῦσιν . . . τὰ ἐγκώμια, *Republic* 400c μήκη . . . καὶ βραχύτητας (to metrical units), 491a δόξαν . . . φιλοσοφίᾳ. The present passage seems, however, to be the earliest instance of the verb being used where a figure from the past, whose real condition cannot be changed, has something 'assigned' to them by words in the present (LSJ s.v. 5 *to ascribe, attribute*, citing Arist. *Pol.* 1259a6 ff.). By emphasising the violence Polycrates has done to the Busiris-myth, Isocrates creates a favourable background for his own defence of *Busiris* ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων (§ 35). Cf. on § 7 ἠμέλησας.

ἐξευρεῖν: the verb underlines the fact that it is Polycrates' selection of material, εὕρεσις, that is disastrously wrong.

τῶν γὰρ ἄλλων τῶν ἐπιχειρησάντων ἐκεῖνον λοιδορεῖν: Polycrates is implicitly included among the 'abusers' of Busiris. In *Busiris* λοιδορεῖν is to κατηγορεῖν as ἐπαινεῖν/ἐγκωμιάζειν/εὐλογεῖν are to ἀπολογεῖσθαι. Cf. § 6, § 33, § 36, and *Nic.* 4. For polemical convenience, but with some artificiality, Isocrates constructs a symmetry between Polycrates' two works, and for this purpose it is useful to be able to run together the categories of 'accusation' and 'abuse', κατηγορία and λοιδορία, in the same way as with 'defence' and 'praise', ἀπολογία and ἔπαινος etc.

βλασφημούντων: in Isocrates the word βλασφημεῖν (which is very rare in earlier oratory, but common in Demosthenes and Aeschines) generally means 'speak ill of', a near synonym of λοιδορεῖν (βλασφημεῖν = λοιδορεῖν, *Zeug.* 22 f., *Helen* 45, *Antid.* 248, *Panath.* 251; βλασφημεῖν = διαβάλλειν, *Antid.* 32, 101, 258, cf. *Soph.* 11; βλασφημία = κατηγορία, *Plat.* 62, *Antid.* 197). βλασφημεῖν is always pejorative, and implies that what is said is false as well as injurious (the same tends to be true of λοιδορεῖν, but there are exceptions: see e.g. *Paneg.* 130, *Areop.* 72). But the word also has a religious sense, as the opposite of εὐφημεῖν (Plato *Republic* 381e, *Laws* 800b ff., 821d etc.). This sense appears in Isocrates at *Helen* 64 (Stesichorus' punishment for his βλασφημία against Helen is a mark of her ἰσόθεος δύναμις), and is implicit also in *Nic.* 9. The impiety hinted here becomes explicit at § 38: because of Busiris' divine parentage, to speak ill of him is βλασφημία in the strongest sense.

ᾐτιάσω: see note above on διαβολῆς ἀπήλλαξας. As Isocrates takes on Busiris' defence, so Polycrates becomes his accuser.

ὥσπερ ἐγκωμιάσαι βουλόμενος . . . ἔδωκας: ἔδωκας (a metaphor less commonplace than its English equivalent, and not used elsewhere by Isocrates) suggests an arbitrary decision: see above on προσῆψας.

Ἀλκιβιάδην . . . μαθητὴν . . . παιδευόμενον: what Isocrates says Polycrates invented is not the association between Socrates and Alcibiades, but the specific claim that Alcibiades was Socrates' *pupil* and was *educated* by him: see Introduction **II**.

οὐδεὶς ᾔσθετο: 'no-one had noticed': ironic, and made more so because Polycrates has been portrayed as suffering from a kind of impaired perception (see note on § 1–9), which makes it unlikely that he would see something which everyone else had overlooked.

πολὺ διήνεγκε τῶν Ἑλλήνων: this is the reading of ΓΘ. Benseler/Blass adopt the variant τῶν ἄλλων (Λ), on the analogy of *Zeug.* 10 f. (the detractors of the elder Alcibiades αὐτοῦ προσποιοῦνται καταφρονεῖν, λέγοντες ὡς οὐδὲν διαφέρει τῶν ἄλλων). The comparison is apt, but does not justify the conclusion that Isocrates used the same form of words here. Drerup and Mathieu/Brémond follow ΓΘ. Note the similar divergence between manuscripts in § 35.

By definition, οἱ διαφέροντες are fit subjects for encomium: see *Helen* 14–15, *Panath.* 123, 260. In Isocrates by far the most common sense of διαφέρειν is 'to excel/surpass others' in positive qualities (which may or may not be specified), though it can simply mean 'to be different' (e.g. *de Pace* 54, *Antid.* 64, *Panath.* 224), and occasionally 'to outdo' others in some negative quality (*de Pace* 85 ἀνοίᾳ, *Panath.* 55 ἀνομίᾳ καὶ πλεονεξίᾳ). Thus the use of the verb on its own here just about leaves space for divergent assessments of Alcibiades (everyone agrees that he 'was exceptional'—for good or ill), while strongly suggesting (falsely, but as suits the argument) that everyone agrees in a positive assessment.

§ 6 εἰ γένοιτ' ἐξουσία . . .: this conceit may be compared with Plato *Apology* 41b, where Socrates anticipates the next world: ἐπεὶ ἔμοιγε καὶ αὐτῷ θαυμαστὴ ἂν εἴη ἡ διατριβὴ αὐτόθι, ὁπότε ἐντύχοιμι Παλαμήδει καὶ Αἴαντι τῷ Τελαμῶνος καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος τῶν παλαιῶν διὰ κρίσιν ἄδικον τέθνηκεν, ἀντιπαραβάλλοντι τὰ ἐμαυτοῦ πάθη πρὸς τὰ ἐκείνων . . . Here, as there, an afterlife meeting is imagined between characters who have suffered bad treatment in an earthly court (in *Apology*, bad verdicts; in *Busiris*, bad 'representation' by Polycrates), and who discuss and compare their experiences. The picture of Socrates and Busiris

'deliberating' about Polycrates' performance and passing judgement—a kind of miniature *prosopopoeia* of these two contrasting figures—has a striking comic effect. It turns the tables on the rhetorician who puts figures from the past 'on trial' for purposes of his own ἐπίδειξις. Cf. Isocrates' use of 'swapping positions' as a polemical weapon against Polycrates in § 46, and see note on § 46 εἰ μεγάλων καὶ δεινῶν . . . For the idea of the dead taking an interest in what the living say about them after they die (rather different from the *Apology* passage, where they discuss the events which which caused their death) compare Lucian's anecdote in which Alexander tells the historian Onesicritus that he wishes he could return to life for a brief while after his death, to hear people's honest reaction to Onesicritus' account of his achievements (Lucian *How to Write History* 40 = Onesicritus of Astypalaia F 7).

ἔχοι χάριν: because Alcibiades πολὺ διήνεγκε, and any educator would wish to have famous and influential pupils. Isocrates had composed praise of Alcibiades in the speech *On the Yoke*, but even so it is surprising that in *Busiris* he could so confidently dismiss the idea that association with him was discreditable.

τῶν ἐπαινεῖν αὐτὸν εἰθισμένων: this may refer to the 'Socratics' in general, but probably to Plato above all. Isocrates might well regard Plato's *Apology* as 'praise in the guise of defence', just as Gorgias' *Helen* is defence in the guise of praise (Isoc. *Helen* 14). In *Antidosis*, a work with clear echoes of the *Apology* (see Too 1995 pp. 192 f.), Isocrates states that he has chosen self-defence as a better alternative to self-praise (*Antid.* 8).

πρᾳότατος: πρᾳότης is the opposite of ὠμότης, the quality which Polycrates has ascribed to Busiris (§ 32).

αἰσχύνεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ σεμνύνεσθαι: the verb σεμνύνεσθαι can mean 'be dignified/serious', in a positive sense (*Helen* 11, *Areop.* 49), or 'take pride (in)', like μέγα φρονεῖν (*Evag.* 74, *De Pace* 50), in which case its normative value depends on whether or not the pride is justified (note Isoc.'s explicit acknowledgement in § 9 that the Busiris theme does not permit σεμνοὶ λόγοι). Here σεμνύνεσθαι continues the theme introduced by μεγαλαυχούμενον in § 4 (see *ad loc.*). Isocrates speaks as if the 'judgement' by Socrates and Busiris has really taken place (cf. τὸν . . . ἀγαπώμενον)—but even this has not put an end to Polycrates' foolish pride.

ἀγαπώμενον: 'popular', cf. *Helen* 37.

§ **7 ἠμέλησας**: cf. § 38 οὐδέν σοι τῆς ἀληθείας ἐμέλησεν.

αὐτὸν: the use of the pronoun to refer to Busiris makes rather an abrupt transition. Isocrates is sparing in his use of Busiris' name, especially in the Encomium: see note on § 10 Βουσίριδος.

ζηλῶσαι δόξαν: cf. *ad Nic.* 38 ὧν τὰς δόξας ζηλοῖς, μιμοῦ τὰς πράξεις. Aeolus is known for his control of the winds, Orpheus for his music's power over nature: it is plausible that Polycrates used them in a σύγκρισις with Busiris, whom he credited with supernatural achievements such as the creation of the Nile Delta (§ 31); see also note on § 13 δύναμιν . . . ἰσόθεον. On σύγκρισις in encomium see note on § 10–29.

τοῖς περὶ Αἰόλου λεγομένοις: i.e. above all *Odyssey* X.1–75. With εἰς τὰς αὐτῶν πατρίδας ἀπέστελλεν cf. *Od.* X.65 f. ἦ μέν σ' ἐνδυκέως ἀπεπέμπομεν, ὄφρα ἵκοιο/πατρίδα σὴν καὶ δῶμα . . . There is no suggestion in the tradition that Aeolus performed this service regularly, or indeed for anyone but Odysseus (though Aeolus' words at *Odyssey* X.73 f., οὐ γάρ μοι θέμις ἐστὶ κομιζέμεν οὐδ' ἀποπέμπειν/ἄνδρα τόν, ὅς τε θεοῖσιν ἀπέχθηται μακάρεσσιν, could at a stretch suggest a regular practice).

τοὺς . . . ἐκπίπτοντας . . . ἀπέστελλεν . . . τοὺς τεθνεῶτας ἀνῆγεν: the generalising plurals make isolated incidents sound like habitual behaviour; this balances Busiris' habit of guest-murder, and avoids irrelevant details. The result is a burlesque picture: it is as if Polycrates' Busiris were busily engaged in undoing the work of the other heroes (τοὺς . . . ἐκπίπτοντας stands as object both of ἀπέστελλεν and of κατήσθιεν, as though the same people were involved in each case).

εἰ χρὴ τοῖς ὑπὸ σοῦ λεγομένοις πιστεύειν: cf. § 32 ἀπέχεις τοῦ πιστὰ λέγειν. The ironic preamble is a foil to the summary directness of θύσας κατήσθιεν.

§ **8 τοῖς 'Ορφέως ἔργοις**: i.e. his rescue of Eurydice from the underworld. There is no question here of a version involving more than one such exploit: see note on τοὺς . . . ἐκπίπτοντας . . . above; also Heurgon 1932 p. 12, Ziegler 1939 p. 1273, Heath 1994 pp. 182 f. This passage is one of surprisingly few pre-Vergilian references to the story: others include Euripides *Alcestis* 357, Plato *Symposium* 179d

and *Phaedo* 68a, Hermesianax quoted by Athenaeus (597b), 'Επιτάφιος Βίωνος 122; see Heath 1994. Debate continues as to whether, in the 'original' version of the story (or in any version at all), Orpheus was finally successful in rescuing Eurydice. Heurgon takes ἀνῆγεν as evidence for a happy ending, but this view is rightly rejected by Ziegler and Heath: *Busiris* affords no evidence one way or the other. If the story Isocrates knew did end in failure, he would not say so here: it would be no more relevant rhetorically than is the ultimate failure of Aeolus' home-sending of Odysseus.

πρὸ μοίρας: this emotive poetic expression is used by Isocrates only here and at *Aegin.* 29. It underlines the unholiness of Busiris' conduct as described by Polycrates, a counterpoint for Isocrates' emphasis on Busiris' εὐσέβεια and a preparation for the 'blasphemy' argument in § 38–43.

περὶ τὰς γενεαλογίας ἐσπουδακὼς: we do not know in what sense Polycrates was 'zealous about genealogies': see Introduction **II**. For the argument from mythic chronology, see note on § 36 τοῖς χρόνοις. Isocrates is aware of genealogy as a literary genre, but it is not one for which he has much respect: cf. *Antid.* 45.

ὧν οὐδ' οἱ πατέρες πω κατ' ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον γεγονότες ἦσαν: Orpheus was a contemporary of Heracles (both were Argonauts: e.g. Pindar *Pythian IV* 171–8); Aeolus, a contemporary of the heroes of the Troy, belongs to a later generation than Heracles. It thus follows from the chronological argument in § 37 that they both lived more than 200-years-plus-four-generations after Busiris. See note on § 37 Περσέως . . .

§ 9 ἵνα δὲ μὴ δοκῶ τὸ προχειρότατον ποιεῖν, ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι τῶν εἰρημένων μηδὲν ἐνδεικνὺς τῶν ἐμαυτοῦ: these transitional words closely resemble the equivalent transition in *Helen* (§ 15 ἵνα δὲ μὴ δοκῶ τὸ ῥᾷστον ποιεῖν, ἐπιτιμᾶν τοῖς ἄλλοις μηδὲν ἐπιδεικνὺς τῶν ἐμαυτοῦ); cf. also the transition from polemic to statement of Isocrates' own views in *Against the Sophists* (§ 14 εἰ δὲ δεῖ μὴ μόνον κατηγορεῖν τῶν ἄλλων ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ δηλῶσαι διάνοιαν).

Here the words μηδὲν ἐνδεικνὺς τῶν ἐμαυτοῦ are not in the text of Γ, but are added in the margin by the corrector $Γ_5$ and appear in Θ, while Λ has μηδὲν ἐπιδεικνὺς τῶν ἐμαυτοῦ. The words missing from Γ were condemned by Blass (see Benseler/Blass *apparatus*), followed by Drerup and Mathieu/Brémond, as having been imported from *Helen* 15. Blass argues that in the *Helen* τῶν ἐμαυτοῦ stands in

antithesis with τοῖς ἄλλοις, but that the words are redundant in *Busiris*, where the main antithesis is between τῶν εἰρημένων and ἐξ ὧν ἔδει . . . later in the sentence. It seems likely that the phrase should stand in both speeches (probably with ἐνδεικνὺς in *Busiris* as against ἐπιδεικνὺς in *Helen*). Without it, the formula is incomplete in sense: Isocrates' point, commonplace as it is, is not that criticism in general is facile, but that it is too easy *just* to criticise: when the critic backs up the criticism by setting a better example—as Isocrates does—it is not facile. Isocrates does not characteristically choose elliptical expressions in preference to fuller ones; and τῶν εἰρημένων vs. τῶν ἐμαυτοῦ is an appropriate antithesis in *Busiris*, since the polemic is directed not at a nebulous collection of anonymous opponents but at specific works of a specific individual, Polycrates (it is quite clear in context that τῶν εἰρημένων = τῶν σοὶ εἰρημένων). I would therefore keep μηδὲν ἐνδεικνὺς τῶν ἐμαυτοῦ in the text.

τὸ προχειρότατον: what anyone could do, = τὸ ῥᾷστον (*Helen* 15). See note on § 45 ῥᾳθυμοτάτην.

πειράσομαι: in § 4 above (πειράσομαί σοι ποιῆσαι καταφανὲς) the word points to the problem of 'getting through' to Polycrates; here the tone is more one of self-deprecating false modesty.

διὰ βραχέων: fitting both Encomium and Defence into this small compass (35 'sections', where the Encomium of Helen alone occupies 54 and that of Evagoras 62) is in itself an achievement in βραχυλογία (see on § 44). Isocrates does not devote excessive space to a theme which is 'not serious'.

οὐ σπουδαίαν οὖσαν οὐδὲ σεμνοὺς λόγους ἔχουσαν: Isocrates continues to suppress the possibility that Polycrates himself regarded his work as παιδιά and that this may excuse or explain some of its 'faults'; cf. § 48. One tool of this suppression is the overblown, unselfconscious—and, by implication, humourless—pomposity with which Polycrates is credited (§ 4 μεγαλαυχούμενον, § 6 σεμνύνεσθαι), leading the reader to believe that Polycrates, unlike Isocrates, made the mistake of taking his theme seriously.

ἐξ ὧν ἔδει: ΘΛ have ὡς δεῖ, but Γ's reading ἐξ ὧν ἔδει is clearly correct (cf. also *hypothesis* line 45 πῶς ἔδει αὐτὸν γράψαι τὸ ἐγκώμιον). The past tense points once again to Polycrates' failure, and also combines with the preceding reference to the unseriousness of the theme

in limiting the scope of Isocrates' demonstration: he will show how the encomium and defence should have been written, *given* Polycrates' choice to write on such a theme. Cf. § 49.

τὸν ἔπαινον: see on § 4 εὐλογεῖν.

§ 10–29 *Encomium of Busiris*

§ 10–11 Genealogy of Busiris, son of Poseidon and Libye; transition to the account of his 'deeds', i.e. of the Kingdom of Egypt.
§ 11–14 Geographical Qualities of Egypt: climate and fertility; the Nile, which provides defence and irrigation, and confers the advantages both of mainland and of island.
§ 15–20 The Egyptian Constitution: separation of classes, importance of specialisation and adherence to a particular task; their constitution approved by philosophers, and copied by the Spartans; σύγκρισις of Egypt and Sparta.
§ 21–23 Intellectual Culture (φρόνησις): promoted by the priestly class, which Busiris established; medicine for the body, philosophy for the soul; propaideutics for the young.
§ 24–27 Religious Observance (εὐσέβεια): piety the only virtue beneficial even when 'exaggerated'; Egyptians god-fearing because of ἀσκήσεις prescribed by Busiris to test his subjects' obedience.
§ 28–29 Purity (ὁσιότης)—**Pythagoras as Witness**: Pythagoras a μαθητής of the Egyptians; high esteem consequently enjoyed by Pythagoras and his own μαθηταί.

The only fixed point in the early theory and practice of organising an encomium is the pride of place given to genealogy: see note on § 10 εὐγενείας. For the rest, there is a tension between chronological narrative and organisation of deeds under the 'virtues' they illustrate.

The *Rhetoric to Alexander* seems to advocate, after genealogy, a treatment of advantages which are due to good fortune (1441a15, where the lacuna makes interpretation uncertain; cf. 1440b17–19); then there is to be a brief account of virtues displayed in youth (1441a16 ff.), followed by the main account of adult achievements, divided according to the virtues they demonstrate: δικαιοσύνη, σοφία, ἀνδρεία (1441b18 ff.). Aristotle does not give rules for arrangement of material, but his discussion at *Rhetoric* 1366a23 ff. of τὸ καλόν (the proper standard and material of praise, 1358b27 f.) similarly focuses

on ἀρεταί or μέρη ἀρετῆς, which are listed as δικαιοσύνη, ἀνδρεία, σωφροσύνη, μεγαλοπρέπεια, μεγαλοψυχία, ἐλευθεριότης, φρόνησις, σοφία. Agathon's Encomium of Love in Plato's *Symposium* is a good example of an encomium organised by qualities: first κάλλος and its subdivisions—qualities due to good fortune; then ἀρετή and its subdivisions. ('Genealogy' and 'youthful virtues' do not appear, but are in effect subsumed into the argument concerning νεότης, the first subdivision of beauty.) See also Introduction **I.iv**.

In Isocrates' *Helen*, the principal topic, introduced immediately after Helen's genealogy, is her one obvious 'excellence', namely κάλλος. This remains the underlying topic from § 17 to § 60, though there is a long interruption in the form of an inset encomium of Theseus (§ 18–38): his admiration for Helen serves as evidence for the power of her beauty. The praise of Theseus begins the account of deeds which bear witness to Helen's beauty (naturally the proof of beauty is in its influence on others, not in the beautiful person's deeds): this narrative of deeds continues in § 39–53 (Helen's suitors, Paris, the combatants at Troy), and is followed by αὔξησις of κάλλος itself (§ 54–60). Next comes Helen's apotheosis and divine power (§ 61–66), and a conclusion (§ 67–69) returning to the subject of the Trojan War and its positive consequences.

The encomium of Theseus in the *Helen* begins with his birth (§ 18) and moves immediately into the account of his abduction of Helen (§ 18–20): this is necessary to establish the connection with the main theme of Helen's beauty (§ 18 ἰδὼν αὐτὴν . . . τοσοῦτον ἡττήθη τοῦ κάλλους . . . ὥσθ' . . .). The transitional passage § 21–23 defines the purpose of the fuller account of Theseus' deeds which is to follow: it will show that he possessed παντελὴς ἀρετή, lacking none of the μέρη ἀρετῆς. At the same time it reminds us of the relevance to Helen of Theseus' virtue. The ἔργα of Theseus are treated first through a σύγκρισις of his achievements with those of Heracles (§ 23–28), followed by a *praeteritio* of other exploits, then an analysis according to virtues (§ 31): ἀνδρία, ἐπιστήμη πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον, εὐσέβεια, σωφροσύνη. The last of these is demonstrated by his policies as a 'democratic king', which provide the subject for the next section (§ 32–37).

The organisation of *Evagoras* (*terminus post quem* 374 B.C.: see Mathieu/Brémond II.142) is not far removed from the prescriptions of the *Rhetoric to Alexander*. Genealogy and birth occupy § 12–21, and demonstrate the (admittedly obvious) principle stated in *Rhet. ad Alex.*

that, if the earlier ancestors—in Evagoras' case, the Aeacidae in the distant heroic age—are distinguished while the later ones are less so, one should list the former but pass over the latter (1440b32–35). Then in § 22 come Evagoras' boyhood virtues (κάλλος, ῥώμη, σωφροσύνη), and in § 23–24 the adult virtues of ἀνδρεία, σοφία, and δικαιοσύνη. In what follows, however, there is no very clear organisation of Evagoras' achievements according to the virtues they demonstrate. First comes his rise to kingship (§ 25–32), followed by a σύγκρισις with the ways other kings have acquired their thrones (§ 33–39) and an αὔξησις of kingship itself (§ 40). The first place given to Evagoras' status as a king could be seen in the light of *Rhet. ad Alex.*'s recommendation that good qualities due to fortune be dealt with first—being born into a royal line is a matter of good luck (though, as Isocrates stresses, Evagoras had to win his throne, and displayed his ἀρετή in doing so); but chronological priority is the main consideration. Next comes Evagoras' conduct as a king, divided into domestic policy and treatment of his subjects (§ 41–46), wider civilising influence in Cyprus (§ 47–50), and achievements in war: against Sparta (§ 51–57—with supporting 'evidence' from Evagoras' association with Conon) and against Persia (§ 57–64). There is not much sign of virtues as an organising principle, but there are periodic reminders along the way of the connection of deeds with particular qualities: Evagoras acquired the kingdom ὁσίως καὶ δικαίως (§ 26, 38); his government of it showed him to be δημοτικός, πολιτικός, στρατηγικός and μεγαλόφρων (§ 46); his treatment of Conon and others is evidence of ὁσιότης (§ 51). This connection with virtues is reasserted in § 65, where the two specifically mentioned are ἀνδρεία and φρόνησις, representing excellence in war and in peace respectively. After a recapitulation (§ 65–69), the encomium concludes by returning to Evagoras' good fortune (§ 70–72): he, if anyone, deserves to be called a god on earth, since he was εὐτυχής and θεοφιλής, and enjoyed εὐδαιμονία, long life without decrepitude, εὐπαιδία and πολυπαιδία. This section fits a chronological scheme, since it stands in for an account of Evagoras' death (Mathieu/Brémond II.165 n. 1), as well as pointing forward to his reputation after death (§ 71 ἀθάνατον τὴν περὶ αὐτοῦ μνήμην κατέλιπεν: see note on *Bus.* 10 μνημεῖον εἰς ἅπαντα τὸν χρόνον).

Xenophon in *Agesilaus* (c. 357 B.C.: Russell and Wilson 1981 p. xv) simplifies matters by separating the continuous narrative from the explicit account of the subject's virtues. He presents first a chrono-

logical account of Agesilaus' career (i–ii), in which his τρόποι will be shown by his ἔργα (i.6) and then proceeds to a systematic account (ii–ix) of ἡ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ αὐτοῦ ἀρετή (iii.1). Agesilaus possessed εὐσέβεια (iii), δικαιοσύνη (iv), σωφροσύνη (v), ἀνδρεία (vi.1–3), and σοφία (vi.4–8); he was φιλόπολις and φιλέλλην (vii), displayed τὸ εὔχαρι (viii), and presented a striking contrast with the ἀλαζονεία of the Persian king (ix). The work concludes with a summary of Agesilaus' life (and death) as enviable and exemplary (x), and a résumé ἐν κεφαλαίοις of his character.

It is just about possible to read the Encomium of Busiris as a chronological narrative of Busiris' career: he establishes his kingdom (§ 11–14), organises his subjects into classes (§ 15–20), assigns particular tasks and privileges to particular groups (§ 21–23), and takes measures to ensure the continuing stability of his regime (§ 24–27); the supposed visit of Pythagoras to Egypt (§ 28–29) obviously takes place long after the reign of Busiris, and could thus be seen as indicating the lasting glory of his achievements (though this is not explicitly stated).

In reality, however, no clear chronological progression persists beyond § 15 (ἤρξατο . . . μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα . . .). The Encomium as a whole is primarily a description of the Egyptian state, though its features are formally presented as the acts of its founder, and their significance is periodically explained by stating his motive (§ 12 ἑώρα, 15 ἡγούμενος, 16 εἰδώς, 26 f. ἅμα μὲν . . . οἰόμενος . . . ἅμα δὲ βουλόμενος, 27 ἐνόμιζεν). The obvious organisation of the Encomium is thematic, as the scheme presented at the head of this note suggests. The sections address different aspects of Egypt: geographical amenities (§ 11–14), specialisation and consequent superiority in the art of war and in productive τέχναι (§ 15–20); education and intellectual achievements (§ 21–23); religion (§ 24–29).

This organisation is akin to the organisation according to virtues which is advocated in the *Rhetoric to Alexander* and more-or-less implemented in *Evagoras*: three of the sections have an introductory reference to the 'virtue' of the Egyptians which they demonstrate: φρόνησις, § 21–23; εὐσέβεια, § 24–27; ὁσιότης, § 28–29 (though ὁσιότης is not entirely distinct from εὐσέβεια, and has already been mentioned in § 26). The difference, of course, is that in *Busiris* the virtues in question are never said to belong to Busiris himself, the object of the encomium. The reader may infer, but is not told, that Busiris possessed the qualities of which he was αἴτιος (cf. § 21 τῆς

περὶ τὴν φρόνησιν ἐπιμελείας εἰκότως ἄν τις ἐκεῖνον αἴτιον νομίσειεν, § 26 πολλὰς γὰρ αὐτοῖς καὶ παντοδαπὰς ἀσκήσεις τῆς ὁσιότητος ἐκεῖνος κατέστησεν). Compare how Agathon in Plato's *Symposium* links possessing a quality with producing it in others: 195a οἷος οἵων αἴτιος ὢν τυγχάνει, 197c ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ . . . Ἔρως πρῶτος αὐτὸς ὢν κάλλιστος καὶ ἄριστος μετὰ τοῦτο τοῖς ἄλλοις ἄλλων τοιούτων αἴτιος εἶναι. And in his Defence of Busiris Isocrates, asserting the perfect virtue of the gods and their offspring, makes the connection between virtues and deeds: § 41 ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν οὐχ ὅπως τοὺς θεούς, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τοὺς ἐξ ἐκείνων γεγονότας οὐδεμιᾶς ἡγοῦμαι κακίας μετασχεῖν, ἀλλ' αὐτούς τε πάσας ἔχοντας τὰς ἀρετὰς φῦναι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τῶν καλλίστων ἐπιτηδευμάτων ἡγεμόνας καὶ διδασκάλους γεγενῆσθαι. Here in the Encomium, however, the inference that the different aspects of Busiris' work reflect his personal virtues is never explicitly made: there is only the general assertion in § 10 that Busiris intended his achievements to be a monument of his ἀρετή.

If the Encomium of Busiris is seen in the light of organisation by virtues, the treatment of the physical advantages of Egypt may be set alongside the treatment of kingship in *Evagoras*. Here too qualities which might be attributed to good fortune are placed first, and here too it is shown that they in fact give evidence of ἀρετή—in this case, because Busiris deliberately chose Egypt as the ideal place for his kingdom.

In *Evagoras*, as has been made clear, the virtues do not by any means produce a rigid scheme, and there is no reason to expect perfect regularity of structure in the Encomium of Busiris. All the same it is worth considering why two sections—§ 11–14 and § 15–20—are not associated with a particular virtue.

In the case of § 11–14, the reason is clear: the physical qualities of Egypt cannot be seen as directly reflecting qualities of Busiris himself, and to place one of them—κάλλος for example—as the 'heading' of the section would be to make it too obvious that Egypt, not Busiris, is being praised. A kind of explanation is offered in the transitional sentence in § 15 (ἤρξατο . . . ὅθεν περ χρὴ τοὺς εὖ φρονοῦντας, ἅμα τόν τε τόπον ὡς κάλλιστον καταλαβεῖν καὶ τροφὴν ἱκανὴν . . . ἐξευρεῖν): the qualities of Egypt are κάλλος and fertility, and in choosing Egypt Busiris showed himself to be εὖ φρονῶν.

It would not have been difficult, however, to attach a virtue—perhaps σωφροσύνη or δικαιοσύνη—to the account of the Egyptian class system in § 15–20. (Cf. *Panath.* 204, where δικαιοσύνη appears

alongside φρόνησις and εὐσέβεια constituting τὰ κάλλιστα τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων.) Several possible reasons can be envisaged for not giving this section such a heading. One might be a desire not to depart too far from existing preconceptions about Egypt: Egyptian medicine and priestly wisdom, massive temples and reverence for animals were all well-known (see Introduction **IV.i**, **V.i**), and easily described in terms of φρόνησις and εὐσέβεια, but there is no equivalent tradition which would make the Egyptians remarkable for δικαιοσύνη, σωφροσύνη or ἀνδρεία. Another reason not to commend the Egyptians explicitly for δικαιοσύνη might be that it would produce too stark and striking a contrast with the traditional Busiris-story, and the audience would be reminded of what they are being encouraged to forget.

It is also possible that the absence of a heading serves the parody, if such it is, of Plato's *Republic* (see Introduction **IV.i**). This section states a principle resembling that which emerges unexpectedly in *Republic* as the essence of justice (§ 16 ἀεὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς τὰς αὐτὰς πράξεις μεταχειρίζεσθαι προσέταξεν). Isocrates could not identify this feature with δικαιοσύνη without destroying the subtlety of his parody and hopelessly bewildering those unacquainted with Plato's ideas; on the other hand, if he articulated some more familiar way in which the Egyptian constitution exemplified δικαιοσύνη (or some other excellence), the parody would be very much weakened. As it is, the identification of the Egyptian constitution as displaying Platonic δικαιοσύνη is left available for those able to make it—and is perhaps suggested by the conspicuous and surprising absence of δικαιοσύνη and its cognates from the Encomium. But this is clearly a speculative line of argument, and the quest for an 'explanation' of this feature of the Encomium may itself be misguided.

Two features of the encomia in *Helen* and in *Evagoras* appear on a smaller scale in the Encomium of Busiris: the σύγκρισις, and the introduction of some well-known figure whose association with the object of praise serves as 'testimony' to their virtue. Comparison is noted by Aristotle as a technique of αὔξησις characteristic of Isocrates: κἂν μὴ καθ' αὐτὸν εὐπορῇς, πρὸς ἄλλους ἀντιπαραβάλλειν, ὅπερ Ἰσοκράτης ἐποίει . . . δεῖ δὲ πρὸς ἐνδόξους συγκρίνειν· αὐξητικὸν γὰρ καὶ καλόν, εἰ σπουδαίων βελτίων (*Rhet.* 1368a19–22). For the importance of the σύγκρισις in later theory of encomium, see e.g. Menander Rhetor *RG* III.372.21–5, 377.2–9. The use of 'witnesses' may be seen as exemplifying another Isocratean practice on which Aristotle remarks,

that of 'bringing in' people to praise: ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικοῖς δεῖ τὸν λόγον ἐπεισοδιοῦν ἐπαίνοις, οἷον Ἰσοκράτης ποιεῖ· ἀεὶ γάρ τινα εἰσάγει (*Rhet.* 1418a33 f.).

Evagoras is compared with Cyrus and others who have won kingdoms (§ 35–39) and with the heroes of Troy (§ 65–69), Theseus in *Helen* is compared with Heracles (§ 23–28); in *Busiris* there is a σύγκρισις of the Egyptian constitution with the Spartan: a miniature and light-hearted parallel for the full-scale σύγκρισις of Athens with Sparta in *Panegyricus* and *Panathenaicus* (cf. in particular Isocrates' introduction to this comparison at *Panath.* 39–41). Again, with the role of Theseus in the *Helen*, a μάρτυς τῶν Ἑλένῃ προσόντων ἀγαθῶν (§ 38), and with that of Conon whose association with Evagoras is a τεκμήριον καὶ τοῦ τρόπου καὶ τῆς ὁσιότητος τῆς ἐκείνου (*Evag.* 51), we may compare the part played by Pythagoras as a well-known figure who 'observed' the ὁσιότης of the Egyptians and learned from them (*Busiris* 28 f.). The great antiquity of the Busiris-story is reflected in the fact that both the Spartan constitution and the religious expertise of Pythagoras are much younger than their Egyptian equivalents; more than that, they are derived from them.

As has been said, the Encomium of Busiris is in effect more of an Encomium of Egypt, and in outline it conforms closely to the precepts given by Menander Rhetor for 'praise of a city' (*RG* III.344.16–367.8). Praise of a city combines elements of praise of a country and praise of an individual person (346.27–9): first come the city's geographical advantages, based on the same topics as praise of a country; then its origin, and the ἐπιτηδεύματα of its inhabitants arranged according to virtues, following the same scheme as encomium of an individual. Similarly in *Busiris* we have geographical excellence (§ 11–14) followed by ἐπιτηδεύματα arranged according to virtues (§ 15–29). Menander divides 'praise of a country' into the two main categories of φύσις, nature, and θέσις, position; position divides into relation to land, sea, and sky (the last encompassing 'seasons'); nature divides into mountain vs. plain, waterless vs. well-watered, fertile vs. barren (344.16–345.4: cf. also 351.19). All of these topics are treated in one way or another in *Bus.* 11–14. Position relative to land and sea is covered by the conceit in § 14 that Egypt combines the advantages of continent and island (see note *ad loc.*); position relative to the sky, and seasons, are treated in § 12, and revisited in § 13 in the notion that the Nile gives the Egyptians power over the weather; Egypt is a country of wide plains (§ 14), abundantly watered by the

Nile (§ 13 f.), and bears the richest and most varied crops (§ 12). The extent to which *Busiris* prefigures the conventions of later 'praise of cities' is acknowledged by Pernot, who assumes, however, that its status as a παίγνιον prevented it from being an influential model (Pernot 1993 I.185).

The praise of Egypt as a country in *Busiris* 11–14 has a fourth-century parallel in the praise of Attica in Xenophon's Πόροι (i.3–8), which treats several of the same topics: well-adjusted seasons and freedom from extremes of weather (i.3, 6), variety of crops (i.3), and above all the combination of the advantages of island and continent (i.7). See note on § 14 ἤπειρον . . . νῆσον.

On the theory of encomium in general, see Buchheit 1960, Russell and Wilson 1981 pp. xi–xxxiv, Pernot 1993. On the relationship of the Encomium to the other sections of the *Busiris*, see Introduction **I.iv**.

§ 10 περὶ μὲν οὖν: transitional μὲν οὖν (Denniston 1954 p. 472) is characteristic of Isocrates' rhetorical prose, and marks similar transitional passages in the other encomia (*Helen* 16, *Evag.* 12; also *Panath.* 26).

Βουσίριδος: this is the only occurrence of Busiris' name in the Encomium. In the remainder of § 10–29 he appears as the implicit subject of a verb (§ 12 ἑώρα, 15 ἤρξατο etc.) or referred to by a demonstrative pronoun (§ 12 ἐκεῖνον, 26 ἐκεῖνος). Contrast *Evagoras*, where in § 12–72 Evagoras' name occurs 28 times; even in *Helen*, where Helen herself is rarely centre-stage, the name Helen occurs 11 times in § 16–69. The omission of Busiris' name from here on perhaps reflects the conciseness of the encomium (§ 9 διὰ βραχέων); also, Isocrates' strategy of praise will be more effective if readers start to think of his hero simply as 'the founder of Egypt' and forget about the Busiris they know from myth. The absence of the name lets us see that the Encomium of Busiris is really an Encomium of Egypt, and thus makes it more likely to trigger recollections of other accounts of ideal πολιτεῖαι, e.g. Plato's *Republic* (see Introduction **IV.i**). Busiris' name only reappears when the discussion has returned to Polycrates' version: note the contrast between § 30 ὡς . . . αἴτιος ἦν ὃν ὑπεθέμην and § 31 βουληθεὶς . . . Βούσιριν εὐλογεῖν προείλου λέγειν κτλ.

εὐγενείας: genealogy is the agreed first topic of encomium: see Gorgias *Helen* 3, Isoc. *Helen* 16 (asserting its priority), *Evag.* 12 (coupling γένος

with φύσις as in Gorgias' *Helen*), Xenophon *Agesilaus* i.2 (a close parallel for the present passage: περὶ μὲν οὖν εὐγενείας αὐτοῦ τί ἄν τις μεῖζον ἢ κάλλιον εἰπεῖν ἔχοι . . .), and *Rhet. ad Alex.* 1440b24 f. μετὰ τὰ προοίμια πρῶτον τὴν γενεαλογίαν τάξομεν. In *Rhet. ad Alex.* γενεαλογία retains this first place in spite of the fact that (just before the passage quoted) it is classed among τὰ ἔξω τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀγαθά, which 'are concealed' (κλέπτεται) not justly praised. Aristotle rationalises: noble origins make the account of noble deeds more plausible (*Rhet.* 1367b29–32 τὸ δ' ἐγκώμιον τῶν ἔργων ἐστίν (τὰ δὲ κύκλῳ εἰς πίστιν, οἷον εὐγένεια καὶ παιδεία· εἰκὸς γὰρ ἐξ ἀγαθῶν ἀγαθοὺς καὶ τὸν οὕτω τραφέντα τοιοῦτον εἶναι)). When Sextus Empiricus attacks rhetoricians for not knowing how to praise, since they regard characteristics such as good birth which are not παρ' ἡμᾶς γινόμενα as suitable material, the name of Busiris heads his *reductio ad absurdum*: ἐπεί τοί γε εἰ ψιλῶς ἐπαινετέον τὴν εὐγένειάν ἐστι καὶ πολυτεκνίαν καὶ πᾶν τοιουτῶδες, ἐπαινετέος καὶ Βούσιρις καὶ Ἄμυκος καὶ Ἀνταῖος οἱ ξενοκτόνοι, ὅτι Ποσειδῶνος ἦσαν υἱεῖς, ἐπαινετὴ δὲ καὶ ἡ Νιόβη, ὅτι πολύτεκνος (*adv. math.* II.104).

ῥᾳδίως: in encomium it is obviously appropriate to stress the abundance of material (cf. *Helen* 67, 69, *Evag.* 73). A good genealogy is always a rich resource: see Gorgias' observation, as recorded by Aristotle, ὅτι οὐχ ὑπολείπει αὐτὸν ὁ λόγος . . . εἰ γὰρ Ἀχιλλέα λέγει Πηλέα ἐπαινεῖ, εἶτα Αἰακόν, εἶτα τὸν θεόν (*Rhet.* 1418a35–7).

Ποσειδῶνος: this is the most constant element in Busiris' genealogy, on which see Introduction **V.v**.

Λιβύης . . . ἥν φασι . . .: Libye ἐπώνυμος appears at Hdt. IV.45.3 and probably at Aeschylus *Suppliants* 317; Pindar at *Pythian IV* 24 f. uses the phrase Ἐπάφοιο κόραν to refer to the country. The scope of πρώτην is not quite clear: is Libye the first woman to rule a country, the first to give a country her name, the first to do each, or the first to do both? None of these 'firsts' is attested elsewhere, and the detail is not important to the encomiastic effect. For this topic in αὔξησις see *Rhet.* 1368a10 f. χρηστέον δὲ καὶ τῶν αὐξητικῶν πολλοῖς, οἷον μόνος ἢ πρῶτος . . . The close identification of Libye with the territory named after her makes it easier to present the founding of Egypt as entirely Busiris' own work: contrast Apollodorus' account, in which the 'dynasty' already rules Egypt before Libye is born (I.i.4).

οὐκ ἐπὶ τούτοις μόνοις μέγ' ἐφρόνησεν, ἀλλ' ᾠήθη δεῖν . . .: the τόπος of taking pride in achievements rather than (solely) in good fortune

appears again at *Evag.* 45 (μέγα φρονῶν οὐκ ἐπὶ τοῖς διὰ τύχην, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τοῖς δι' αὑτὸν γιγνομένοις), and is used by Aristotle in the *Rhetoric* (1368a1–7) to illustrate the change of expression (λέξις) by which a symbouleutic 'precept' may be converted into an ἔπαινος: the precept is οὐ δεῖ μέγα φρονεῖν ἐπὶ τοῖς διὰ τύχην ἀλλὰ τοῖς δι' αὑτόν, which in encomiastic form becomes μέγα φρονῶν οὐκ ἐπὶ τοῖς διὰ τύχην ὑπάρχουσιν ἀλλὰ τοῖς δι' αὑτόν—a close paraphrase of the *Evagoras* passage. Another close parallel for the present passage is *Zeug.* 29: οὐδ ἠξίωσεν (sc. Alcibiades senior) αὐτὸς μὲν ῥᾳθύμως ζῆν, σεμνύνεσθαι δ' ἐπὶ ταῖς τῶν προγόνων ἀρεταῖς, ἀλλ' εὐθὺς οὕτω μέγ' ἐφρόνησεν ὥστ' ᾠήθη δεῖν δι' αὑτὸν καὶ τἀκείνων ἔργα μνημονεύεσθαι. Cf. also *Panath.* 32.

μνημεῖον: i.e. the Egyptian kingdom and constitution, the lasting monuments of Busiris' career. On the 'immortal monument' motif, see next note. Busiris' intention to leave a memorial has a 'reflexive' effect, as in other texts where an author makes a character anticipate being remembered (cf. esp. *Iliad* VI.357 f., *Odyssey* VIII.580). For Isocrates' view of speech as a memorial, see especially *Evag.* 73 ἐγὼ δ' . . . ἡγοῦμαι μὲν εἶναι καλὰ μνημεῖα καὶ τὰς τῶν σωμάτων εἰκόνας, πολὺ μέντοι πλείονος ἀξίας τὰς τῶν πράξεων καὶ τῆς διανοίας, ἃς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἄν τις μόνον τοῖς τεχνικῶς ἔχουσιν θεωρήσειεν. Xenophon adapts this antithesis in *Agesilaus,* cutting out the role of λόγοι and the encomiast: where Isocrates presents encomium as a finer alternative to sculpture, Agesilaus is said to prefer deeds to statues, because they are his own work, not another's (xi.7: cf. last note). Here there is an element of irony because what Busiris is made to imagine as a μνημεῖον—the kingdom of Egypt—has been no μνημεῖον at all, since he has not hitherto been 'known' as its founder; thus his *only* memorial is the present speech itself.

Another important passage reflecting on encomium as the monument of deeds is *Panegyricus* 186, where the pairing φήμη–μνήμη encapsulates the function of encomium (cf. Lysias II *Epitaphios* 3). Similarly the *Antidosis* is its author's own memorial (§ 7), and takes the place of an ἔπαινος (§ 8). Plato at *Republic* 599b attacks the literary artist's pretensions, but at the same time presupposes the nexus καλὰ ἔργα—μνημεῖον—ἐγκώμιον: someone who understood μίμησις and realised that an actual thing is superior to a copy πειρῷτ' ἂν πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ ἔργα ἑαυτοῦ καταλιπεῖν μνημεῖα, καὶ εἶναι προθυμοῖτ' ἂν μᾶλλον ὁ ἐγκωμιαζόμενος ἢ ὁ ἐγκωμιάζων (compare the sentiments of Xenophon's Agesilaus). Plato's immediate concern here is with poetry (see Halliwell

1988 *ad loc.*), but the way he expresses his thought suggests the influence of the rhetorical tradition.

εἰς ἅπαντα τὸν χρόνον: immortal fame is naturally a motif of prose encomium (as of earlier poetry: Theognis 243–254 West etc.): cf. *Helen* 17, *Evag.* 3, 4, 67, 71, Xenophon *Agesilaus* vi.2, xi.7, 16; other Isocratean examples of the praise topic of 'immortal glory' include *de Pace* 94, *Plat.* 53, *Phil.* 145, *Archid.* 109. The same τόπος is turned to negative effect at *Paneg.* 89 (Xerxes bridged the Hellespont and channelled Athos βουληθεὶς . . . τοιοῦτον μνημεῖον καταλιπεῖν ὃ μὴ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεώς ἐστιν), and receives a further twist in Isocrates' own claim to immortality at *Panath.* 260, where *hybris* is avoided both by putting the words in the mouth of his pupil and by including an explicit denial that the immortality in question is the same as that of the gods: τελευτήσας δὲ τὸν βίον μεθέξειν ἀθανασίας, οὐ τῆς τοῖς θεοῖς παρούσης, ἀλλὰ τῆς τοῖς ἐπιγιγνομένοις περὶ τῶν διενεγκόντων ἐπί τινι τῶν καλῶν ἔργων μνήμην ἐμποιούσης.

§ 11–14 *The Geographical Situation of Egypt*

The way Isocrates develops his account may be compared with Herodotus' outline of what makes Egypt exceptional: Αἰγύπτιοι ἅμα τῷ οὐρανῷ τῷ κατὰ σφέας ἐόντι ἑτεροίῳ καὶ τῷ ποταμῷ φύσιν ἀλλοίην παρεχομένῳ ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι ποταμοί, τὰ πολλὰ πάντα ἔμπαλιν τοῖσι ἄλλοισι ἀνθρώποισι ἐστήσαντο ἤθεά τε καὶ νόμους . . . (II.35.2). Isocrates transmutes Herodotean θωμάσια skilfully into topics of praise.

§ 11 ἐλάττω . . . ἢ κατὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ φύσιν: the exceptional individual's φύσις impels his rise: cf. *Evag.* 24. See also above on § 10 τυχὼν δὲ . . . Like τῆς ἀρετῆς τῆς αὑτοῦ μνημεῖον in § 10, κατὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ φύσιν helps to articulate a connection between the praise of Egypt which follows and the figure of Busiris himself: the country was κατὰ τὴν φύσιν for him, 'appropriate' or 'proportionate' to his nature.

πλείστους δὲ καταστρεψάμενος καὶ μεγίστην δύναμιν κτησάμενος: balanced phrases (πλείστους δὲ καταστρεψάμενος: nine syllables, two with long vowel-sounds; μεγίστην δύναμιν κτησάμενος: ten syllables, two with long vowel-sounds) with marked *homoeoteleuton.* Busiris' life up to the founding of his kingdom is dealt with summarily, in marked contrast with the lavish development of § 12–13 on the amenities of Egypt. πλείστους and μεγίστην conform to the principle of αὔξησις in encomium: see Arist. *Rhet.* 1368a22 f.

ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ . . . οἴκησιν: Isocrates' account suggests that he is following the 'Ionian' usage, in which Αἴγυπτος means only the Nile Delta, the rest of what others call Egypt being divided by the Nile between Arabia and Libya: cf. § 12 τετειχισμένην, § 13 ἔντος αὐτοῦ, § 14 κύκλῳ . . . περιέχων, and see Herodotus II.15–18 (with Lloyd 1976 *ad loc.*). The use of the 'Ionian' definition helps the 'mainland-island' conceit of § 14, which forms the basis of Isocrates' praise of the country's amenities: Egypt has the traditional merits of mainland (fertility; the ref. to 'abundance of land' may suggest some flexibility in the definition, see note on § 14 τῷ πλήθει τῶν πεδίων) and island (ease of transport and defence); plus one uniquely local advantage, the Nile floods, here represented as human control of the weather.

προκρίνας: the lavish praise of Egypt's special qualities might tend to detract from Busiris' personal achievement (so Eucken 1983 p. 184), and Isocrates' 'plausible' account, unlike Polycrates', cannot make him directly responsible for them (see § 31, 34 f.). Isocrates compensates by emphasising Busiris' deliberate choice of Egypt and the good sense to which it testifies (§ 12 ἑώρα, § 15: see note on § 10–29).

§ 12–14 The section on the physical advantages of Egypt is an αὔξησις intertwining four basic points, all related to the properties of the Nile:

(A) Egypt has good 'weather', i.e. sunshine plus Nile water.
(B) consequently, Egypt is very fertile.
(C) the Nile is a barrier against attack.
(D) the Nile provides easy transport.

These points are combined in a complex pattern of repetition and re-ordering, which may be summarised as follows:

> Unlike other countries, Egypt (A) has ideal weather, (B) is very fertile, and moreover (C) is protected by the Nile, (§ 13) which not only defends it but (D) supplies it, making it both (C) well-protected and (D) easily supplied; the Nile is responsible for (B) the agricultural prosperity of the Egyptians, because it provides (A) the uniquely controlled weather. In fact (§ 14), the Egyptians are so fortunate as to have (B) the fertile abundance of a continent, but also (D) the ease of export and import of an island, since the Nile flows everywhere and makes transport easy.

Thus schematised, the pattern is AB CD CD BA BD. A and B (loosely, the 'continental' properties) are presented first without explanation;

then C and D (the 'insular' properties) are presented as gifts of the Nile, and re-stated to emphasise their practical implications. Then B and A appear again (reversed in order), and are now also seen to be gifts of the Nile. Finally, in § 14, the conclusion—that Egypt has the best of both continental and insular geography—is underlined by repetition of B and D, one member from each pair.

For a stylistic analysis of § 12–13, see Introduction **I.v.**

οὐκ εὐκαίρως οὐδ' εὐαρμόστως . . . ἔχοντας: the expression, though impressive, is not in itself very clear, but is immediately explained by the second half of the antithesis ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὲν κτλ. Other countries are not εὐκαίρως ἔχοντες in the sense that sun and water do not appear at exactly the right time and in the right quantity for their crops; they are not εὐαρμόστως ἔχοντες because they are located in arid or rain-washed zones, not having the ideal conjunction of sun and water. Egypt has sunlight and water regularly and advantageously distributed in time and space. For Egypt as a place with a regulated, if not homogeneous, climate, see Aristophanes' *Seasons* F 581 K–A. For the use of εὐκαίρως, cf. *Areop.* 30; see also Wersdörfer 1940 p. 69. For εὐαρμόστως, cf. *Panath.* 32 τὴν ἕξιν . . . εὐάρμοστον ἔχοντας.

ὑπ' ὄμβρων κατακλυζομένους . . . ὑπὸ καυμάτων διαφθειρομένους: cf. § 13 ὄμβρων . . . αὐχμῶν, and see commentary *ad loc.* for the sense of ὄμβρων. Compare Plato *Timaeus* 22de, where the Nile protects Egypt from the periodic destruction by fire or water to which the rest of the world is subject, and see Introduction **IV.iii.**

ἐν καλλίστῳ . . . τοῦ κόσμου κειμένην: 'au plus bel endroit de l'univers' (Mathieu/Brémond). There is one other instance in the work of Isocrates of the word κόσμος meaning 'the heavens', 'the world/universe', namely *Panegyricus* 179 τῆς . . . γῆς ἁπάσης τῆς ὑπὸ τῷ κόσμῳ κειμένης (elsewhere it has the sense of 'good order', *Panath.* 116, or 'ornament', *Evag.* 9, *ad Nic.* 32). This usage, first attested for early philosophers such as Pythagoras, Heraclitus, Parmenides (see LSJ s.v. IV), is frequent in Plato (e.g. *Timaeus* 28b ὁ δὲ πᾶς οὐρανός—ἢ κόσμος ἢ καὶ ἄλλο ὅ τι ποτὲ ὀνομαζόμενος μάλιστ' ἂν δέχοιτο, τοῦθ' ἡμῖν ὠνομάσθω), and κόσμος in this sense seems to have been seen as a 'buzz-word' of sophistic φυσιολόγοι: cf. Xenophon *Memorabilia* I.i.11 οὐδὲ περὶ τῆς τῶν πάντων φύσεως, ᾗπερ τῶν ἄλλων οἱ πλεῖστοι, διελέγετο σκοπῶν ὅπως ὁ καλούμενος ὑπὸ τῶν σοφιστῶν κόσμος ἔχει. In oratory its

use remains a mark of stylistic elevation: cf. [Dem.] LX *Epitaphios* 24 εἴ τις ἐκ τοῦ καθεστηκότος κόσμου τὸ φῶς ἐξέλοι . . ., and [Dem.] XXVI *Against Aristogeiton II* 27.

πλεῖστα δὲ καὶ παντοδαπώτατα φέρειν δυναμένην: compare the similar praise of Athens in Xenophon's Πόροι, i.3 (ἃ γοῦν πολλαχοῦ οὐδὲ βλαστάνειν δύναιτ' ἂν ἐνθάδε καρποφορεῖ. ὥσπερ δὲ ἡ γῆ οὕτω καὶ ἡ θάλαττα παμφορωτάτη ἐστίν), but contrast the higher praise at *Areopagiticus* 74: ἐπίσταμαι γὰρ ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἄλλοις τόποις φύσεις ἐγγιγνομένας καρπῶν καὶ δένδρων καὶ ζῴων ἰδίας ἐν ἑκάστοις καὶ πολὺ τῶν ἄλλων διαφερούσας, τὴν δ' ἡμετέραν χώραν ἄνδρας φέρειν καὶ τρέφειν δυναμένην οὐ μόνον πρὸς τὰς τέχνας καὶ τὰς πράξεις καὶ τοὺς λόγους εὐφυεστάτους ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς ἀνδρείαν καὶ πρὸς ἀρετὴν πολὺ διαφέροντας (cf. *de Pace* 94). See also Introduction **IV.iii** with n. 176.

παντοδαπώτατα Γ: παντοδαπὰ ἀγαθὰ $Γ_5$Θ: παντοδαπὰ τἀγαθὰ Λ: Mathieu/Brémond follow Λ's reading παντοδαπὰ τἀγαθά, but παντοδαπώτατα, adopted by Benseler/Blass and Drerup and said by the latter to be the text given by the first hand in Γ, is preferable. Cf. *Antid.* 295 ἆθλα μέγιστα τιθεῖσαν . . . καὶ γυμνάσια πλεῖστα καὶ παντοδαπώτατα παρέχουσαν. Here τἀγαθὰ would be redundant, whereas the superlative παντοδαπώτατα, matching πλεῖστα and κάλλιστα in the preceding clause, adds to the αὔξησις.

ἀθανάτῳ . . . τείχει: compare Menander Rhetor's recommendations for praising a city in the middle of a plain (ὅτι εὐερκής ἐστιν, ὥσπερ τείχους ἀνεστηκότος, *RG* III.349.18 f.) and a city surrounded by mountains (ὅτι αὐτοφυὲς τεῖχος καὶ ἀπρόσβατον κέκτηται, 350.32–351.1); it is hard to see, though, how the Nile is really a 'defence'. Metaphorical uses of τεῖχος are quite rare. One other instance where the word may designate a concrete defence other than an actual wall is the famous oracle quoted by Herodotus at VII.141, referring to a ξύλινον τεῖχος: the Athenians are divided between a literal interpretation and a metaphorical one (the walls of the Acropolis vs. the fleet). See also Antisthenes *Odysseus* 7 (Ajax' shield as a ἑπταβόειον τεῖχος: cf. the Iliadic σάκος ἠύτε πύργον, VII.219 etc.) and Demosthenes' famous boast at XVIII *On the Crown* 299: οὐ λίθοις ἐτείχισα τὴν πόλιν οὐδὲ πλίνθοις ἐγώ, οὐδ' ἐπὶ τούτοις μέγιστον τῶν ἐμαυτοῦ φρονῶ· ἀλλ' ἐὰν τὸν ἐμὸν τειχισμὸν βούλῃ δικαίως σκοπεῖν, εὑρήσεις ὅπλα καὶ πόλεις καὶ τόπους καὶ λιμένας καὶ ναῦς καὶ ἵππους καὶ τοὺς ὑπὲρ τούτων ἀμυνομένους· ταῦτα προὐβαλόμην ἐγὼ πρὸ τῆς Ἀττικῆς, ὅσον ἦν ἀνθρωπίνῳ λογισμῷ

δυνατόν, καὶ τούτοις ἐτείχισα τὴν πόλιν, οὐχὶ τὸν κύκλον τοῦ Πειραιῶς οὐδὲ τοῦ ἄστεως. See Wankel 1976 *ad loc.*, and compare Aeschines III *Against Ctesiphon* 84, Dem. XXI *Against Meidias* 138. Note also Alcidamas' metaphor φιλοσοφία ἐπιτείχισμα τῷ νόμῳ, condemned as unconvincing by Aristotle at *Rhet.* 1406b11 ff., and Xenophon *Agesilaus* i.22 (cited on § 13 ἀνάλωτος below). Here, the metaphor likening the Nile to a work of human craftsmanship (set off by ἀθανάτῳ, which is presumably meant to remind us of Νεῖλος as a god) is a more acceptable alternative to Polycrates' fanciful claim that it was Busiris himself who split the Nile to form the Delta (cf. § 31).

τῷ Νείλῳ: the Nile, with its paradoxical summer flood, is the θαῦμα of Egypt *par excellence.*

§ 13 ἀνάλωτος . . . καὶ δύσμαχος: these adjectives (neither of which is used elsewhere by Isocrates) are appropriate to the special qualities of the river-as-wall, and contribute to the high epideictic style of the passage.

ἀνάλωτος in its obvious sense 'impossible to capture' is rare: e.g. Herodotus I.84.3 (an oracle) περιενειχθέντος τοῦ λέοντος τὸ τεῖχος ἔσονται Σάρδιες ἀνάλωτοι and VIII.51.2 τὸ ξύλινον τεῖχος ἀνάλωτον ἔσεσθαι (paraphrasing the oracle at VII.141, which used the adjective ἀπόρθητον); Xenophon *Agesilaus* i.22 (ἀναλώτων τειχέων) and viii.8, where there is a play betweeen literal and figurative senses: καλὸν μὲν δοκεῖ εἶναι τείχη ἀνάλωτα κτᾶσθαι ὑπὸ πολεμίων· πολὺ μέντοι ἔγωγε κάλλιον κρίνω τὸ τὴν αὑτοῦ ψυχὴν ἀνάλωτον κατασκευάσαι καὶ ὑπὸ χρημάτων καὶ ὑπὸ ἡδονῶν καὶ ὑπὸ φόβου. Its only occurrence in classical oratory besides the present passage is in a figurative sense, 'unattainable', at [Dem.] LXI *Eroticus* 37; it is also used once, figuratively, by Plato (*Theaetetus* 179c); at Thucydides IV.70 it means 'uncaptured'.

δύσμαχος too has only one other occurrence in oratory: Dem. I *First Olynthiac* 4 ὃ δυσμαχώτατόν ἐστι τῶν Φιλίππου πραγμάτων. Cf. also Plato *Laws* 863b, Xenophon *Hellenica* IV.ii.10. (In the present passage, δύσμαχος (Γ), is certainly correct, as against ΘΛ δυσμάχητος. δυσμάχητος, an even rarer adjective which does not seem to occur in classical prose, would spoil the syllabic balance of the antithesis (δύσμαχος matches χρήσιμος as ἀνάλωτος matches εὐάγωγος), and looks like a copyist's replacement of δύσμαχος with an adjective formed in a more familiar way.)

εὐάγωγος: see LSJ s.v. II: 'easily managed, of the Nile, Isoc. 11.13; of horses, docile, Poll. 1.195; . . . of land, easily cultivated, Strab.

5.3.12 . . .' The sense underlying these uses is 'easily led/guided', cf. *Ep. II* 15 (the only other instance in Isoc.), Plato *Republic* 486d. Here the primary reference, developed in the next sentence, is to the manageability of the Nile as a water supply.

δύναμιν . . . ἰσόθεον: the climax of a thread of auxesis running from § 10 εἰς ἅπαντα τὸν χρόνον through ἀθανάτῳ . . . τείχει above. Cf. *Helen* 61 οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἀθανασίας ἔτυχεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν δύναμιν ἰσόθεον λαβοῦσα . . ., and the more figurative uses of the adjective in *ad Nic.* 5 ἰσοθέους ἅπαντες νομίζουσι τοὺς ἐν ταῖς μοναρχίαις ὄντες and *Phil.* 145. Here, within the terms of the conceit, the adjective is precise: the power attributed to the people of Egypt precisely matches a particular δύναμις of Zeus.

The background to this contrast between the Egyptians' 'divine power' and other nations' dependence on Zeus is surely Herodotus' anecdote at II.13.3: hearing that Greece is watered by rain, not rivers, the Egyptians said that one day the Greeks 'would be cheated in their great expectation, and suffer terrible famine'. For Herodotus—who adds the further twist that the boot may be on the other foot, if the land-level in Egypt continues to rise—the 'point' of the story is not that Egypt is a better place, but that different environments produce radically different outlooks. Adapting it as material for praise, Isocrates stresses the individual control which the Nile (being εὐάγωγος, unlike temperamental Zeus) gives to the Egyptians, thus invoking readers' knowledge of Egyptian irrigation systems as well as of the Nile flood.

Polycrates ascribed to Busiris the creation of the Nile Delta itself, a feat belonging to divine, not human, power (§ 31). It may be on this basis that he compared Busiris with Aeolus: Busiris gave the Egyptians control of the waters as Aeolus gave Odysseus control of the winds (see note on § 7 ζηλῶσαι δόξαν). If so, the present passage is Isocrates' common-sense response: his Busiris possesses the human attribute of choosing the Nile Delta for his kingdom rather than the superhuman one of creating the Nile Delta itself. This admits reputable auxesis of the amazing properties of the Nile, and Isocrates can outdo Polycrates by making a comparison, not with a minor figure like Aeolus, but with Zeus himself. Where Polycrates' Busiris vied with Aeolus, the ταμίας ἀνέμων (*Odyssey* X.21), Isocrates' Egyptians vie with Zeus, ὄμβρων καὶ αὐχμῶν ταμίας (see note below on Ζεὺς ταμίας ἐστίν).

If both Polycrates and Isocrates associated Busiris with control

over water, this may simply reflect Greek fascination with the Nile and its flood. On the other hand, there may be a connection with the aetiology for Busiris' ξενοκτονία which figures in the later tradition: a nine-year drought, for which a seer prescribed human sacrifice as the remedy (Callimachus *Aetia* F 44, etc.: see Introduction **V.iii**). If this part of the story did appear in a source known to the two rhetoricians, they might be expected to respond to it in some way, and Isocrates' account implicitly refutes it: how could there be a nine-year drought, when the Nile is such a dependable and controllable source of water? Isocrates' Egypt is altogether free from the devastation by καύματα to which other countries are subject (§ 12).

ὄμβρων: Herodotus at II.25.4–5 contrasts other rivers, which are in spate during the winter through being fed with rain (ὀμβρίου ὕδατος συμμισγομένου πολλοῦ αὐτοῖσι) but low in summer when the rains cease and they are evaporated by the sun (τῶν τε ὄμβρων ἐπιλειπόντων αὐτοὺς καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου ἑλκόμενοι), with the Nile, which, because it is rainless (ἐὼν ἄνομβρος) and is affected by the sun's heat in winter, is unique in being lower in that season than in the summer. Cf. also II.22.3 ἄνομβρος ἡ χώρη. In its narrow sense, the word ὄμβρος (used by Isocrates only here and in § 12 above, and not common in Attic prose) describes continuous, 'pouring' rain, which may be destructive (as in § 12 above, cf. *Iliad* IX.111, XIII.245) or beneficial (as here, cf. *Iliad* X.6, XIII.39); the distinction between ὄμβρος and (lighter) ὑετός is formally made at [Arist.] *de Mundo* 394a31. ὄμβρος in Homer is often Διὸς ὄμβρος (*Iliad* V.91, XI.493, XII.286; *Odyssey* IX.111, 358), and it gives Zeus Ὄμβριος his title (see below on Ζεὺς ταμίας ἐστίν).

αὐχμῶν: 'droughts'. Cf. Hdt. II.13.3, and *Evag.* 14. The coupling ὄμβρων . . . αὐχμῶν serves to suggest the extreme conditions from which the Egyptians, with their control of the Nile, are exempt: cf. ὄμβρων . . . καυμάτων in § 12.

Ζεὺς ταμίας ἐστίν: cf. Hdt. II.13.3 ἐκ Διὸς μοῦνον. At Athens the most familiar ταμίαι are the officials in charge of temple treasuries, the 'Treasurers of Athena' and 'Treasurers of Other Gods' (on which see e.g. Rhodes 1981 pp. 549 f.). The antithesis between ταμίας and κύριος may evoke this everyday sense of the former word, suggesting a contrast between individual property and public funds: the Egyptians do not, as it were, have to apply to an official for rain:

it is at their disposal as if it were their own. On the other hand, ταμίας plus a genitive is often applied to a god (e.g. Euripides *Electra* 704 Πᾶνα . . . ἀγρῶν ταμίας), and especially Zeus, as an epithet identifying areas of life over which he has control. Zeus is ταμίης πολέμοιο at *Iliad* IV.84 and XIX.224, ὅρκων ταμίας at Eur. *Medea* 170; he is also ταμίας of wider destiny: cf. Sophocles F 590 Radt 3–4 πλὴν Διὸς οὐδεὶς τῶν μελλόντων/ταμίας ὅ τι χρὴ τετελέσθαι, and the poetic claim criticised by Socrates at Plato *Republic* 379e, ὡς ταμίας ἡμῖν Ζεὺς ἀγαθῶν τε κακῶν τε τέτυκται. The word is not used elsewhere, however, of his function as rain-maker, although he makes Aeolus ταμίας ἀνέμων (*Odyssey* X.21) and is himself called τῶν ὡρῶν ταμίας, in a list of his attributes, by Maximus of Tyre (XLI p. 474 Hobein). The cult and iconography of Ζεὺς Ὄμβριος (and of the closely related Ζεὺς Ὑέτιος) are described in Cook 1940 pp. 525–70. Cook documents connections between Ζεὺς Ὄμβριος and cults involving human sacrifice (pp. 525 f.): if, as seems likely, Polycrates presented Busiris as some kind of weather-master, it is conceivable that he made a connection between this and the king's practice of human sacrifice (see notes on δύναμιν . . . ἰσόθεον above, and on § 45 καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τινὲς).

§ 14 τῇ . . . ἀρετῇ καὶ τῇ φύσει τῆς χώρας: hendiadys, 'the excellent nature of the land', i.e. its fertility.

ἤπειρον . . . νῆσον: when describing a coastal location, or an island, it is natural to think in terms of a meeting of sea and land: cf. e.g. *Odyssey* XIX.172 f. Κρήτη τις γαῖ' ἔστι μέσῳ ἐνὶ οἴνοπι πόντῳ,/καλὴ καὶ πίειρα, περίρρυτος. The land is fertile; the sea 'surrounds' and brings trade. Thucydides characterises Sicily as an island almost attached to the mainland (VI.1.2), but Isocrates seems to be the first to commend a place specifically as combining the best of both island and mainland—subsequently a τόπος. The idea is exploited by Xenophon when praising Attica in Πόροι, where the main point (as the subject of the work dictates) is Athens' accessibility to trade both by sea and by land: καὶ μὴν οὐ περίρρυτός γε οὖσα ὅμως ὥσπερ νῆσος πᾶσιν ἀνέμοις προσάγεταί τε ὧν δεῖται καὶ ἀποπέμπεται ἃ βούλεται· ἀμφιθάλαττος γάρ ἐστι. καὶ κατὰ γῆν δὲ πολλὰ δέχεται ἐμπορίᾳ· ἤπειρος γάρ ἐστιν (i.7). (It has been argued (e.g. Breitenbach 1967 p. 1754) that Πόροι (*terminus post quem* 362 B.C.) was composed c. 356–5, under the influence of Isoc.'s *On the Peace*—a theory which would make a borrowing from *Busiris* all the more plausible.) The τόπος reaches its fullest development

in Aristides' *Panegyric in Cyzicus* (XXVII.6–11); compare also Aristides' similar praise (showing the influence of Πόροι i.6–7) of the 'isthmian' situation of Corinth, XLVI *Isthmian to Poseidon* 21 ff. In Menander Rhetor's instructions on 'praise of a country' (*RG* III.344.16 ff.), the 'peninsula', (χώρα) νήσῳ ἐοικυῖα, is one of the possibilities under the category of 'position relative to the sea', and he cites appropriate models when treating this τόπος: εἰ δὲ νήσῳ ἐοικυῖαν, ἅ τε περὶ Τύρου Ἀριστόβουλος ἱστόρησε (= *FGrH* 139 F 12) καὶ περὶ Κυζίκου Ἀριστείδης ἐν τῷ πρὸς Κυζικηνούς, καὶ Ξενοφῶν ἐν τοῖς Πόροις περὶ τῆς Ἀττικῆς (345.19–22). Menander recommends the 'best of both worlds' treatment more explicitly under 'praise of a city': ἐὰν δὲ παραθαλάττιος ᾖ καὶ ἐπ' αἰγιαλοῖς, ὅτι ἀμφότερα ὑπάρχει τὰ ἀγαθά (348.30 f.).

τῷ πλήθει τῶν πεδίων: see note on ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ . . . οἴκησιν above. Egypt itself, whether restricted to the Delta (cf. κύκλῳ . . . περιέχων) or defined in terms of the land watered by the Nile (cf. πᾶσαν διαρρέων), is perhaps not specially characterised by its wide expanses, but it has access to the plains of Libya and Arabia on either side. The great size of all things Egyptian is a favourite theme of Herodotus (see Lloyd 1975 pp. 143 f., and e.g. Hdt. II.6.2–3, II.10, 124 ff., 148 f., 175 f.), who exaggerates the size of the country by erroneously making its σχοῖνος twice the length of the Persian parasang. Abundance of fertile land takes its place in later rhetorical theory among the praiseworthy qualities of an inland area (see Menander Rhetor *RG* III.345.10), and the τόπος also figures in Aristides' praise of Cyzicus, XXVII *Panegyric in Cyzicus* 9.

περιόντων διαθέσει . . . ἐλλειπόντων κομιδῇ: compare the role given to the Peiraeus in Isocrates' praise of Athens at *Panegyricus* 42; also [Xen.] *Ath. Pol.* ii.11 and Xen. Πόροι i.7 (cited on ἤπειρον . . . νῆσον above). The abstract noun διάθεσις (not used elsewhere by Isocrates) rarely has the sense of 'distribution', 'export', 'sale', and this seems to be the earliest instance; cf. Arist. *Rhet.* 1372b33, where διαθέσεις seems to be 'means of disposing' of stolen goods ('opportunities of disposal', Kennedy 1991 p. 98), and Harpocration's gloss διάθεσις· ἀντὶ τοῦ πρᾶσις. Ἰσοκράτης Βουσίριδι (p. 91 line 18 Dindorf). The corresponding sense of the verb διατίθεσθαι is common (LSJ διατίθημι B.3: e.g. *Paneg.* 42). κομιδή ('import', 'procurement', cf. Thucydides VI.21.2, IV.27.1) is another word not used elsewhere by Isocrates (the compound συγκομιδή 'harvest' appears at *Areop.* 30). The two abstract words have a slight technical ring, appropriate in the tran-

sition from straightforwardly encomiastic material to the more 'philosophical' account of the constitution of Egypt.

§ 15–27 *The Αἰγυπτίων Πολιτεία*

§ 15 ὅθεν περ χρὴ τοὺς εὖ φρονοῦντας: a formulaic expression: cf. e.g. *Areop.* 31 ὅσην περ χρὴ τοὺς εὖ φρονοῦντας, *Panath.* 230 ὥσπερ χρὴ τοὺς εὖ φρονοῦντας.

ἅμα . . . ἐξευρεῖν: the close link that has been established between the geography of Egypt and its fertility slightly undercuts the 'double' achievement here attributed to Busiris. Similarly the work assigned to the classes—the τεχνῖται furnishing τὰ ἀναγκαῖα καὶ τὰς περιουσίας, the priests and soldiers serving as φυλακή—duplicates, on the face of it, what has been provided supernaturally by the Nile. 'Das glänzende Lob des Landes mindert die Bedeutung von Busiris' Werk' (Eucken 1983 p. 184): it is not only the praise of Busiris' achievement that is undercut, but also the seriousness of the Αἰγυπτίων πολιτεία itself.

διελόμενος . . . ἠνάγκασεν: the Egyptian class or caste system (the words are used here in a loose sense, as convenient translations for γένος 'race', μέρος 'division' etc.) was well known to the Greeks, who formed and retained an exaggerated view of its rigidity. Herodotus lists seven γένεα: ἱρέες, μάχιμοι, βουκόλοι, κάπηλοι, ἑρμηνέες and κυβερνῆται (II.164). *Timaeus* 24ab, influenced by class-divisions in the *Republic* and perhaps also by *Busiris* (see Introduction **IV.iii**), has three main classes (γένη): ἱερεῖς, δημιουργοί, and τὸ μάχιμον, the δημιουργοί being sub-divided into νομεῖς, θηρευταί, and γεωργοί. The pattern is a class of priests, a class of soldiers, and one or more other groups of 'workers' involved in one way or another in the production and distribution of goods: so also Diodorus Siculus I.73–4 (ἱερεῖς, μάχιμοι, νομεῖς, γεωργοί, τεχνῖται), Strabo 787 (στρατιῶται, γεωργοί, ἱερεῖς). Isocrates' three-category system, with a hint at a possible subdivision of the category of 'workers' in the antithesis ἔκ τε τῆς χώρας καὶ τῶν τεχνῶν, fits the general pattern, and may be a simplification of Herodotus' list of seven; equally it fits in with the theory of Plato's *Republic*, where three parts of the soul (λογιστικόν, θυμοειδές, ἐπιθυμητικόν) are matched by three 'classes'—philosopher-rulers, (ordinary) guardians, and workers. The theoretical principle

on which the class-division is based in § 16–17 (and the importance ascribed to this principle) are much more reminiscent of the *Republic* than of any known reports of Egypt. The emphasis on the *choice* of individuals for each class can be explained in terms of the need to provide a role for Busiris, the subject of the Encomium, but all the same it is interesting that there is no suggestion of *hereditary* class membership—again this brings Isocrates' account closer to the Platonic utopia (cf. the 'Myth of the Metals' at *Republic* 415a–c) than to Greek lore about Egypt.

The idea of dividing a population into sections devoted to specific tasks—exemplified at a simple level by warrior-castes in Sparta and other Doric states—was already a τόπος of Greek political thought in the fifth century: the planner Hippodamus of Miletus based his ideal city on a division between three groups (μέρη, in Aristotle's report): artisans, farmers, and armed defenders (τεχνῖται, γεωργοί, τὸ προπολεμοῦν καὶ τὰ ὅπλα ἔχον: Arist. *Pol.* 1267b30–33). (Note that alongside this threefold division of the population was a threefold division of land, into ἱερά, κοινή and ἰδία, of which the first would supply offerings for the gods, the second would feed the soldier-class, and the third would belong to the farmers: this leaves the ἱερά as the 'odd one out' in that it does not correspond to one of the three classes, and it would be an easy modification of Hippodamus' scheme—at a superficial level—to replace the τεχνῖται with a class of priests who would have charge of, and benefit from, the ἱερὰ χώρα.) Aristotle treats the need for class-division based on occupation as a long-established principle of political science: he cites Egypt and Crete to prove its antiquity, naming Sesostris and Minos respectively as the rulers believed to have introduced it (*Politics* 1329a40–b5). (On Aristotle's own analysis of occupational and economic class, see de Sainte Croix 1981 pp. 77–80.) His pupil Dicaearchus apparently ascribed the origin of the Egyptian caste system to the same king, but called him Sesonchosis: Δικαίαρχος δὲ . . . Σεσόγχωσιν (sc. αὐτὸν καλεῖ), καὶ νόμους αὐτὸν θεῖναι λέγει, ὥστε μηδένα καταλιπεῖν τὴν πατρῴαν τέχνην· τοῦτο γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνειν ἀρχὴν εἶναι πλεονεξίας (F 57a Wehrli). Dicaearchus' interpretation of adherence to an inherited occupation as a precaution against πλεονεξία reflects his own theory of the origins of Greek society, in which πλεονεξία causes the progressive loss of Golden Age simplicity: cf. F 49, and see Wehrli's note on F 57.

The Aristotelian 'Αθηναίων Πολιτεία mentions a system of three classes at Athens, identified there as εὐπατρίδαι, ἄγροικοι, and

δημιουργοί (xiii.2). The 'occupational' division suggested by the latter two names is probably a product of philosophical theory, not a historical reality: see Rhodes 1981 *ad loc.* (p. 183) and pp. 71–6. This Athenian class-division was apparently later used (by 'the Egyptians') as evidence that Athens was originally an Egyptian colony, D.S. I.28.4–5.

At *Areopagiticus* 44 f. Isocrates describes a division of the populace as part of the arrangements made by the Areopagites of old for the healthy employment of 'all the citizens, and the younger ones especially' (§ 43). They were divided, he says, into two groups; it was impossible to give them all the same activities, because of differences in wealth (§ 44). Whereas in *Busiris* 'specialisation' is the key to Egyptian pre-eminence, the much more limited 'selective training' in Athens was an unfortunate necessity. Citizens were given tasks appropriate to their means: the poor were set to farming and trade, the rich to horsemanship, athletics, hunting and philosophy (§ 45). The arrangement is described as if it were enacted in law (cf. § 46 καὶ ταῦτα νομοθετήσαντες). Note the match between ἔτρεπον . . . ἠνάγκασαν . . ., ὁρῶντες in *Areop.* 44 f. and ἔτρεψεν . . . ἠνάγκασεν, ἡγούμενος here in *Busiris*.

τοὺς μὲν . . . ἠνάγκασεν: an elegant tricolon, with last term longest and most emphatic, and with subtly varied homoeoteleuton -ησεν/-εψεν/-ασεν.

τὰ μὲν ἀναγκαῖα καὶ τὰς περιουσίας . . . φυλακὴν ἀσφαλεστάτην: cf. § 13 οὐ μόνον φυλακὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ τροφὴν ἱκανὴν: human work supplements what has been provided by the Nile (see note on ἅμα . . . ἐξευρεῖν above). For metaphorical use of φυλακή see e.g. *ad Nic.* 21, [Andocides] IV *Against Alcibiades* 19, Gorgias' designation of ἀριθμός as χρημάτων φύλαξ in *Palamedes* 30.

§ 16 ἅπαντας δὲ τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς περιλαβὼν: a difficult phrase.

Isocrates uses the plural ἀριθμοί nowhere else, and the exact sense of ἅπαντας τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς here is obscure. Three interpretations have been proposed: (i) 'il embrassa *tous les calculs* qui permettent de bien administrer l'Etat' (Mathieu/Brémond I.192, emphasis added); (ii) ἅπαντας τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς is used 'as a mark of completeness' (LSJ s.v. ἀριθμός I.4), which I take to mean that ἅπαντας τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς περιλαβὼν is an elaborate way of saying ἅπαντα περιλαβών; (iii) 'including *in all classes the right numbers* for the best administration of the

commonwealth' (Van Hook 1945 p. 111), cf. Flacelière 1961 *ad loc.* ('(il s'agit) des *proportions* chiffrés qui déterminent l'harmonie du corps social') and Burkert 1972b pp. 265 f. ('Busiris took "all numbers", that is all the classes, in their state as numbered and ordered groups that would be useful in the government of society. Ἀριθμός stands for that which is counted').

None of these is wholly satisfactory. Interpretation (i) seems impossible: the obvious word for 'calculations' would be λογισμοί (cf. § 23), and nothing has prepared the reader for the idea of Busiris performing calculations or indicated what the nature of those calculations might be. Interpretation (ii) is perhaps supported by ἐξ ὧν, and gives a simple and appropriate sense, but lacks parallels. In other cases where ἀριθμοί = 'items', there is something in the context which makes the idea of counting or separating the items relevant (cf. Dodds 1960 on *Bacchae* 209). (The closest parallel might be Aristotle *Poetics* 1461b24–25, where ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ἀριθμῶν seems not to mean much more than ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων (or ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων τοσούτων ὄντων); but there the 'items' in question have been listed, and a statement of their number follows immediately (εἰσὶν δὲ δώδεκα).) Moreover, this reading provides no clue at all as to why Isocrates might have chosen such an obscure way to say something so simple. Interpretation (iii) likewise gives an appropriate sense, but again parallels are lacking, and this reading rouses the suspicion that words are being forced to yield a more concentrated sense than is usual in Isocrates' abundant and fluent prose. The closest match would perhaps be Plato *Laws* 668d τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς τοῦ σώματος (see England 1921 *ad loc.*: ἀριθμοὺς is plural because each part of the body has its own 'number'); ἅπαντας would remain surprising, since there are only three classes.

However ἀριθμοὺς is understood, περιλαβὼν too is rather odd. It must mean 'including', 'taking on board', but including *in what*? When Isocrates uses the verb elsewhere, where or how the material is question is 'included' (e.g. in Isocrates' own λόγος: *Ad Nic.* 9, *Plat.* 63, *Antid.* 8, 217) is quite clear, and is sometimes specified (*De Pace* 141 τῷ λόγῳ, *Antid.* 184 τῷ εἰδέναι). The perfect περιείληφα is employed in a looser sense, roughly 'possess' (*Nic.* 22, *Paneg.* 45), but this does not help with the present passage.

I follow interpretation (iii), but without great conviction. Considerations which may help in understanding ἅπαντας are (a) that there will be different kinds of τεχνῖται and a separate number of each,

so more than just three significant numbers altogether; (b) ἅπαντας coupled with ἀριθμοὺς can perhaps suggest *both* all the appropriate figures (*x* priests, *y* soldiers, *z* craftstmen) *and* all the individuals making up those figures: i.e. 'the full complement of all the numbered parts' of the state. We may tentatively translate 'he included all classes, in those numbers out of which one might best construct the state'.

τὰ κοινὰ: slightly odd of a monarchic state: but in general the monarchic aspect of the Egyptian πολιτεία is not stressed. Busiris appears simply as νομοθέτης; no role is defined for him as king.

ἀεὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς τὰς αὐτὰς . . . εἰδὼς . . .: the rationale for specialisation is that experience confers skill. Compare *Nic.* 18 on the advantages of specialist government and *Archid.* 76 on those of single-minded soldiering. Herodotus stresses specialisation in Egypt only in the case of μάχιμοι, II.166.2. Specialisation and 'doing one's own work' is the central principle of Plato's *Republic*: see Introduction **IV.i.**

§ 17 τοιγαροῦν . . .: the passage from § 17 to § 20 is parenthetical, in that Busiris is not mentioned and no further details of the Egyptian constitution are provided; it contains a series of arguments (cued by the first-person εὑρήσομεν) which contribute to the αὔξησις. See on § 21 εἰκότως ἂν . . .

τὴν σύνταξιν: σύνταξις is used elsewhere by Isocrates only in the plural, meaning 'military contributions', e.g. *de Pace* 29; but cf. τὸ σύνταγμα τῆς πολιτείας at *Areop.* 28, *Panath.* 151. σύνταξις meaning 'arrangement', 'organisation' of the state (slightly broader than πολιτεία) is used by both Plato and Aristotle: cf. *Timaeus* 24c, and Arist. *Pol.* 1265b26 (also 1271b2, 1325a3). Here the σύνταξις seems to be the concrete manifestation of the abstract πολιτεία, which reflects the πολιτεία but also preserves it (δι' ἧς . . . διαφυλάττουσιν). Admiration of the observable σύνταξις induces philosophers to prefer the (abstract) Egyptian πολιτεία.

ὥστε καὶ τῶν φιλοσόφων . . . εὐδοκιμοῦντας: the passage τοιούτων . . . εὐδοκιμοῦντας is partly erased in Γ (see Drerup's *apparatus* for details); the corrector $Γ_5$ gives τοὺς ὑπὲρ τῶν τοιούτων λέγειν ἐπιχειροῦντας καὶ μάλιστ' εὐδοκιμοῦντας, which is also the reading of ΘΛ and the text accepted by Benseler/Blass and Mathieu/Brémond. Drerup, however, reconstructs the reading of the first hand in Γ as τοὺς ὑπὲρ τῶν

τοιούτων μάλιστα λέγειν ἐπιχειροῦντας, and accordingly adopts this as the correct text; he condemns καὶ . . . εὐδοκιμοῦντας as an interpolation (with transposition of μάλιστα). It seems unwise, though, to accept the testimony of a corrupt passage in Γ against the clear and unobjectionable reading of the other manuscripts. Loss of εὐδοκιμοῦντας in Γ (say by a copyist's eye straying from ἐπιχειροῦντας to εὐδοκιμοῦντας) is easier to explain than an interpolation in ΘΛ. I therefore agree with Benseler/Blass and Mathieu/Brémond in preferring the text of $Γ_5$ΘΛ.

Scholars' identifications of the philosopher(s) in question divide quite evenly between Plato (Teichmüller, Gomperz, Pohlenz, Eucken) and Pythagoras or a Pythagorean (Wilamowitz, Diès, Froidefond). For references and discussion, see Eucken 1983 pp. 179 ff.; cf. also Bernal 1987 pp. 103–8. According to Wilamowitz, the reference 'geht wohl auf Pythagoras, da kaum ein anderer Name für ein so hohes Lob zur Verfügung steht' (Wilamowitz 1919 II.116 n. 3); also μάλιστ' εὐδοκιμοῦντας may be compared with § 28–29 (of Pythagoras) ἡγούμενος . . . μάλιστ' εὐδοκιμήσειν. ὅπερ αὐτῷ καὶ συνέβη . . . Eucken, on the other hand, argues that the present tenses (esp. ἐπιχειροῦντας, but also εὐδοκιμοῦντας, προαιρεῖσθαι) suggest a contemporary figure, and that we do not know of a contemporary Pythagorean of appropriate stature and interests. The plurals here may be literal rather than 'generalising', and contemporary Pythagoreans as a group (cf. § 29) might perhaps count as μάλιστ' εὐδοκιμοῦντας. (Or Isocrates may have Plato in mind both here and in § 29, i.e. be treating Plato as a would-be Pythagorean.) But it is probably a mistake to look for specific individuals behind all Isocrates' sidelong references to other intellectual tendencies, and the superlative here may just be αὔξησις, not a focusing of the reference. If readers wonder what sort of philosophers 'admire Egypt', one solution is instantly offered by the claim that Sparta imitates Egypt: any intellectual perceived as 'Laconising' (cf. e.g. *Panath.* 41) can now be construed as 'Egyptianising'.

In conclusion, the phrase need not be seen as referring to any single figure or group. A reader who has made a connection between other features of the Encomium and Plato's political ideas will think of Plato (see Introduction **IV.i**); others may think of Pythagoreans or 'Laconisers'.

τὴν ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ προαιρεῖσθαι πολιτείαν ἐπαινεῖν: the word ἐπαινεῖν appears only in Γ's text. It is kept by Drerup and Mathieu/Brémond:

Benseler/Blass follow the other manuscripts in omitting it (for views of other scholars, see Eucken 1983 p. 178 n. 36). Both constructions with προαιρεῖσθαι (+ infinitive and + direct object) are common in Isocrates. In general, a direct object appears more often when there is a choice between alternatives (cf. *Areop.* 22, *Ep. V* 4), rather than an absolute preference for one example of a species; but note *Panath.* 39. Eucken has four arguments for rejecting ἐπαινεῖν: (i) the sense is complete with the word πολιτείαν, so the discovery on reaching ἐπαινεῖν that πολιτείαν is not the object of προαιρεῖσθαι breaks the smoothness of the sentence; (ii) τὴν ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ . . . πολιτείαν at the end of the colon is nicely balanced with τὴν αὑτῶν πόλιν concluding the next colon; (iii) ἐπαινεῖν produces a strange narrowing from the wider theoretical perspective suggested by τῶν φιλοσόφων . . . ἐπιχειροῦντας to a focus on a particular Encomium of Egypt; (iv) ἐπαινεῖν can be explained as a marginal gloss, introduced by a reader who wanted to make the point relate more closely to 'ideal encomium' as the supposed theme of the *Busiris*.

On the other hand, ἐπαινεῖν derives support from similar usage in *Panath.* 200 and 237, and none of Eucken's points against it is compelling. The weakest is (iii): the use of ἐπαινεῖν in Isocrates does *not* imply reference to a 'Lobrede' (cf. e.g. *Panath.* 200, and see note on § 4 εὐλογεῖν). As for (ii), the πολιτείαν/πόλιν antithesis is not destroyed by the addition of ἐπαινεῖν, but is made less direct and perhaps more subtle; and (iv), though plausible, is not in itself a reason to reject the word. The strongest point is (i): ἐπαινεῖν alters the flow of sense, without adding much to it. It is not clear how obtrusive this would be for a Greek audience, but it is hard to find parallels. All the same it seems safest to accept Γ's reading and retain ἐπαινεῖν.

Λακεδαιμονίους . . . μιμουμένους: see Introduction **IV.i**. Herodotus at II.167 discusses whether the institution of a specialised military class should be traced to an Egyptian origin: it is uncertain, he says, whether it was from the Egyptians that the Greeks learned this, since the custom of despising manual work and honouring those who refrain from it, especially those devoted to war, is virtually universal among barbarians; but the Greeks 'have certainly learned it, and the Spartans especially' (μεμαθήκασι δ' ὦν τοῦτο πάντες οἱ Ἕλληνες καὶ μάλιστα Λακεδαιμόνιοι). Presumably what Herodotus is asserting is not just that the Greeks practise this custom (and must have acquired it somehow), but that, since it is general among the barbarians,

but less so among Greeks, it must have originated among the barbarians and been transmitted, by one barbarian race or another, to the Greeks: so the Spartan and other systems are derivative. Traditionally Lycurgus received the Spartan constitution, or the inspiration for it, from the Delphic oracle (Plato *Laws* 624a, 691de, Plutarch *Lycurgus* 5). Herodotus reports this tradition, but claims that 'the Lacedaemonians themselves' say that Lycurgus brought it from Crete. Xenophon may be responding to this, or to *Busiris*, or to some wider debate, when he explicitly rejects any such idea in the preamble to his Λακεδαιμονίων Πολιτεία (on the question of its date, see MacDowell 1986 pp. 8–14): ἐκεῖνος γὰρ (sc. Λυκοῦργος) οὐ μιμησάμενος τὰς ἄλλας πόλεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐναντία γνοὺς ταῖς πλείσταις, προέχουσαν εὐδαιμονίᾳ τὴν πατρίδα ἐπέδειξεν (i.2); he insists again on the originality and uniqueness of the Spartan system at x.8: ὅτι μὲν παλαιότατοι οὗτοι οἱ νόμοι εἰσί, σαφές . . . οὕτω δὲ παλαιοὶ ὄντες ἔτι καὶ νῦν τοῖς ἄλλοις καινότατοί εἰσι· καὶ γὰρ τὸ πάντων θαυμαστότατον ἐπαινοῦσι μὲν πάντες τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐπιτηδεύματα, μιμεῖσθαι δὲ αὐτὰ οὐδεμία πόλις ἐθέλει. In later accounts, Lycurgus—like almost all prominent σοφοί of the archaic and classical periods—joins the ranks of those who visited Egypt and learned from the Egyptians (Strabo 482, D.S. I.98.1, Plutarch *Lycurgus* 4 (the fullest account), *Isis and Osiris* 354e). Plutarch observes that ἔνιοι τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν συγγραφέων bear witness to Lycurgus' Egyptian pupilage; this is probably a reference to Herodotus and Isocrates among others, though strictly what they mention is Spartan borrowings from Egypt, not Lycurgus' visit. It is possible that Hecataeus of Abdera (thought to have been a major source for Diodorus' Book I: *FGrH* 73 B 7, and see Burton 1972) told the story of Lycurgus' visit. The wise man's visit to Egypt rapidly became a τόπος (see note on § 28 ὧν καὶ Πυθαγόρας . . .), so with the hints from Herodotus and Isocrates it was inevitable that such a story should arise for Lycurgus if it did not exist already.

Athenians took pride in the 'originality' of their own political system: e.g. Thucydides II.37.1. To derive a Greek city's laws from a barbarian model would be particularly galling. Rawson 1969 p. 94 notes that *Busiris*, characterising Sparta as an *inferior* copy of Egypt, stands in contrast with the later habit of detecting traces of the Spartan system in 'barbarian' cultures—Roman, Jewish, Carthaginian—and using these to give them a more civilised image.

ἄριστα διοικεῖν τὴν αὑτῶν πόλιν: for this judgement of the Spartans cf. *Nic.* 24, *Areop.* 61, *Panath.* 40–41 (Sparta is good enough for a

σύγκρισις with Athens—which will show the latter's superiority). It is a recurrent theme in Isocrates' works that the Spartans have an excellent system, but that the use they make of it is deplorable (see in particular *Panath.* 109–111); he also deploys both praise and blame of Sparta, as the occasion demands. In *Panegyricus* and *Panathenaicus* Sparta is compared unfavourably with Athens; in *Areopagiticus* Sparta and Athens alike have declined from a pristine ideal; in *Panathenaicus* the dissenting pupil presents a pro-Spartan view, and a Spartan outlook is convincingly adopted in *Archidamus*. On the political versatility or 'ventriloquism' of Isocratean rhetoric, see Livingstone 1998 pp. 273 f.; on Isocrates' judgements of Sparta, Mathieu 1925, Rawson 1969 pp. 37–44 and p. 49, Harding 1973, Wallace 1985 pp. 158–173, Gray 1994, Fisher 1994.

§ **18 καὶ γὰρ τὸ μηδένα τῶν μαχίμων . . . ἀποδημεῖν**: Harpocration (p. 166 lines 9–16 Dindorf) quotes this observation and comments: Ἰσοκράτους ἐν Βουσίριδι ταῦτα λέγοντος ῥητέον, ὅτι καὶ οἱ τὰς Λακεδαιμονίων πολιτείας γεγραφότες τὰ ὅμοια εἰρήκασιν· ὁ δὲ Ἀριστοτέλης (= F 549,1 Gigon) οὐκ ἐξεῖναί φησιν ἀποδημεῖν τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις, ὅπως μὴ ἐθίζωνται ἄλλων νόμων εἶναι φίλοι. τοῦ μέντοι Ἰσοκράτους τοὺς μαχίμους μόνους λέγοντος κωλύεσθαι ἀποδημεῖν οἱ περὶ Ἀριστοτέλην τοὺς πάντας Λακεδαιμονίους φασίν. The prohibition is also mentioned in Xenophon Λακεδαιμονίων Πολιτεία xiv.4; cf. Plutarch *Lycurgus* 27, *Spartan Sayings* 238d. There is no evidence for a corresponding prohibition in Egypt.

τὰ συσσίτια: on Spartan συσσίτια (called φιδίτια, Arist. *Pol.* 1271b26–27, cf. Plut. *Lycurgus* 12) see MacDowell 1986 pp. 111–4. They figure in Herodotus' sketch of the Lycurgan constitution (I.65.5), were notorious in Athens (see e.g. Antiphanes F 46 K–A), and are mentioned by Aristotle at *Politics* 1266b41 as among the Spartan institutions praised as 'democratic' by enthusiasts (cf. 1271a26: συσσίτια less democratic at Sparta than in Crete). They are a feature of the state in Plato's *Republic*: φοιτῶντας δὲ εἰς συσσίτια ὥσπερ ἐστρατοπεδευμένους κοινῇ ζῆν (416e, cf. 458c and *Laws* 780a ff.). They are not a feature of Egypt, but Isocrates may have in mind the food received, according to Herodotus, by the priests and by the king's bodyguard (II.37.4, 168.2: see notes on μηδένος τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀποροῦντας below and on § 21 εὐπορίαν).

τὴν τῶν σωμάτων ἄσκησιν: the most obvious Egyptian σωμάτων ἄσκησις is their concern for purity (Hdt. II.37: see note on § 21 ταῖς ἁγνείαις),

but this could also be an allusion to the military training of the μάχιμοι (Hdt. II.166.2 τὰ ἐς πόλεμον ἐπασκέουσι μοῦνα). In relation to Sparta σωμάτων ἄσκησις would immediately suggest military training and athletics (cf. *Panath.* 217, and see MacDowell 1986 pp. 66–70); the proverbial austerity of the συσσίτια could be a link with Egyptian καθαρότης.

μηδένος τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀποροῦντας: according to Herodotus, the Egyptian μάχιμοι enjoy a land allocation, and the royal bodyguard an additional daily grant of food and drink (II.168); the priests too receive maintenance (see note on § 21 εὐπορίαν). On Spartan συσσίτια, and the sharing of land through the system of κλῆροι, see MacDowell 1986 pp. 89–99. Similarly in *Republic* the φύλακες receive enough provisions to experience 'no lack' (416de).

μηδ' ἐπὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις διατρίβειν, ἀλλὰ . . . προσέχειν: Spartans are forbidden to pursue any non-military profession: see esp. Xenophon Λακ. Πολ. vii.1–2, and cf. *Panath.* 46, where abstention from other work is associated with Spartan militarism. For the specialisation of the Egyptian μάχιμοι, see Hdt. II.166.2, cited above on § 16 ἀεὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς τὰς αὐτὰς . . .

§ 19 τοσούτῳ δὲ χεῖρον κέχρηνται . . .: transition from use of the Spartan copy as testimony to the greatness of the Egyptian original, to unfavourable comparison of the copy with the original. On comparison (σύγκρισις) as a resource of encomium, see note on § 10–29.

ἅπαντες στρατιῶται καταστάντες . . .: the Spartans are right to specialise, but wrong to pursue one specialism—war—to the exclusion of others: the result is that the state as a whole is parasitic on the labour of other (subject and conquered) peoples.

τὰ τῶν ἄλλων λαμβάνειν: Isocrates telescopes two unattractive features of Sparta: (a) her internal (constitutionally-driven) dependence on the labour of non-citizens—Helots and Perioikoi (cf. *Panath.* 179–181 (Spartan oppression) and MacDowell 1986 pp. 27–34); (b) her alleged dependence on constant foreign wars, to keep the Spartiatai active, win new subjects etc. (cf. note on § 20 ἀργίαν καὶ πλεονεξίαν).

§ 20 εἰ . . . ἅπαντες μιμησαίμεθα . . .: the Spartans have turned the good model they copied (§ 17 μιμουμένους) into a disastrous model for others. The 'universalising' argument—'what if everyone did this?'—is comparable with the 'reversal of positions' argument—'what

if someone did this to you?'—used against Polycrates in § 46, which in turn is a form of what modern scholars have called the Golden Rule ('treat others as you would wish them to treat you'). See note on § 46 εἰ . . . περὶ σὲ . . .

ἀργίαν καὶ πλεονεξίαν: ἀργία here is the avoidance of manual work which makes the Spartans unable to provide for themselves directly. Note, however, Plato *Gorgias* 515e, where Callicles attributes to Laconisers the claim that Pericles has made the Athenians ἀργοί: this perhaps suggests that ἀργία was a contested term in comparisons between the Athenian and Spartan systems. For πλεονεξία as part of the Spartans' image among other Greeks, see the words of the pro-Spartan student at *Panath.* 241 Σπαρτιάτας δ' ὑπεροπτικοὺς (sc. πεποίηκας) καὶ πολεμικοὺς καὶ πλεονέκτας, οἵους περ αὐτοὺς εἶναι πάντες ὑπειλήφασιν. It encompasses both aggression abroad (*Panath.* 46, 98, 228; Plato *Laws* 625e ff.; Arist. *Politics* 1271b2–6) and avarice at home (*Politics* 1271b15–17, Xenophon Λακ. Πολ. xiv, and see Hodkinson 1994). Both these species of greed figure in the account at *On the Peace* 96 of how the Spartans have been corrupted by power: τοὺς μὲν ἰδιώτας ἐνέπλησεν ἀδικίας, ῥᾳθυμίας, ἀνομίας, φιλαργυρίας, τὸ δὲ κοινὸν τῆς πόλεως ὑπεροψίας μὲν τῶν συμμάχων, ἐπιθυμίας δὲ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων, ὀλιγωρίας δὲ τῶν ὅρκων καὶ τῶν συνθηκῶν. It is primarily the aggressive variety of πλεονεξία that is in question in *Busiris*, as § 19 makes clear: *pace* Hodkinson, the πόλεμος πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτούς which Isocrates imagines has nothing to do with 'Spartiate relations with the helots', but signifies war between Greek states. (See Hodkinson 1994 p. 196; in Hodkinson's refs. to *Panath.* and *Bus.*, for '225' read '228', and for '17' read '19'.)

τοῖς Αἰγυπτίων νομίμοις: in relation to Sparta, τὰ νόμιμα has a specialised sense, as the term for the requirements to which members of the Spartiate class must conform (cf. *Archid.* 1; Xenophon Λακ. Πολ. x.7; MacDowell 1986 pp. 42–4). Hence τοῖς Αἰγυπτίων νομίμοις is a striking phrase (especially in opposition to τὴν Λ. ἀργίαν καὶ πλεονεξίαν), stressing the point that the 'admirable' features of Sparta are not really Spartan but Egyptian.

ἐργάζεσθαι . . . σῴζειν: the σύγκρισις with Sparta continues to develop the topics of τροφή and φυλακή, the two imperatives governing the establishment of Busiris' kingdom (§ 13, 15). If everyone adopted the Spartan model, τροφή would give way to ἔνδεια and starvation,

φυλακή to πόλεμος and slaughter; if everyone copied Egypt, τροφή and φυλακή would prevail.

τὴν αὑτῶν ἔχοντες: the antithesis of πλεονεξία. 'Self-containedness' is a strong theme in Isocrates' account of Egypt: § 13 ἕκαστος . . . αὐτὸς αὑτῷ κύριος, § 16 ἀεὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς τὰς αὐτάς, and here ἕκαστοι τὴν αὑτῶν. Compare the principle of τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν in Plato's *Republic*, and see note on § 16 ἀεὶ κτλ.

§ 21–23 *Egyptian Intellectual Culture*

As in the *Republic*, the educational programme begins with the commonplace division between σῶμα and ψυχή, followed by a progression, in training for the ψυχή, from mathematical sciences to τὰ μέγιστα τῶν πραγμάτων. It has been argued that the system outlined here is specifically Pythagorean (see Delatte 1922 p. 45, Eucken 1983 pp. 187 f., and note below on § 28 ὧν καὶ Πυθαγόρας . . .); in this context 'Pythagorean' and 'Platonic' need not be mutually exclusive terms.

τῆς περὶ τὴν φρόνησιν ἐπιμελείας: cf. § 15 τὴν . . . περὶ τὸν πόλεμον ἐπιμέλειαν.

τὴν φρόνησιν: the word φρόνησις in Isoc. sometimes signifies general thought/awareness (*Plat.* 61), some particularised branch of mental ability (*Antid.* 212, 271), or the faculty of judgement (*Panath.* 196), but more often it means practical, problem-solving intelligence as a whole, rather as in Aristotle (*Nic. Eth.* 1140a24–b11 etc.). φρόνησις has a place among the virtues, and hence among the subjects of encomium: see esp. *Panath.* 204, and *Phil.* 110, *Panath.* 127, *Ep. IX* 7. The enhancement or cultivation of φρόνησις is a recurrent theme of Isocrates' pedagogical works. (The words ἀσκεῖν, ἄσκησις are more common in this context than ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, ἐπιμέλεια: e.g. *Antid.* 71, *Evag.* 80, and *Bus.* 22 φιλοσοφίας ἄσκησιν.) At *Antidosis* 84, Isoc.'s teaching is characterised by the highly reputable quality of the φρόνησις he promotes; at § 209, ἡ τῆς φρονήσεως ἄσκησις is the essence of education, and at § 294 φρόνησις and eloquence are the twin constituents of that παιδεία by which Athenians are distinguished from other Greeks, Greeks from barbarians, and men from animals: τῷ καὶ πρὸς τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ πρὸς τοὺς λόγους ἄμεινον πεπαιδεῦσθαι.

εἰκότως . . . ἐκεῖνον: after the 'proofs' in § 17–20 the account returns to Busiris himself, but with a subtle change in focus. The simple

narrative of § 11–16 (third person, past tense—apart from the 'timeless' description of the Nile in § 13–14—ostensibly telling 'what Busiris did') continues in παρεσκεύασεν . . . ἔταξεν . . . ἔπεισεν, but we are made more aware of its rhetorical context and of the relationship between the persuader (Isocrates) and the person to be persuaded (Polycrates, or the wider audience). This increased awareness is mediated by the argument from probability in § 21 (εἰκότως ἄν τις . . . νομίσειεν); by the reference to *current* views on science in § 23; by the authorial engagement implicit in § 24 ἄξιον; by the present tense of the generalisations in § 24 (βλάπτουσι/ὠφελοῦσιν) and of the ethnographic statements in § 25; and by the witness of Pythagoras and his present-day followers in § 28–29.

εὐπορίαν . . . σωφροσύνην . . . σχολήν: this list effectively recapitulates the living-conditions of the μάχιμοι as described in the comparison with Sparta (§ 18):

> εὐπορία = συσσίτια, μηδένος τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀπορεῖν
> σωφροσύνη = σώματος ἄσκησις, μηδένα ἀποδημεῖν
> σχολή = μηδ' ἐπὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις διατρίβειν.

It matches the regime of the Egyptian priests as described by Herodotus (esp. II.37): the abundance enjoyed by the priests (εὐπορία) and the limitations imposed on them (σωφροσύνη) are closely linked, and it is implied, though not stated, that they have σχολή from all non-priestly duties. At the same time, the list specifies the obvious pre-conditions of intellectual culture from a Greek perspective: one must be wealthy enough (εὐπορία) not to need to work for a living (σχολή), and have the self-restraint (σωφροσύνη) necessary to prioritise soul over body. It also recalls the regime of Plato's φύλακες, who are to receive sufficient maintenance, but must lead a simple life without possessions or money (416de); for their σχολή, see *Rep.* 374de, and cf. *Timaeus* 18b. See also commentary on § 18, and Introduction **IV.i.** The σχολή of the Egyptian priests is remarked on by Aristotle at *Metaphysics A* 981b23–25: διὸ περὶ Αἴγυπτον αἱ μαθηματικαὶ πρῶτον τέχναι συνέστησαν, ἐκεῖ γὰρ ἀφείθη σχολάζειν τὸ τῶν ἱερέων ἔθνος.

ταῖς ἁγνείαις: a rare word (not elsewhere in classical oratory), and especially so in the plural; close in meaning to καθαρότης. In the singular, '(religious) purity' (Soph. *OT* 864); in the plural, 'observances ensuring purity', or 'practices of avoiding/removing pollution'. Herodotus does not use the noun, and uses the verb ἁγνεύειν only once (I.140.3, of the Egyptian priests); there are two instances

of the noun in Plato (*Laws* 909de, 917b). The closest classical parallel for Isocrates' use is Hippocrates περὶ ἱερῆς νούσου 1 (VI.358.14 f. Littré): quacks claiming to treat epilepsy ἀνθρώπους ἐξαπατέουσι προστιθέμενοι . . . ἁγνείας τε καὶ καθαρότητας. (On the ἁγνός word-group in general, see Parker 1983 pp. 147–51.)

Numerous 'observances for the sake of purity' on the part of the Egyptian priests are enumerated by Herodotus (II.37), who closes his list by saying ἄλλας τε θρησκείας ἐπιτελέουσι μυρίας ὡς εἰπεῖν λόγῳ. In *Republic*, one prescription which could be described as a ἁγνεία is laid down for the φύλακες, namely total avoidance of contact with gold and silver: μεταχειρίζεσθαι καὶ ἅπτεσθαι χρυσοῦ καὶ ἀργύρου οὐ θέμις, οὐδ' ὑπὸ τὸν αὐτὸν ὄροφον ἰέναι οὐδὲ περιάψασθαι οὐδὲ πίνειν ἐξ ἀργύρου ἢ χρυσοῦ (417a; the myth justifying this prohibition, 416e–417a, is heavy with language of religious purity: ὅσια, μιαίνειν, ἀνόσια, ἀκήρατον).

An elaborate, idealised picture of monastic intellectual asceticism in Egypt was presented by the Egyptian priest and Stoic Chaeremon (I–II A.D.): see esp. *FGrH* 618 F 6 (*apud* Porph. *de abst.* IV.6–8) = Chaeremon F 10 in Van der Horst 1987. Chaeremon's account has enough detailed points of contact with *Busiris* to suggest, despite apparent improbability, that Isocrates might be among his sources. Points of contact include the following (see also Van der Horst 1987, notes 52–53 on F 10):

Busiris	Chaeremon F 6 Jacoby = F 10 V. d. Horst
§ 18 τὸ μηδένα . . . ἀποδημεῖν	152.10 f. ἐν τοῖς ἀσεβεστάτοις ἐτίθεντο πλεῖν ἀπ' Αἰγύπτου, διευλαβούμενοι ξενικὰς τρυφὰς καὶ ἐπιτηδεύματα . . .
§ 20 freedom from πλεονεξία	150.5 f. λιτότητα δὲ ἐπετήδευσαν καὶ καταστολὴν ἐγκράτειάν τε καὶ καρτερίαν τό τε ἐν παντὶ δίκαιον καὶ ἀπλεονέκτητον.
§ 21–22 ταῖς . . . ἀτελείαις, μεθ' ὧν . . . ἐξεῦρον . . .	149.26 ff. ἀπειπάμενοι δὲ πᾶσαν τὴν ἄλλην ἐργασίαν καὶ πόρους ἀνθρωπίνους, ἀπέδοσαν ὅλον τὸν βίον τῇ τῶν θείων θεωρίᾳ καὶ θεάσει, διὰ μὲν ταύτης τό τε τίμιον καὶ ἀσφαλὲς καὶ εὐσεβὲς ποριζόμενοι, διὰ δὲ τῆς θεωρίας τὴν ἐπιστήμην . . .
§ 22 φιλοσοφίας ἄσκησιν	149.17 ff. τοὺς Αἰγυπτίους ἱερέας . . . οὓς καὶ φιλοσόφους ὑπειλῆφθαί φησι (sc. Χαιρήμων) παρ' Αἰγυπτίοις . . .

§ 23 mathematical sciences	152.1 ff. διῄρουν δὲ νύκτα μὲν εἰς ἐπιτήρησιν οὐρανίων, ἐνίοτε δὲ ἁγιστείαν, ἡμέραν δὲ εἰς θεραπείαν τῶν θεῶν ... τὸν δὲ ἄλλον χρόνον πρὸς θεωρήμασιν ἦσαν ἀριθμητικοῖς καὶ γεωμετρικοῖς ...

Chaeremon uses αἱ ἁγνεῖαι as a technical term denoting special times or festivals of purification: 150.7 f., 150.31 ff., 151.13.

§ **22 βιοτεύοντες**: the verb is rare in classical prose: not elsewhere in oratory, once in Plato, twice in Thucydides. Its semantic range corresponds to that of the noun βίος: 'live off', 'gain a living from' (Thuc. I.11, Xen. *Cyr.* III.ii.25); 'live out' a period of time (Plato *Phaedrus* 252d); 'lead one's life' in a particular way (Thuc. I.130, Xen. *Cyr.* IV.vi.6); here simply 'live'.

ἰατρικὴν ἐξεῦρον ἐπικουρίαν: for Herodotus and for Homer before him Egypt is a country of doctors (*Od.* IV.231 f., Hdt. II.84, III.1, III.129); neither, however, states that the Egyptians invented medicine. Medicine is not highly rated in the *Republic*: see esp. 406d.

οὐ διακεκινδυνευμένοις ... ἀσφάλειαν ... ὠφελείας: the background to this piece of αὔξησις is primarily *Odyssey* IV.227–30:

τοῖα Διὸς θυγάτηρ ἔχε φάρμακα μητιόεντα,
ἐσθλά, τά οἱ Πολύδαμνα πόρεν, Θῶνος παράκοιτις,
Αἰγυπτίη, τῇ πλεῖστα φέρει ζείδωρος ἄρουρα
φάρμακα, πολλὰ μὲν ἐσθλὰ μεμιγμένα, πολλὰ δὲ λυγρά.

Drugs can be ἐσθλά or λυγρά, and naturally the ἐσθλά are used in good medicine. οὐ διακεκινδυνευμένοις is not without point, since φάρμακα in texts of the classical period are more often destructive than salutary in effect. The only drugs explicitly mentioned in Herodotus' account of Egypt are purgatives, emetics and enemas; in *Republic*, these same drugs, together with cautery and incision, constitute the basic medicine which alone is to be admitted to the state (406d). For an attentive reader well acquainted with Herodotus, the expression ἀσφάλειαν ὁμοίαν ... τῇ τροφῇ τῇ καθ' ἡμέραν would have a certain irony: at II.77.2 Herodotus explains that the Egyptians cleanse their digestive system regularly νομίζοντες ἀπὸ τῶν τρεφόντων σιτίων πάσας τὰς νούσους τοῖσι ἀνθρώποισι γίνεσθαι (see Lloyd 1976 *ad loc.* for an explanation in terms of Egyptian medical theory).

ὁμολογουμένως ὑγιεινοτάτους εἶναι καὶ μακροβιωτάτους: αὔξησις with rhetorical licence of statements made by Herodotus, perhaps with some ironic play (in ὁμολογουμένως) given that Herodotus attributes these qualities, not to the Egyptians, but to their near neighbours. His Egyptians are *second* healthiest, after the Libyans (II.77.3); Egyptian longevity is not mentioned, but certain Ethiopians in Book III are given the epithet μακρόβιοι (III.17, 21, 23, 97.2, and cf. III.114).

φιλοσοφίας ἄσκησιν κατέδειξαν: cf. *Paneg.* 47 φιλοσοφίαν τοίνυν . . . ἡ πόλις ἡμῶν κατέδειξεν. If *Busiris* was composed after *Panegyricus* (possible but not demonstrable: see Introduction **III.iv–v**), there may be an echo here of the majestic period which begins in *Panegyricus* 47, one of the high points of that work. The effect would perhaps be to undercut the assertion here that the Egyptians invented φιλοσοφία, and thus reveal the author's ironic distance from his composition.

νομοθετῆσαι: in the broadest sense the word can be used of setting down any political principles, and hence of Isocrates' own φιλοσοφία, as at *ad Nic.* 8 νομοθετῆσαι ταῖς μοναρχίαις—if the text there is sound: cf. Introduction **III.v** n. 121.

τὴν φύσιν τῶν ὄντων ζητῆσαι: this could include two kinds of enquiry: (a) with emphasis on τὰ ὄντα, 'investigating the nature of what (really) exists', i.e. Eleatic-style ontological theorising of the kind dismissed as frivolous at *Helen* 3 and *Antid.* 268; or (b) with emphasis on τὴν φύσιν, 'investigating the natural behaviour of what exists' (= the universe), i.e. natural philosophy/science. Interpretation (a) is probably supported by the contrast in § 23 between these pursuits—τὰ μέγιστα τῶν πραγμάτων—and the scientific studies reserved for the young; but the distinction might not be of great importance to Isocrates.

§ 23 τὰ μέγιστα τῶν πραγμάτων: presumably both 'the greatest affairs' (government, cf. νομοθετῆσαι) and 'the greatest questions' (philosophy, cf. τὴν φύσιν τῶν ὄντων ζητῆσαι).

ἔταξεν . . . ἔπεισεν: these singular forms are in $\Gamma_2\Theta\Lambda$, followed by Benseler/Blass and Mathieu/Brémond; Γ has the plurals ἔταξαν . . . ἔπεισαν, adopted by Drerup, who takes the priests to be the subject. If this were so, however, the object of the verbs would have to be the (older and younger ones among) the Egyptians in general: impossible, because each class in Egypt adheres to its own task (§ 16), and

intellectual pursuits and matters of government belong to the priests, not to soldiers or craftsmen. Thus the singulars must be correct: as we would expect, it is Busiris who prescribes this course of education. The change of subject (after § 22 ἐξεῦρον . . . κατέδειξαν) is abrupt, but not excessively so, since Busiris was the subject of the main verb in the last sentence (παρεσκεύασεν); and αὐτῶν referring to the priests in § 24 is not problematic, since their education has been discussed in § 23. The plurals in Γ are easily explained by the influence of the plural verbs in § 22: similarly $Γ_2$ has the (clearly incorrect) singular κατέδειξεν in § 22, under the influence of ἔταξεν . . . ἔπεισεν.

τοὺς δὲ νεωτέρους ἀμελήσαντες τῶν ἡδονῶν . . .: see *Panath.* 26–27 for a view of science as useful primarily because it keeps the young out of mischief, and see note on οἱ μὲν . . . οἱ δ' . . . below.

ἀστρολογίᾳ . . . καὶ γεωμετρίᾳ: geometry was thought by Herodotus to be an invention of the Egyptians (II.109.3), a view which remained widely current (Lloyd 1988 *ad loc.*). Egyptian astronomy is not explicitly discussed by Herodotus, but their invention of the calendar is related to knowledge of the stars (II.41.1). In later tradition ἀστρολογία—both 'astronomy' (as here) and 'astrology'—did enter the list of Egyptian discoveries: see e.g. D.S. I.9.6, I.50.1, I.81.6, with Burton 1972 on I.81.4 ff. For Egyptians as early practitioners of astrology see also Cicero *De Divinatione* I.2 and Pease 1963 *ad loc.*

λογισμοῖς: in general, 'reasonings', 'calculations' (*Helen* 45, *Antid.* 221, *Panath.* 261); here probably mathematical calculations. Cf. Harpocration's gloss λογισμός· ἡ λογιστικὴ τέχνη. Ἰσοκράτης Βουσίριδι (p. 194 line 6 Dindorf). Gomperz interprets λογισμοί as referring to Platonic dialectic; Eucken argues against this on the grounds that the juxtaposition with γεωμετρία suggests a mathematical sense (Gomperz 1905 p. 196; Eucken 1983 p. 186 n. 64). This is probably right, though it is worth noting two passages where the non-mathematical field of 'eristics' (within which Isocrates probably includes Plato's activities, in whole or in part) appears as a third term after ἀστρολογία and γεωμετρία: *Antid.* 261 (ἐριστικοὶ λόγοι) and *Panath.* 26 (οἱ λόγοι οἱ ἐριστικοὶ καλούμενοι).

οἱ μὲν . . . οἱ δ' . . .: the two views are (i) that the mathematical sciences are useful for certain purposes; (ii) that they contribute a great deal towards (the acquisition of) ἀρετή. (πρὸς ἔνια, the reading of Γ,

is clearly to be preferred to ΘΛ's banal variant πρὸς ἕτερα.) Scholars have tended to assume that (i), the less generous view, is to be seen as endorsed by the author (e.g. Eucken 1983 p. 187, Froidefond 1971 p. 253). Certainly the inclusion of this narrower valuation comes as a surprise in the context of an encomium, where superlatives are the rule, and it has the effect of breaking the flow; and it is reasonable to relate this to the scepticism expressed elsewhere in Isocrates' work about the value of scientific education. It is a much more doubtful step to take this passage as asserting that science has (limited) practical value. In the substantial discussion of mathematical studies at *Antidosis* 261–267, the 'popular' view that such education is of *no* practical use is endorsed (§ 263), but a case is made instead for a propaideutic function (§ 264–267); so science does, perhaps, contribute towards ἀρετή, not indeed πλεῖστα, but because it prepares students for φιλοσοφία.

ἀποφαίνειν: see note on § 4 πλείω τῶν ὑπαρχόντων . . .

§ 24–27 *Egyptian Religion*

θεοσεβέες δὲ περισσῶς ἐόντες μάλιστα πάντων ἀνθρώπων . . .: Herodotus II.37.1. Isocrates treats the Egyptians as not just exceptionally religious, but exaggeratedly so: a view presumably fostered among Greeks by awareness of animal-worship, and reinforced by the space Herodotus devotes to Egyptian religion. Here this exaggerated piety is rationalised and used as evidence of Busiris' concern for the stability of the social order he has established. The 'noble deception' implied in § 24 εἶναι δοκεῖν ἀκριβεστέρας τῶν συμβαινόντων may be compared with the use of deceitful myths in the moral education of the φύλακες in Plato's *Republic.*

§ 24 σφᾶς αὐτοὺς . . . κατεσχημάτισαν: 'put on an appearance' (σχῆμα), 'put on airs'. The verb (cf. Plutarch *Romulus* 26) does not occur elsewhere in classical prose, but it is a straightforward compound of σχηματίζειν (usu. middle -εσθαι), e.g. Plato *Republic* 577a, *Gorgias* 511d. Here it is probably chosen in part for the sake of symmetry with προέστησαν (ὅσοι μὲν . . . κατεσχημάτισαν/ὅσοι δὲ . . . προέστησαν: antithetical clauses each fifteen syllables long). The preposition κατ- also breaks what might otherwise be an excessive accumulation of sibilants, ὅσοι μὲν σφᾶς αὐτοὺς οὕτως ἐσχηματίσαντο.

κατὰ σοφίαν . . . μειζόνως ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν: a passing stab at the exaggerated claims of sophists, with particular application to Polycrates (cf. § 42 below); it also prepares the way for the ironic treatment of Pythagoras and his followers in § 28–29.

ὑπολαμβάνεσθαι: for the use of the verb cf. *Panath.* 5: Isocrates is misjudged by the public οὐχ οἷός εἰμι γιγνωσκόμενος, ἀλλὰ τοιοῦτος ὑπολαμβανόμενος οἷον ἂν παρ' ἑτέρων ἀκούσωσιν.

τοὺς ἐξαπατηθέντας: thus it is implied—but not explicitly stated, in a way that would destroy the encomium—that Busiris' subjects too are the victims of a deception, albeit a salutary one.

προέστησαν: 'have championed', or 'have taken charge of'. προιστάναι is by far most commonly used in Isocrates with reference to political or military leadership (*Paneg.* 4 προεστάναι τῶν Ἑλλήνων etc.); the more figurative use here is unusual, but cf. *Soph.* 19 τῆς τοιαύτης παιδεύσεως, *Antid.* 219, 227 (τῆς) παιδείας, 290 τῆς ἡλικίας, *Panath.* 242 τῆς ἰσότητος.

καὶ τὰς ἐπιμελείας καὶ τὰς τιμωρίας: attention to human conduct and punishment of wrongdoers. Cf. esp. *Areop.* 46–48, where the Areopagus Council, understanding that the best deterrent from crime consists in the twin expectations of being found out and of being punished, ἀμφοτέροις κατεῖχον τοὺς πολίτας, καὶ ταῖς τιμωρίαις καὶ ταῖς ἐπιμελείαις· (48) τοσούτου γὰρ ἔδεον αὐτοὺς λανθάνειν οἱ κακόν τι δεδρακότες, ὥστε καὶ τοὺς ἐπιδόξους ἁμαρτήσεσθαί τι προῃσθάνοντο. The Athenian πρόγονοι needed no such ruse as animal-worship to detect potential wrong-doers. Comparison with Isocrates' serious praise of Athens in other works reveals the unserious Encomium of Egypt for what it is (cf. on § 12 πλεῖστα . . ., § 22 φιλοσοφίας ἄσκησιν κατέδειξαν).

εἶναι δοκεῖν ἀκριβεστέρας τῶν συμβαινόντων: 'than is actually the case'; but we might expect the feminine συμβαινουσῶν.

Γ has δοκεῖν εἶναι μείζους; the corrector $Γ_5$ adds τῶν συμβαινόντων in the margin. Θ has the obviously incomplete reading εἶναι δοκεῖν τῶν συμβαινόντων, while Λ has εἶναι δοκεῖν ἀκριβεστέρας τῶν συμβαινόντων. Drerup prints Γ's text, explaining '(sc. ἢ εἰσιν)'. Mathieu/Brémond follow $Γ_5$, printing δοκεῖν εἶναι μείζους τῶν συμβαινόντων, while Benseler/Blass follow Λ.

Drerup (pp. LXXVIII–LXXIX) argues that an inept but original repetition (μειζόνως . . . μείζους) has been preserved in Γ, while the

vulgate has improved the text by emendation. This seems unlikely, in view of the careful and elegant construction construction of the period: the two ὅσοι-clauses are perfectly balanced (see note on κατεσχημάτισαν above), and while there is no such exact parallelism between the ὥστε clauses, it is hard to believe that the abundance of ὥστ' ἢ κατὰ σοφίαν ἢ κατ' ἄλλην τιν' ἀρετὴν ὑπολαμβάνεσθαι μειζόνως ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν was originally placed in antithesis with something as blunt as ὥστε καὶ τὰς ἐπιμελείας καὶ τὰς τιμωρίας δοκεὶν εἶναι μείζους. It seems necessary at least to add τῶν συμβαινόντων, and, if Γ's text is corrupt, the reading of Λ deserves consideration. ἀκριβεστέρας is apt in sense (cf. κρίσεις ἀκριβεῖς in the closely similar context of *Areop.* 47), and μείζους in Γ is a plausible gap-filling restoration if the original words were lost. The transposition of the two infinitives (δοκεῖν εἶναι in Γ vs. εἶναι δοκεῖν in ΘΛ) can be explained by Drerup as the work of a vulgate scribe avoiding the hiatus εἶναι ἀκριβεστέρας; on the alternative hypothesis, it can be attributed to the awareness of a scribe in Γ's tradition that the hyperbaton of δοκεῖν was awkward in a short phrase such as εἶναι δοκεῖν μείζους. In conclusion, I cautiously favour Λ's reading εἶναι δοκεῖν ἀκριβεστέρας τῶν συμβαινόντων.

§ 25 τὴν ἀρχὴν . . . πρὸς ἀλλήλους: this claim, and the aetiology of animal-worship in § 26–27, recall (and may be derived from) the theory put forward by the title character Sisyphus in a play variously attributed to Critias or to Euripides (Critias F 19 Snell: most recent edition, Diggle 1998 pp. 177–9), that humans rose from an original brute condition by the invention of law and punishment, but were left with the problem of undetected wrongdoing: to solve this, a wise man invented the fear of the gods, inculcating belief in an all-seeing, all-hearing deity. The sceptical, anthropocentric theory is made compatible with conventional religion, and with the religious expertise of Pythagoras et al., because 'Götterfurcht' is here based partly on invention (in the case of animal worship), but partly also on an exaggerated account of real divine justice (cf. § 24 τῶν συμβαινόντων). Note that in Busiris' Egypt fear of the gods is not enough to deter people from secret crime; animal worship serves to condition people to obedience, and to expose, by repeated public tests, anyone who is inclined to disobey.

αἴτιοι . . . τοῦ μὴ παντάπασι θηριωδῶς διακεῖσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους: the escape from 'bestial' life is a τόπος (e.g. *On Ancient Medicine* 7.1), and

an achievement claimed elsewhere in Isoc. for other fundamental discoveries: agriculture at *Paneg.* 8, persuasive communication at *Nic.* 6 = *Antid.* 254. The claims are compatible—there are different aspects of the 'bestial condition' to be overcome—but it is unlikely that παντάπασι points specifically to other prerequisites of civilisation (so Eucken 1983 p. 190). It is more likely that the adverb provides αὔξησις of the imagined savage state, τὸ παντάπασι θηριωδῶς διακεῖσθαι.

ἁγίως . . . καὶ σεμνῶς: the extreme religiosity of the Egyptians is underlined by the rather unusual use of the adjectives ἅγιος and σεμνός in an active sense ('reverent'); they are more often passive, 'venerable', 'demanding reverence'. See Parker 1987 p. 147 n. 16 (on ἅγιος) and p. 150 (on σεμνός, referring to this passage in n. 34).

τοὺς ὅρκους πιστοτέρους εἶναι τοὺς ἐν τοῖς ἐκείνων ἱεροῖς: how Isocrates' praise of Egypt is attuned to, and limited by, its 'barbarian' subject is well illustrated by a comparison with *Paneg.* 81. The strength of the Egyptians' oaths depends on an external sanction, and not only that but on the fixed physical expression of that sanction, the temple; by contrast, in *Panegyricus* we are told that the mere word of the Greeks who fought against Persia was more binding than an oath is now (πιστοτέροις μὲν τοῖς λόγοις ἢ νῦν τοῖς ὅρκοις χρώμενοι: cf. *ad Nic.* 22), and that for them an agreement had the force of necessity.

παραχρῆμα δώσειν δίκην, ἀλλ' οὐ διαλήσειν . . . οὐδ' εἰς τοὺς παῖδας . . .: a surprising, and un-Greek, expectation; contrast e.g. Solon IV.16 W (Δίκη) τῷ δὲ χρόνῳ πάντως ἦλθ' ἀποτεισομένη, and for punishment of inherited guilt Herodotus I.91.1.

§ 26 εἰκότως: 'for a reason'. Cf. § 21 εἰκότως . . . ἐκεῖνον. Here again what is 'argued' is not, as one might expect, that it was indeed Busiris who established these religious practices, but just that the religious practices which Isocrates ascribes to him are the cause of present conditions in Egypt.

πολλὰς . . . καὶ παντοδαπὰς: not scornful in itself (cf. e.g. *Antid.* 128, 196, 295), as such a description might be, for instance, in Plato; but the ensuing account redefines 'varied' as 'bizarre'.

τῶν ζῴων: Αἴγυπτος . . . οὐ μάλα θηριώδης ἐστι. τὰ δὲ ἐόντα σφι ἅπαντα ἱρὰ νενόμισται . . . (Herodotus II.65.2). On Egyptian animal worship, see Lloyd 1976 on Herodotus II.65–76, Smelik and Hemelrijk 1984 pp. 1860–63.

τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν καταφρονουμένων ἔστιν ἃ . . .: a corollary of Herodotus' statement that *all* animals are sacred (see last note): cf. Lloyd 1976 *ad loc.* 'the vast majority, if not all, of Eg. fauna was accorded divine honours'. Contrasting Greek and Egyptian attitudes to individual species are exploited for comic effect in Anaxandrides F 40 K–A: e.g. line 8 κύνα σέβεις, τύπτω δ' ἐγώ.

οὐκ ἀγνοῶν τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῶν, ἀλλ' . . .: Herodotus declines to say why the Egyptians worship animals (II.65.2); Lloyd 1976 *ad loc.* reports explanations offered by later Greek writers, but does not mention *Busiris*.

ἅμα μὲν . . . ἅμα δὲ . . .: balanced phrases (33 syllables in each), including a number of elements in corresponding positions which also correspond in sound and/or sense: ἐθίζειν οἰόμενος δεῖν/βουλόμενος πεῖραν λαμβάνειν, τοῖς . . . παραγγελλομένοις/ἥντινα . . . διάνοιαν ἔχουσιν, ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχόντων/περὶ τῶν ἀφανῶν.

§ 27 πεῖραν λαμβάνειν ἐν τοῖς φανεροῖς ἥντινα περὶ τῶν ἀφανῶν: two ideas telescoped together. One obvious sense of the φανερά/ἀφανῆ antithesis is 'visible animals vs. invisible gods' (cf. Flacelière 1960 *ad loc.*): Busiris observes his subjects' behaviour towards sacred animals in order to gauge their private attitude towards the gods. (τούτων/τῶν μειζόνων in the next sentence can also be taken as referring to animals and gods respectively.) This reading is supported by the statement that it is the subjects' εὐσέβεια that is being tested. On the other hand, φανερά/ἀφανῆ can be read as referring to the subjects' conduct, 'public actions' vs. 'private actions' (τούτων/τῶν μειζόνων will then mean 'these commands'/'more important commands': so Mathieu/Brémond I.195). This reading suits the first motive given in § 26 (the wish to condition his subjects to be obedient), and is supported by ἐμμένοντας τῇ τάξει in § 27 and by comparison with the similar passage *Areop.* 46–48. Cf. also the commonplace complaint that appearance is no sure guide to (hidden) character: e.g. Eur. *Hipp.* 925 ff., *Medea* 516 ff.

ἐμμένοντας τῇ τάξει: the military metaphor develops the connotations of προστάττειν in § 16 and § 21 and τάττειν in § 23.

§ 28–29 *The 'Evidence' of Pythagoras*

On 'witnesses' in encomium, see note on § 10–29. In *Helen*, Theseus' passion testifies to the power of Helen's beauty, which could 'conquer' someone of such pre-eminent ἀρετή (§ 18, § 38); Conon in *Evagoras* shows that Evagoras' regime, though a monarchy, was more conducive to individual excellence than many πολιτεῖαι: it was through going to Cyprus that Conon reached the summit of his career (*Evag.* 51, 53). Pythagoras achieved success through what he learned from the Egyptians (ἡγούμενος . . . μάλιστ' εὐδοκιμήσειν. ὅπερ αὐτῷ καὶ συνέβη . . .). Like the Spartans in § 17, he shows the value of the Egyptian example, and thus, indirectly, of Busiris' own example (Bus. προέστη τῶν θείων πραγμάτων, § 24).

The glory of having inspired the Spartan constitution is somewhat undermined by sharp criticism of Sparta in the σύγκρισις (§ 19–20), but at least it is stressed that Egypt is free of Sparta's defects; here, the reader is much more openly invited to doubt whether Egypt should be proud of its 'pupil' Pythagoras. It is strongly suggested that what he learned from the Egyptians was not religious wisdom but religious charlatanism: the cynicism of Busiris' use of animal-worship as an instrument of social control is mirrored in Pythagoras' calculation that his religious exertions will impress humans if they do not impress the gods. Care is taken, however, to communicate the negative message by insinuation rather than assertion, so as not to depart entirely from the ἰδέα δι' ἧς εὐλογεῖν δεῖ. The characterisation of Pythagoras as the μαθητής of the Egyptians also anticipates the examination of Polycrates' likely influence on his pupils in the Epilogue.

Busiris 28 appears as Pythagoras 4 in Cardini 1958.

§ 28 ἔχοι δ' ἄν τις μὴ σπεύδειν ὡρμημένος πολλὰ καὶ θαυμαστὰ διελθεῖν . . .: cf. § 24 μάλιστα δ' ἄξιον ἐπαινεῖν καὶ θαυμάζειν . . .: a self-conscious rhetorical frame for the εὐσέβεια-section, 'it is worth speaking of X . . .'/'. . . much more could be said about X'. The *praeteritio* here is both appropriate to encomium (the possibilities of the subject are inexhaustible) and in keeping with Isoc.'s promise of brevity: cf. § 9 διὰ βραχέων, § 44 οὐχ ἡγοῦμαι δεῖν μακρολογεῖν.

οὔτε μόνος οὔτε πρῶτος ἐγὼ . . .: again we are made aware of the author's persuasive voice: cf. § 29 οὐχ οἷόν τ' ἀπιστεῖν, and see note on § 21 εἰκότως . . . ἐκεῖνον. For the form of the appeal to precedent,

cf. *Euth.* 17, *Panath.* 149. Here it creates the expectation that Isoc. is going to refer to a previous writer on Egypt, and coming after the account of Egyptian ὁσιότης it might well make readers think of Herodotus.

καὶ τῶν ὄντων καὶ τῶν προγεγενημένων: probably just αὔξησις (cf. § 47 καὶ τῶν νῦν ὄντων καὶ τῶν πώποτε γεγενημένων) rather than a pointer to any particular contemporary authorities, though of course Plato would be a possible candidate.

ὧν καὶ Πυθαγόρας ὁ Σάμιός ἐστιν: the appearance of Pythagoras' name here is παρὰ προσδοκίαν (an effect which καὶ tends to accentuate). If readers expect an authority on Egypt, Herodotus is most likely to come to mind; if they expect an eminent visitor to that country, there is again a much more obvious candidate, namely Solon. Solon's visit to Egypt is attested by Herodotus (I.30, II.177), and what better witness to the excellence of the Egyptian πολιτεία than Athens' νομοθέτης and foremost benefactor (cf. *Antid.* 232)? (Lycurgus would be another possibility, suggested by the claim in § 17–18 that the Spartan constitution was partly borrowed from Egypt; but (a) this would be in tension with the negative remarks about Sparta in § 19–20, and (b) Lycurgus' visit to Egypt may itself be a later tradition: see on § 17 Λακεδαιμονίους . . . μιμουμένους.)

Pythagoras suits the emphasis on ὁσιότης (rather than e.g. δικαιοσύνη) in the πολιτεία, and the picture of a society characterised by restrictions and prohibitions (which loomed large in the popular image of Pythagoreans). The philosopher who laid down rules for his disciples on his own semi-divine authority is aptly linked with Isocrates' Busiris, the semi-divine creator of an authoritarian state; and insofar as Pythagoras is a marginal, mysterious figure, he is a suitable authority in a playful, non-serious encomium. Two other possible reasons for the choice may be mentioned. Pythagoras and his followers were famous for vegetarianism (see e.g. D–K 58 E): this makes a humorous counterpart to Polycrates' story of Busiris the cannibal. Secondly, it has been suggested that the πολιτεία has specifically Pythagorean elements (see note on § 17 ὥστε καὶ τῶν φιλοσόφων . . . for references), though the evidence is problematic: our evidence for Pythagorean political theory comes almost entirely through later sources, and is influenced by their authors' assumptions as to the extent of Pythagorean influence on Plato.

The wise man's visit to Egypt soon became a biographical τόπος, and

the list grew to include Orpheus, Melampus, Homer, Lycurgus, Thales, Democritus, Oenopides, Plato, Eudoxus, Daedalus, and the artists Telecles and Theodorus, as well as Pythagoras and Solon: see e.g. D.S. I.96–8, Plutarch *Isis and Osiris* 354e, and cf. Lloyd 1975 pp. 49 ff.

ἀφικόμενος εἰς Αἴγυπτον: Pythagoras' visit to Egypt is canonical in the later 'Lives': Porphyry *Vita Pythagorae* 7, 11 f.; Iamblichus *De Vita Pythagorica* 12 etc.; Diogenes Laertius VIII.2–3. (Porphyry and Diogenes Laertius cite the obscure authority of one Antiphon: Porphyry cites Ἀντιφῶν ἐν τῷ Περὶ τοῦ βίου τῶν ἐν ἀρετῇ πρωτευσάντων; Diogenes calls the work Περὶ τῶν ἐν ἀρετῇ πρωτευσάντων. The work is also referred to by Cyril, *Against Julian* X.340e, quoting Porphyry; the identity of this Antiphon is unclear.) There is no clear authority for the story before Isoc., and opinions differ as to its origin. In Guthrie's view, 'naturally Isocrates did not invent this legend, and it cannot be doubted that Pythagoras is one of those whom Herodotus had in mind at II.123' (I.163 n. 2). He is inclined to regard it as historical: 'the tradition . . . may be thought to have arisen from the general Greek respect for Egyptian wisdom, especially religious wisdom. But the same cause would naturally drive a man like Pythagoras to seek enlightenment in that quarter, and that he did so is very likely' (I.173). Lloyd agrees that 'we find evidence which implies the existence of the tradition of his visit to Egypt as early as Herodotus' (Lloyd 1975 pp. 57 f.), but reaches negative conclusions on the reality of Pythagorean 'borrowings' from Egypt and hence, by implication, of the visit itself.

The passages in Herodotus relevant to supposed Pythagorean borrowings from Egypt are:

> II.81 οὐ μέντοι ἔς γε τὰ ἱρὰ ἐσφέρεται εἰρίνεα οὐδὲ συγκαταθάπτεταί σφι· οὐ γὰρ ὅσιον. ὁμολογέουσι δὲ ταῦτα τοῖσι Ὀρφικοῖσι καλεομένοισι καὶ Βακχικοῖσι, ἐοῦσι δὲ Αἰγυπτίοισι καὶ Πυθαγορείοισι

(where uncertainties about the text—on which see Burkert 1972b pp. 127 f.—do not affect the present argument), and

> II.123 πρῶτοι δὲ καὶ τόνδε τὸν λόγον Αἰγύπτιοί εἰσι οἱ εἰπόντες, ὡς ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴ ἀθάνατός ἐστι, τοῦ σώματος δὲ καταφθίνοντος ἐς ἄλλο ζῷον αἰεὶ γινόμενον ἐσδύεται· ἐπεὰν δὲ πάντα περιέλθῃ τὰ χερσαῖα καὶ τὰ θαλάσσια καὶ τὰ πετεινά, αὖτις ἐς ἀνθρώπου σῶμα γινόμενον ἐσδύνειν, τὴν περιήλυσιν δὲ αὐτῇ γίνεσθαι ἐν τρισχιλίοισι ἔτεσι. τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ εἰσὶ οἳ Ἑλλήνων ἐχρήσαντο, οἱ μὲν πρότερον, οἱ δὲ ὕστερον, ὡς ἰδίῳ ἑωυτῶν ἐόντι· τῶν ἐγὼ εἰδὼς τὰ οὐνόματα οὐ γράφω.

Commentators agree that Pythagoras and his followers must be among the unnamed targets of the second passage. Lloyd's arguments against the reality of the borrowings are not very convincing. On wool, 'the idea of taking over a taboo is not easy to except' (Lloyd 1975 p. 57): a strange borrowing perhaps, but would not Pythagoras be just the person to make it? On metempsychosis, 'not only is there no evidence of this idea in Egypt but it is fundamentally opposed to the Egyptian mentality' (p. 58). This may be true, but Lloyd goes on to describe images in Egyptian religious art which in his view might have reminded Herodotus of the doctrine—if so, might they not have suggested it to Pythagoras? It is not hard to imagine the doctrine of transmigration arising from misunderstanding, reinterpretation and elaboration of the importance attached by the Egyptians to the dead person's journey into the next life.

If there are no firm grounds for disbelieving these borrowings, however, there are also no firm grounds for believing them. Herodotus' testimony may have its basis in the process characterised by Lloyd on p. 56: 'similarity of practice suggests identity, identity suggests borrowing and borrowing suggests a visit.' Two further questions may be asked: (a) in the Pythagorean case, did Herodotus go as far as step three in Lloyd's chain of reasoning—did he believe that Pythagoras had visited Egypt? And (b) did he acquire the idea of Pythagorean connections with Egypt from a pre-existing tradition? Neither question can be answered with certainty, but his words provide some possible evidence. At II.81, the reference to 'practices [taking τοῖσι κτλ. as neuter] which are called Orphic and Bacchic, but are really Pythagorean and Egyptian' places the Pythagoreans closer to Egypt than the other cults; but Herodotus may simply be asserting (i) that cults popularly known as 'Orphic' or 'Bacchic' are really inspired by Pythagoras, and (ii) that Pythagoras' teachings contain Egyptian elements (elements for which Herodotus finds models in Egypt), however these elements may have been acquired. At II.123, the phrase οἱ μὲν πρότερον, οἱ δὲ ὕστερον is not inconsistent with a one-off borrowing of ideas which have subsequently been reused, but seems more natural if 'Egyptian' transmigration is thought of as having influenced different Greek thinkers at different times. As to the question of an earlier tradition, each passage presents its information as an interesting discovery, not a well-known fact; but Herodotus might be concealing a source. On the other hand, if there was a tradition that Pythagoras had visited Egypt, the people most likely

to preserve that tradition would be his followers, the Pythagoreans; and the point of the story would surely have been the same as in later sources, that Pythagoras learned important wisdom from the Egyptian priests (see next note). But if the Pythagoreans did tell such a story, Herodotus' snipe at Greeks who have presented the Egyptian doctrine as their own (ἐχρήσαντο . . . ὡς ἰδίῳ ἑωυτῶν ἐόντι) would lose its point. A well-known tradition that Pythagoras visited Egypt would also devalue the delicate irony of Herodotus' refusal to 'name names'.

For this reason its seems likely that the parallels between Egypt and Pythagoreanism are Herodotus' own, original observation; that he did not know of, and does not imply (though he may have guessed at) an actual visit to Egypt by Pythagoras; but that he did in effect originate the story of such a visit, by taking the first two steps of the reasoning which leads to the idea of a visit (similar feature, therefore same feature; same feature, therefore borrowed feature: cf. Lloyd 1975 p. 57, 'at all events we have [in Herodotus] the basic pre-condition viz. the observation of what are alleged to be identical beliefs'). Someone, perhaps Isocrates, then followed Herodotus' hint and took the third step of asserting that Pythagoras visited Egypt, an idea which was eagerly accepted by later Pythagoreans and biographers of Pythagoras.

μαθητὴς ἐκείνων γενόμενος: 'learning' is the standard motive for visits of great men to Egypt—naturally so, if the visit-story has its roots in an alleged borrowing. The later tradition furnishes lavish detail of Pythagoras' activities in Egypt. According to Porphyry 'most people' say he learned geometry from the Egyptians, but ἀριθμοί and λογισμοί from the Phoenicians, and astronomy from the Chaldaeans (*VP* 6, cf. Iamblichus *De VP* 158). According to Iamblichus, he spent no less than twenty-two years in Egypt, ἀστρονομῶν τε καὶ γεωμετρῶν καὶ μυούμενος . . . πάσας θεῶν τελετάς (*De VP* 18 f.). Pythagoras' colourful education figured in a sub-plot of Antonius Diogenes' lost novel *Wonders Beyond Thule*: Diogenes numbered Arabs, Chaldaeans and Jews as well as Egyptians among Pythagoras' instructors, and told how he learned the wisdom of the priests along with their language and three kinds of writing, καὶ περὶ θεῶν πλέον τι ἔμαθεν (Porph. *VP* 11 f.). The most colourful account was that of the mysterious Antiphon (Porph. *VP* 7 f., cf. D.L. VIII.3: see last note): having heard about the ἀγωγή of the Egyptian priests, Pythagoras obtained from Polycrates of Samos a letter of introduction to King Amasis, who in turn gave

him letters patent for the Egyptian priests; but the priests of Heliopolis referred him to the priests of Memphis, and at Memphis they referred him to Diospolis. The Diospolitan priests could make no further excuses, so they tried to deter him by making him carry out προστάγματα σκληρὰ καὶ κεχωρισμένα τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς ἀγωγῆς; when he accomplished these, they were so impressed that they gave him the right to sacrifice and participate in other rituals, a privilege granted to no other foreigner.

φιλοσοφίαν πρῶτος: there seems to have been a tradition at least from the mid-to-late fourth century which made Pythagoras the first (real) philosopher: Heraclides of Pontus in his dialogue Περὶ τῆς ἄπνου (F 88 Wehrli) presented Pythagoras in conversation with the tyrant Leon and characterised him, according to Diogenes Laertius, as the inventor of the words φιλοσοφία and φιλόσοφος (D.L. I.12). Cicero *Tusc.* V.iii.8 (clearly using Heraclides) has Leon ask Pythagoras what art he practises; Pythagoras says he is a philosopher, and Leon asks for an explanation; Pythagoras likens the role of philosophers in life to that of spectators at the Olympic games. For discussion of the content and point of this episode in Heraclides, and of the question whether it was his invention or had some basis in earlier tradition, see Burkert 1960, Guthrie I.204 and Gottschalk 1980 pp. 23–33.

εἰς τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἐκόμισεν: for the denial of originality, cf. Herodotus II.123 (cited on ἀφικόμενος . . . above); and also the famous pronouncement of Heraclitus Πυθαγόρης Μνησάρχου ἱστορίην ἤσκησεν ἀνθρώπων μάλιστα πάντων καὶ ἐκλεξάμενος ταύτας τὰς συγγραφὰς ἐποιήσατο ἑαυτοῦ σοφίην, πολυμαθίην, κακοτεχνίην (B 40 D–K), where ἐκλεξάμενος ταύτας τὰς συγγραφὰς, though its exact sense is in doubt, certainly seems to be a charge of 'derivativeness'.

τὰ περὶ τὰς θυσίας καὶ τὰς ἁγιστείας . . .: possibly double-edged, since Pythagoreans were notorious in fourth-century comedy both for the depressing (because vegetarian) character of their sacrifices (e.g. Alexis Πυθαγορίζουσα F 201 K–A, lines 1–3; Mnesimachus F 1 K–A) and for their personal dirtiness, in contrast with their self-perception as uniquely 'pure' (e.g. Aristophon Πυθαγοριστής F 12 K–A, Alexis Πυθαγορίζουσα F 201 K–A lines 5–6).

ἐπιφανέστερον . . . ἐσπούδασεν: what is at first sight innocent αὔξησις is turned into insinuation by the participial phrase ἡγούμενος . . .:

Pythagoras' aim was to have his zeal noticed as much as to achieve any real religious end.

εἰ καὶ . . .: irony gives way to satire in what is nearly an open accusation of charlatanism; the motive is so expressed as to be just consistent with the requirements of encomium (cf. on § 28–29), while displaying clear contempt for the claims of the Pythagoreans. Pythagoras taught the total supremacy of 'divine' over 'earthly' objectives, and, by his followers' account, would be a very dependable authority on divine matters, as a reincarnated son of Hermes (Heraclides of Pontus F 89 Wehrli = D.L. VIII.4) and a kind of demi-god himself (cf. Aristotle F 156 Gigon).

§ 29 νεωτέρους . . . πρεσβυτέρους: for Pythagoras' success in attracting disciples, cf. the story of mass conversion told by Porphyry at *Vita Pythagorae* 20 (citing Nicomachus). There, whole families are converted, but the more familiar picture involves the triangular relationship of sophist, son, and father (as in Aristophanes' *Clouds*). Again the praise verges on sarcasm: to be glad when a son neglects τὰ οἰκεῖα is more likely the sign of a dupe than of an enlightened parent.

οὐχ οἷόν τ' ἀπιστεῖν: tangential 'evidence' once again (see note on § 21 εἰκότως . . .), here for the Pythagoreans' public acclaim rather than for the substance of their philosophy.

τοὺς προσποιουμένους ἐκείνου μαθητὰς εἶναι: Pythagoras appears as a leader-of-disciples *par excellence*, both during his lifetime and after, at *Republic* 600b (discussing Homer's failure to hand down a 'model for life'): ὥσπερ Πυθαγόρας αὐτός τε διαφερόντως ἐπὶ τούτῳ ἠγαπήθη, καὶ οἱ ὕστεροι ἔτι καὶ νῦν Πυθαγόρειον τρόπον ἐπονομάζοντες τοῦ βίου διαφανεῖς πῃ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις. ἐπονομάζοντες may be compared with Isocrates' προσποιουμένους, and διαφανεῖς πῃ with μᾶλλον . . . θαυμάζουσιν.

σιγῶντας: to be admired for silence once again suggests charlatanism: the Pythagoreans' reputation rests on appearance, not substance. (*Pace* Too, who suggests that the silence of Pythagoras' followers is put forward as a positive counterpoint to Polycrates' πολυπραγμοσύνη—Too 1995 pp. 177–9.) On Pythagorean silence (ἐχεμυθία), see Guthrie I.150–2, citing allusions to ἀπόρρητα (e.g. Arist. F 156

cited on εἰ καὶ . . . above); Porphyry *VP* 19; Alexis Πυθαγορίζουσα F 201 K–A, lines 5–6. The present passage may be our earliest reference, as is hinted by Dodds (1951 p. 175 n. 122) and asserted by Boyancé (1959 p. 413). For silence as a mark of pretention, cf. Plato *Phaedrus* 275d (the written word, when questioned, σεμνῶς πάνυ σιγᾷ) and Aristophanes *Frogs* 911 ff. (on the silence of characters in Aeschylus).

§ 30–43 *Defence of Busiris*

§ 30–33 *Comparison of the Two Encomia*

Isocrates introduced his Encomium with an admission of its lack of seriousness (§ 9); as he begins his discussion of it, he rapidly distances himself from any claim to truth. First, he puts in Polycrates' mouth the criticism that it is unsupported (§ 30), to which he responds with a counterattack rather a defence; his own version is more believable than Polycrates', and at least not impossible (§ 32). Finally in § 33 he admits, for the sake of argument, that both versions may be false. Our attention is thus brought back from the specifics of the Busiris story to the principles, moral and rhetorical, which it illustrates.

§ 30 ἴσως ἂν οὖν τοῖς εἰρημένοις ἀπαντήσειας ὅτι . . .: for the formulation, cf. *Areop.* 36 ἴσως ἂν οὖν τις ἐπιτιμήσειεν τοῖς εἰρημένοις, ὅτι . . .

χώραν . . . νόμους . . . εὐσέβειαν . . . φιλοσοφίαν: the anticipated objection serves also as an ἀνακεφαλαίωσις of Isocrates' Encomium. φιλοσοφία is placed out of sequence (it came before εὐσέβεια), and is emphasised by ἔτι δὲ: this may be for the pleasing effect of an ascending number of syllables (2, 2, 4, 5), but perhaps also signals the renewed focus on φιλοσοφία as Isocrates understands it, i.e. λόγων παιδεία.

αἴτιος: encomium shows what a thing is like and of what sort of things it is αἴτιος: *Evag.* 50, Plato *Symp.* 195a, 197c, note on § 10–29. The objection thus has a 'technical' flavour: cf. αἰτιώτερον in a quasi-technical context at § 35, and see note below on ἀπόδειξιν.

ὧν ὑπεθέμην: cf. § 9 ὑπόθεσιν.

ἀπόδειξιν: the more theoretical rhetorical discussion in § 30–37 is marked by an increased use of technical or semi-technical terms: § 31 πίστιν, § 31 τοῦ πιστὰ λέγειν, § 33 τῆς ἰδέας, § 35 ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων, § 37 πίστιν . . . ἐναργῆ.

εἰ μὲν ἄλλος τις . . . σοὶ δ' οὐ . . .: as in the Prologue, Polycrates is found to be uniquely lacking in elementary παιδεία.

ἐπέπληττεν . . . ἐπιτιμᾶν . . . ἐπίληψιν: a display of *variatio*. Equivalence of sense is underlined by metrical balance (each word has four syllables, with one long vowel and three short ones) and by the repetition of ἐπ-.

ἐπίληψιν: the reading of the manuscripts is ὑπόληψιν, but the conjecture ἐπίληψιν, proposed by Retberg in 1794, is now accepted by all editors and is clearly correct. Compare similar corruptions at *De Pace* 61 (ἐπιλήψεις Γ: ὑπολήψεις Λ) and *Panath.* 150 (ὑπολήψεων MSS: ἐπιλήψεων Cobet). ἐπίληψιν 'criticism' is far more appropriate than ὑπόληψιν 'reply', and in any case ὑπολαμβάνειν in Isocrates never means 'reply' or 'respond', but always 'interpret' (e.g. *Paneg.* 130) or 'judge', 'assess' (cf. § 24 ὑπολαμβάνεσθαι). For ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι = 'criticise', see e.g. § 9 ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι τῶν εἰρημένων.

§ 31 βουληθεὶς γὰρ Βούσιριν εὐλογεῖν: the reappearance of the name Βούσιρις (see note on § 10 Βουσίριδος) is underlined by the *parechesis* βουληθεὶς . . . Βούσιριν, perhaps with a note of scorn: in his own Encomium Isocrates has avoided the name as far as possible, but he now emphasises it to point out that Polycrates made the eccentric choice of Busiris as an object of praise. On the significance of 'intention' (βουληθεὶς), see note on § 4 βουλομένους.

ὡς τὸν . . . Νεῖλον περὶ τὴν χώραν περιέρρηξεν: 'that he split the Nile [i.e. divided its stream] around the country': cf. Herodotus II.16.2 τοῦ Δέλτα δὲ τούτου κατὰ τὸ ὀξὺ περιρρήγνυται ὁ Νεῖλος. It seems likely that the use of the verb περιρρηγνύναι here is an echo of Herodotus, whether direct or mediated by Polycrates. Polycrates' Busiris clearly created the Delta by dividing the Nile: this feat may have formed the basis for praise of Busiris as the εὑρετής of Egypt, with all its unique properties, as well as its κτίστης. If so, this may suggest that Polycrates adopted the narrow, 'Ionian' definition of Egypt (see note on § 11 ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ). The attribution to Busiris of superhuman engineering works would have possible models (i) in Herodotus' account

of Egypt, esp. the man-made Lake Moeris (II.149.2 χειροποίητός ἐστι καὶ ὀρυκτή), and (ii) in the famous/notorious feats of Xerxes, who bridged the Hellespont and channeled through Athos (e.g. *Paneg.* 89).

οὐδεμίαν πίστιν εἴρηκας: πίστις is used here in a more-or-less technical sense, 'rhetorical proof' (Arist. *Rhet.* 1355b35 ff. etc.); cf. § 37 πίστιν . . . ἐναργῆ, and see note on § 30 ἀπόδειξιν.

πῶς οὐ καταγέλαστόν ἐστιν: cf. § 37 πῶς οὐκ ἄτοπόν ἐστιν, and note *ad loc.*

παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων: the argument—'how can you demand from others what you have not done yourself'—is a relative of the 'Golden Rule': see note on § 46 εἰ μεγάλων . . . Polycrates is unable to perceive general principles or apply them to himself.

§ 32 ἀπέχεις τοῦ πιστὰ λέγειν: ἀπέχεις corresponds with διημαρτηκώς below, giving § 32–33 a chiastic structure.

δημιουργὸν: used by Isocrates only here and in § 17 above (the verb δημιουργεῖν occurs eight times in his work). The extended use of the noun ('maker' in general, as opposed to 'artisan') is very common in Plato; for a close parallel to its application here, see Aristotle *Politics* 1273b32–33 οἱ μὲν νόμων ἐγένοντο δημιουργοὶ μόνον, οἱ δὲ καὶ πολιτείας. The definition of rhetoric as πειθοῦς δημιουργός (Plato *Gorgias* 453a), which may be a Gorgianic coinage, or Plato's own (see Dodds 1959 *ad loc.*), appeared in a τέχνη attributed to Isocrates (F 1 Mathieu/Brémond, IV.229). It is very unlikely, however, that Isocrates composed any such treatise; the τέχνη was either a *pseudepigraphon* or the work of a later rhetorician who shared Isocrates' name. See Barwick 1963 (on πειθοῦς δημιουργός, p. 63), arguing for the latter hypothesis: the τέχνη was composed by another Isocrates, probably in the first half of the first century A.D. (pp. 58–60). Some further arguments against the idea of a genuine Isocratean τέχνη are added by Usher 1973, though Usher curiously misreports Barwick as arguing *in favour* of an early τέχνη by (the famous) Isocrates.

§ 33 ἐγὼ μὲν . . . οἷσπερ χρὴ τοὺς ἐπαινοῦντας, σὺ δ' οἷς προσήκει τοὺς λοιδοροῦντας: a return to the theme of § 4–5, that Polycrates' works achieve the opposite of their supposed intention.

οὐ μόνον τῆς ἀληθείας . . . ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς ἰδέας: a crucial point in the development of the submerged theoretical argument of *Busiris* (see

Introduction **I.iv**). The work as a whole elucidates the relationship between two criteria by which Polycrates' speech has failed, the everyday criterion 'is it true or false?' and the theoretical criterion 'does it conform to the appropriate rhetorical ἰδέα?'. Isocrates sets out to show that if Polycrates had made his speech conform to the ἰδέα of encomium, that would have been enough to guarantee a reputable or at least a harmless piece of work, without the further requirement of ἀλήθεια.

ἰδέα in Isocrates' work can perhaps be called a technical term, but it is not a very precise one. For the range of its application, see Wersdörfer 1940 pp. 45–54, and note especially *Soph.* 16 and *Ep. VI* 8 (also *Antid.* 183, for an analogy between rhetorical ἰδέαι and the σχήματα taught by a παιδοτρίβης). These passages suggest that ἰδέαι are microcomponents of rhetorical production: devices and τόποι which are the objects of εὕρεσις. It might seem strange, then, to refer to a single ἰδέα as the required means of encomium; but the ἰδέα in question is probably a very basic one, namely the principle of 'multiplying good qualities' stated in § 4. If so, the word must be used to refer to the rhetoricians' 'ingredients' in quite a broad sense, including generic 'rules' as well as specific τόποι. For further discussion of Isocrates' ideas about εὕρεσις, see Gaines 1990.

§ 34 χωρὶς δὲ τούτων: a transitional formula favoured by Isocrates (who often follows it, as here, with a conditional clause: *Paneg.* 32, *Antid.* 230, *Phil.* 37, *Panath.* 150) and by Demosthenes (XVIII *On the Crown* 24, XIX *On the False Embassy* 151, XX *Against Leptines* 25 etc.); it is used several times by Isaeus (e.g. IV *On the Estate of Nicostratus* 17, IX *On the Estate of Astyphilus* 16), and once by Lycurgus (*Against Leocrates* 57: cf. *ibid.* 31 χωρὶς τοίνυν τούτων), but not by the other orators.

τῶν σῶν ἀπαλλαγέντας: the verb ἀπαλλάττεσθαι can carry a slight suggestion of relief (e.g. Plato *Republic* 357a; Dem. IV *First Philippic* 50). The plural ἀπαλλαγέντας is a new reading from Γ, brought to light by Drerup and adopted by Mathieu/Brémond (ΘΛ have ἀπαλλαγέντα); the plural, sandwiched as it is between τῶν σῶν and τὸν ἐμὸν, will suggest a genuine 'you and me' (rather than just plural-for-singular 'us' = 'me'), and thus convey a more vivid impression of Isocrates' dialogue with Polycrates.

οὐδεὶς ἂν αὐτῷ δικαίως ἐπιπλήξειεν: cf. § 30 above εἰ μὲν ἄλλος τίς . . . ἐπέπληττεν. Isocrates defends his technique by putting objections in

Polycrates' mouth, refuting them, then letting it appear that their inappropriateness typifies Polycrates' lack of judgement.

§ 35 τίν' ἄν τις . . . αἰτιώτερον εἶναι νομίσειεν: the comparative suits the relativistic argument ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων, contrasting with the 'factual' proof adduced in § 36. See also notes on § 30 αἴτιος and ἀπόδειξιν.

τὸν ἐκ Ποσειδῶνος: the argument that Busiris' divine descent makes him a likely benefactor of humanity prepares for the more far-reaching argument in § 38–43, that a god's child necessarily is good and does good. It has a parallel in *Panathenaicus* 206: it cannot be true that the Spartans discovered τὰ κάλλιστα τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων, because the heroes lived before them—προσήκει δὲ τοὺς ἀπὸ θεῶν γεγονότας καὶ χρῆσθαι ταύταις μᾶλλον τῶν ἄλλων καὶ καταδεῖξαι τοῖς ἐπιγιγνομένοις.

παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις: this is the reading of ΘΛ (adopted by Mathieu/Brémond and Benseler/Blass): Γ has παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν (adopted by Drerup). There is similar divergence between manuscripts at *Ep. VII* 5, where the reading of ΓΕ is παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν, while the vulgate tradition has παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἕλλησιν, and both Benseler/Blass and Mathieu/Brémond follow Baiter/Sauppe in printing παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις. The concrete τοῖς Ἕλλησιν would perhaps be more likely to remind readers *how* Busiris is famed among the Greeks, namely as a villain (compare Herodotus' use of the story to illustrate Greek ignorance about Egypt: II.45.1 λέγουσι δὲ πολλὰ καὶ ἄλλα ἀνεπισκέπτως οἱ Ἕλληνες), and would thus point to the non-seriousness of the Encomium. It would be slightly over-specific in the context, since it is Busiris' fame, not his fame among the Greeks in particular, that makes him a likely founder of Egypt. παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις, on the other hand, would be an appropriate if colourless piece of αὔξησις. It is a recurrent phrase in Isocrates' language for describing fame: qualifying the noun δόξα at *Evag.* 29; the adj. ἔντιμος at *Paneg.* 49; and the verb εὐδοκιμεῖν at *Zeug.* 23, *ad Nic.* 22, *Evag.* 74, *Antid.* 83, 151, *Panath.* 252, 261, *Ep. VII* 5, *Ep. VIII* 4. In all these passages, παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις stands in an antithesis, and adds at least something to the picture of the subject's fame: *Zeug.* 23 καὶ παρ' ὑμῖν καὶ παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις, *Paneg.* 49 οὐ μόνον ἐν ταῖς αὑτῶν . . . ἀλλὰ καὶ παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις, and so on. The question here is whether παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις can stand in antithesis with τῶν καθ' αὑτὸν, implying a temporal sense: 'of his contemporaries . . . among other people [i.e. in later generations]'. I have found no clear parallels for this usage. In view of the very high

frequency of παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις in similar contexts, I prefer this reading to παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν, but the text remains in doubt; Prof. D.A. Russell has suggested to me that παρὰ τοῖς ὑστέροις may be required.

εὑρετάς: the reading of Γ is clearly correct (ΘΛ have the banal—and ungrammatical—variant εὐεργέτην). Cf. *ad Nic.* 17 εὑρετὴς γίγνου τῶν βελτίστων (sc. προσταγμάτων καὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων), *Panath.* 205, 210.

§ **36 τοῖς χρόνοις**: Busiris was not even alive at the time of the alleged incident—a radical form of the argument from 'lack of opportunity' (e.g. Gorgias *Palamedes* 5).

Isocrates has already deployed a chronological argument against Polycrates in the Prologue (§ 8). Questions of relative chronology arise naturally out of concern with the genealogy of heroes, so they do not necessarily point to a unifying 'historical' view of the legendary past—though of course historians treating it were obliged to tackle them. For the type of calculation used here, cf. e.g. Xenophon *Agesilaus* i.2 ἀπομνημονεύεται ὁπόστος ἀφ' Ἡρακλέους ἐγένετο, and Plato *Timaeus* 22b (Solon gives the Egyptian priests an account of 'ancient' Greek myth) καὶ τὰ τῶν ἐτῶν ὅσα ἦν οἷς ἔλεγεν πειρᾶσθαι διαμνημονεύων τοὺς χρόνους ἀριθμεῖν.

τῶν λοιδορούντων . . . οἱ γὰρ αὐτοὶ . . . κατηγοροῦσιν: cf. § 5 τῶν γὰρ ἄλλων τῶν ἐπιχειρησάντων ἐκεῖνον λοιδορεῖν . . . Isocrates represents the mythographic sources as if they were themselves examples of the rhetorical forms which their stories would suit, thus underlining Polycrates' error: he used λοιδορία and κατηγορία as models when what he was supposed to be writing was ἔπαινος or ἀπολογία.

ξενοφονίας: this reading is given by the first hand in Γ, and is accepted by Benseler/Blass, Drerup and Mathieu/Brémond: $Γ_5$ΘΛ give ξενοκτονίας. If correct, it seems to be our only instance of the abstract noun ξενοφονία: the verb ξενοφονεῖν occurs at Eur. *IT* 1021, the adjective ξενοφόνος at *IT* 776 (ξενοφόνους τιμάς: *v.l.* ξενοκτόνους is unmetrical) and Plato *Ep. VII* 336d (ξενοφόνων ἀνδρῶν τόλμας). For cognates of ξενοκτονία see e.g. Eur. *IT* 53 (τέχνην ξενοκτόνον), *Hecuba* 1247, Herodotus II.115.6 (Proteus to Paris: περὶ πολλοῦ ἥγημαι μὴ ξεινοκτονέειν). In later accounts of Busiris, ξενοκτονία is the usual term: e.g. D.S. I.88.5 περὶ τῆς Βουσίριδος ξενοκτονίας, D.H. *Roman Antiquities* I.41. Here ξενοφονία is to be preferred as *difficilior*, though the colourful word stands out in this context of fairly down-to-earth argumentation, not elevated αὔξησις. The (rare) -φονία element, with

its connotations of pollutant blood-guilt, may prepare for Isocrates' 'theological' attack on this and other such stories as examples of βλασφημία (§ 38–43).

ὑφ' Ἡρακλέους ἀποθανεῖν: Isocrates' claim (οἱ γὰρ αὐτοὶ . . .) implies either that stories of Busiris the guest-killer invariably ended with his death at Heracles' hands (which may well have been the case: see Introduction **V.iii**), or, less likely, that Isocrates has identified specific sources from which Polycrates took the ξενοφονία motif, and in those sources he is killed by Heracles. This passage suggests that Polycrates chose not to mention this part of the traditional story, but does not prove it (since Polycrates himself may be included among οἱ αὐτοί).

§ 37 ὁμολογεῖται δὲ παρὰ πάντων τῶν λογοποιῶν: i.e. all those who have treated these questions; those who make Busiris be killed by Heracles have ignored the chronological problem, failing, like Polycrates himself, to take note of what is 'universally agreed'. ὁμολογεῖται is an exaggeration, since Busiris' genealogy does not seem to have been entirely fixed: see Introduction **V.v**.

Elsewhere in Isocrates λογοποιοί are prose-writers, contrasted directly with poets (*Antid.* 137, *Phil.* 109): cf. Harpocration's gloss on the present passage (p. 194 lines 18–19 Dindorf) λογοποιός· ὁ ὑφ' ἡμῶν ἱστορικὸς λεγόμενος. Ἰσοκράτης Βουσίριδι καὶ Ἡρόδοτος ἐν τῷ β′ [Hdt. II.143.1]. Note, however, ἐλογοποίησαν used of the poets in § 38. Here ὁμολογεῖται . . . followed by ἀλλὰ γὰρ . . . ἐπηκολούθησας below creates the impression of a general contrast between truthful prose and lying poetry; this contrast, however, is only apparent, since the pre-Polycratean 'accusers' of Busiris referred to in § 36 certainly include prose-writers. See note on § 38 ταῖς . . . βλασφημίαις.

Περσέως . . . νεώτερον . . . πρεσβύτερον: the first claim is straightforward: Amphitryon is son of Alcaeus son of Perseus; Alcmene is daughter of Electryon son of Perseus; thus through both his mortal parents Heracles is great-grandson of Perseus (cf. Rose 1933 p. 226 n. 90). We cannot tell how Isocrates arrived at the second, but it is essentially 'confirmed' by the traditional genealogies: Perseus' mother Danaë is the daughter of Acrisius, son of Abas, son of Lynceus and Hypermestra; Hypermestra is the daughter of Danaus son of Belus son of Libye daughter of Epaphus (Rose 1933 p. 272 and p. 284 n. 60). Busiris, son of Libye, belongs to the same generation as Belus (see Introduction **V.v**, where it is suggested that a substitution of

Busiris for Belus may lie behind Isocrates' genealogy of Busiris). Thus from Busiris to Perseus is a matter of six generations, or (using the equation 3 generations = 100 years, as at Hdt. II.142.2), two hundred years: πλέον ἤ can be put down to αὔξησις.

Theon paraphrases Isocrates' argument in the *Progymnasmata*:

> δεύτερον δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀδυνάτου ἐπιχειρήσομεν [ἀνασκευάζειν], δεικνύντες ὅτι ἀδύνατον τὸ πρᾶγμα οὕτω γενέσθαι ὥς φησιν ὁ συγγραφεὺς ἤτοι διὰ τὸ μηδ' ὅλως πεφυκέναι γίνεσθαι, ἢ διὰ τὸ μὴ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον εἶναι τὰ ἱστορούμενα, οἷον πρὸς τοὺς λέγοντας, ὅτι Ἡρακλῆς ἀπέκτεινε Βούσιριν· κατὰ γὰρ Ἡσίοδον πρεσβύτερος Ἡρακλέους ἐστὶν ὁ Βούσιρις ἕνδεκα γενεαῖς (*RG* II.93.16–23).

Theon's κατὰ γὰρ Ἡσίοδον is either a misrecollection or a loose paraphrase, *exempli gratia*, of Isocrates' ὁμολογεῖται . . . παρὰ πάντων τῶν λογοποιῶν: see Introduction **V** n. 202. Theon's 'eleven generations' can be explained as an interpretation of the figures given by Isocrates: 200 years is six generations; six generations plus four generations makes ten; one extra, to allow for πλέον ἤ, makes eleven.

τὸν βουλόμενον: see note on § 4 βουλομένους.

ἀπολύσασθαι: Γ's reading is adopted by Benseler/Blass, Drerup and Mathieu/Brémond: ΘΛ have διαλύσασθαι. Either reading is possible: for διαβολὴν ἀπολύσασθαι cf. *Antid.* 56 (δια- in Θ); διαβολὰς διαλύσασθαι is found at *de Pace* 142, *Antid.* 16. Editors are probably right to prefer ἀπολύσασθαι, since δια- may be due to the influence of διαβολὴν. In the parallel passages of *Busiris* ἀπο-compounds are used: § 5 οὐχ ὅπως τῆς ὑπαρχούσης αὐτὸν διαβολῆς ἀπήλλαξας, § 45 οὐ γὰρ ἀπολύεις αὐτὸν τῶν αἰτιῶν.

πῶς οὐκ ἄτοπόν ἐστιν . . .: the rhetorical question introduced by πῶς οὐ is one of Isocrates' favourite weapons of ridicule in *Busiris*: § 6, 31, 45, 46, 47; cf. also § 46 πῶς ἂν διατεθείης;

πίστιν . . . ἐναργῆ: cf. § 31 οὐδεμίαν πίστιν εἴρηκας, and see note on § 30 ἀπόδειξιν. For the adjective, cf. *Helen* 61 (deification of the Dioscuri) βουλομένη δὲ πιστὴν ποιῆσαι τὴν μεταβολὴν οὕτως αὐτοῖς τὰς τιμὰς ἐναργεῖς ἔδωκεν ὥσθ' . . ., and also *de Pace* 73, *Antid.* 243, Demosthenes XVIII *On the Crown* 300 (with Wankel 1976 *ad loc.*), and Hesiod F 273 τέκμαρ ἐναργές. In the orators ἐναργής is used in the same contexts as φανερός and σαφής, but being rarer is perhaps stronger. (On Isocrates' use of these adjectives as terms of art, see

Wersdörfer 1940 pp. 96–98.) Here ἐναργῆ signals again Isocrates' task of making Polycrates 'see' as he did not before: compare *de Pace* 73, where the adviser (νουθετῶν) who is most to be honoured is τὸν ἐναργέστατα δυνάμενον δηλῶσαι τὰς πονηρίας τῶν πραξέων.

§ 38 οὐδέν σοι . . . ἐμέλησεν: see note on § 7 ἠμέλησας.

ταῖς τῶν ποιητῶν βλασφημίαις: see notes on § 5 βλασφημούντων and on § 37 ὁμολογεῖται.

The obvious strength of Polycrates' account of Busiris (which incorporates ξενοφονία) as compared with Isocrates' (which discards it) is that the ξενοφονία story has the near-unanimous voice of tradition behind it: killing strangers is what Busiris is known for. Isocrates blocks this line of argument by attacking the tradition head-on; in so doing he identifies it as a specifically poetic tradition. This tactic may remind readers that a well-known prose writer, Herodotus—whom Athenians might reasonably regard as an expert on matters Egyptian—had ridiculed the ξενοφονία story. It gives Isocrates the opportunity to align himself with a long tradition of attacks on poetic representation of the gods as impious; this τόπος joins hands here with another one, Isocrates' favourite antithesis between his own discourse, which aims to improve and to tell the truth, and other discourses which aim only at sensation (e.g. *To Nicocles* 42–49, *Panathenaicus* 272).

Moral criticism of poetic myth is an important strand in ancient discussion of poetry from the archaic period onwards (see e.g. Russell 1995 pp. 84–98). In what follows I attempt only to identify those elements which are of immediate relevance as a context for the present passage.

(i) *Xenophanes*

The idea that poets blaspheme in giving the gods faults and weaknesses like those of human beings was articulated by the philosopher Xenophanes of Colophon (c. 570–470 B.C.); his aim was not to 'defend' the Olympian gods, but to undermine the whole anthropomorphic theology (21 B 23 D–K: εἷς θεός, ἔν τε θεοῖσι καὶ ἀνθρώποισι μέγιστος,/ οὔτι δέμας ἀνθρώποισι ὁμοίιος οὐδὲ νόημα). It appears, however, that he did use the charge of impiety, alongside ridicule and the 'relativist' arguments for which he is most famous, in his attack on traditional views of the divine: cf. Aristotle *Rhetoric* 1399b6–9,

οἷον Ξενοφάνης ἔλεγεν ὅτι ὁμοίως ἀσεβοῦσιν οἱ γενέσθαι φάσκοντες τοὺς θεοὺς τοῖς ἀποθανεῖν λέγουσιν· ἀμφοτέρως γὰρ συμβαίνει μὴ εἶναι τοὺς θεούς ποτε.

Isocrates' list beginning οὐ γὰρ μόνον κλοπὰς καὶ μοιχείας κτλ. echoes what seems to have been a recurrent line in Xenophanes' poem(s), since it is cited from two distinct contexts by Sextus Empiricus: *Adversus Mathematicos* IX.193 = Xenophanes 21 B 11 D–K (πάντα θεοῖς ἀνέθηκαν Ὅμηρος θ' Ἡσίοδός τε,/ὅσσα παρ' ἀνθρώποισιν ὀνείδεα καὶ ψόγος ἐστίν,/κλέπτειν μοιχεύειν τε καὶ ἀλλήλους ἀπατεύειν) and *Adv. Math.* I.289 = Xenophanes 21 B 12 D–K (ὡς πλεῖστ(α) ἐφθέγξαντο θεῶν ἀθεμίστια ἔργα/κλέπτειν μοιχεύειν τε καὶ ἀλλήλους ἀπατεύειν). In the latter context, Sextus appends an explanation to his quotation: Κρόνος μὲν γὰρ . . . τὸν πατέρα ἠνδροτόμησε καὶ τὰ τέκνα κατέπιεν, Ζεύς τε ὁ τούτου παῖς ἀφελόμενος αὐτὸν τῆς ἡγεμονίας γαίης νέρθε καθεῖσε [*Iliad* XIV.204]. The first part of this explanation corresponds with Isocrates' παίδων βρώσεις καὶ πατέρων ἐκτομάς, and may perhaps reflect some following lines in Xenophanes. (Sextus is unlikely to have had first-hand knowledge of Xenophanes' works (Guthrie I.367), but a passage such as this was probably much quoted and anthologised.)

In Euripides' *Heracles*, when the hero rejects stories of crime and conflict among the gods in favour of a more exalted conception of divinity (1341–6), the influence of Xenophanes is apparent:

> ἐγὼ δὲ τοὺς θεοὺς οὔτε λέκτρ' ἃ μὴ θέμις
> στέργειν νομίζω δεσμά τ' ἐξάπτειν χεροῖν
> οὔτ' ἠξίωσα πώποτ' οὔτε πείσομαι
> οὔτ' ἄλλον ἄλλου δεσπότην πεφυκέναι.
> δεῖται γὰρ ὁ θεός, εἴπερ ἔστ' ὀρθῶς θεός,
> οὐδενός· ἀοιδῶν οἵδε δύστηνοι λόγοι.

Heracles invokes these ideas in response to Theseus' consolatory argument that even the gods are subject to τύχαι, so, *a fortiori*, mortals must endure them too (1314–21): compare the similar argument used by Phaedra's nurse in *Hippolytus* (439–66), and note the explicit reference in both passages to art as an authority for divine vicissitudes (*Heracles* 1315 ἀοιδῶν εἴπερ οὐ ψευδεῖς λόγοι, *Hipp.* 450–2 ὅσοι μὲν οὖν γραφάς τε τῶν παλαιτέρων/ἔχουσιν αὐτοί τ' εἰσὶν ἐν μούσαις ἀεὶ/ ἴσασι . . .). It is interesting to note that in defending Busiris Polycrates too used an argument from precedent (§ 45 ὡς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τινὲς ταὐτὰ πεποιήκασιν), quite possibly (in view of ταῖς τῶν ποιητῶν βλασφημίαις ἐπηκολούθησας here) backed up by poetic 'evidence'.

(ii) *Other Early Sources*

That poetry can deceive as well as reveal the truth is a notorious fact already admitted, or boasted of, by Hesiod's Muses: ἴδμεν ψεύδεα πολλὰ λέγειν ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοῖα,/ ἴδμεν δ', εὖτ' ἐθέλωμεν, ἀληθέα γηρύσασθαι (*Theogony* 27 f.). It is an inevitable inference from the existence of mutually inconsistent poetic versions of a myth (West 1966 on *Theogony* 27). The proverb πολλὰ ψεύδονται ἀοιδοί (used by Socrates' interlocutor in the pseudo-Platonic dialogue Περὶ Δικαίου, 374a) appeared, and perhaps originated, in Solon's elegies (Solon F 29 Bergk); it goes one step further insofar as it hints at wilful dishonesty on the poets' part. The idea that a poet may actually suffer for telling a false, blasphemous story is famously embodied in the story of Stesichorus' 'palinode' (see note below on § 39 ἐτυφλώθησαν).

In *Olympian I*, Pindar rejects the prevailing account of the fate of Pelops, namely that he was served and (at least partly) eaten at a feast for the gods given by his father Tantalus (Pindar's rejection of the story is echoed by Euripides' Iphigenia, *IT* 386–91). It is dangerous to speak ill of the gods: ἐμοὶ δ' ἄπορα γαστρίμαργον μακάρων τιν' εἰπεῖν· ἀφίσταμαι·/ἀκέρδεια λέλογχεν θαμινὰ κακαγόρους (52 f., and cf. 35 f. ἔστι δ' ἀνδρὶ φάμεν ἐοικὸς/ἀμφὶ δαιμόνων καλά· μείων γὰρ αἰτία). Pindar blames the false story not on the poets who report it, but on the spitefulness of Tantalus' neighbours; on the other hand, his introduction to the myth, speaking of the deceitful quality of μῦθοι embroidered with subtle falsehoods (29) and of the power of χάρις which for the most part makes even the unbelievable believable (30–32), clearly associates these lying myths with the arts of poetry. (Compare *Nemean VII* 20 ff., where the power of poetry is demonstrated by its ability to deceive: see Lloyd-Jones 1973 p. 130.) For a comparison of Pindar's revision of myth in *Olympian I* with Isocrates' in *Busiris*, see Usener 1993 p. 261 n. 34.

Another sophisticated treatment of the problem of false myths, in which the poet both expounds the true version and explains a false one, may be found in Euripides *Bacchae* 26 ff. (cf. *Homeric Hymn I: To Bacchus* 1–7). Semele's sisters explained her death as a punishment because she had blasphemed in ascribing her pregnancy to Zeus: in fact, her story was true, and in denouncing her they themselves committed blasphemy, for which they are now punished. This is a countertwist to Xenophanes' argument: sceptics who attack mainstream myth (underlined here by the etymological figure in l. 27, Διόνυσον οὐκ ἔφασκον ἐκφῦναι Διός), appropriating for their own pur-

poses the concept of blasphemy or of ἀσέβεια, are themselves guilty of a blasphemous presumption.

(iii) *Plato*

The most conspicuous fourth-century development of an attack on poetry in the tradition of Xenophanes is, of course, Plato's in Books II and III of the *Republic* (377e–391e). Plato is not concerned about the falsehood of the poetic myths *per se* (controlled falsehood will sometimes be permissible in the education of the guardians, 376e–377a, 389b) so much as their immorality and demoralising effect (391e μὴ ἡμῖν πολλὴν εὐχέρειαν ἐντίκτωσι πονηρίας). When it comes to the gods, however, the edifying and the true coincide: the gods are perfect and must be represented as such (379–381: note 379a οἷος τυγχάνει ὁ θεὸς ὤν, ἀεὶ δήπου ἀποδοτέον, 381b ὁ θεός γε καὶ τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ πάντῃ ἄριστα ἔχει). Plato's critique of poetry begins with obvious examples of alleged divine wrongdoing, many of which figure also in Isocrates' list here: 377e Ouranos/Kronos/Zeus, 378bc wars and familial strife (including the γιγαντομαχία: Xenophanes 21 B 1 line 21), 378d binding of Hera, and fighting between Homeric gods. After this the focus moves from the gods to their offspring, the heroes (closer role-models for the guardians). They have already been included in the ban at 378c against ἄλλας ἔχθρας παντοδαπὰς θεῶν τε καὶ ἡρώων πρὸς συγγενεῖς τε καὶ οἰκείους αὐτῶν, and it is emphasised that it is by reason of their divine descent that the heroes must be regarded as perfect (e.g. 388a Ἀχιλλέα θεᾶς παῖδα, 388b Πρίαμον ἐγγὺς θεῶν γεγονότα, 391c Ἀχιλλεύς, θεᾶς ὢν παῖς καὶ Πηλέως, σωφρονεστάτου τε καὶ τρίτου ἀπὸ Διός . . . Θησεὺς Ποσειδῶνος ὑὸς Πειρίθους τε Διός). The point is explicitly argued at 391d:

> μηδὲ (sc. πειθώμεθα μηδ' ἐῶμεν λέγειν) τιν' ἄλλον θεοῦ παῖδά τε καὶ ἥρω τολμῆσαι ἂν δεινὰ καὶ ἀσεβῆ ἐργάσασθαι, οἷα νῦν καταψεύδονται αὐτῶν· ἀλλὰ προσαναγκάζωμεν τοὺς ποιητὰς ἢ μὴ τούτων αὐτὰ ἔργα φάναι ἢ τούτους μὴ εἶναι θεῶν παῖδας, ἀμφότερα δὲ μὴ λέγειν, μηδὲ ἡμῖν ἐπιχειρεῖν πείθειν τοὺς νεοὺς ὡς οἱ θεοὶ κακὰ γεννῶσιν, καὶ ἥρωες ἀνθρώπων οὐδὲν βελτίους· ὅπερ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐλέγομεν, οὔθ' ὅσια ταῦτα οὔτε ἀληθῆ· ἐπεδείξαμεν γάρ που ὅτι ἐκ θεῶν κακὰ γίγνεσθαι ἀδύνατον.

Cf. 408c (on Asclepius): εἰ μὲν θεοῦ ἦν, οὐκ ἦν, φήσομεν, αἰσχροκερδής· εἰ δ' αἰσχροκερδής, οὐκ ἦν θεοῦ.

On Isocrates' parallel criticisms of Homer at *To Nicocles* 42–29, see note on § 3 ὅτι τοῖς πλείστοις τῶν νουθετουμένων . . . See Introduction **IV.i** on the possibility of a relationship between *Busiris* and the

Republic, and **IV.ii** for a comparison of the attack on poetic blasphemy in *Busiris* with Socrates' 'palinode' in the *Phaedrus*.

ἀποφαίνουσιν: see note on § 4 πλείω τῶν ὑπαρχόντων . . .

τοιούτους . . . οἵους οὐδεὶς . . .: cf. Xenophanes 21 B 11 (cited on ταῖς τῶν ποιητῶν βλασφημίαις above). Isocrates goes further than Xenophanes: what the poets have attributed to the gods is not just human wickedness, but superhuman—or rather sub-human.

κλοπάς: the most famous stories of theft among the gods, and thus the most likely targets of Xenophanes' critique, are

(i) Prometheus' theft of fire: e.g. Hesiod *Works and Days* 50–2, *Theogony* 565–9. Note that in *Theogony* the theft of fire is characterised as a 'deception' (565 ἐξαπάτησεν), while in both poems the withholding of fire is itself a punishment for Prometheus' earlier 'deception' of Zeus over the division of sacrifices (*Works and Days* 47–9: 48 ἐξαπάτησε, *Theogony* 535–63: 537 Διὸς νόον ἐξαπαφίσκων); compare the Xenophanean line κλέπτειν μοιχεύειν τε καὶ ἀλλήλους ἀπατεύειν.

(ii) Hermes' theft of Apollo's cattle, as recounted in the *Homeric Hymn to Hermes*. This story was also treated by Sophocles in the satyr-play *Ichneutae*: the traditional form of the story is retained, but there is probably allusion to Xenophanes' critique in the arguments with which Cyllene is made to defend Hermes. Compare F 314 line 338 τίνα κλοπὴν ὠνείδισας; with Xenophanes' ὀνείδεα . . . κλέπτειν (21 B 11 lines 2–3), and see especially 358–64 (supplements following Lloyd-Jones 1996):

> τὸν παῖδα δ' ὄ]ντα τοῦ Διὸς σαφεῖ λόγῳ
> μὴ βλάπτε κιν]ῶν ἐν νέῳ νέον λόγον.
> οὗτος γὰρ οὔτε] πρὸς πατρὸς κλέπτης ἔφυ
> οὔτ' ἐγγενὴς μ]ήτρωσιν ἡ κλοπὴ κρατεῖ.
> σὺ δ' ἄλλοσ', εἴ τ]ίς ἐστι, τὸν κλέπτην σκόπει,
> σκοπὴν ἄ]καρπον· τοῦδε δ' οὐπάνω δόμος
> δείξ]ει γένος.

μοιχείας: esp. Aphrodite and Ares, *Odyssey* VIII.266–366.

παρ' ἀνθρώποις θητείας: Poseidon at *Iliad* XXI.442–5 reminds Apollo of

> ὅσα δὴ πάθομεν κακὰ Ἴλιον ἀμφὶ
> μοῦνοι νῶϊ θεῶν, ὅτ' ἀγήνορι Λαομέδοντι
> πὰρ Διὸς ἐλθόντες θητεύσαμεν εἰς ἐνιαυτὸν
> μισθῷ ἐπὶ ῥητῷ· ὁ δὲ σημαίνων ἐπέτελλεν.

Cf. also Apollo's account in the prologue to Euripides' *Alcestis* of his service in Admetus' house, esp. line 6 f. καί με θητεύειν πατὴρ/θνητῷ παρ' ἀνδρὶ τῶνδ' ἄποιν' ἠνάγκασεν.

The reference to θητεία replaces Xenophanes' καὶ ἀλλήλους ἀπατεύειν, which probably refers in particular to the Διὸς ἀπατή of *Iliad* XIV (e.g. XIV.159 f. μερμήριξε δ' ἔπειτα βοῶπις πότνια Ἥρη/ ὅππως ἐξαπάφοιτο Διὸς νόον αἰγιόχοιο), but see also note on κλοπὰς above. Isocrates' motive for the change is not clear. It may reflect a desire not to echo the source too obviously; also the point about ἀπατή would not fit neatly into the sentence without rewording, since Isocrates would not write καὶ ἀπατὰς ἀλλήλων αὐτοῖς ὠνείδισαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ . . .

ὠνείδισαν: cf. Xenophanes' ὀνειδέα . . . ἐστίν (21 B 11 line 2).

παίδων βρώσεις: the most conspicuous example is Kronos devouring his children, *Theogony* 453–62, but the phrase also calls to mind the feast of Tantalus treated by Pindar in *Olympian I* (see above on ταῖς τῶν ποιητῶν βλασφημίαις). For this atrocity, and for the list as a whole, compare Isocrates' catalogue at *Panathenaicus* 121–122 of un-Athenian crimes which have fuelled the tragic stage:

> τί γὰρ οὐκ ἂν εὕροιμεν τῶν ὑπερβαλλόντων ἀνοσιότητι καὶ δεινότητι πεπραγμένον ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσιν, καὶ μάλιστ' ἐν ταῖς μεγίσταις καὶ τότε νομιζομέναις καὶ νῦν εἶναι δοκούσαις; οὐ φόνους ἀδελφῶν καὶ πατέρων καὶ ξένων παμπληθεῖς γεγενημένους; (122) οὐ σφαγὰς μητέρων καὶ μίξεις καὶ παιδοποιίας ἐξ ὧν ἐτύγχανον αὐτοὶ πεφυκότες; οὐ παίδων βρῶσιν ὑπὸ τῶν οἰκειοτάτων ἐπιβεβουλευμένην; οὐκ ἐκβολὰς ὧν ἐγέννησαν, καὶ καταποντισμοὺς καὶ τυφλώσεις καὶ τοσαύτας τὸ πλῆθος κακοποιίας ὥστε μηδένα πώποτ' ἀπορῆσαι τῶν εἰθισμένων καθ' ἕκαστον τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν εἰσφέρειν εἰς τὸ θέατρον τὰς τότε γεγενημένας συμφοράς;

For the more compressed presentation of the catalogue of crimes in *Busiris*, cf. *Panegyricus* 114 (φυγὰς δὲ καὶ στάσεις καὶ νόμων συγχύσεις καὶ πολιτειῶν μεταβολάς, ἔτι δὲ παίδων ὕβρεις καὶ γυναικῶν αἰσχύνας καὶ χρημάτων ἁρπαγὰς τίς ἂν δύναιτο διεξελθεῖν;). The plurals contribute to *auxesis*, but also, by generalising the crimes and indignities referred to, place them at a safer distance and make them less shocking.

πατέρων ἐκτομὰς: the castration of Ouranos, *Theogony* 159–82. The word ἐκτομή, not surprisingly, does not occur elsewhere in Isocrates, but is used in a context closely similar to the present one in Agathon's speech in Plato's *Symposium*, 195c:

ἀλλά φημι νεώτατον αὐτὸν εἶναι θεῶν καὶ ἀεὶ νέον, τὰ δὲ παλαιὰ πράγματα περὶ θεούς, ἃ Ἡσίοδος καὶ Παρμενίδης λέγουσιν, Ἀνάγκῃ καὶ οὐκ Ἔρωτι γεγονέναι, εἰ ἐκεῖνοι ἀληθῆ ἔλεγον· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐκτομαὶ οὐδὲ δεσμοὶ ἀλλήλων ἐγίγνοντο καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ βίαια, εἰ Ἔρως ἐν αὐτοῖς ἦν, ἀλλὰ φιλία καὶ εἰρήνη, ὥσπερ νῦν, ἐξ οὗ Ἔρως τῶν θεῶν βασιλεύει.

Socrates in *Republic* is more discrete: 377e ὅ τε αὖ Κρόνος ὡς ἐτιμωρήσατο αὐτόν.

μητέρων δεσμοὺς: Hephaestus' binding of Hera, not a very widespread myth, but one of those condemned in the *Republic* (378d Ἥρας . . . δεσμοὺς ὑπὸ ὑέος). The only early version of the story we know of was in Pindar: F 283 Maehler [Ἥρα] παρὰ Πινδάρῳ . . . ὑπὸ Ἡφαίστου δεσμεύεται.

ἀνομίας: cf. *Paneg.* 114 (the continuation of the passage quoted on παίδων βρώσεις above) τὰς δὲ σφαγὰς καὶ τὰς ἀνομίας τὰς ἐπὶ τούτων γενομένας οὐδεὶς ἂν ἰάσασθαι δύναιτο.

κατ' αὐτῶν: the use of κατά suggests deliberate defamation rather than mere error, strengthening the analogy with Polycrates, whose praise of Busiris was really a κατηγορία.

§ 39 τὴν μὲν ἀξίαν . . . οὐ μὴν ἀτιμώρητοί γε: μὲν . . . οὐ μήν (cf. *Philip* 61, and see Denniston 1954 p. 335) expresses a strong antithesis, 'it is true that their punishment fell short of what they deserved—but they certainly did not go unpunished'.

οἱ μὲν . . . οἱ δ' . . . ἄλλος δὲ . . . Ὀρφεὺς δὲ . . .: Orpheus deserves prominence because his fate is the most lurid, and also because Polycrates made a comparison with Orpheus in his praise of Busiris (§ 7 above); he is placed at the climax of the sequence, and he alone is identified by name.

ἀλῆται καὶ τῶν καθ' ἡμέραν ἐνδεεῖς: ἀλῆται is Γ's reading; ΘΛ have πλανῆται, a noun from a more prosaic root which doubtless entered the tradition here as a gloss on ἀλῆται. For ἀλῆται cf. *Plat.* 46, Isocrates' only other use of this rare noun. The plural adds to the *auxesis*, but the reference is primarily to Homer: he belongs first in the list, and the description fits his image in the biographical tradition (Lefkowitz 1981 p. 12). For the expression τῶν καθ' ἡμέραν ἐνδεεῖς cf. e.g. *Archid.* 55, *de Pace* 46.

ἐτυφλώθησαν: Stesichorus (see *Helen* 64). Plato's Socrates at *Phaedrus* 243a makes blasphemy against Helen the cause of Homer's blind-

ness as well as Stesichorus'. Isocrates in *Helen* has Homer compose the *Iliad* at Helen's express command; to avoid inconsistency, therefore, he has to be vague about the exact nature of the blasphemy for which Stesichorus was punished (*Helen* 64 ἐβλασφήμησέν τι περὶ αὐτῆς). Plato's version, contrasting Stesichorus (who realised his error and corrected it) with Homer (who did not), may reflect a comparison made, implicitly or explicitly, by Stesichorus himself. See further Introduction **IV.ii**.

φεύγων τὴν πατρίδα καὶ τοῖς οἰκειοτάτοις πολεμῶν: Alcaeus is most likely, as an exile (F 348) famous for his involvement in civil strife (Lefkowitz 1981 pp. 35 f.); Archilochus has also been suggested (see Mathieu/Brémond *ad loc.*).

τὸν χρόνον διετέλεσεν . . . τὸν βίον ἐτελεύτησεν: elegantly balanced phrases, each of eight syllables, with a clear but unobtrusive closeness in the sounds of the verbs.

'Ορφεὺς δ': there may have been several stories current in which Orpheus' death was a divine punishment, but the idea that it was a punishment for 'blasphemies' contained in his poems is probably Isocrates' invention. In Aeschylus' *Bassarae*, it appears that Orpheus, returning from the underworld, devoted himself to Apollo/Helios and neglected Dionysus, who sent the Maenads to punish him (*testimonia, TGF* II.138 f.). Rather closer to the 'blasphemy' idea is the story that Orpheus was punished as an inventor of Mysteries, for revealing divine secrets: our earliest source for this is Pausanias (IX.30.5 εἰσὶ δὲ οἵ φασι κεραυνωθέντι ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ συμβῆναι τὴν τελευτὴν 'Ορφεῖ· κεραυνωθῆναι δὲ αὐτὸν τῶν λόγων ἕνεκα ὧν ἐδίδασκεν ἐν τοῖς μυστηρίοις οὐ πρότερον ἀκηκοότας ἀνθρώπους), but it or some similar story may lie behind the epitaph for Orpheus quoted in Alcidamas' *Odysseus* (§ 24), which testifies to a death by the thunderbolt of Zeus. Invention of Mysteries figures in close conjunction with the more usual death by σπαραγμός in the account of Apollodorus (I.iii.2 εὗρε δὲ 'Ορφεὺς καὶ τὰ Διονύσου μυστήρια, καὶ τέθαπται περὶ τὴν Πιερίαν διασπασθεὶς ὑπὸ τῶν μαινάδων): this perhaps represents a conflation of two different versions, one with death (by thunderbolt) as a punishment for revealing secrets, and another with death by σπαραγμός (for some other reason). If so, the conflation has the tidy result that Orpheus is in effect killed by his own invention, the Dionysiac ἐνθουσιασμός of the Maenads.

μάλιστα τούτων τῶν λόγων ἀψάμενος: a reference to the 'Orphic' theogonies, cosmogony-poems ascribed to Orpheus in which the gods'

dynastic revolutions and their grotesque mechanism—castration, swallowing etc.—were prominent. Our evidence is fragmentary, but more than one of the attested versions could have been current in Athens at this time (see West 1983 p. 112; also Bremmer 1999 p. 80, on *Busiris* as evidence for the currency of Orphic theogonies). By focusing on Orpheus Isocrates draws attention away from Hesiod—author of a more celebrated, and equally blasphemous, *Theogony*, and one of the named targets of Xenophanes. One reason may be that, while there was a tradition in which Hesiod came to a bad end (killed as a μοιχός: *Certamen* 229–47), it was by human, not divine, agency; another may be Isocrates' (qualified) admiration for Hesiod as author of the didactic *Works and Days* (see *ad Nic.* 43 ff.). (Later critics defended Hesiod by deleting 'unworthy' lines from the *Works and Days*, and even denying his authorship of the *Theogony*: see Lefkowitz 1981 p. 8.)

διασπασθεὶς: i.e. as a victim of σπαραγμός. Cf. Eratosthenes Καταστερισμοί 24: ὁ Διόνυσος ὀργισθεὶς αὐτῷ (sc. Ὀρφεῖ) ἔπεμψε τὰς Βασσάρας, ὥς φησιν Αἰσχύλος ὁ τῶν τραγῳδιῶν ποιητής (Radt III p. 138), αἳ διέσπασαν αὐτὸν καὶ τὰ μέλη ἔρριψαν χωρὶς ἕκαστον.

§ 40 ἢν σωφρονῶμεν . . . φυλαξόμεθα καὶ . . .: cf. *Paneg.* 165 ἂν σωφρονῶμεν . . . φυλαξόμεθα καὶ πειρασόμεθα . . . The expression φυλαξόμεθα καὶ νομιοῦμεν is more or less equivalent to φυλαξόμεθα ὅπως νομιοῦμεν, 'be sure to regard'.

οὐ μιμησόμεθα: by contrast with P. (§ 38 ἐπηκολούθησας). The issue of imitation and following examples has arisen already: see § 18–20 and note on § 28–29. Polycrates chooses bad examples to follow: as a result, he in turn sets a bad example to his pupils (§ 47).

νομοθετήσομεν . . . ὀλιγωρήσομεν: Xenophanes drew attention to the paradox that what poets say about the gods would be abusive if it were said about humans (ὅσσα παρ' ἀνθρώποισιν ὀνείδεα καὶ ψόγος ἐστίν); Isocrates heightens this paradox: the gods actually suffer worse abuse than humans (§ 38 λόγους . . . οἵους οὐδεὶς ἂν περὶ τῶν ἐχθρῶν εἰπεῖν τολμήσειεν), but unlike humans, they do not have the protection of the law of slander (on which see *Loch.* 3 and Halliwell 1991 pp. 49 f.).

Eucken takes *Bus.* 40 as a rejection of legislative censorship on religious grounds, and thus as a polemical move against Plato: in

his view, Isocrates asserts that legal sanctions are appropriate for slander, but that in the case of blasphemy the proper response is one of strong disapproval (νομιοῦμεν ἀσεβεῖν) and no more (Eucken 1983 p. 199). His reading seems to overemphasise the antithesis between νομοθετήσομεν and νομιοῦμεν, at the expense of the more prominent antithesis between νομοθετήσομεν and ὀλιγωρήσομεν. It is presented as a paradox that offences against humans are pursued by law, whereas offences against gods (self-evidently more serious) are ignored. The obvious 'solution' to this paradox is that blasphemy should be dealt with more rigorously than slander, and while νομιοῦμεν stops short of asserting this, it does not assert the opposite. If the passage comments on the censorship programme of the *Republic*, it comes closer to endorsing than opposing it.

παρρησίας: Isocrates uses παρρησία most often in its positive sense, 'fearless free speech' (see on § 1 ἐπαρρησιασάμην). For its negative sense here, 'speaking without proper restraint', compare *Zeug.* 22 οὐκ αἰσχύνονται τοιαύτῃ παρρησίᾳ χρώμενοι περὶ τοῦ τεθνεῶτος, ἣν ἔδεισαν ἂν ποιήσασθαι περὶ ζῶντος (also *Archid.* 97, *Areop.* 20), and see Harpocration p. 239 lines 1–2 Dindorf: παρρησίας· ἀντὶ τοῦ βλασφημίας καὶ λοιδορίας. Ἰσοκράτης Βουσίριδι. Good and bad παρρησία are explicitly distinguished at *Ep. IV* 4.

ὁμοίως . . . τούς τε λέγοντας . . . καὶ τοὺς πιστεύοντας: this does not follow logically from what has gone before, but serves as a transition to the declaration of faith in § 41, which in turn brings the focus back (a) from stories about the gods to stories about heroes (like Busiris), and (b) from the poets as primary myth-makers to prose writers such as Polycrates and Isocrates.

ἀσεβεῖν τούς τε λέγοντας τὰ τοιαῦτα: Γ's text is clearly correct: the reading of ΘΛ (τούς τε λέγοντας τὰ τοιαῦτα πλημμελεῖν) will be the result of an accidental omission of ἀσεβεῖν, followed by insertion of πλημμελεῖν to complete the sense. The verb ἀσεβεῖν is found in Isocrates only here and at *Archid.* 32, but is common in the other orators.

§ 41 ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν: the emphatic change of subject sets Isocrates' pious attitude conspicuously apart from the errors of Polycrates and the poets.

οὐδὲ τοὺς ἐξ ἐκείνων γεγονότας: cf. § 35 τὸν ἐκ Ποσειδῶνος μὲν γεγονότα . . .

οὐδεμιᾶς . . . κακίας μετασχεῖν: cf. e.g. *Republic* 381b ὁ θεὸς καὶ τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ πάντῃ ἄριστα ἔχει.

ἀλλ' αὐτούς τε . . . καὶ . . . γεγενῆσθαι: the connection between these two propositions—'god is good' and 'god is the cause only of good things'—is argued at *Republic* 379bc; cf. also *Symposium* 197c, and see above, introductory note on § 10–29 and note on § 38 ταῖς τῶν ποιητῶν βλασφημίαις.

τῶν καλλίστων ἐπιτηδευμάτων ἡγεμόνας καὶ διδασκάλους: the metaphorical use of ἡγεμών is common (e.g. *Panath.* 207 τῶν καλλίστων ἐπιτηδευμάτων, 241, *Antid.* 294, Plato *Laws* 670de), and metaphorical ἡγέμων and διδάσκαλος are twice coupled in Plato, in one passage which is clearly 'para-epideictic' (*Menexenus* 240d) and in another which is possibly so (*Republic* 595c). Here ἡγεμόνας suits the double theme of choosing the right examples to follow and setting a good example for others, while διδασκάλους prepares for the specific focus in § 47 on Polycrates' likely impact on his own pupils (see note on § 40 οὐ μιμησόμεθα).

εὐπαιδίας: cf. *Evag.* 72, where Evagoras' εὐπαιδία and πολυπαιδία form the climax of the evidence that he has at least as good a title to divinity as any deified hero of the past, having lived εὐτυχέστερον καὶ θεοφιλέστερον ἐκείνων (§ 70). This is the only other instance in Isocrates of the noun εὐπαιδία: it belongs definitely to the poetic register (e.g. Eur. *Supp.* 490, *Ion* 678), and suits the elevated moral tone of the present passage.

§ 42 εἰ . . . τις τῆς τῶν ἀνθρώπων φύσεως κατασταίη κύριος: the idea of 'controlling' human nature is not a common one: in general, each person's φύσις is a given, and proverbs are interested in the desirability of knowing it (e.g. Eur. *Hipp.* 925–7, and see Barrett 1964 *ad loc.*), the need to make the best of it (e.g. Eur. F 634 ὅστις νέμει κάλλιστα τὴν αὑτοῦ φύσιν/ οὗτος σοφὸς πέφυκε πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον) and the folly of trying to change it (e.g. Eur. F 904 ἀλλ' ἄκρας εὐηθίας/ ἅπτοιτ' ἄν, ὅστις τὴν φύσιν νικᾶν θέλει). There is a hint here of the claim to teach ἀρετή, regularly attributed to sophists (see note on καὶ σὺ μὲν οἴει . . . below), a claim which is hybristic (and subversive) because it implies an ability to change φύσις; Isocrates himself is careful to stress that a good φύσις is a precondition, not a product, of education (e.g. *Soph.* 17, 21, *Antid.* 187), though of course he aims to 'enhance' the good φύσις. We might also compare the souls' choice

of a new life in the Myth of Er in *Republic* X. The thought that no-one would choose πονηρία in their servants (much less in their family or themselves) is a distant relative of the Socratic precept οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν ἁμαρτάνει.

καταγιγνώσκομεν, ὡς . . .: probably to be punctuated as a question, since Isocrates does not make himself, or people in general, complicit in Polycrates' blasphemy except as a remote supposition (e.g. § 41 εἰ . . . νομίζοιμεν). In this case, the next sentence (καὶ σὺ . . . ἔχειν ἐπιμέλειαν) is probably also a question.

οὕτως ἀσεβεῖς καὶ παρανόμους ὄντας: corresponding to § 38 δεινότερα . . . ἢ τοὺς ἐκ τῶν ἀνθρώπων τῶν ἀνοσιωτάτων, and also reminding us of Polycrates' characterisation of Busiris: § 5 τηλικαύτην . . . παρανομίαν προσῆψας.

καὶ σὺ μὲν οἴει . . . βελτίους ποιήσειν: for sophists' exaggerated claims to 'teach virtue' in one sense or another, see e.g. Plato *Meno* 95bc, *Euthydemus* 273c–e, *Apology* 20b, *Protagoras* 318a, *Republic* 337d, and Dodds 1959 on *Gorgias* 459c6–460a4. Greek vocabulary (ἀρετή, βελτίων etc.) does not facilitate a clear distinction between imparting knowledge and skills—which any teacher aims to do—and effecting moral improvement. (The ambiguity is neatly illustrated by the exchange between Callias and Antisthenes at Xenophon, *Symposium* iii.4: ἀνθρώπους γὰρ οἶμαι ἱκανὸς εἶναι βελτίους ποιεῖν. καὶ ὁ Ἀντισθένης εἶπε· Πότερον τέχνην τινὰ βαναυσικὴν ἢ καλοκἀγαθίαν διδάσκων;) Here the stock charge fits the argument, and has no value as evidence for Polycrates' actual claims.

οὐδεμίαν ἡγεῖ . . . ἔχειν ἐπιμέλειαν: in contrast with Busiris, who exaggerated divine ἐπιμέλειαι (§ 24)! Once again Polycrates' world-view is topsy-turvy: he claims for himself a superhuman power to improve strangers, and attributes to the gods a subhuman indifference to their own offspring.

§ 43 εἰ μὲν . . . εἰ δὲ . . .: on βούλεσθαι vs. δύνασθαι, see note on § 4 βουλόμενος.

ἐλάττω τῶν σοφιστῶν . . .: an *ad hominem* argument (κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον), since Isocrates does not seriously accept that sophists have this power; see note on § 42 εἰ . . . κύριος.

§ 44–50 *Epilogue*

In § 38–43 the Busiris theme is still officially the main topic, the purpose of the arguments being to refute Polycrates' version and simultaneously to show what would be required in a 'Defence of Busiris'. However, the move away from detail and towards more general argument about the moral status of gods and their children prepares us for a return to theoretical discussion, and makes the break at § 44 less abrupt. The explicit 'cutting short' of the treatment of Busiris signals that the promise of brevity (§ 9 διὰ βραχέων δηλῶσαι) has been kept, and that the author has not been beguiled into taking his theme too seriously or using it as an opportunity for idle display. There is now enough material to move on to the conclusion. The Epilogue itself begins with an echo of the terms in which the Busiris demonstration was first announced, but with a decided change of emphasis: in § 9, when Isocrates promises to show Polycrates 'how it should be done', it is possible for a reader to see this simply as forestalling the objection 'you couldn't do any better'; but in § 44, it is absolutely clear that Isocrates has been *teaching* Polycrates: the demonstration has been an attempt to enlighten him and bring him to his senses, not to outdo his 'achievement' or show Isocrates' superiority.

Now that the correct methods of praise and defence, which Polycrates failed to use, have been demonstrated, we are ready for an examination of the methods which he did use. This appears at the beginning of § 45, in antithesis with what he ought to have done (οὐ γὰρ ἀπολύεις . . . ἀλλ' ἀποφαίνεις . . .), and followed at once by a summary condemnation, framed by the key words ῥᾳθυμοτάτην . . . καταφυγήν: Polycrates' defence strategy is a lazy excuse for criminality. § 45–47 underpin this condemnation with three separate instances of *reductio ad absurdum*: what would be the consequences if Polycrates' argument were generally applied? would he want it used in his own defence? what would happen to a pupil who took it seriously? The answers lead us once again through the stages of Isocrates' attack on Polycrates' speech: it is contrary to common sense, it is bad rhetoric, and it is morally corrupting.

As in the Prologue, the insistent tone and accumulation of arguments make the reader feel the effort that is required to get a simple point across to someone so perverse and obtuse as Polycrates. The first explanation is introduced by a simple εἰ γὰρ . . ., but from

then on Isocrates demands his addressee's attention with mounting emphasis (note μάλιστα δ' ἂν κατίδοις, ἐνθυμήθητι γάρ, σκέψαι . . . καὶ δίελθε πρὸς αὐτόν). Each point ends with a rhetorical question introduced by πῶς οὐκ, and the last has a second question (ἆρ' οὖν χρὴ . . . γράφειν . . .;) which forms the climax of the sequence.

In § 48, Isocrates moves on to anticipation, and rejection, of Polycrates' reply. He is expected to claim that he was aware of the deficiencies of his speech, but intended it as a purely theoretical example of how someone with a poor case, facing serious charges, might be defended. Isocrates replies that even on these terms it has no value: such a defence would do the defendant more harm than good.

The Epilogue intertwines the themes of moral danger and practical uselessness. In anticipating Polycrates' defence of his speech, Isocrates comes close to taking on board the idea that it was a paradoxical exercise rather than a 'real' Encomium or Defence; but by making Polycrates present the idea of such an exercise in very serious terms, as a παράδειγμα τοῖς φιλοσόφοις, he prevents any deflection of his moral attack. If Polycrates' work were successful, it would be morally pernicious; since it is unsuccessful, it is a disgrace to its author: a moral disgrace in its aim, an intellectual disgrace in its incompetence. Isocrates rounds off the polemic with a higher consideration (§ 49), which reminds us of his stance of professional responsibility in the Prologue: unfortunately, the disgrace is not limited to Polycrates, but threatens φιλοσοφία itself, already the victim of misunderstanding and hostility. The closing passage recapitulates in strong and explicit terms the judgement that has been passed on Polycrates' work, and instructs him of the remedy. Finally, Isocrates explains and defends his own right to give this advice, and once more there is a reprise of the themes of the Prologue: the ironic allusion to Polycrates' seniority in years recollects the unhappy circumstances which brought him late to the rhetorical profession, and again Isocrates suavely asserts his own strong position of knowledge and goodwill.

§ 44 πολλῶν δ' ἐνόντων: 'superabundance' formulae are used by Isocrates both parenthetically, to underline choices and draw attention to the motives and principles which guide him (e.g. *Panath.* 22, 90), and to close a work (while emphasising that its curtailment is deliberate and not the result of a failure of invention), e.g. *de Pace*

145 (where the formula is closely parallel to the one used here), and *Helen* 67–69; cf. also § 28 ἔχοι δ' ἄν τις . . . πολλὰ . . . διελθεῖν, and note *ad loc.* The present instance combines these functions, closing the treatment of the Busiris theme, effecting the transition back to the polemic that is the real substance of the work, and signalling the approaching end of the work itself; compare *Antidosis* 310, where a similar formula introduces the concluding section of the work. The motif of superabundance is also an effective way of disclaiming sophistic contrivance and creating the impression that the facts are on one's side (e.g. Lysias XII.1–3). For Isocrates, it goes hand in hand with his adherence to reputable themes: topics so 'good in themselves' that it is hard to do them justice (see note on § 4 πλείω τῶν ὑπαρχόντων and on § 10 ῥᾳδίως). Here, it underlines his success in recasting the paradoxical Busiris-theme as a reputable one. Contrast the conclusion of the Lysianic speech in Plato's *Phaedrus* (234c ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ἱκανά μοι νομίζω τὰ εἰρημένα· εἰ δ' ἔτι τι σὺ ποθεῖς, ἡγούμενος παραλελεῖφθαι, ἐρώτα) and the claim of Phaedrus, as its defender, that it has treated its subject exhaustively (235b τῶν γὰρ ἐνόντων ἀξίως ῥηθῆναι ἐν τῷ πράγματι οὐδὲν παραλέλοιπεν).

ἐξ ὧν ἄν τις καὶ τὸν ἔπαινον καὶ τὴν ἀπολογίαν μηκύνειεν: cf. § 8 ἐξ ὧν ἔδει καὶ τὸν ἔπαινον καὶ τὴν ἀπολογίαν ποιήσασθαι, and see note *ad loc.*

μηκύνειεν . . . μακρολογεῖν: Isocrates has only one other instance of the verb μηκύνειν, in the closely parallel passage which concludes the encomium at *Helen* 69: ἣν οὖν τινὲς βούλωνται ταῦτα διεργάζεσθαι καὶ μηκύνειν, οὐκ ἀπορήσουσι ἀφορμῆς . . . Cf. also *de Pace* 145 τὸ μῆκος τοῦ λόγου. The expression οὐ δεῖ μακρολογεῖν (with variants) is a formula, like πολλῶν (λόγων) ἐνόντων, for bringing a work or section of a work to a close: *Plat.* 7, *Archid.* 111, *Paneg.* 66. Its relative τί δεῖ μακρολογεῖν; is similar in function to Latin 'Quid multa?': *Zeug.* 8, *Plat.* 29, *Panath.* 270, and cf. *Nic.* 63, *Panath.* 181.

To treat a subject at indefinite length (or, less commonly, with the maximum concision: Plato *Gorgias* 449c) was among the arts of the sophists. It is also, of course, a valuable skill in epideictic oratory (Usher 1973 p. 40), though one which Isocrates does not commend (for Isocrates' expressed views on βραχυλογία and μακρολογία, see Wersdörfer 1940 pp. 98–101). Here, ἐξ ὧν ἄν τις . . . μηκύνειεν suggests what a less responsible rhetorician might have done (see note below on οὐ γὰρ ἐπίδειξιν . . .). Plato associates the 'art of length' especially with Gorgias (*Phaedrus* 267a Τεισίαν τε Γοργίαν τε . . . οἳ . . .

συντομίαν τε λόγων καὶ ἄπειρα μήκη περὶ πάντων ἀνηῦρον, *Gorgias* 449c) and with Protagoras (*Protagoras* 329b, 334e–335c): both are mockingly adjured by Socrates to abstain from μακρολογία (which in non-technical use often simply means 'long-windedness') and to practise the βραχυλογία which alone is compatible with dialectic. Elsewhere Plato, like Isocrates, uses μακρολογία in a quite general sense, of the use of more words than are necessary: *Theaetetus* 163d, *Republic* 403de, 455c, *Laws* 655b.

οὐ γὰρ ἐπίδειξιν τοῖς ἄλλοις ποιούμενος, ἀλλ' ὑποδεῖξαί σοι βουλόμενος: Isocrates regularly insists that his works are not intended for ἐπίδειξις, public performance and self-display (e.g. *Antid.* 1, 55, *Phil.* 17, 93, *Ep. I* 5–6, *Ep. VI* 4–5). This fact is several times used to explain features of their technique: *Antidosis* 55 and *Philip* 93 (alleged 'unembellished' character of these works); *Antidosis* 1 (use of a preamble); *Ep. VI* 4 (choice of subject-matter). Here it is an explanation for cutting short the Busiris theme.

ἐπιδείξεις are, for Isocrates, the province of the worst kind of sophistic rhetorician (see e.g. *Antid.* 147–148); epideictic oratory in general is condemned, together with forensic, at *Panathenaicus* 271. Isocrates' antithesis between (mere) ἐπίδειξις and practical, useful rhetoric parallels the Platonic Socrates' contrast between ἐπίδειξις and dialectic (see e.g. *Gorgias* 447bc, with Dodds 1959 on 447c3). It is set out most explicitly at *Panegyricus* 17, and reappears in places where, as here, the practical objective is to give useful advice—*Phil.* 17, *Ep. I* 5–6, *Ep. VI* 4–5. In this last passage, and at *Philip* 25, there is an additional contrast between ἐπίδειξις and seriousness: here in *Busiris*, where a non-serious, 'epideictic' theme has been treated, it is all the more necessary to remind his readers that this is not ἐπίδειξις for its own sake, but for a serious purpose.

ὑπόδειξαί σοι: the verb ὑποδεικνύναι suggests a more restrained 'presentation' than ἐπιδεικνύναι, but also has other connotations which play a part here. Its primary meaning in Isocrates is 'to show by one's own example' (*Nic.* 57, *Phil.* 12, 27, 111, *Panath.* 78, 166, *Ep. II* 11). The present passage may be compared with *Panathenaicus* 150 ὅσον ὑποδείξαντα μόνον τοῖς ἄλλοις, ἐξ ὧν ληροῦντας ἂν αὐτοὺς ἐπιδείξαιμεν . . ., where ὑποδεικνύναι means 'to illustrate', to show in brief what materials are available for the refutation of his critics (cf. ἐξ ὧν at *Bus.* 9), without going through them at length. Finally, it can be used of getting a message across without stating it publicly:

e.g. *Panath.* 170, where the ambassadors are to give public advice (συμβουλεύσοντας) but at the same time to deliver a veiled threat of intervention (κἀκεῖν' ὑποδείξοντας, ὡς . . .). In the present passage the idea of a concealed communication (see note on § 2 ἀποκρύψασθαι) is reinforced by the antithesis τοῖς ἄλλοις/σοι. Compare especially *Ep. I* 6, where Isocrates uses the fact that he is writing to Dionysius personally, rather than speaking at a public festival, as evidence that his aim is serious and practical, not 'epideictic'.

τόν γε λόγον ὃν συνέγραψας: γε points ironically to the incongruity between the actual content of Polycrates' speech and its supposed purpose (see note on § 7 μηδὲν ὁμολογούμενον).

The alternative reading ὃν σὺ γέγραφας (added in the margin of Γ by the corrector $Γ_2$) is adopted by Blass, and may well be correct. σὺ would fit well into the pattern of repeated second-person pronouns (see note on § 46 μάλιστα . . .), while the perfect γέγραφας has a parallel in § 1 (τῶν δὲ λόγων τινὰς ὧν γέγραφας) and produces a more direct formal contrast between what Isocrates has done and what Polycrates has done (διείλεγμαι/γέγραφας); Drerup, however, rejects the variant on the grounds that this corrector's testimony elsewhere in *Busiris* is of poor quality. Compare § 47 γράφειν Γ || συγγράφειν ΘΛ, where Benseler/Blass, Drerup and Mathieu/Brémond all follow Γ.

ὁμολογίαν: the rhyme with ἀπολογία brings out the absurdity: as though an admission of guilt was as valid a rhetorical form as a defence.

§ 45 οὐ γὰρ ἀπολύεις . . . ἀλλ' ἀποφαίνεις: the metrical equivalence is highlighted by the repetition of ἀπο-. With οὐ γὰρ ἀπολύεις cf. § 5 οὐχ ὅπως . . . ἀπήλλαξας, § 37 ἀπολύσασθαι. So far, this deficiency—failure to refute the traditional 'charge' against Busiris—has been the essential complaint against Polycrates' speech; now for the first time it is revealed what Polycrates did instead. On the sense of the verb ἀποφαίνειν, see note on § 4 πλείω τῶν ὑπαρχόντων, and note especially § 7 φῂς μὲν . . . ἀποφαίνεις δὲ . . . (as here, contrasting what should have been in Polycrates' work with what actually was in it).

αἰτιῶν: Γ's reading is clearly correct; ΘΛ have ἁμαρτιῶν.

ὡς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τινὲς ταὐτὰ πεποιήκασιν: a similar form of argument seems to have been used in the paradoxical speech *Alexandros*, which

may be attributable to Polycrates (Arist. *Rhet.* 1397b23–25 ff.: see Introduction II). We do not know what precedents, mythological or historical, Polycrates used to exonerate Busiris.

In the case of human sacrifice, the task would not have been too difficult. Tragedy offers many stories of παρθένοι who, under varying degrees of pressure, become willing sacrificial victims. In Euripides' *Erechtheus*, the sacrifice of the king's own daughter saves the city from destruction, and Makaria plays a similar role in *Heracleidae*. In the fates of Iphigenia and Polyxena, heroism is more starkly juxtaposed with cruelty and waste; but Polycrates need not acknowledge this, and mere reference to the eminent status of the doer, victim and recipient of each sacrifice would provide ample material for his argument. (For the plot and fragments of Euripides' *Erechtheus*, see Collard, Cropp and Lee 1995, pp. 148–94; for a study of Euripides' sacrificial virgins, Rabinowitz 1993 pp. 31–66.) Even the sacrifice of unwilling victims has a 'reputable' precedent in *Iliad* XXIII.166–76, where Achilles offers twelve Trojan captives to the ghost of Patroclus.

It is less easy to guess how the defence of cannibalism might have been achieved. When humans (or gods) eat human flesh in myth (e.g. at the feasts of Tantalus, Tereus and Thyestes) it is usually a mistake on the part of the eater, and the incident is horrific. The exceptions are inauspicious. Tydeus gnawed at the head of his fallen enemy Melanippus, but by doing so lost the immortality which Athena had meant to confer on him. (See Beazley 1947 for two vase paintings of fifth-century origin apparently depicting this incident, and an account of other sources.) Phalaris, the legendary sixth-century tyrant of Acragas who owned a bronze bull in which foreigners were roasted alive, often appears alongside Busiris in later literature as a byword for cruelty; according to Clearchus (quoted by Athenaeus, 396e) he 'feasted on unweaned infants'. The myth of Kronos devouring his children, one of the standard 'poetic blasphemies' listed by Isocrates (§ 38 παίδων βρώσεις: see note *ad loc.*), is similarly unpromising in view of its sequel. One line would have been to exploit passages in the *Iliad* where characters imagine cannibalism, 'eating someone raw', as the ultimate expression of hatred: e.g. IV.34–36, XXII.346 f., XXIV.212 f. Another would have been to associate Busiris' conduct with sacrificial rituals in which human flesh was eaten: though perhaps a less familiar precedent, this would be a closer one, since the context of Busiris' cannibalism seems explicitly to have been the sacrificial meal itself (§ 7 θύσας κατήσθιεν, § 31 θύων κατήσθιεν).

Note, for instance, the μῦθος concerning the ritual of Zeus Λυκαῖος to which Plato's Socrates refers at *Republic* 565d: the participant who eats the human flesh, which is mixed in with other sacrificial meats, is transformed into a wolf, but such a ritual might still furnish a general argument that cannibalism is practised with divine sanction. (On the cult of Zeus Λυκαῖος, see Hughes 1991 pp. 96–107.) Similarly, though the legends concerning the death of Orpheus and the similar fate of Pentheus do not go so far as cannibalism, there are stories of Dionysiac rituals in which σπαραγμός of a human victim may have been followed by ὠμοφαγία: evidence is collected by Dodds 1960 pp. xviii f. In general, though, cannibalism is represented as the antithesis of civilisation, a barbarous or pre-cultural practice: see Hughes 1991 p. 188.

ῥᾳθυμοτάτην: 'laziest'. Cf. *de Pace* 114 (cited on § 46 μάλιστα δ' ἂν κατίδοις . . .), and τὰς ἀπολογίας . . . ῥᾳδίας ποιήσαιμεν below.

καταφυγὴν: literally 'place of refuge', 'asylum' (*Paneg.* 41, *Plat.* 55, *Evag.* 52). The word's metaphorical use, especially for a defendant's recourse, hope of safety or defence, can be seen developing and becoming more familiar in Attic oratory. In Antiphon I *Against the Stepmother* 4 the word's spatial sense is strongly felt: πρὸς τίνας οὖν ἔλθῃ τοὺς βοηθούς, ἢ ποῖ τὴν καταφυγὴν ποιήσεται ἄλλοθι ἢ πρὸς ὑμᾶς καὶ τὸ δίκαιον; At Isoc. *Callim.* 43 the amnesty is a καταφυγή for the oligarchs. In Demosthenean oratory the meaning 'defence' is well established: cf. Dem. LVII *Against Euboulides* 6, LIV *Against Conon* 21, XLVI *Against Stephanus II* 9, and [Dem.] LVIII *Against Theocrines* 65, where νόμοι, δικαστήρια, μάρτυρες, and ἀγοραί are listed as ἀδικημάτων καταφυγαί.

εἰ γὰρ . . .: the argument can be reduced to syllogistic form: if (a) all crimes are acts that have occurred before, and (b) no one who commits an act which has occurred before is to be deemed guilty, then (c) no-one who commits a crime is to be deemed guilty. The syntax marks the logical co-ordination of the premisses, εἰ γὰρ τῶν μὲν . . . τοὺς δ' . . ., but the conclusion breaks into an indignant rhetorical question, which omits a few logical steps in order to press home the practical consequences: '[criminals, on this argument, cannot be regarded as guilty, so] it will be easy for them to defend themselves, and it will be open season for anyone with a mind to wrongdoing'. Polycrates' premiss could be brought to an immediate *reductio ad*

absurdum by using the verb ἀδικεῖν in place of δεινὸν ποιεῖν, which would justify a conclusion to the effect that οὐδὲν ἀδικεῖν ἡγοίμεθ' ἂν τοὺς ἐπ' ἀδικήμασιν ἁλισκομένους, but rather than score a logical point Isocrates presses on to the lively anarchic picture of total licence for would-be criminals.

μὴ ῥᾴδιον εὑρεῖν ὃ μήπω τυγχάνει γεγενημένον: cf. *Panath.* 121–122 (quoted on § 38 παίδων βρώσεις), and contrast Cicero's treatment of patricide at *Pro Sex. Roscio Amerino* 70: Solon did not prescribe a penalty for this crime, because it was unheard of and unanticipated, but the Roman lawgivers wisely realised *nihil esse tam sanctum, quod non aliquando violaret audacia.*

τοῖς βουλομένοις εἶναι πονηροὺς πολλὴν ἐξουσίαν παρασκευάσαιμεν: for the concept of 'giving people ἐξουσία to do wrong' cf. *Areop.* 34, *Antid.* 164, and the similar use of εὐχέρεια at Plato *Rep.* 391e. Here Isocrates adapts a τόπος from the epilogue of prosecution speeches, that acquittal will be an invitation for others to commit the same crime: e.g. Lysias XXII *Against the Corn-dealers* 19 (πολλὴν ἄδειαν αὐτοῖς ἐψηφισμένοι ἔσεσθε ποιεῖν ὅ τι ἂν βούλωνται), XXIX *Against Philocrates* 13 (ἄδεια), I *On the Killing of Eratosthenes* 48 (ἄδεια, in a defence speech which recasts itself as a prosecution); Demosthenes XXIV *Against Timocrates* 205 (ἐξουσία καὶ ἄδεια), [Demosthenes] LIX *Against Neaera* 112 (ἐξουσία).

§ 46 μάλιστα δ' ἂν κατίδοις . . . ἐπὶ σαυτοῦ θεωρήσας: 'you would recognise it best by looking (at it) in your own case'. Cf. *de Pace* 114 πεπόνθατε γὰρ πάντων αἴσχιστον καὶ ῥᾳθυμότατον· ἃ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁρᾶτε, ταῦτ' ἐφ' ὑμῶν αὐτῶν ἀγνοεῖτε. In § 46–47 second person pronouns are used repeatedly, emphasising the effort required to bring the argument home to Polycrates and instil in him a sense of responsibility: ἐπὶ σαυτοῦ . . . περὶ σὲ . . . σοι . . . ὑπὲρ σαυτοῦ . . . σοι . . . σὺ (plus § 47 πρὸς αὐτὸν, where πρὸς σαυτὸν should perhaps be restored: see note *ad loc.*).

τὴν εὐήθειαν: Polycrates' speech is εὐήθης because he made no effort to test its true value as a defence—such as to ask himself whether he would wish to be defended in the same way. In the orators, εὐήθεια is always a quality of people and actions; for εὐήθεια applied to a λόγος, cf. Plato *Phaedo* 87c, *Laws* 818b, *Alc. II* 149e, and esp. *Phaedrus* 242de: Socrates' describes his first speech as εὐήθη καὶ ὑπό τι ἀσεβῆ, and goes on to explain ἡ εὐήθεια αὐτοῖν [τοῖν λόγοιν: his

own and the 'Lysias' speech] πάνυ ἀστεία, τὸ μηδὲν ὑγιὲς λέγοντε μηδὲ ἀληθὲς σεμνύνεσθαι ὥς τι ὄντε. On parallels between *Phaedrus* and *Busiris* see Introduction **IV.ii**.

ἐνθυμήθητι γάρ· εἰ . . .: forensic in tone: cf. e.g. Lysias I *On the Killing of Eratosthenes* 40 ἐνθυμήθητε· εἰ ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ νυκτὶ ἐγὼ ἐπεβούλευον Ἐρατοσθένει, πότερον ἦν μοι κρεῖττον αὐτῷ ἑτέρωθι δειπνεῖν ἢ τὸν συνδειπνήσοντά μοι εἰσαγαγεῖν;

εἰ μεγάλων καὶ δεινῶν αἰτιῶν περὶ σὲ γεγονυιῶν: if Polycrates was not persuaded by the hypothetical reversal in the Prologue (see note on § 6 εἰ γένοιτ' ἐξουσία), perhaps a scenario in which he is personally at risk will concentrate his mind. The parallels with that section of the Prologue are clearly marked—§ 46 μᾶλλον ἂν αὐτὸν μισήσειας ἢ τοὺς κατηγοροῦντας: cf. § 6 τοσαύτην ἔχοι χάριν ὑπὲρ τῆς κατηγορίας ὅσην οὐδενὶ τῶν ἐπαινεῖν αὐτὸν εἰθισμένων, § 46 πῶς οὐκ αἰσχρόν: cf. § 6 πῶς οὐκ αἰσχύνεσθαι . . . προσήκει, § 46 ἐφ' αἷς ὑπὲρ σαυτοῦ λεγομέναις μάλιστ' ἂν ὀργισθείης: cf. § 6 ἐπί γε τοῖς ὑπὸ σοῦ λεγομένοις οὕτως ἂν ἀγανακτήσειεν ὥστε . . . The hypothesis of 'Polycrates on trial' is made more vivid by the forensic tone of this part of Isocrates' speech: in a certain sense, of course, Isocrates is putting Polycrates on trial.

This is the clearest instance in *Busiris* of an argument of the 'Golden Rule' type (cf. notes on § 20 εἰ . . . ἅπαντες μιμησαίμεθα and on § 31 παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων). See Dihle 1962 pp. 85–95 and pp. 95–102 (on Isocrates esp. p. 101); Russell 1963; Dihle 1981. Elsewhere Isocrates uses both the positive form ('treat others as you would wish them to treat you'), e.g. *Paneg.* 81, *Nic.* 49, 62, *ad Nic.* 24, and the negative form found here ('do not treat others as you would not wish them to treat you'), e.g. *Nic.* 61 ἃ πάσχοντες ὑφ' ἑτέρων ὀργίζεσθε, ταῦτα τοὺς ἄλλους μὴ ποιεῖτε. In the present context it has particular force because (as we are reminded in § 47) Polycrates is a teacher: someone whose work and conduct ought to be exemplary.

τις . . . σοι συνείποι: for this real-world scenario Isocrates assimilates Polycrates' third-person defence of Busiris to the real forensic variety it most closely resembles, namely a supporting-speech such as Isocrates' *Against Euthynous.* (For συνειπεῖν = 'to appear as a συνήγορος', cf. *Loch.* 22.)

ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ οἶδ': μέν *solitarium*, 'with personal and demonstrative pronouns, implicitly contrasted with other persons and things': Denniston 1954 p. 381, (ii).

πῶς οὐκ αἰσχρὸν . . .: for the shamefulness of hypocrisy—failing to abide by the standards one applies to other people—cf. § 31 above, and *de Pace* 114 (cited on § 45 ῥᾳθυμοτάτην).

§ 47 σκέψαι . . . καὶ δίελθε πρὸς αὑτόν: cf. e.g. *Antidosis* 306 διέλθετε πρὸς ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ σκέψασθε ποῖός τις ἦν καὶ πῶς γεγονὼς καὶ τίνα τρόπον πεπαιδευμένος ὁ τοὺς τυράννους ἐκβαλών, where, as here, Isocrates is striving to impress what is to him an obvious and vital truth on the minds of an audience taken to be obtuse and perverse.

For the third person of the reflexive pronoun functioning as second person, cf. *ad Nic.* 38, *Antid.* 145. F. Seck has argued, however, that the manuscripts of Isocrates do not give adequate evidence for the variants αὑτόν/ἑαυτόν in place of σαυτόν or ἐμαυτόν: in all cases either (i) σαυτόν/ἐμαυτόν appears in the tradition as a *varia lectio*, or (ii) αὑτόν for second-person appears, as here, in a combination such as πρὸς αὑτόν, where a second Σ could easily have dropped out. See Seck 1965 pp. 62 f. In the present context, where heavy repetition of the second-person pronoun is used to 'point the finger' at Polycrates (see note on § 46 μάλιστα . . .), πρὸς σαυτόν is perhaps to be preferred.

εἴ τις τῶν σοι συνόντων: σοι συνόντων echoes § 46 σοι συνείποι, underlining the parallelism between the two arguments: if Polycrates' associates were to speak, or worse still to act, in accordance with the example he has set them, the consequences would be disastrous. Polycrates harms those closest to him most (note the repeated σοι συν-); compare *Helen* 7, where teachers of eristic are said to be worse than common cheats because, instead of harming strangers, they cause the most damage to their close associates (i.e. their pupils). The irony underlying § 42 σὺ . . . οἴει καὶ τοὺς μηδὲν προσήκοντας, ἥν σοι πλησιάσωσιν, βελτίους ποιήσειν is now exposed.

ἐπαρθείη: Isocrates regularly uses ἐπαίρειν of incitement to wrong-doing: *Euth.* 5, 11, *Callim.* 17, 43, *Trap.* 35, 46, *Paneg.* 108, *de Pace* 105 (exceptions: *Phil.* 10, *Ep. I* 5).

ἃ σὺ τυγχάνεις εὐλογῶν: so far, we have only been told that Polycrates passed off Busiris' crimes as οὐδὲν δεινόν: now it is suggested that he actually praised them. It is unclear how literally we should take this. It may be exaggeration, or perhaps ἃ σὺ τυγχάνεις εὐλογῶν is to be understood as ἅπερ ἐπετήδευεν ἐκεῖνος ὃν σὺ τυγχάνεις εὐλογῶν. Of course, even to praise Polycrates *although* he was a cannibal could

theoretically incite others to emulate him; but the paradoxical effect would be strongest if Polycrates found a way not just to praise a cannibal, but to praise cannibalism itself. See note on § 45 καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τινὲς.

γράφειν: Γ's reading: ΘΛ have συγγράφειν. See note on § 44 τόν γε λόγον ὃν συνέγραψας.

προσέσται μέγιστον ἀγαθόν: cf. § 4 πλείω . . . προσόντ'.

λόγους . . . οἷς . . . μέγιστον ἀγαθόν, ἣν μηδένα πεῖσαι . . . δυνηθῶσιν: a paradox, and an index of the perversity of Polycrates' work, the saving grace of which is that it is in fact unpersuasive (cf. § 46, § 48). Thus the last in the sequence of rhetorical questions unites the two aspects of Polycrates' failure, incompetence and immorality—the two marks of the bad rhetorician, just as expertise and good intentions are marks of the good rhetorician (cf. § 50). Fortunately, the incompetence limits the direct harm done by the immorality, so the greatest practical danger is the one introduced in § 49: Polycrates and his kind bring φιλοσοφία itself into disrepute.

§ 48 ἴσως ἂν εἴποις: at last, and very briefly, we are allowed to glimpse what must have been the real point of Polycrates' speech (see Introduction **II**): a self-advertising rhetorical exercise, deliberately paradoxical. By presenting the idea as an anticipated defence (a form of προκατάληψις), Isocrates both distances himself from it and adds to the 'forensic' atmosphere.

Isocrates deals with this new possibility with resolute seriousness: if Polycrates' work was an exercise, an exercise *in what?* Presumably in defence; but if so, everything that has been said about it still applies—it is at best useless, at worst pernicious. The same would be true if it were an exercise in praise. The possibility that it was primarily humorous is never mentioned (cf. note on § 9 οὐ σπουδαίαν οὖσαν), perhaps because, from Isocrates' point of view, aiming solely to raise a laugh would not really count as having a purpose at all. The effect is complex: Isocrates' wilful determination to treat Polycrates' absurd speech seriously itself creates an effect of ironic humour, as well as opening the way for direct ridicule. At the same time, the stance of seriousness keeps us aware that Isocrates' humour (unlike Polycrates' humour—the very possibility of which is banished from *Busiris*) does have a serious moral and instructive purpose.

ὡς οὐδὲ σὲ τοῦτο παρέλαθεν: οὐδὲ σὲ is subtly ambiguous: ostensibly it presents Polycrates' point of view, 'I was aware of that *too*'; but we can also hear in it Isocrates' point of view: '*even* you were aware of that' (in spite of the inability to see the obvious which is central to Isocrates' portrait of Polycrates: see note on § 1–9).

τοῦτο: i.e. the point underlying the rhetorical questions in § 47, that the speech would have a bad influence on anyone who was convinced by it.

ἀλλ' ἐβουλήθης τοῖς φιλοσόφοις . . . καταλιπεῖν: the defence depends on the assumption that expert φιλόσοφοι will be safe from corruption. ἀλλ' ἐβουλήθης . . . καταλιπεῖν recalls § 10 ἀλλ' ᾠήθη δεῖν . . . καταλιπεῖν, drawing attention to the absurd discrepancy in ambition between Polycrates and Isocrates' Busiris.

περὶ τῶν αἰσχρῶν αἰτιῶν καὶ δυσχερῶν πραγμάτων: perhaps hendidays, 'concerning the hard task of dealing with dreadful accusations'; but probably with a stronger distinction between αἰτίαι 'charges' and πράγματα 'facts of the case', in which case this is a euphemistic way of saying 'when the accusations are dreadful and the defendant is guilty'.

ἡγοῦμαί σοι νῦν γεγενῆσθαι φανερὸν: cf. § 4 πειράσομαί σοι ποιῆσαι καταφανὲς . . . In announcing Polycrates' failure to do what he said he was doing, Isocrates simultaneously reminds us of one declared objective which his own work has now achieved.

§ 49 τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἐπικήρως διακειμένης καὶ φθονουμένης: the personification of philosophy as a victim of unjust persecution (like Isocrates himself) is a key image in *Antidosis*: e.g. 170, 176, 215, 312. Compare Socrates' comments in *Republic* VI on false or debased philosophers who give philosophy its bad name (491a (referring back to 487d); also 489cd, 497a, 500b, 535c, 536bc).

Here the personification is made striking by the use of the adverbial form (a *hapax* in classical Greek) of the rare adjective ἐπίκηρος. We might expect the adjective to have a poetic tinge (cf. Callimachus *Epigram I* (Page) line 3), evoking its root κήρ, but it is in fact less frequent in verse than in prose, esp. technical prose: it is common only in the writings of Peripatetic philosophers and Christian theologians. Its usual meaning is 'mortal'/'perishable'/'fragile' by nature: cf. Callimachus *loc. cit.* δακρύσας ἐπίκηρον ἐὸν βίον, Aristotle *GA* 753a,

[Plato] *Axiochus* 367b, [Aristotle] *On the Universe* 392a. The active meaning 'destructive'/'dangerous' is found in the Hippocratic treatise περὶ ἱερῆς νούσου 1, and [Longinus] *On the Sublime* 29.1. For the usage here, meaning '(contingently) in danger of death', 'mortally threatened', there is no close parallel.

φθονουμένης . . . μισήσουσιν: for the *topos* of popular resentment of philosophers, see e.g. Plato *Apology* 28a, Isoc. *Antid.* 31, and cf. *Soph.* 1 ff.: an attempt to redirect public hostility towards those who really deserve it—not genuine educators, but charlatans who make excessive claims.

§ 50 ἣν οὖν ἐμοὶ πείθῃ, μάλιστα μὲν . . . εἰ δὲ μὴ . . .: these polite qualifications are made incongruous and ironic by the powerful condemnatory terms which they accompany: πονηρὰς, χείρων, λυμανεῖ, διαβαλεῖς.

πονηρὰς: i.e. base, corrupt or simply wrong: cf. *Antid.* 86 (how could Isocrates, the author of *Panegyricus*, ever have written (λόγους) πονηροὺς . . . καὶ περὶ πονηρῶν πραγμάτων?), *Panath.* 203.

μήτ' . . . μήτε . . . μήτε . . .: a devastating recapitulation of the faults of Polycrates' Busiris-speech. χείρων εἶναι δόξεις, covering both moral and intellectual disgrace, refers to § 45–46; τοὺς μιμουμένους λυμανεῖ to § 47; τὴν . . . παίδευσιν διαβαλεῖς to the reply anticipated and demolished in § 48–49.

διαβαλεῖς: cf. *Antid.* 170 (φιλοσοφιάν . . . διαβεβλημένην), 285 (τῶν διαβαλλόντων τὴν τοιαύτην παιδείαν), and Plato *Rep.* 489d (διαβολὴ γίγνεται φιλοσοφίᾳ). Clearly διαβαλεῖς here = 'will bring into disrepute'; but διαβάλλειν standardly implies malice, and by using the verb here Isocrates insinuates that the damage Polycrates has done to the profession was reckless, if not deliberate.

μὴ θαυμάσῃς, εἰ νεώτερος ὢν . . .: Archidamus is made to excuse himself in similar words at *Archid.* 1; cf. Cicero's development of the *topos* at *Pro Sex. Roscio Amerino* 1 ff. Here, however, the tone is ironic. Isocrates is not a νεανίας: he is 42 years old at the very least, perhaps significantly older (cf. Introduction **III.v**); so the point of this 'apology' is not Isocrates' youth, but Polycrates' age—which adds to the disgrace of his incompetence.

νεώτερος ὢν καὶ μηδέν σοι προσήκων . . . οὐ τῶν πρεσβυτάτων οὐδὲ τῶν οἰκειοτάτων: this is the text of $\Gamma_2\Theta\Lambda$, accepted by Benseler/Blass and

Mathieu/Brémond; the words νεώτερος ὢν καὶ and τῶν πρεσβυτάτων οὐδὲ are omitted by Γ and condemned by Drerup. Drerup has general doubts about the value of Γ_2's testimony for *Busiris* (see note on § 44 τόν γε λόγον ὃν συνέγραψας), but what he regards as the clinching evidence of interpolation is the fact that Γ omits *both* νεώτερος ὢν καὶ *and* the logically related words τῶν πρεσβυτάτων οὐδὲ (Drerup p. CXXXI). This argument does not have much force: faced with an exemplar in which νεώτερος ὢν had accidentally been omitted, a copyist who understood the text would naturally delete τῶν πρεσβυτάτων as incoherent. The double deletion is no harder to explain than the double interpolation which Drerup envisages in the other manuscripts. Moreover, the disputed words produce a satisfactory and 'Isocratean' antithetical development, with the sequence νεώτερος ὢν/τῶν πρεσβυτάτων/τῶν πλεῖστ' εἰδότων corresponding to μηδέν σοι προσήκων/τῶν οἰκειοτάτων/τῶν βουλομένων ὠφελεῖν (cf. Pohlenz 1913 p. 218). Finally, the reference to Polycrates' seniority fits the pattern whereby the Epilogue of *Busiris* reminds readers of the themes of the Prologue (see note on § 44–50; also notes on § 46 εἰ μεγάλων καὶ δεινῶν, § 48 εἰ καὶ πρότερον, § 50 ἡγοῦμαι γάρ): in this case, recalling the reference in § 1 to his 'change of circumstances'. It is no objection to νεώτερος that (on any of the current views as to the date of *Busiris*) Isocrates is not in absolute terms a young man: as was argued in the last note, the point is not that Isocrates is young, but that Polycrates is old and should know better. (Cf. *Helen* 1, deriding sophists who have persisted in their folly into old age: Polycrates has actually *begun* his foolishness as an old man.) I therefore regard the words as genuine.

προχείρως ἐπιχειρῶ: *figura etymologica* (cf. § 12 τείχει . . . τετειχισμένην) with conspicuous play on the sound of the words, a Gorgianic flourish which Isocrates uses only sparingly. It adds to the impression of fullness and rhetorical completion in this closing period. (On the antithetical structure of the period, see last note.)

ἡγοῦμαι γὰρ . . .: an *ex cathedra* statement parallel to the one introduced by the same words in § 1. Giving advice on rhetoric is a duty, and a privilege, attendant on expert status; and being an expert has two components, knowledge and understanding on the one hand, dedication to the aim of ὠφέλεια (moral and practical helpfulness) on the other. Isocrates' statement of the primacy of these 'intellectual' qualifications for giving advice over the more traditional criteria

of age and proximity is at one level banal (after all, elders have been favoured *because* they know more, kin and friends *because* they have one's interests at heart), but at another level rather bold: it asserts the authority of the professional educator. One of the accusations said to have been levelled at Socrates was that he seduced his companions away from their parents, relatives and friends, by arguing that people with expert knowledge are more use than kinsmen in time of need, and that the good will of friends is useless unless they are also able to help, and then persuading them that, because he himself was 'wisest', they should listen to him more than to anyone else (see Xenophon *Memorabilia* I.ii.49–55, esp. 51–52). At *Apology* 20 Xenophon has Socrates accept a form of this charge while confining it to the realm of παιδεία:

> 'Αλλὰ ναὶ μὰ Δι', ἔφη ὁ Μέλητος, ἐκείνους οἶδα οὓς σὺ πέπεικας σοὶ πείθεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς γειναμένοις. 'Ομολογῶ, φάναι τὸν Σωκράτην, περί γε παιδείας· τοῦτο γὰρ ἴσασιν ἐμοὶ μεμεληκός. περὶ δὲ ὑγιείας τοῖς ἰατροῖς μᾶλλον οἱ ἄνθρωποι πείθονται ἢ τοῖς γονεῦσι· καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις γε πάντες δήπου οἱ 'Αθηναῖοι τοῖς φρονιμώτατα λέγουσι πείθονται μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς προσήκουσιν . . .

Isocrates here takes up the same argument, casting himself as the champion of φιλοσοφία.

συμβουλεύειν: the speech ends, as it began, with a key concept: see note on § 1 τὴν μὲν ἐπιείκειαν. An important element of Isocrates' task has been to make Polycrates listen to advice: § 3 πειρατέον μεθιστάναι τὴν δόξαν τῶν οὕτω πρὸς τοὺς συμβουλεύοντας διακειμένων. He cannot say that this has definitely been achieved, but he has at least presented his critique in the clearest possible way (cf. § 48 ἡγοῦμαί σοι νῦν γεγενῆσθαι φανερὸν). The work ends with a reassertion of Isocrates' authority to give advice, and of his stance as the spokesperson of φιλοσοφία: if Polycrates fails to heed it, he can no longer be seen as a member of the profession.

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